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Creativity is one of humanity’s most important assets. Training it in children is seen as a crucial 
component of ‘21st century skills.’ Executive control (EC) comprises a suite of processes shown 
to improve life chances, from educational attainment to greater health and wealth. This thesis 
explores the relationship between these two key capabilities, specifically addressing the question 
of whether training children in EC reduces their creativity.  
The first study was a cross-sectional, quantitative investigation of the development of creativity 
and EC in 45 children aged 5-11 years. Findings showed that while EC measures improved, most 
creativity measures did not, surprising given expected developmental trajectories for complex 
cognition. The second, qualitative study involved a subset of the same children and used 
stimulated recall interviews to elicit descriptions of their mental processes while completing a 
creativity activity at home. Their verbal reports suggested wide variation in how they deployed 
EC in their creativity, with differences in the levels of spontaneous (EC independent) and control 
(EC dependent) processes and in the flexibility to modulate between them. Triangulation of 
findings showed that greater spontaneity tended to be positively associated with creativity, while 
extremes of control were negatively associated - the first suggestion that better EC might have 
negative side effects.  
The second set of studies moved from correlation to study causation. A large nested school-
based intervention involving 156 children, was designed to train and improve EC in children 
aged 8-10. Children were randomized by class to the EC group or a matched, active control 
group and were tested on EC and creativity measures before and after training. The intervention 
brought about EC improvements in both EC training and control classes, with EC performance 




similar across groups, were mixed; while fluency improved, originality declined. After training 
to improve EC, children produced more, worse ideas.  
The final studies investigated training effects qualitatively, with a subset of children involved in 
the intervention. This time, they all completed the same activity (as each other and as used in pre 
and post intervention assessments) to stimulate recall of their thought process while creating. 
Their qualitative reports formed the basis for defining creative sub types, based on differing 
cognitive approaches. Triangulation analysis investigated whether the qualitative assessment of 
the relative degree of control, spontaneity, and flexibility that children deployed in their 
creativity associated with their performance in quantitative tests. Were there, in short, better or 
worse ways of ‘doing creativity’? Flexibility emerged as a key ingredient to creative success – 
with more flexible children seeing greater fluency gains after training and less substantial 
originality losses. 
The discussion addresses the question of whether, in our enthusiasm to promote EC training, 
insufficient consideration has been given to its possible side effects, specifically in demoting 
original creative thinking. It broadens out to look at the relevance of the current research to 
education, aligning findings here with an existing conflict between performativity and creativity. 
Finally, suggestions are made for how to effectively teach children so that their creativity, as 
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Chapter 1. General introduction 
 
  




The primary goal of this chapter is to present the current evidence regarding the relationship 
between creativity and executive control. After a brief overview to situate the topic in the 
broader context of ‘21st century skills’, creativity will be defined and described in terms of its 
operation and measurement, with attention given to some unique methodological challenges. 
Relevant models for conceptualising creativity will be outlined and evidence presented regarding 
its development in children. An introduction to executive control follows, with definitions and 
descriptions of its operationalisation and an overview of its development to maturity. Evidence 
regarding interventions designed to improve executive control will also be presented, in 
anticipation of the intervention study to come. 
The relevance of executive control processes to creativity will be discussed at greater length, 
with evidence presented chiefly from adults and from children where it is available. Evidence 
comes from a diverse array of brain and behavioural approaches, which implement creativity in a 
huge variety of ways and this section will lead on to a short description of – and justification for 
– the methodological approach taken in this thesis. 
The last section will set out the main goals and research questions of the thesis, describing how 
these will attempt to address gaps in our current understanding. Finally, chapter summaries, 
hinting at the benefits and challenges of a mixed methods approach, will provide an overall 
outline of the thesis. 
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21st century skills 
“We are currently preparing students for jobs that don’t yet exist . . . using technologies that 
haven’t yet been invented . . . to solve problems we don’t even know are problems yet.” Richard 
Riley, US Secretary of Education under Clinton (quoted in Trilling & Fadel, 2009, p.3).  
Creativity, along with critical thinking, communication, and collaboration, has been cited by the 
OECD as one of the essential 21st century skills (Schleicher, 2011). Creativity has “like no other 
mental faculty been omnipotent in transforming human civilizations” (Dietrich & Haider, 2015, 
p. 897) and responding to a world of accelerating technological, environmental, and 
demographic change, as well as the new challenges of the pandemic era, means an urgent need 
for cultivating it. Last year’s Durham Commission Report concluded that “All schools, from 
early years to post-16 education should be better enabled to support the promotion of creativity 
for all young people” (James et al., 2019). Effectively nurturing creativity first means 
understanding how it works.  
Executive control comprises a set of mental processes that allow us “to think before we act, resist 
temptations or impulsive reactions, stay focused, reason, problem-solve, flexibly adjust to 
changed demands or priorities and see things from new and different perspectives” (Diamond & 
Ling, 2016, p.34). Executive control has been shown to have profound effects on individuals’ life 
outcomes: better control in childhood predicts better academic achievement, and greater wealth, 
health, and quality of life over the entire life span (Moffitt et al., 2011). The set of skills which 
make up executive control are also increasingly seen as critical for successful life outcomes 
(Diamond, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).  
How do executive control and creativity relate to one another? Both are seen as desirable, but do 
they work in harmony? Might improvement in one bring about improvement in the other? 
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Should we also consider the possibility that they might be antagonistic, for example the narrower 
focus of greater executive control might reduce awareness of more remote possibilities which 
might be key to creativity? Might we need to make decisions about which to prioritise? This is 
more than a theoretical question. Business leaders want to know if it is possible to hire workers 
who are at once ‘creative and diligent’ (Corgnet et al., 2015, 2016) and there is ongoing debate 
about whether this ‘best of both worlds’ of high creativity and high control is achievable (Amer 
et al., 2016; Thompson-Schill et al., 2009). The ambition of this thesis is to set out some answers 
to these questions. 
 
Creativity 
What is it?  
Creativity includes activities as diverse as Louise Bourgeois sculpting ‘Maman’, Martha Lane 
Fox originating Lastminute.com and you thinking how to combine three unlikely ingredients in 
your fridge in such a way they can be called dinner. Its centrality to human nature (Dietrich & 
Haider, 2017; Vygotsky, 1930) is such that it is hard to find a discipline which does not study it - 
behavioural, evolutionary, economic, social, cultural, educational, clinical, computational, 
historical takes all offering their own perspectives (Runco, 2014). Although there are as many 
definitions of creativity as there are lenses through which it is viewed, they all share the notion 
that its most essential defining attribute is the production of something new (Runco & Jaeger, 
2012) - also referred to, in psychological research, as novelty, uniqueness or originality 
(Abraham, 2018). The standard psychological definition includes a second attribute: value 
(Boden, 2004; Cropley, 2000), variously defined as appropriateness (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010), 
relevance (Kneller, 1965), fit (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995), usefulness (Runco & Jaeger, 2012) or 
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effectiveness (Basadur et al., 2000). All attempt to capture the notion that, to avoid including as 
‘creative’ ideas which are new but might be random or even delusional (Barron, 1955), novelty 
alone is not enough. Creativity must, whatever the domain of human enterprise, demonstrate 
some level of originality and be deemed appropriate to the task in hand.  
This definition is far from watertight. First, there is no avoiding subjectivity: whether we call it 
usefulness or appropriateness or value, this factor requires judgement: useful for whom? 
Appropriate for what? Valuable how? (Amabile, 1982a; Kasof et al., 2007; Kaufman et al., 
2008). Notions of what constitutes value also vary across domain (e.g. aesthetic value for 
painting, commercial value for business innovation (Abraham, 2018)). Second, even the 
apparently straightforward concept of novelty carries complication; should the novelty of a 5-
year-old’s painting be judged in relation to the standard of other 5-year-olds? Children in 
general? People as a whole? The entirety of art history? Many scholars have proposed 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2014; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009) that novelty must be judged within a 
particular frame of reference, to fairly measure all levels of creativity from the everyday to the 
eminent (sometimes referred to as ‘P’ for ‘Psychological’ (new to the person) and ‘H’ for 
‘Historical’ (new to humanity); Boden, 1998). Third, are these two factors sufficient? Boden 
(2004) argues not; she believes a third factor, surprise, should be added, since real creativity 
involves the unexpected. Conceptualising creative thought in terms of its level of surprise helps 
us see the levels – from simple association, to exploration to paradigm transformation – at which 
it might operate (Abraham, 2018; Boden, 2004;). Mackinnon has an even more challenging 
proposal for a third factor: inclusion of the instantiation of the idea - the production of the 
creative product (MacKinnon, 1965). While those working in creative fields would likely 
endorse the sentiment that the enormous creative effort involved in the realisation of an idea 
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should be recognised, from a quantitative psychological perspective, this would render the study 
of creativity intractable. Instead, psychologists frequently settle for distinguishing creative 
potential from creative achievement (Collins & Amabile, 1999; Runco, 2004; Runco & Acar, 
2012;) to acknowledge the big divide that commonly exists between the ability to produce ideas 
and the multifarious means needed to realise them (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). 
Models and concepts  
Within the psychological field alone, there is an array of approaches, including psychometric 
(using quantifiable tests), experimental (measuring the effect of changing variables), 
neurobiological (bringing neuroimaging approaches to bear on the creative processes), 
biographical (analysing creatives’ own accounts of their creativity) and broader sociocultural 
approaches considering contexts conducive to creativity (Sternberg, 1999). In this section, I will 
briefly outline some of the key concepts and models which have been applied to the 
psychological study of creativity, before outlining those aspects I will be focusing on – and the 
many I will not. 
The Four Ps model (Rhodes, 1961) is an attempt to systematise different perspectives on 
creativity to be clearer about the measurement target. The Ps stand for ‘Product’ (creative output 
e.g., an idea, a painting, a song), ‘Process’ (the mental operations, components and stages 
involved), ‘Person’ (the creative person, characteristics, personality, temperament, habits) and 
‘Press’ (the broader ecological environment and its role in enhancing or diminishing creativity). 
All four are an inextricable part of creativity, but each piece of research generally sets its sights 
on one. This thesis is primarily concerned with process. Our field of interest is the set of mental 
operations which constitute creative thought. 
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An early model which remains influential was based on reports of well-known thinkers (most 
famously the mathematician Poincaré) about their ideational process (Rhodes, 1961; Wallas, 
1926), which Wallas characterises in four stages. The first, preparation, involves a deliberate 
investigation of all the relevant aspects of the problem, a sort of readying of the mental soil. 
Then follows a period of incubation, a time of ‘voluntary abstention from conscious thought’ 
during which the problem is not being worked on – the thinker is either relaxing or working on 
something else. The next stage is illumination, the ‘Aha!’ moment, when the solution suddenly 
appears in the conscious mind as ‘that flash of insight that the conscious self can’t will and the 
subliminal self can only welcome’ (Popova, 2013) and which represents, often following many 
unsuccessful attempts, ‘a successful train of association’ (Wallas, 1926). The final verification 
stage is the mirror of preparation, a deliberate and conscious testing of the idea’s validity, a stage 
demanding ‘discipline, attention, will, and consequently, conscious work’ (Wallas, 1926). The 
model is characterised by a recursive shuttling between conscious and unconscious thought 
processes along unpredictable timelines and with success not easily fitting into a ‘problem and 
solution’ scheme (Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976), making lab verification almost impossible and 
leading some to challenge the model (Lubart, 2001) for its lack of empirical evidence. 
Nonetheless, aspects of the various stages have been widely studied (e.g. insight (Bowden et al., 
2005; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios & Beeman, 2015; Kounios et al., 2006;)) and it is 
included here as a first suggestion of the complexity of the role that executive control might play 
in different stages of the process. 
Guilford, seen by many as the founding father of contemporary creativity research (Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2001) following his plea to the American Psychological Association to get serious 
about creativity (Guilford, 1950), offered one of the first conceptualisations of a ‘dual process’ 
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model of creativity (Guilford, 1950, 1956; Runco 2014). His ‘Structure of Intellect Model’ was 
highly specified, with as many as 180 separate possible mental tasks outlined (Guilford, 1956), 
but the main aspect which has endured was his differentiation of divergent from convergent 
thinking processes. Divergent thinking processes are characterised by being open and 
exploratory and generating multiple possible ideas. Several researchers align them with 
associative processes, in which items in memory and from the senses are combined to bring 
about novel combinations (Gabora, 2010; Martindale, 1999; Sowden et al., 2015a). Convergent 
thinking processes, by contrast, involve production of a single solution during creative problem 
solving and are more concerned with evaluation and refinement. As such they are generally 
regarded as being more analytical in nature (Guilford, 1956, 1967a; Sowden et al., 2015a). The 
main use of Guilford’s model has been in its direct application to the creation of a set of tests, 
primarily of divergent thinking, which remain the most commonly used tests for ‘creativity’ 
more than seventy years later (Guilford, 1966, 1978; Runco, 2014).  
Dual process theories, which characterise the brain as having two distinct information processing 
systems that drive a common behaviour, are common in psychology and neuroscience (Abraham, 
2018; Dietrich 2018). One system (often called Type 1) is automatic, quick and unconscious – in 
folk terms, the equivalent of our instinct or gut reaction, while the second (Type 2) is slow, 
effortful, analytic and controlled – more linked to, again in folk terms, our rational side (Evans, 
2008, 2010; Sowden et al., 2015a; Stanovich, 1999). More specifically, Type 2 but not Type 1 
processes are held to require working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
The idea of this dual set of processes has been extended to the study of creativity, with several 
models adapting and applying it (Abraham, 2014; Beaty et al., 2014; Dietrich, 2018; Finke, 
1996; Limb & Braun, 2008; Ward et al., 1997). Ward and Finke’s Geneplore model outlines 
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proposed operations and stages involved in creative cognition (Finke, 1996; Finke et al., 1992; 
Ward et al., 1997) in a way that does not explicitly evoke the dual systems approach but has clear 
links to it (Sowden et al., 2015a). The Geneplore (‘Gen’ for ‘Generate’, ‘Plore’ for ‘Explore’) 
describes a first generative phase in which ‘preinventive structures’, such as creative mental 
images, are produced, either by spontaneous or intentional means. In the exploratory phase, these 
structures are manipulated and explored, again by means which are either intentional or which 
‘occur outside one’s awareness or conscious control’ (Finke et al., 1992), and the preinventive 
structures are modified or replaced. This cycle can be repeated indefinitely until a solution is 
reached, with additional constraints imposed at any stage of the generative or exploratory phases. 
A key aspect of the Geneplore model is that it resists the common temptation (Dietrich, 2015) to 
straightforwardly yoke generation to associative ‘Type 1’ and exploration to analytic ‘Type 2’ 
processes. Top down, goal-directed processes as well as bottom up, exploratory processes can 
each contribute to both generation and exploration (Finke et al., 1992; Finke, 1996; Ward et al., 
1997). While this is a strength in terms of resisting over-simplification, it is potentially also a 
weakness in that, if the different stages are approachable by almost any kind of thought process, 
how does the distinction aid our understanding of the mechanics? 
A more recent and less generalised dual process theory, suggested by Nijstad and colleagues 
(Baas et al., 2013; De Dreu et al., 2008; Nijstad et al., 2010), proposes that there are two distinct 
means to achieving creative ends, one via a flexibility pathway in which a volume of different 
categories of candidate ideas is produced, and another via a persistence pathway involving 
exploration of very few categories in greater depth. Psychological states and traits can, they 
argue, influence creativity via their influence on these pathways, with activation of positive 
mood states enhancing creativity through stimulating flexibility, and activation of negative mood 
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states enhancing it through stimulating the persistence pathway (Nijstad et al., 2010). A 
limitation of the model is that, as the authors say, it “applies to situations in which at least some 
(conscious) attention is directed at a task that requires creativity (i.e., it applies to deliberative 
rather than automatic processes) … not to situations in which creativity occurs ‘spontaneously’ 
without intentional effort” (Nijstad et al., 2010, p.43), raising questions about its ecological 
validity (Sowden et al., 2015a). 
Several researchers have drawn upon an evolutionary analogy in conceptualising creative 
thinking, since creativity’s generate / investigate iterative process maps well to evolutionary 
theory’s variation / selection (Campbell, 1960; Dietrich, 2015; Simonton, 1999). The analogy 
pushes researchers to think about a unique aspect of creative thought: its operation within an 
unknown problem space, where reliable predictions cannot be made (hence the description of it 
as ‘blind’ in Campbell’s (1960) Blind Variation and Selective Retention (BVSR) model) - 
though perhaps not completely blind, since a key advantage of cultural over biological evolution 
is the human brain’s ability to run mental simulations. “An arch with a keystone is the canonical 
example of an interlocking design that must leap over non-adaptive, intermediate forms… 
biological evolution cannot do that” (Dietrich, 2015, p.131). Simonton, whose Darwinian theory 
of creativity (Simonton, 1999, 2010b) is itself an evolution of Campbell’s BVSR model 
(Campbell, 1960), has demonstrated, through studying historical records of eminent creatives 
(Edison, Tesla and others) that, as would be predicted by an evolutionary model, creativity 
results in a lot of waste. Edison held no less than 1,093 patents. To put it another way, “quality is 
a probabilistic function of quantity” (Dietrich, 2015, p.104).  
One of the problems of the evolutionary take on creativity has been that it has been “nearly 
universally ignored in setting up empirical protocols” (Dietrich & Haider, 2017, p.3), meaning 
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that it remains largely theoretical (in a review, Simonton points out that researchers “have been 
largely content to marshal past empirical research on the theory's behalf rather than design new 
empirical tests of particular predictions” (2010, p.173)). Again though, the element salient to our 
research here is the idea that successfully achieving creativity requires bringing both controlled 
(chiefly the selection aspect) and uncontrolled (chiefly the variation) processes to bear. 
Dietrich has proposed a model of creative thinking which is itself quite creative, in 
amalgamating the ‘best of the best’ from other creativity models and from cognitive 
neuroscience models more broadly (Dietrich, 2015, 2019; Dietrich & Haider, 2015, 2017). He 
combines three main elements: the evolutionary framework described above, the prediction 
framework (Wolpert et al., 1995, 2003) that takes predictive representations to be a central 
integrating principle of cognition, and the dual system view that there are two distinct systems 
for knowledge representations, one explicit and one implicit (Dienes & Perner, 1999; Reber, 
1993). Within this framework, creativity proceeds via three possible routes:  
• the deliberate mode (a top-down approach in which thought trials are run through 
representations of predicted goals (RPGs) in a recursive variation / selection cycle to 
tackle explicit goals) 
• the spontaneous mode (essentially similar but involving much less top-down control and 
likely to arise through task set inertia, (which might be described as a form of mind-
wandering) (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Wylie & Allport, 2000) making it on the one hand 
less efficient and on the other more likely, being less directional, to chance upon more 
remote and paradigm-shifting associations; this mode is at work during an idea’s 
incubation phase 
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• ‘flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1990), a fully implicit system brought about through 
transient hypofrontality (i.e., a state of reduced executive control) in which perception 
and action meld and variation / selection trials are blind since no prediction mechanism is 
at work (Dietrich, 2015; Dietrich & Haider, 2017).  
Dietrich is the creativity field’s resident iconoclast (“We know next to nothing about how brains 
generate creative ideas”, the field is “theoretically incoherent” etc.) (Dietrich & Haider, 2017, 
p.1; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010) and his view that all creativity research to date has been a waste of 
time is extreme. However, his notion that in considering creative thought somehow ‘other’, we 
have ignored important evidence is credible - and his framework offers the benefit of being 
grounded in many existing cognitive neuroscience theories for which there is already much 
empirical evidence (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Raichle et al., 2001; 
Wolpert et al., 2003). Its major limitations, through protesting too much that creativity should not 
be seen as ‘other’, are that it fails to show what (if anything) is unique about creativity and does 
not offer up testable hypotheses which could render it falsifiable (Abraham, 2018). 
The purpose of outlining these theoretical models and frameworks, is to provide a context within 
which to situate the current work – both the quantitative work, which will be driven by the 
relatively bounded data derived from lab tests of creativity, and the qualitative work in which 
data involving a wider range of concepts and approaches might potentially be relevant. More 
specifically, this theoretical section has attempted to demonstrate that the question central to this 
thesis – how executive control processes contribute to creativity – also lies implicitly within most 
of the theories. Although direct mappings are over simplistic (e.g., seeing evaluation exclusively 
as a process under executive control or generation as a process involving only free association 
and thus outside of executive control), it would be disingenuous to see no mapping at all. Many 
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propose that apparent dichotomies (e.g., divergent/convergent thinking) are better seen as 
continua (Eysenck, 2003; Runco, 2014), an idea going back to Mednick (1962) who 
characterised a continuum of ‘associative hierarchies.’ In this view, more creative people have 
flatter hierarchies: when a concept is activated for them, it activates many other concepts weakly, 
rather than few concepts strongly, as it does for less creative people. With this theoretical 
complexity directly confronted, we now turn to some specifics about how we might measure 
creativity in practice.   
How is it measured? 
“While the field of creativity has managed to find agreement on the definition of creativity, 
researchers are less clear on how creativity should be operationalised and measured.” (Reiter-
Palmon et al., 2019 p.144) 
There are as many ways of measuring creativity as there are perspectives on it – from very broad 
approaches, such as analysing environments conducive to creativity, to very narrow ones, such as 
neuroimaging trials to examine the brain activity involved in insight. Our focus here will be on 
methods used in psychology and neuroscience to better understand the creative process. There 
are some unique practical problems (Abraham, 2018; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Sawyer, 2011) in 
the neuroscientific study of creativity: for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the 
constriction of movement in the scanner limits many types of domain-specific creativity 
experiment; responses in creativity paradigms involve generation of ideas rather than a simple 
reaction to a stimulus, meaning more time is needed, meaning in turn fewer trials and less power 
to detect brain activity (Liu et al., 2001). Repeated trials cause problems in that they must be 
similar enough to allow comparison and averaging, while being different enough still to be 
testing creativity, which is partly defined by novelty. A similar issue arises with finding 
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appropriate control tasks for the many, often only loosely specified creativity tasks available 
(Abraham, 2018; Dietrich, 2007b, 2015). And this is all in addition to the capricious nature of 
creativity itself. “Clearly one cannot simply take a volunteer, shove him/her into the nearest brain 
scanner, and tell /her: Now please be creative!” (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, p.822). 
There are essentially two main toolsets for studying the creative process. First and most common 
are the divergent thinking tests, still the mainstay of creativity research. Divergent thinking is the 
ability to generate multiple answers to a given stimulus (Guilford, 1967b), an ability which, 
though certainly not the whole story of creativity, is a component (Guilford, 1966; Reiter-
Palmon et al., 2019). By far the most frequently used are the Alternative Uses Test (AUT) 
(Guilford et al., 1978), in which participants are asked to generate multiple interesting, unusual 
alternative uses for an everyday household item such as a brick or a newspaper, and the Torrance 
Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) (Torrance, 1966, 1972, 1974), an array of tests designed to 
assess fluency, flexibility, originality, elaboration and a range of specific creative qualities (such 
as humour, expressiveness) in both verbal and figural domains. Wallach and Kogan (1965) 
emphasised the importance of carrying out tests in a game-like atmosphere with the avoidance of 
strict time limits.  
Second are convergent thinking tasks, of which the most widely used is the Remote Associates 
Task (RAT) (Mednick, 1962) in which participants are given a list of word triads (e.g., illness, 
bus, computer) and must try to find a fourth word associated with each of them (here, the answer 
is ‘terminal’). Convergent thinking tasks also include specific problem-solving tasks such as 
Duncker’s candle task (Duncker & Lees, 1945) or tasks involving rearranging matchsticks 
according to rules which are apparently simple but practically perplexing, usually requiring mini 
‘eureka’ moments to solve (Knoblich et al., 1999).  
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It is worth mentioning that these longstanding ‘tests for creativity’ were mostly not designed as 
such. Guilford’s tests were one of many designed to explore and map his ‘structure of intellect’ 
model (Guilford, 1956) and Torrance’s interest was in trying to understand and nurture specific 
qualities which allow people to express their creativity (Kim, 2006; Torrance, 1966, 1974;) 
rather than to test it. Mednick did wish to explore his notion that individual differences in 
creativity arose through differences in associational hierarchies, but in his test, the creativity 
involved is assumed rather than deduced (a fact he was himself aware of) and solutions can also 
be produced by brute force, non-creative means (Mednick, 1962).  
For the quantitative studies carried out in this thesis (as well as the final qualitative study), 
divergent thinking tests will be used. The tests mentioned (AUT and TTCT) have been used in 
many contexts with many different groups, including children, the tests are straightforward and 
speedy to administer, and the wealth of published studies allows for comparison. They have been 
widely examined in terms of reliability and validity (Kim, 2006; Silvia et al., 2008). The TTCT 
figural tests, which have been normed several times on large samples (Kim, 2006, 2011) have 
high predictive validity over a wide range of ages (Cropley, 2000) e.g., in one analysis, they 
accounted for half the variance of scores in creative achievement and creative participation 
several years later (Plucker, 1999), test-retest reliability is reasonably high (between .5 and .93) 
(Treffinger, 1985) and when tests are used with children, they have been shown to be a 
significantly stronger predictor of adult creative achievement than other cognitive measures such 
as IQ, suggesting some level of discriminant validity (Plucker, 1999). The evidence is not all 
positive. Simonton (2003b) found that scores on creativity tests correlated highly with IQ (i.e., 
low divergent validity) but poorly with each other (i.e., low convergent validity) as well as 
showing poor predictive validity of real-world creative achievement (Silvia et al., 2008), a 
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finding in conflict with other analyses, and one that suggests findings might vary a great deal, 
depending on the nature of the outcome metric (e.g., the wide range of meanings of ‘creative 
achievement’; Carson et al., 2005). The problems with construct validity are considerable 
(Plucker, 1999, 2017; Abraham, 2018; Silvia et al., 2008). To understand how and why, we need 
to go into some more detail about how these tests are executed and scored. 
The first striking point, particularly given the effort to reach accord that creativity should be 
defined in terms of originality and value, is that divergent thinking tests are not scored according 
to these criteria (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019; Runco, 2008; Runco & Charles, 1993). Instead, tests 
produce an array of sub measures, none of which contain the word ‘value’, which is at best 
implied, and within which even ‘originality’ is ambiguous. The reason for this apparent illogic is 
this: researchers almost unanimously agree in theory that ‘divergent thinking’ and ‘creativity’ are 
not synonymous (Plucker & Renzulli, 1999; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Nusbaum et al., 2014) so it 
is theoretically justified to score divergent thinking tests according to their own criteria (Reiter-
Palmon et al., 2019; Plucker et al., 2014). In practice, however, most creativity research does use 
divergent thinking as a proxy for creativity – so researchers are left in something of a logical 
bind: either score the tests according to the definition of the ‘master concept’ of creativity, 
implying that divergent thinking does tell the whole story, or score them according to their own 
rule set and be left with a gap between findings about divergent thinking abilities and creativity. 
Despite many efforts over the years to improve the rigour and coherence of measures used in 
creativity research (Plucker et al., 2004; Silvia et al., 2008; Lubart & Besancon, 2017; 
Forthmann et al., 2018, 2020a, 2020b) there is still some way to go (Puryear & Lamb, 2020). 
The AUT is typically scored, as Guilford outlined (Guilford, 1967), on the dimensions of fluency 
– a simple sum of responses, flexibility – the number of different categories of response, 
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elaboration – a measure of detail in responses (used relatively rarely; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019), 
and originality. Originality is the most complex sub measure for two distinct but related reasons. 
First, it can be scored either according to the ‘frequency method’, a measure of statistical rarity 
within the sample (or a separate comparable sample) or the ‘rater method’, in which responses 
are scored by a group of independent raters who give each response a scaled score (typically 1 to 
5), according to instructions which are often unspecified in publications. The frequency method 
is often seen as a more objective measure (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019; Runco, 2008) but even 
here subjective decisions are involved, for example in judging response similarity (is using a 
water bottle ‘to carry milk’ the same as ‘to carry orange juice’ or ‘to carry a potion’? (Plucker et 
al., 2014)). The rater method is by definition subjective on the part of the raters (Cseh & Jeffries, 
2019; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019) but can also be affected by researcher guidance; for example, 
raters might be guided to score on unusualness, or cleverness, or imaginativeness, or to include 
their sense of the feasibility or appropriateness of an idea, thus also incorporating a value 
dimension.  
The second problem is how to aggregate scores to calculate a participant’s overall originality 
from their individual response scores. Again, there are several methods. Simple summing of 
response scores means high contamination with fluency scores (Plucker et al., 2011), while a 
ratio score (dividing summed originality by fluency) can have the opposite effect of penalising 
high fluency (Forthmann et al., 2018; Plucker et al., 2011), leading others to propose a range of 
workarounds such as ‘top two’ scoring (Silvia et al., 2008) or ‘ideational pool’ scoring 
(Forthmann et al., 2020a, 2020b; Plucker et al., 2014). No method is without its problems. First, 
there is reason to believe that scores represent different mental operations (Vartanian et al., 
2020), as evidenced by variable correlations with IQ and EC measures (Benedek et al., 2012, 
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2014a). Second, the choice of aggregation method might reflect researchers’ underlying theories 
about how creativity is implemented (Forthmann et al., 2020a, 2020b), e.g., whether originality 
is achieved through a ‘scattergun’ approach of exploring many possible idea candidates - in 
which case correlation with fluency would likely be high, or by a strict, exclusionary ‘honing’ 
approach, where correlation would be low. This makes it vital that researchers are explicit about 
their theoretical position. 
If issues of scoring are important, so too are issues of instruction. One of the most observed 
findings in creativity research using divergent thinking tests is the so-called ‘Be creative’ effect  
which shows that if participants are instructed to emphasise quality, the originality of their 
responses is boosted (Chen et al., 2005; Silvia et al., 2008). The effect has even been used as a 
paradigm for exploring executive involvement in ideation (Nusbaum et al., 2014). These 
experiments will be discussed in the following section: for now, the salient point is that task 
instruction detail matters. A second highly replicated finding is the ‘Serial order effect’ which 
shows that responses to divergent thinking tests diminish in quantity (fluency) but improve in 
quality (originality) over time (Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Wang et al., 2017). Again, different 
interpretations of this finding will be explored later, but the important point from a 
methodological point of view, is that the amount of time given for tests can also profoundly 
affect results (Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Plucker et al., 2006).  
This section has shown that there are a host of issues of test execution and scoring which can 
drastically alter findings. As a final illustration of this, a recent study looked at the effects of 
different scoring approaches on neuroimaging findings. Vartanian and colleagues (Vartanian et 
al., 2020) used voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to determine the correlation between regional 
grey matter volume (GMV) variation and seven different scores from the AUT. They compared 
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the four traditional sub-scores (fluency, flexibility, originality, and elaboration) with a subjective 
‘snapshot’ measure (Silvia et al., 2008) in which raters assessed each participant’s output as a 
whole, and a third approach, using the definitional terms of novelty and usefulness (Kaufman & 
Sternberg, 2019). Results from multiple regression analysis revealed that only novelty and 
usefulness showed any significant correlation – a negative one, with the left inferior temporal 
gyrus, while the other five measures showed none. This was despite the fact that the measures 
themselves were, with the exception of elaboration, significantly correlated. Such results might 
reasonably cause despair (“To most scientists, the prospect of studying creativity in the lab must 
seem like trying to nail jelly to the wall” (Dietrich, 2007b, p.1) but certainly show the need to 
tread extremely carefully when it comes to the details of even the field’s most commonly used 
tests. 
A note on the approach taken here 
Given the vast array of creativity components, it might be helpful to be explicit about the many 
that are not within the scope of this thesis: insight (Kounios & Beeman, 2015), imagery (Finke, 
1996), problem solving (Duncker & Lees, 1945), the role of the imagination (Singer, 1999), 
convergent thinking tasks (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003), analogy and metaphor (Hofstadter 
& Sander, 2013), flow (Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1990) and conceptual expansion (Abraham, 
2012). Instead, the starting point for the current research will be the divergent thinking tests 
discussed in some detail above. By using familiar tests but applying new approaches - 
particularly the sort of detailed, first person, chronometric approach that qualitative interviewing 
allows – the goal is to provide new insights to the cognitive mechanisms involved. The approach 
itself sets out to be creative – achieving novelty through applying new methods, and value 
through relating the current work to the existing literature.  
Chapter 1. General introduction 
40 
 
How does it typically develop? 
The creative process is, according to Vygotsky (1930), ‘already manifest in earliest childhood’ 
and easily seen in children’s play; when a toddler is riding a toy horse pretending to be a 
princess, she is not merely reproducing experience but creatively reworking it, demonstrating the 
‘double, mutual dependence between imagination and experience’ which, for him, is creativity’s  
essence. Researchers have recently developed tools to test the divergent thinking abilities of 
children as young as 1 (Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014; Hoicka et al., 2016, 2017). The 
Unusual Box Test is a brightly coloured wooden box with many moving parts and objects within. 
Children are shown the box and then left to explore it; their movements subsequently scored for 
fluency (number) and originality (statistical rarity within the sample). The box has shown good 
test-retest reliability as well as high correlations (around 0.6 depending on sub scores) with other 
divergent thinking tests such as Torrance’s Thinking Creatively in Action and Movement 
(Zachopoulou et al., 2009) in which children have to, for example ‘move across the room in as 
many ways as possible’, and the Instances test in which they must cite instances of, for example, 
‘as many things as they can think of which are round’ (Wallach & Kogan, 1965). The chief 
advantage of the box is its potential for use with very young children (the other tests mentioned 
are typically used for children over 3).  
There is much evidence that creativity can be improved, using techniques that promote 
creativity-fostering environments (Amabile, 1983; Hennessey & Amabile, 1988; Sternberg & 
Lubart, 1995), by specific training tactics, such as the use of analogies (Root-Bernstein & Root-
Bernstein, 1999), heuristics to enhance divergent thinking (Runco et al., 2005) or strategies to aid 
problem-solving (Osburn & Mumford, 2006). This evidence, which applies to both children and 
adults (Runco, 2014; Russ & Fiorelli, 2010), will be dealt with more fully in the final chapter 
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when we consider education through the 21st century skills lens. For now, it is mentioned chiefly 
to show that creativity is highly malleable, so much so that researchers are confident to claim 
that “Everyone has the potential to be creative”. However, “not everyone fulfils that potential” 
(Runco, 2014, p.39). This begs the question of what processes convert (or fail to), creative 
potential into actual creativity. There are two complexities to consider in answering this. The 
first is that creativity is a reflection not just of cognition but of motivation, personality, 
temperament, mood, domain, emotion and more (Amabile, 2018; Runco, 2014), so identifying 
the sources of success or failure in achieving creativity means scouring a very wide field. The 
second is the difficulty of differentiating training from developmental effects (Jolles & Crone, 
2012), a theoretical issue that, as we shall see, will become of great practical concern in the 
training study in Chapter 5. The complexity here lies essentially in the fact that development 
itself is complex: on the one hand, the high level of neural plasticity during development make 
childhood potentially ripe for training interventions, but on the other hand, there might be 
constraints determined by the specific state of structural and functional brain development, 
which might limit the success of training (Jolles & Crone, 2012). To date there remains no 
comprehensive theory of the development of creativity (Alfonso-Benlliure & Santos, 2016). In 
part, progress has been vexed by methodological issues such as the majority of studies relying on 
cross-sectional rather than longitudinal designs (Kim, 2011), tests being highly specific (such 
that when studies deploy multiple tasks over time to the same children, they find distinct 
developmental trajectories for each task; Barbot et al., 2016; Claxton et al., 2005), the test-retest 
issues which plague many of the tests used in creativity research (Barbot et al., 2016, 2019b), the 
negative effects caused by strict time constraints and test-like settings being felt particularly 
acutely by children (Runco, 2016), and questions pertaining to domain generality/specificity 
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(would the child prodigy violinist or artist be moved to think of alternate uses for a brick?). It is 
little wonder that creative development is characterised by a series of ‘lumps and bumps’ (Barbot 
et al., 2016; Runco, 2016; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995), with discrepant levels of recovery from 
downturns. One of the best documented, though consistently controversial, downturn (Claxton et 
al., 2005; Said-Metwaly et al., 2020; Sak & Maker, 2006), is the ‘fourth grade slump’ (i.e., 
children aged 9 and 10), first identified by Torrance (1968). Contradictory findings regarding the 
slump might in part be explained by differences in the tests used: a recent meta-analysis looking 
specifically at divergent thinking, which suggested an overall upward developmental trend with 
some discontinuities, found that performance improvements were moderated by ‘DT test, task 
content domain, intellectual giftedness, and country of study’ (Said-Metwaly et al., 2020). 
Slumps, or downturns are often attributed to children’s improved reasoning abilities, which 
emphasise convention and logic over creativity and imagination. According to Kohlberg (1987), 
young children are preconventional - they do not yet understand the rules they are expected to 
abide by, but by middle childhood most have entered a conventional stage, sometimes giving 
great weight to normative behaviours. The link with creativity – or the severing of it - is clear, 
since originality is essentially defined by its deviation from norms (Runco & Jaeger, 2012).  
There are significant individual differences in both the timing of and recovery from slumps. One 
possible cause for this is asynchronicity i.e., differences in the timing of the development of 
other mental processes. Environmental influences have also been investigated; for example, 
cultural factors seem to be play a role (e.g.,  slumps seem to start younger in China than the 
USA; Chan et al., 2001; Yi et al., 2013), as do family environments, with authoritarian parenting 
being associated with deeper, more persistent slumps (Dacey, 1998, 1999; Fearon et al., 2013). 
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Developmental adversity can sometimes, paradoxically, foster creativity through pushing people 
outside the realm of normality (Makin, 2016).  
Recently, attempts have been made to understand the neural factors underlying these fluctuations 
(Saggar et al., 2019). Using a longitudinal, cohort-sequential design, Saggar and team assessed 
48 3rd and 4th graders using lab tests of creativity, IQ, and executive control (EC), temperament 
and behaviour questionnaires, and Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) while the 
children performed creative (and control) drawing tasks. They found three distinct 
developmental trajectories, one in which children slumped then bumped, another in which they 
bumped then slumped and a final group who were flat and then bumped. They relate the 
trajectories to externalising behaviours (e.g., rule-breaking, aggression), which were positively 
associated with creativity and found that creativity improvements were also related to increased 
functional segregation of the right lateral prefrontal cortex, the brain’s seat of executive control. 
These two findings appear somewhat contradictory, and the researchers note that other 
behavioural markers such as response inhibition showed no association with externalising 
behaviours. The evidence base rested on a single overall measure for creativity (specified only as 
the ‘mean’ from the Torrance figural tasks, a set usually resulting in at least 6 different sub 
measures) making a full interpretation and unpicking of their findings - even straightforward 
points such as fluency / originality distinctions – difficult. The authors themselves note that “the 
common cognitive and neural mechanisms of rule-breaking and creativity remain unclear” (p. 
100). Some children appear not to recover from their slumps, continuing to show declines in 
creativity over the school years (Kim, 2006; Lubart & Lautrey, 1995), with some suggesting that 
it is the school environment itself which constrains creative thought (Robinson, 2011a, 2011b; 
Doron, 2016; Baer, 2016; Beghetto & Kaufman, 2014; Runco et al., 2017). Other studies have 
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found the opposite - that creativity scores increase with age (Besancon & Lubart, 2008; 
Mouchiroud & Lubart, 2001, 2002; Smith & Carlsson, 1983, 1985), with the explanation often 
rooted in the greater experience that older children clearly have. Since some see creativity as “the 
capacity to construct original meaning from interpretations of experience” (Runco, 2008, quoted 
in Runco, 2016; also, Vygotsky, 2004), having more experience to draw upon is clearly 
advantageous. A difficulty with interpreting often conflicting evidence arises from the plethora 
of creativity sub measures; researchers vary in which they emphasise according to their 
theoretical position, the choice of test and their particular research interest. For example, one sub 
measure used in both figural and verbal DT tests is ‘elaboration’, largely a measure of detail in 
responses. It is likely to show age-related improvement as children have more sophisticated 
language and greater dexterity. (Kim, 2011). Fluency, too, might improve with age in time 
limited tests, since older children can think, write, and draw more quickly. Originality, by 
contrast – though depending on how it is scored – might be less clearly aligned with age: while 
greater experience might admit more novel ideas, reason’s increasing ascendency over 
imagination might push the opposite way (Vygotsky, 1930). The issue of which sub measure best 
represents creativity will be confronted, theoretically and practically. in the cross-sectional study 
in Chapter 2. 
One consistent finding in a mosaic of data is that divergent thinking ability and evaluative ability 
do not follow the same developmental paths. While research suggests divergent thought has a 
turbulent trajectory, there is relative consensus that evaluation improves with age, as children 
develop a better understanding of what is valued by others (Runco & Acar, 2012) and put more 
emphasis on appropriateness (Charles & Runco, 2001). This improvement, involving both skill 
at appraising feasibility and better theory of mind understanding, is likely to be buttressed by the 
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development of executive control (Carlson et al., 2002, 2004), and is another important clue for 
the current work.  
 
Executive control 
What is it? 
Executive control, also known as ‘executive functions’ (Diamond, 2013; Kerr & Zelazo, 2004) 
and ‘cognitive control’ (Miller & Cohen, 2001) is the ‘manipulation and prioritization of 
information in the brain to achieve desired goals’ (Johnson & Haan, 2015). The term refers to a 
family of top-down, effortful processes which are required when there is the need to pay 
attention, hold information in mind, adapt and plan ahead (Davidson et al., 2006) rather than rely 
on intuition or instinct (Diamond, 2013).  
The structure of executive control was first conceived as a single construct (Sala et al., 1998) but 
the broadly accepted current view is that it comprises a set of interrelated and interdependent 
processes that are somewhat dissociable (Kerr & Zelazo, 2004). And although some point to 
ongoing debate as to precisely what those separable processes are (making EC impossible ‘to 
define in a way that entirely satisfies any two colleagues’ (Astle & Scerif, 2008)) there is some 
consensus that achieving our goals demands three core capabilities: storing and using 
information in working memory (Baddeley, 1996), flexibly switching between tasks, and 
inhibitory control - both in terms of control of cognitive interference and self-control (Diamond, 
2013). Miyake et al.’s influential 2000 study, which involved extensive testing on a host of EC 
tasks within this triad, found both unity and diversity: confirmatory factor analysis showed that 
‘updating’ (working memory), ‘shifting’ (flexibility) and ‘inhibition’ were ‘moderately 
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correlated but clearly separable’ (Miyake et al., 2000). The figure below (Fig. 1.1, from 
Diamond, 2013) suggests a model for how these core processes interact and form the basis for 
higher level decision making, mediated by the prefrontal cortex (Kerr & Zelazo, 2004). 
 
Fig. 1. 1 From Diamond, 2013. Executive functions and related terms 
EC is not detached from other brain functions but rather is inextricably linked to emotions 
(Immordino-Yang, 2015; Schmeichel, 2007), motivation (Pessoa, 2009), stress levels (Derakshan 
& Eysenck, 2009) as well as to broader biological factors such as hormones, nutrition, rest, and 
exercise. A common distinction is made between ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ EC (Zimmerman et al., 2016); 
cold control, deploying clinically efficient executive processes such as planning and inhibition, is 
associated with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortical regions while hot control, which supports 
behaviours which demand emotional regulation or awareness and empathy, is supported by 
regions in the ventromedial and orbito-frontal cortex (Chan et al., 2008). The evidence suggests 
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that, neurologically and behaviourally, there is a continuum from colder to hotter skills, with the 
balance led by the motivational and emotional weight of the task at hand (Zelazo & Carlson, 
20112; Zelazo et al., 2008, 2010).  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to expand fully on the brain basis for EC processes, but it is 
relevant to appreciate the breadth, complexity, and dynamism of what is meant when we talk 
about executive control. It is a description of ends more than a detailed description of means, 
essentially ‘an umbrella concept, encompassing a variety of, potentially disparate, mechanisms’ 
(Astle & Scerif, 2008), something that will become highly relevant when we try to understand its 
form as enacted and described by young children.  
Why is it important? 
Understanding executive control helps us see “how children, who often ‘act without thinking’, 
develop into mature, responsible adults, able to plan and control their actions” (Mulder & Cragg, 
2014). It is apparent why so much attention has been placed on this compendium of skills, since 
the benefits it sustains are legion and far-reaching - from school achievement (Gathercole, 
2004b) to physical and mental health (Crescioni et al., 2011; Diamond, 2013), job success 
(Bailey, 2007) and quality of life (Brown & Landgraf, 2010).  
The context of most relevance to the current work is schooling. Here we also find evidence of the 
wide-ranging benefits of good EC. It plays a central role in school readiness (as measured by 
emergent literacy, phonological awareness, orthographic knowledge, and emergent mathematic 
knowledge) in pre-schoolers (Shaul & Schwartz, 2014), in mathematics proficiency (Cragg & 
Gilmore, 2014) and in reading ability (Cartwright, 2012). EC has been shown to be a strong 
predictor of academic achievement in English, Maths and Science (e.g., WM accounted for 
between 16 and 20% of variance in literacy and numeracy scores; Alloway & Alloway, 2010), 
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and has been shown to better predict overall success throughout the school years than IQ (e.g., a 
composite self-control measure accounted for twice as much of the variance in Final Grade Point 
Average scores as IQ; Duckworth & Seligman, 2005).  
How is it measured? 
There are many tests available to assess executive control by digital or analogue means. Some of 
the most commonly used are the Wisconsin card sort, various versions of Stroop, anti-saccade 
tasks, go/no go, digit span and backwards digit span tasks, keep track tasks, Navon global/local 
tasks, Simon tasks, Towers of Hanoi/London, Flanker, random number generation and various 
dual tasks combining elements to be completed simultaneously or alternately (Miyake et al., 
2000). Many are used as standard tests for single EC components (e.g., Stroop for inhibitory 
control) but the issue of task impurity (i.e., the fact that any executive task implicates additional 
cognitive processes as well as the test target itself) is widely recognised (Cepeda et al., 2001; 
Luna et al., 2004; Miyake et al., 2000). For example, in the Wisconsin card sort task, participants 
must sort cards according to rules of colour, shape and number. The changing rules necessitate 
frequent ‘switching’ and the test is generally taken as a measure of switching flexibility (Greve 
et al., 2005; Nyhus & Barceló, 2009; Miyake et al., 2000). But when the task instruction changes 
from ‘sort by shape’ to ‘sort by colour’, is the key cognitive work successful administration of 
the rule change (shifting), blocking the prior rule (inhibitory control) or keeping the relevant 
information in mind (working memory)? Fractionating the relevant cognitive processes is 
difficult (Cepeda et al., 2001), a complexity compounded by EC’s involvement in the regulation 
of other cognitive processes such as executing verbal or motor responses (Ven et al., 2013).  
Another critique levelled at EC tests focuses on doubt surrounding their ecological validity – the 
extent to which lab findings reflect the real world (Wallisch et al., 2018). Researchers, cite, for 
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example, children with severe behavioural problems at home or school who behave impeccably 
in the lab (Anderson, 2002). EC measures are also often inconsistent in the same individual at 
different time points (Anderson, 2002) and the specifics of the interplay between context and 
performance is not well understood (Wallisch et al., 2018). A conceptual difficulty with EC tests 
lies in the fact that task success might be achieved by different neural pathways at different ages 
(Astle & Scerif, 2007; Karmiloff-Smith, 1998), clearly a problem if the aim is to understand the 
processes embedded in what we call EC and not just their behavioural output.  
How does it typically develop? 
Executive processes emerge in infancy and develop throughout childhood into early adulthood 
(Anderson, 2002; Diamond, 2013); recent research has highlighted their protracted continued 
development throughout adolescence (Blakemore, 2006; Davidson et al., 2006; Luna et al., 
2004).  The constituent EC components differ in their developmental trajectories, supporting 
arguments for their separability (Huizinga et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2013) though with considerable 
unity – in Miyake and colleagues’ latent variable analysis, correlations between the three factors 
of updating, shifting and inhibition were moderately high, estimated to range between .42 and 
.63 (Miyake et al., 2000). Some studies support the three-factor structure (e.g., Rose et al., 2011) 
while others suggest that the structure changes with age (Lee et al., 2013). An emerging picture 
is one of undifferentiated EC in the preschool years (Lee et al., 2013; Wiebe et al., 2008) giving 
way to a two factor structure (comprised either of working memory and shifting (Huizinga et al., 
2006) or working memory and ‘everything else’ (Lee et al., 2013) through the primary school 
years and arriving at the fully differentiated three factor structure by the teenage years (Lee et al., 
2013).  
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Development of working memory is well-established both in terms of behaviour (Gathercole et 
al., 2004a) and brain function, with neuroimaging studies showing that working memory 
improvements tightly coincide with maturation of the lateral PFC (Klingberg et al., 2002). The 
gradual myelination of prefrontal connections, the proposed basis for this maturation, is not 
complete until well into adolescence (Anderson et al., 2001). 
Flexibility in switching between rule sets is hard for both the very young and the very old 
(Cepeda et al., 2001). Young children (around 3 years of age) often have difficulties of 
‘perseveration’, meaning that they find it difficult, having learned one rule, to overcome the 
attentional inertia to apply a new one, even when they can verbally report it (Davidson et al., 
2006; Kirkham et al., 2003a, 2003b). This problem, which can be ameliorated by helping 
children refocus their attention, usually resolves naturally by the time children are 4 or 5. Right 
into early adolescence, children’s ‘shift cost’ remains greater than adults (Best & Miller, 2010) 
and there are signs of different processes at play. For example, Huizinga and colleagues found a 
speed/accuracy trade off whereby, in their study of 7, 11- and 15-year olds, only the teenagers 
slowed down to ensure a correct response, perhaps because of better strategic reasoning 
(Huizinga et al., 2006).  
Inhibitory control is probably the most multifaceted of the three EC components, with some 
researchers distinguishing as many as eight kinds of inhibition (Nigg, 2000, 2017). These include 
‘executive’ inhibition types such as interference control, cognitive inhibition (‘directed 
ignoring’), behavioural inhibition and oculomotor inhibition, and various types of selective 
attention, including suppression of previous irrelevant information and suppression of current 
information lying outside the attentional field (Nigg, 2000). These different kinds develop at 
different rates throughout childhood, making a coherent detailed taxonomy of the underlying 
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processes extremely complicated (Munakata et al., 2011; Nigg, 2017). The general picture, as 
with the other EC components, is of continued, protracted development throughout childhood 
and adolescence. While overriding impulses, ignoring distractions, and delaying gratification are 
difficult skills for young children to master, (Diamond, 2013) the benefits of good inhibitory 
control in the early years have been shown literally to last a lifetime (Diamond, 2013; Moffitt, 
2011). There are two points of note regarding the famous early work on delayed gratification 
(Mischel and colleagues’ ‘marshmallow test’; Mischel, 1975; Mischel & Mischel, 1987; Mischel 
et al., 1989, 2011; Shoda et al., 1990): the first is that more recent studies have shown 
considerable cultural variation in the development of inhibitory control (Sabbagh et al., 2006) 
and the second is that some attempts at replication using larger and more diverse samples and 
considering the confound of socioeconomic status, have found (Watts et al., 2018a) that the 
correlation between an early ability to delay gratification and later educational outcome is much 
smaller (in some cases, no longer significant), making a simple causal picture less clear.   
Can it be improved? 
Given the weight of positive life outcomes brought about by better EC, there has understandably 
been great interest in the potential for training to improve it (Boot et al., 2008; Goldin et al., 
2014; Green & Bavelier, 2002, 2008; Rueda et al., 2005; Wass et al., 2011, 2012) and this thesis 
includes a school-based EC training intervention. A whole host of training activities has been 
investigated, using approaches as varied as martial arts, mindfulness and aerobic exercise as well 
as more direct, usually computerised, cognitive training (Cardoso et al., 2018, for a systematic 
review of interventions in children; also Blair & Raver, 2014; Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Ericsson 
et al., 1993; Jha et al., 2007; Kamijo et al., 2011; Klingberg, 2010; Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 
2013; Neville et al., 2013; Paananen et al., 2018; Tang et al., 2012; Zelazo et al., 2016), many of 
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which report success. Diamond and Ling (2016) reviewed 84 studies conducted over the last 
decade which met certain criteria such as control groups, measuring outcomes beyond the 
immediate (in both time and distance of transfer from the training regimen itself) and not being 
solely correlational in nature (e.g., comparing EC between children who participated in martial 
arts vs those who did not). They concluded that, although EC ‘can be improved at any age 
through training and practice’ that transfer is generally narrow – that is, it improves the specific 
component trained on (e.g., working memory) but improvements do not generalise beyond that 
(e.g., no effect on inhibitory control or flexibility; Melby-Lervag & Hulme, 2013). They also 
found that the gains made were dependent on the amount of time spent practising (Ericsson & 
Towne, 2010), that EC needed to be challenged, i.e., pushed at the limit of an individual’s 
capability (Davis et al., 2011) and that the gains seen typically diminish once practice ends 
(Klingberg et al., 2005). More broadly, they emphasise that the most successful programmes 
focus not only on the direct training of EC but also its more indirect support – i.e., reducing other 
factors, such as stress, sadness, tiredness, loneliness and physical ill health which impair its 
performance (Diamond & Ling, 2016), again emphasising the truism that EC ability does not 
exist in a vacuum but is highly dependent on other more fundamental aspects of brain function.   
It is interesting that, in the long list of ‘burning questions’ posed by Diamond and Ling (2016. p. 
42) about EC training, they do not consider the possibility of any downside to improving EC. 
This is something we will turn to in the next section, as we look at current evidence regarding the 
relationship between EC and creativity. 
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What is the relationship between creativity and executive control?  
“Cognitive control is a double-edged sword – aiding performance on some tasks when fully 
engaged, and many others when less engaged.” (Amer et al., 2016, p.905) 
The nature of the relationship between creativity and control has been the subject of much 
interest over recent decades (Beaty et al., 2014; Benedek et al., 2014a; Vartanian et al., 2019, 
2020). That findings present a messy picture is predictable given the multi-componential profile 
of both constructs and the fact that it is difficult to compare findings from different levels of 
description. In particular, ‘control’ is sometimes conceived broadly, as a general notion of self-
control (Baumeister et al., 2007; Carson et al., 2003, Liu et al., 2012) and sometimes narrowly in 
terms of the specific factors which comprise executive control  (Benedek et al., 2014a; Radel et 
al., 2015; Zabelina et al., 2019). Connected problems concern differences in execution and 
scoring even when similar task sets are used, and the enormous difference between ‘pure’ lab 
measures (e.g., using tests of divergent thinking in the lab) and studies which seek greater 
ecological validity (e.g., by allowing participants to operate in a domain relevant to them; Fink et 
al., 2009; Limb & Braun, 2008; Liu et al., 2012). Given the combination of quantitative lab 
measures and real-world qualitative approaches used in the current research, both types of 
evidence are relevant and in this section I will give a brief overview of both. I will begin by 
presenting evidence based on ‘control’ as conceived broadly, then come on to consider 
individual EC components, before finally looking at evidence specifically from children. 
Control in the broad sense 
Creative people have long been characterised as lacking both cognitive and behavioural 
inhibition (Eysenck, 1995; Martindale, 1999). Evidence from lesion studies, neurodevelopmental 
disorders (e.g., ADHD) and psychopathology have all found that lower inhibition is associated 
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with higher levels of creativity (Acosta, 2014; Boot et al., 2017; Carson et al., 2003; Sawyer, 
2011; White & Shah, 2006, 2011). Carson and colleagues considered the idea that creative 
individuals are characterised by an ability to ‘perceive and describe what remains hidden from 
others’ (Carson et al., 2003, p.499) accounted for by reduced latent inhibition (the ability to filter 
out information which experience has shown is not relevant), a phenomenon typically associated 
with schizophrenia. In a set of correlational studies, the team showed that high lifetime creative 
achievers (as measured using the well validated Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; 
Carson et al., 2005a, 2005b) had significantly lower latent inhibition, as measured by their 
relative failure to filter out irrelevant stimuli in a multiphase auditory task (Lubow et al., 1992). 
This finding was particularly true for eminent creative achievers, who were 7 times more likely 
to have low rather than high latent inhibition scores.  
Research at the broad level is sometimes framed in terms of a distinction between ‘focused’ 
(controlled) and ‘defocused’ (not controlled) attention (Gruzelier, 2009, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; 
Martindale, 1999), often measured with EEG or using neurofeedback, or between ‘externally 
focused’ (directly controlled) and ‘internally focused’ (not directly controlled) attention, often 
measured with fMRI and associated with the executive control and default mode networks 
(Raichle, 2015) respectively (Beaty et al., 2015, 2016, 2018, 2019; Chrysikou, 2019; Marron et 
al., 2018; Sowden et al., 2015a). In a series of EEG experiments, Martindale (Martindale, 1999; 
Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978; Martindale & Mines 1975; Martindale et al., 1984) studied brain 
activation during creative ideation. He found that highly creative individuals (in terms of real-
world creative achievement) were, during inspiration, characterised by an enhanced state of 
defocused attention as reflected in increased alpha wave activity – generally taken to be a marker 
of reduced cortical arousal. Martindale proposed that the looser associational thinking this 
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allowed meant greater activation of the remote associations which produce surprising ideas. 
Others have taken this idea further, using neurofeedback training to increase the EEG alpha/theta 
wave ratio and enhance creativity – with some success in both novice and professional dancers 
and children (Gruzelier et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2014c).  
Somewhat more direct evidence of deactivations of the brain’s control regions during creative 
thinking comes from fMRI studies. Limb and Braun (2008) took pains to create a protocol more 
ecologically valid than psychometric tests. Using a specially designed, scanner-friendly 
keyboard, they compared brain activations when professional jazz pianists played memorised 
music sequences with matched sequences during which they improvised new melodies. They 
found that the improvised sequences were characterised by extensive deactivations within the 
executive control network (particularly the DLPFC) and focal activation of parts of the default 
mode network and concluded that “Such a pattern may reflect a combination of psychological 
processes required for spontaneous improvisation in with internally motivated stimulus-
independent behaviors unfold in the absence of central processes that typically mediate self-
monitoring and conscious volitional control” (Limb & Braun, 2008, p.1). While studies of 
improvisation such as the part-music, part-language lyrical improvisation of freestyle rap (Liu et 
al., 2012) have found similar effects, other studies have not. In a study also using fMRI to look at 
the brain correlates of improvisation, this time comparing expert with novice musicians, 
Berkowitz and Ansari (2010) found that the trained musicians showed deactivation in the right 
temporo-parietal junction in conditions of increased melodic freedom whereas non musicians 
showed no such changes. The researchers interpret this deactivation as deployment of top down 
inhibition to prevent distraction during performance of the task, something only the professionals 
had mastered.  
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There is a growing body of research looking at the potential for ‘hypofrontality’, as induced by 
‘flow’ states (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Dietrich, 2003, 2018), by dreaming (Lewis et al., 2018; 
Stickgold & Walker, 2004; Stickgold et al., 1999) or by hallucinogenic drugs (Carhart-Harris et 
al., 2016; Girn et al., 2020) to bring creative benefits. Hypofrontality refers to the temporary 
deactivation of the PFC, while ‘flow’ refers to a positive state of immersive engagement in an 
activity – painting, strumming a guitar, playing Minecraft - which is so deep that actions seem to 
become ‘effortless, fluid and graceful’ (Dietrich, 2015). There is not the space here to detail 
these findings, but they are mentioned to highlight the breadth of approaches to considering, 
directly or otherwise, the creativity/control relationship.  
There is an emerging agreement that creativity depends on a unique coupling between brain 
networks which more usually work in opposition - the default mode network and the central 
executive network most commonly act antagonistically (Beaty et al., 2015, 2016; Chrysikou, 
2019; Chrysikou et al., 2014; Vartanian et al., 2020). Whether this loose accord does any more 
than deflect the problem up to a new level of abstraction is unclear. It certainly begs new 
questions: what mechanisms might govern a change in coupling? Does it happen automatically 
or is it under top-down control or both (Sowden et al., 2015a; Vartanian et al., 2009)? Does it 
shift during the creative process (Basadur et al., 1995; Sowden et al., 2015a)? Or does the nature 
of the creative task bring about the switch (Barr et al., 2017)? Is it governed by mood (Pinho et 
al., 2016)? Or by cultural norms (Ivancovsky et al., 2018)? And is the salience network (a 
collection of brain regions with key nodes in the insular cortex, responsible for detecting 
‘behaviourally relevant stimuli’ and coordinating responses to them; Uddin, 2017) the right 
candidate for the shifting mechanism (Menon & Uddin, 2010)? Notwithstanding the many 
unanswered questions, the prevailing notion – that better creativity results from greater flexibility 
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at this higher level – chimes with observations over decades about what makes creative people 
unique: “One view we have developed on the basis of our studies is that creative persons are 
characterised not so much by single traits, but rather by their ability to operate through the entire 
spectrum of human characteristics. So, they are not just introverted, but can be both extroverted 
and introverted…sensitive and cold, arrogant, and humble, masculine, and feminine, as the 
occasion demands” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014 p. 170). 
EC components 
Coming to the more specific evidence regarding executive control, Zabelina and colleagues set 
the scene (Zabelina et al., 2019), taking from Miyake et al.’s (2000) approach to look at the unity 
and diversity of executive control in creativity. They examined whether working memory, 
shifting and inhibition predicted creativity, operationalised by self-report creative achievement, 
lab tests of divergent thinking and whether participants were employed in artistic (creative) vs 
Information Technology (IT – i.e., not creative) professions. Multiple regression analysis, 
controlling for general cognitive ability, education level, age, and gender, found that better 
working memory predicted higher fluency in divergent thinking; no other single factors showed 
any significant effect with divergent thinking (DT). Real world creative achievement was 
significantly predicted by better response inhibition for the artists and by poorer shifting ability 
for the IT professionals, though both effects were small. Finally, professional involvement in the 
arts was associated with better common EC  (a composite measure computed by averaging z-
scored inhibition, updating, and shifting scores) as well as better shifting ability, compared to IT 
professionals. The authors conclude that the extent to which aspects of EC predict creativity 
depends on how it is operationalised. 
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Taking a different approach, Benedek and team used latent variable analysis to look at the 
relationship between creativity and executive control (Benedek et al., 2014a) in a sample of 243 
young adults. Administering a battery of lab tests (four for divergent thinking - scored by raters 
on a single measure of ‘creativity’), they found that both updating (working memory) and 
inhibition, but not shifting ability, predicted creativity scores. No significant correlations were 
found between the latent factors of updating, inhibition and shifting. The results are surprising 
both for the lack of overall cohesion of the EC measures and the fact that flexibility, often seen 
as a key feature of creative success, showed no relationship here, suggesting that lab measures of 
switching and the sort of flexibility of thought required for creative thinking might be some 
distance apart. These sort of inconsistencies in findings sometimes arise when different tests are 
used to represent EC components – here, it is possible that the single test used to represent 
switching (a number letter task; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) was not the most relevant for 
creativity. 
Inhibitory control 
A commonly proposed role for EC in divergent thinking tests is that of inhibitory control, said to 
be needed to block the obvious, common, outlawed or repeat responses likely to arise from 
spontaneous associative thinking (Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Benedek et al., 2014a; Cassotti et al., 
2016; Edl et al., 2014; Mayseless et al., 2015a, 2015b). Evidence for this view comes from 
several studies which distinguish between the generative and evaluative dimensions of the 
creative process (Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Mayseless et al., 2015a, 2015b). Beaty and Silvia 
examined the serial order effect, the well-known observation that better (more original) ideas 
tend to appear later than obvious ideas, a finding traditionally explained by a ‘spreading 
activation in semantic memory’ (Mednick, 1962). The researchers’ contrasting view was that the 
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improvement in creativity over time was accounted for by increased influence of top-down 
executive control, something they set out to measure by subjecting their participants to a full 10 
minutes thinking about alternative uses for a brick (Beaty & Silvia, 2012). Operationalising EC 
as fluid intelligence with a six-test battery, they time stamped each AUT response and used 
multilevel structural equation modelling to look at the within-person effect of time. Their 
findings showed that while fluid intelligence did not predict fluency, it did interact with time, 
such that as intelligence increased, the serial order effect diminished, i.e., for those high in fluid 
intelligence the creativity of their responses was less dependent on time. They take this evidence 
(which they concede is ‘indirect and oblique’) to mean that those who are more effective at 
‘managing their minds’ can draw on effective idea generation strategies ‘despite interference 
generated from obvious ideas and entrenched ways of thinking.’ Replication involving more 
typical tests for EC, as opposed to the looser ‘fluid intelligence’ would be helpful. 
Cheng and colleagues (Cheng et al., 2016) used a similar method of time stamping to look at the 
role of inhibition in a problem finding task and found that the role of inhibitory control varied 
according to when in the task one looked. Relative to those with higher inhibition, lower 
inhibition was associated with better ideational originality in the early stages of a divergent 
thinking task, but with worse ideation later on, a finding which the authors interpret in line with 
models (e.g., Nijstad et al., 2010) which suggest that associational thinking early on in ideation 
yields to a more strategic controlled approach as spontaneous ideas run out.  
Some studies assessing inhibitory control using Stroop performance have reported a positive 
correlation between inhibition and divergent thinking performance (Edl et al., 2014; Groborz & 
Necka, 2003) but some experimental studies have found the opposite. Radel et al. (2015) used a 
within-subjects design to test the effects of depleting inhibition (so called ‘ego depletion’) as an 
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alternative way of manipulating levels of inhibitory control. The idea is that enduring taxing 
inhibitory control tasks leads to a temporary reduction in inhibitory control, since executive 
control cannot be maintained indefinitely (Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2010). 
Hypothesising that inhibitory control would be beneficial to convergent thinking tasks but 
detrimental to DT tasks, the team tested participants on multiple occasions over a week, with 
different levels of inhibitory control task demands immediately before completing creativity tests 
of each type. They found, in line with their predictions, that exposure to the high demand 
inhibitory control task led to higher fluency in the AUT but had no effect on performance in the 
convergent task This finding suggests that inhibitory control might play contrasting roles in 
different aspects of creativity. Excessive inhibitory control might well be unhelpful during 
divergent, generative thinking, which requires less goal-oriented and more ‘playful’ thought. By 
contrast, when the goal is to converge on a single right answer, inhibitory control might be 
helpful to rule out inappropriate responses and home in on the correct one. 
One explanation for the contradictory findings regarding the effect of inhibitory control is that 
‘inhibition’ can be over-simplistically characterised. For example, when Cassotti et al. (2016) 
claim that inhibitory control can support creativity because the “ability to think of something 
new and original requires first inhibiting spontaneous solutions that come to mind quickly and 
unconsciously”, they are referring to a single limited definition of proactive cognitive inhibition. 
In reality, inhibition is composed of a broad range of cognitive, behavioural, and social 
dimensions. It is quite possible that inhibition “can serve to enhance creative thinking in some 
instances while impairing it in others” (Storm & Patel, 2014, p. 1597) and it is likely that “the 
variety of conceptualisations of inhibition may also be one reason for the number of apparently 
inconsistent findings in the literature” (Benedek et al., 2012, p. 484). 




There is less empirical evidence regarding the relationship between working memory and 
creativity (Benedek et al., 2014a), in part because it is less contentious: unlike inhibitory control, 
there is no theoretical reason why better working memory might be detrimental. In addition to 
the Zabelina et al. study already mentioned, other studies have found positive correlations 
between lab measures of working memory and fluency and originality in DT tasks (De Dreu et 
al., 2012; Oberauer et al., 2008). Others have found no direct relationship (Lee & Therriault, 
2013). 
Shifting 
There is strong consensus that creativity requires flexibility of thought at a macro level. For 
example, in personality trait measures of ‘openness to experience’, lab findings have shown that 
creative (more open) people show less filtering of task-irrelevant information, suggesting that 
being ‘open to experience’ manifests at the sensory level (Antinori et al., 2017; Beaty et al., 
2018; Kaufman & Sternberg, 2019), as well as the micro level (e.g., in being able to flexibly shift 
from one strategy to another (Nijstad et al., 2010; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010a). The notion that 
flexibility is strongly connected to creativity is even baked in to some DT tests, where flexibility 
is one of the key sub measures (Benedek et al., 2014a; Guilford et al., 1978; Torrance, 1974) - 
though clearly ideational flexibility ‘cannot serve as independent evidence for creativity and 
flexibility at the same time’ (Benedek et al., 2014a). Confusion in terminology can also 
obfuscate: in Diamond’s influential EC work, she defines EC in such a way as to absorb 
creativity within it, suggesting cognitive flexibility means “creatively thinking ‘outside the box’” 
(Diamond, 2013, p. 135). Despite linguistic overlaps, there is little empirical evidence. Instead, 
evidence comes indirectly, such as from intervention studies which have found that inducing 
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positive mood has positive effects on both cognitive flexibility and creative problem solving 
(Ashby et al., 1999; Rowe et al., 2007) and from micro-analyses of Stroop measures showing 
that individuals scoring higher on creative thinking tests show more flexible cognitive control, as 
defined by greater control modulation from trial to trial (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010a). 
Here again, as with inhibition, the problem might lie in the level of description at which 
flexibility is being conceived and described. Sometimes, cognitive flexibility is framed in terms 
of attention – and in such a way that it even becomes detached from the broader idea of 
executive control. Vartanian (2020), also citing Gabora (2018) says, “Considering a concept 
(e.g., brick) in a new context (e.g., needing a doorstop) also requires a shift in attention, and such 
a shift can arise spontaneously due to the sparse, distributed, content-addressable nature of 
memory…Such shifts, to the extent that they are spontaneous and reflect overlap in distributed 
representations, would appear to involve the default-mode network (DMN) rather than the 
executive control network (ECN)” (Vartanian, 2020, p.9). 
Evidence from children 
There is “a trade-off between the ability to explore creatively and learn flexibly, like a child, and 
the ability to plan and act effectively, like an adult” (Gopnik, 2016, p. 9).  
Although there has been much interest over the years in the relationship between intelligence and 
creativity in children, studies of the relationship between EC and creativity, particularly any 
using DT tasks, are rare. One of the few studies to consider it directly looked also at a possible 
mediating role for EC in the relationship between intelligence and creativity (Krumm et al., 
2018). Participants were 209 children aged 8-13 who completed tests for shifting, working 
memory and inhibitory control (EC), the Torrance figural tests and the Creative Intelligence test 
(Corbalán et al., 2003), which required them to formulate questions around given stimuli 
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(creativity), and three intelligence tests. Using hierarchical regression analyses, the researchers 
found that inhibition and shifting, but not working memory, predicted creativity when controlling 
for intelligence. Further analysis looking at mediation effects suggested that in fact shifting was 
the chief driver; when both shifting and inhibitory control were included in their structural 
equation model, all the variance between inhibition and creativity was explained by shifting.  
A different finding emerged from an experiment (German & Defeyter, 2000) looking at 
children’s experience of functional fixedness (Duncker, 1945). This is the finding that people’s 
knowledge of an object’s typical function hinders them from considering it in alternative ways. 
Using a version of Duncker’s candle task adapted for use in young children (Bobo the bear can’t 
reach a shelf with his toy on; solving the problem means having to use the box presented as 
Bobo’s house to make the tower of items sufficiently tall), they assigned one group to a ‘pre-
utilisation’ condition in which they were shown the object (i.e., the box)’s conventional use 
while the other group had no such introduction. They found that while the 7-year-olds solved the 
task quicker and in higher percentages than the 5-year-olds in the no pre-utilisation condition, in 
those who had experienced the object’s use, it was the reverse: 60% of 5-year-olds compared to 
40% of 7-year-olds solved the problem – and in less than half the time of the older children. 
They suggest that this finding is explained by one of two things: either younger children have a 
more flexible attitude to object function or the exact opposite – that they have an impoverished 
idea of function which means there is no prepotent response (or functional fix) requiring 
inhibitory control to suppress. 
Cassotti and colleagues (2016) claim that inhibitory control is a core process of creative problem 
solving throughout childhood, mainly based on theory and some evidence from the adult 
literature. They cite one developmental neuroimaging study (Kleibeuker et al., 2013a) looking at 
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adolescents and adults, which showed that brain regions (specifically, the inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)) typically associated with EC - and 
inhibitory control in particular - were more activated when participants provided successful 
solutions in matchstick problem-solving tasks, and that the relative activation was even greater in 
adolescents compared to adults. They attribute this not to the traditional view that the increased 
activation reflects insufficient recruitment of later-developing brain regions (Crone & Dahl, 
2012), i.e., the idea that these regions are having to work harder, but to an alternative view that 
adolescence, a time of learning independence, requires a more exploratory and flexible mindset, 
i.e., that the increased activation in these regions is adaptive. This pattern could also be explained 
by adolescents relying more on on-line computation of the solutions, while adults rely more on 
retrieval strategies from memory. 
Van Reet used an ego depletion paradigm to study pretend play (as an example of real-world 
creativity) in pre-schoolers (Van Reet, 2015). Pretend play is a complicated behaviour to study 
with regard to inhibitory control: is inhibition required to inhibit typical behaviour in order to 
pretend something that is not real? Or is inhibition undesirable in that it might impede the leap 
into the unknown that pretend play requires? In a series of studies, Van Reet tried to differentiate 
the effect of ‘conflict inhibition’ (the control required to stop a prepotent response in a motor 
response task such as Luria’s hand game (Luria, 1976)) from ‘delay inhibition’ (the control 
needed to wait, as in a go/no go task) on subsequent pretend play. Findings were nuanced; 
children who had experienced cognitive depletion through conflict inhibition tasks immediately 
before play showed subsequently better pretend play (measured by more use of imaginary 
objects, more elaborate pretence actions and length of pretence) while those experiencing 
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depletion through delay inhibition showed no such effects. This experiment is another useful 
reminder that inhibitory control should not be construed as monolithic. 
Again, as with research in adults, some researchers take a broader view of control (Gopnik et al., 
2015; Thompson-Schill et al., 2009). Gopnik has carried out several studies based around the 
idea that adults ‘know more and explore less’ while children, who are still learning about the 
world, necessarily take a different approach. Her well-known ‘blicket detector’ (Gopnik et al., 
2000, 2004; Griffiths et al., 2011; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2005; Lucas et al., 2014), a machine more 
likely to light up and play music when certain combinations of colourful blocks are put on top of 
it, found that 4-year-olds efficiently learnt abstract principles of causal relationships, using 
statistics consistent with Bayesian learning, to predict correct combinations. Moreover, they 
generalised better than adults when a new unconventional relationship was presented, a finding 
that the researchers attributed to adults being more reluctant to let go of previous successful 
principles (Lucas et al., 2014). The idea that creative cognition might benefit from an absence of 
cognitive control is shared by others (e.g., Blackwell & Munakata, 2014; Thompson-Schill et al., 
2009) and even led Gopnik to propose that the long childhood experienced by human children (a 
protracted period of underdeveloped prefrontal cortex and lots of exploratory play) is evolution’s 
way of protecting the research and development department of the human species (Gopnik, 
2016). 
 
Current methodological approach 
How to “gain insights into someone’s mental processing as they create…is one of the most 
intractable problems of creativity research” (Sowden et al., 2020, p.314). What lies between the 
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setting of a creativity task and the delivery of creative output still contains many mysteries; while 
it is straightforward to measure someone’s ‘original and valuable’ ideas for what to do with a 
paperclip or their success at producing a remotely associated word, how do we measure how they 
actually produced those ideas? Did ideas arise spontaneously? Or were they actively sought out 
using strategies that can explicated? Do individuals favour a particular approach or do they use a 
mixture of approaches? And if it is a combination, is the principal variation over time within 
individuals, or across individuals tending to be creative in consistent ways? Answering these 
sorts of questions about an individual’s creative process involves doing something that has been 
rather foreign to psychological research in this area: asking them.  
The reluctance to utilise ‘introspective reports’ to examine cognitive processes is explained in 
large part by one of the most cited (over 14,500 citations in October 2020) papers in the 
psychological sciences, Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) ‘Telling more than we can know’. It reports 
on a series of experiments in which participants are asked to give explanations about their 
behaviour which has been, unbeknownst to them, covertly manipulated. Nearly all give 
explanations which do not include the manipulation, leading the authors to conclude that, “There 
may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes” (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977, p.231). This work, subsequent replications, and critiques (Fazelpour & Thompson, 
2015; Johansson et al., 2005, 2006; Petitmengin, 2011; Petitmengin et al., 2013; Shear & Varela, 
1999) will be considered in detail in Chapter 3. For now, the important point is that evidence 
shows that, with the right techniques and conditions, this bleak verdict on the value of self-report 
for cognitive insight need not be inevitable. Indeed, several creativity researchers have 
highlighted a need to be more open to these approaches, “Creativity could benefit from greater 
valuation of subjective self-reports from participants” (Barr, 2018, p.28), particularly given the 
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unique phenomenology of creativity itself (McPherson & Limb, 2013; Warr et al., 2018). Verbal 
qualitative techniques (e.g., ‘think aloud’ protocol analysis and stimulated recall interviewing) 
have been used in a few studies to investigate the creative process in adults (Després, 2021; 
Gilhooly et al., 2007; Khandwalla, 1993; Pringle & Sowden, 2017a). They have also been used, 
albeit even more rarely, to investigate children’s thinking in areas such as reading 
comprehension strategies (Meyers et al., 1990) and self-regulated learning (Heirweg et al., 2019; 
Vandevelde et al., 2015). Think aloud protocol analysis has also been used to study the creative 
process in undergraduates (Ruscio et al., 1998) but to my knowledge, there are no such studies in 
children.  
As part of this thesis, verbal qualitative reports from primary school children will be used to gain 
insights into their creative process and the extent and nature of their evocation of executive 
control processes in it. Some of the processes involved will be readily accessible by introspection 
– for example, description of developing a strategy to find unusual ideas by focusing a search on 
words beginning with unusual letters (q, z, j). Other relevant parts of the process might be less 
readily accessible – for example, describing the processes which result in an idea just arising 
spontaneously with no strategy or directed attention. These reports will be used in conjunction 
with quantitative lab approaches using the divergent thinking tasks described in detail above.  
As well as the novel qualitative approaches, this thesis will also include a training study. Its goal 
will be to bring about improvements in EC through training, then evaluate resulting effects on 
creativity. Given that the other studies here are correlational, this manipulation of the system is 
an important step in trying to establish a causal role (positive or negative) for EC in children’s 
creative process. The particular challenges of training paradigms, including the difficulty of 
trying to differentiate practice and developmental effects from the effects of training, as well as 
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the challenges of putting EC training techniques ‘into the wild’ of the classroom, will be covered 
when we introduce the training study in Chapter 5.  
The rationale of this ‘mixed methods’ methodology (defined as the collection and analysis of 
both quantitative and qualitative data; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010) is 
that combining quantitative and qualitative approaches provides a fuller, more rounded 
understanding than either method alone (Fetters et al., 2013). In particular, here the quantitative 
aspect will measure creative product while the qualitative will focus on the creative process. 
Given the imperfections of any single approach to studying creativity, it is “a useful strategy to 
employ multiple approaches and experimental designs to directly or indirectly investigate the 
same operations of creative cognition” (Abraham, 2018, p. 170), and an important attempt to 
address the low convergent validity of different creativity test measures (Kaufman, 2003; 
Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2003; Yoon, 2017;) compared to lab tests and real world creativity 
(Benedek et al., 2017; Carson et al., 2005a, 2005b). 
Creativity presents as a special case for the suitability of mixed methods for other reasons. We 
have seen there are particular issues – of time, motivation, domain specificity, fragility, whimsy 
– with quantitative lab measurement of creativity, as well as a problem of more specific concern 
for the current investigation: that the nature and context of lab tests themselves tend to conjure 
executive control, meaning EC involvement in creativity in the lab might differ from that ‘in the 
wild’. These matters make it prudent not to rely solely on evidence from psychometric tests, 
though these remain the most reliable tools for generalising beyond the current work. Qualitative 
research too, requires care and reflexivity, with robust questions asked about the validity of the 
data as well as their wider generalisability.  
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Bringing together quantitative and qualitative data is not an easy task, either theoretically or 
practically (Yardley & Bishop, 2008). Theoretical problems can stem from epistemological 
incompatibility of approaches, while pragmatic problems arise from the sheer complexity of 
assessing highly diverse data (Willig & Rogers, 2017). Some argue for an approach which keeps 
different data types essentially distinct; in Mason’s ‘facet methodology’ (Mason, 2011), the 
overall research question is a gemstone, with different facets reflecting different lines of enquiry 
and different ways of seeing. Understanding comes not from maximising data production but 
from an emphasis on the significance of ‘the flashes of insight offered up by different facets’ 
(Mason, 2011, p.75). At the other end of the spectrum are pragmatic approaches, in which the 
quantitative dimension often leads, with qualitative data adding texture and depth (Yardley & 
Bishop, 2008). An ideal for a fully triangulated design is one in which different but 
complementary data are obtained on the same topic (Johnson et al., 2007; Morse, 1991) and 
brought together in such a way that the results, through cross verification from multiple sources 
(Creswell & Clark, 2011; Fielding, 2010) are both robustly laboratory tested and ecologically 
valid. 
In the current work, the mixed methodology, and triangulation, in particular, has evolved over 
the course of the study.  
 
Aims and outline 
The main goal of the thesis is to better understand the role that executive control plays, positively 
and negatively, in children’s creativity. Specific questions are: 
• To what extent are there individual differences in the role EC plays?  
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• Does inhibitory control have a detrimental effect on children’s creativity (by 
excessively narrowing the potential ideational search space)? 
• What is the effect of training EC on children’s creativity? 
• Does the effect of training differ between individuals?  
The thesis will focus on children of primary school age. This choice of age is principally 
motivated by the desire to address research questions in the context of education – specifically, 
on the current emphasis on EC to improve school achievement. In our consideration of 21st 
century skills, have we got the balance right?   
The thesis will be structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 will look at the underlying relationship between EC components and divergent 
thinking ability in a group of primary school children aged 5 to 11. What do psychometric tests 
tell us about the relationship between these constructs? How do EC and creativity components 
develop over this age range and what similarities and differences are there in their trajectories? 
Chapter 3, drawing a small group from the sample in the previous study, invites children to 
complete a creative activity and then describe the process in detail. Using video stimulated recall 
and a task involving drawing or making up a story (they choose), children are prompted to 
describe their unfolding creative process through semi-structured interviews which are then 
assessed through theoretical thematic analysis. The structured questions aim for insight into 
executive control processes while the open nature of the interviewing also allows new insights, 
not derived from theory, to be evaluated. 
Chapter 4 is the first attempt to triangulate quantitative and qualitative data, asking whether 
characteristics of children’s qualitative responses predict their performance in quantitative tests. 
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This chapter depicts in honest detail some of the challenges presented in bringing diverse data 
sources together and ends with specific proposals about how to make the task more tractable.  
Chapter 5 is one of three chapters using data from an EC training intervention study carried out 
on 156 children in years 4 and 5 in London primary schools. This chapter focuses on the 
quantitative findings, using linear mixed modelling to look first at whether the EC training 
succeeded in improving EC and second, at whether there was any far transfer to children’s 
performance in creativity tests.  
Chapter 6 is a nested qualitative study, involving 16 children who were also part of the training 
intervention. Again, using stimulated recall and thematic analysis, the children were asked about 
their creative process completing a version of one of the same divergent thinking tests used in the 
quantitative study, to allow for more direct comparison of children’s responses. The questions 
focused on the involvement, or exclusion, of control processes.  
Chapter 7 is a second attempt at triangulation, assimilating learning from the first, including 
using a consistent creativity test across both quantitative and qualitative studies and a fixed set of 
questions. Qualitative analysis led to the delineation of creative sub-types, based on different 
descriptions of process. These sub types were used to make predictions about the possible 
differentiation of the effects of EC training on creativity across children, and these differential 
predictions were then tested against the quantitative results.  
Chapter 8 discusses findings across the thesis, highlights limitations and points to possible future 
directions of research in this area. What have we learned about the relationship between EC and 
creativity in children? Finally, the chapter broadens out to consider current educational 
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approaches to EC and creativity, and to speculate on whether children’s ‘21st century skills’ 
might be better supported by altering the balance of the current approach. 
  








Chapter 2. Cross-sectional exploration of the relationship between creativity and EC across 
primary school ages 
  




Chapter 1 described some of the conflicting evidence regarding the role executive control plays 
in creativity (Amer et al., 2016; Barr et al., 2015; Chrysikou, 2019; Chrysikou et al., 2014; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 2009). Since EC and creativity are both complex, multifaceted 
constructs, the contradictions are perhaps unsurprising: effects are likely to be nuanced, vary 
according to task and context, and interact with many other creativity-relevant factors including 
motivation (Collins & Amabile, 1999), time (Plucker et al., 2006), emotional state (Pessoa, 
2009), domain knowledge (Baer, 2010), experience (Fink et al., 2009), constraint level 
(Cummiskey & Baer, 2018) and more. This is in addition to the diversity within EC factors 
themselves and the evidence that even within a factor (e.g., inhibitory control) there might be 
different effects depending on the stage of the creative process (Beaty & Silvia, 2012), the type 
of inhibition (Van Reet, 2015) and even the instructions given (Nusbaum et al., 2014). Added to 
this are the many issues with creativity tests themselves (Runco, 2008). The conflict nonetheless 
presents the first problem in formulating precise hypotheses, with a second arising from the 
paucity of evidence from children.  
This study is a first step in trying to address these problems by rendering the broad question (of 
how executive control processes contribute to children’s creativity) more tractable, in two ways. 
The first involves deconstructing both creativity and EC to look at the relationships between their 
components - both within and between the constructs and in different creative domains. Here, we 
are looking for evidence through patterns of correlation. The second involves looking at 
developmental trajectories (using a cross-sectional approach with children across the primary 
school age range) of each construct component and their patterns of similarity and difference, 
i.e., here, we are considering the effect of age on performance. The goal is to find firm evidence 
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of relationships which will pave the way for further, more detailed investigation. High positive 
correlations between inhibitory control and originality, for example, might suggest that inhibition 
might act on the critical evaluation of ideas, allowing new research questions to be specified; 
high positive correlations between working memory and fluency would bolster a theory that the 
ability to mentally play with multiple items from memory and the senses could aid the 
production of a greater quantity of ideas, again suggesting a clear direction for further 
investigation. So, what does the available evidence lead us to expect? 
Empirical evidence on the relationship of EC components to creativity 
The evidence regarding working memory is, with a low bar, the most consistent. WM, as 
measured, for example, with tasks requiring updating memory of changing sequences of 
numbers, letters, or category contents (Friedman et al., 2016) has been found to be positively 
associated with fluency in the Abbreviated Torrance Tests for Adults (ATTA), a mix of verbal 
and figural DT tests (Zabelina et al., 2019). In another study, WM, measured with a non-verbal 
2-back task involving abstract shape recall and a single overall creativity measure, comprised of 
composite scores (incorporating both quantity and quality measures) from four verbal DT tests in 
a latent variable analysis again showed a positive relationship (β=.29) (Benedek et al., 2014a). 
De Dreu and colleagues (2012) hypothesised that working memory would be relevant to 
creativity in enabling ‘persistent, focused, and systematic combining of elements and 
possibilities.’ In a varied set of studies, ranging from musical improvisation to insight tasks and a 
novel idea-generating brainstorming task, they looked at correlations with WM, measured with a 
delayed serial recognition task which involved participants seeing 8 words or images in sequence 
then, after a short pause, having to say if a subsequent word or image was a part of the original 
set. Their findings found that this measure of WM did indeed seem relevant to creativity, with 
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high correlations (e.g., .41 for fluency and .63 for originality in the DT task). The authors 
conclude that working memory capacity “benefits creativity because it enables the individual to 
maintain attention focused on the task and prevents undesirable mind wandering” (De Dreu et 
al., 2012, p.656) a description that suggests a broad characterisation of WM. Finally, Lee and 
Therriault (2013) attempted to unpick the relationship between WM, intelligence and creativity, 
using a range of creativity tests including the AUT and the ATTA and two measures of WM, one 
a backward digit span task, one a visuospatial task in which participants must decide whether a 
presented shape is symmetrical while committing to memory the position of a red square on a 
matrix. They conclude that WM operates indirectly, via intelligence and associative fluency, to 
predict DT scores, though on its own WM did not predict DT scores and no creativity sub 
measures were significantly correlated with either WM score.  
• On the balance of this evidence, we would tentatively expect to see a positive correlation 
between WM and DT test measures, particularly for fluency in verbal tests. 
Turning to flexibility, and focusing on flexibility as construed in EC tasks rather than in its 
broader characterisation (Antinori et al., 2017; Diamond, 2013), the same latent variable analysis 
mentioned above (Benedek et al., 2014a) found that shifting did not significantly predict 
divergent thinking ability (β=.03, n.s), a finding replicated in a similar study which showed 
shifting predicted neither fluency nor originality in DT, though better shifting ability was seen in 
those involved in artistic professions (Zabelina et al., 2019). Zabelina and Robinson (2010a) 
considered the question of whether the key characteristic of highly creative people is not their 
level of cognitive control per se, but their enhanced ability to modulate it – a sort of higher-level 
flexibility. They considered this, again using the ATTA and here operationalising flexibility via 
the Stroop test. As well as calculating the congruent-incongruent RT difference as the typical 
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‘Stroop effect’ (a typical inhibition measure) they looked at the effect on RTs of switches from 
congruent to incongruent trials and vice versa, using a within-participant 2x2 design considering 
both priming and target congruence/incongruence. Flexible cognitive control, they argue, is 
represented by smaller target congruency effects after incongruent primes and a larger effect 
after congruent primes, i.e., flexible people relax cognitive control when it is not needed (i.e., 
after congruent trials) but employ it more fiercely when it is (i.e., after incongruent trials). They 
then used GLM analysis (as a way of including both this within-participant variance and the 
between-participant variance in originality scores on the ATTA) and found a significant three-
way interaction between ATTA originality x prime congruence x target congruence. Further 
investigation showed that, while all participants showed some flexibility of control, those with 
high originality showed significantly more (with a medium effect size, r=.29), supporting their 
idea that it is higher flexibility rather than higher control that predicts greater originality.  
• The prediction here, based on the balance of evidence, is that flexibility might show little 
correlation with DT test scores, though we might see positive correlation with originality 
in verbal tests. For figural tests, it is hard to make any prediction based on the evidence. 
The evidence regarding inhibitory control is the most contradictory. Some researchers testing 
theories based on a broad definition of cognitive control suggest that, particularly for children, 
lower control might benefit the unconventional thinking that defines creativity (Amer et al., 
2016; Thompson-Schill et al., 2009) while others show the opposite, suggesting that creative 
ideas are enhanced by greater ability to apply top-down control over attention and cognition 
(Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Beaty et al., 2014; Gilhooly et al., 2007). Looking specifically at research 
using DT tests, we see the same conflicting findings. Edl and team (2014) compared 
undergraduates on creatively demanding courses (e.g., design) with those taking non-creative 
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courses (e.g., psychology) on performance on the Stroop test and verbal and figural DT tests 
including the TTCT. While the non-creative group showed, as expected, a strong Stroop effect, 
the creative group showed no effect, i.e., RTs did not significantly differ between congruent and 
incongruent trials, suggesting high control. On DT tasks, they found that better Stroop 
performance (i.e., lower RTs) was associated with higher fluency (but not higher originality) in 
the verbal domain and higher originality (but not higher fluency) in the figural domain. The 
study was limited by small numbers (30 in one group, 31 in the other) and the big assumption 
about each group’s underlying ‘creativity’; i.e., it is conceivable that psychology undergraduates 
might in fact be creative. 
A similar finding (Camarda et al., 2018) comes from an experimental manipulation using a dual-
task paradigm, again involving the Stroop and a novel DT test (participants had to think of ideas 
to ensure a hen’s egg does not break when dropped from a height of 10 metres). Participants 
were randomly assigned either to a single task group (DT task only), an inhibition dual task (DT 
task plus a taxing version of the Stroop task involving all incongruent trials) and a control dual 
task (DT task plus Stroop involving all congruent trials) and scores were calculated for fluidity 
(equivalent to fluency), flexibility and expansivity (a measure of participants’ ability to ‘think 
beyond the obvious’ and thus a proxy for originality). The manipulation design proposes a carry-
over effect from the more taxing IC task which might influence subsequent creativity. Planned 
contrasts on the main effect found for condition showed that, while there were no differences 
between the single task and control dual task groups, those in the inhibition dual task group had 
significantly lower scores for both fluency and expansivity. 
Indirect evidence for the importance of inhibitory control comes from studies looking at the 
neural underpinning of originality. Mayseless and team used fMRI to look at originality in AUT 
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performance, using the frequency method (i.e., a measure based on statistical rarity rather than 
rater judgement) to score originality. For the AUT, participants had to respond with an original 
use for a familiar object, while in the control condition they had to name a characteristic of the 
same object. Activation patterns suggested that areas in both the DMN and the ECN were 
involved in producing original ideas, a finding the researchers attribute to the need for both 
associational processes to make novel, surprising connections, and inhibitory control to attenuate 
conventional thinking (Mayseless et al., 2015a).  
Other research suggests that reduced inhibitory control might benefit creativity. One example is a 
repeat measures experimental study on an undergraduate sample, which sought to directly 
manipulate inhibitory control levels by exhausting them (Radel et al., 2015) and again used the 
AUT to look at the effects on fluency, flexibility, and originality. Participants were tested in two 
separate sessions; each began with a Flanker task (Eriksen, 1995) a typical inhibitory control task 
in which participants must respond with a key press corresponding to the direction of an arrow 
on screen, with surrounding arrows pointing either in the same (congruent) or the opposite 
(incongruent) direction. This was to assess baseline performance and was followed by the Simon 
task (Simon, 1990), another conflict task, in which participants respond with a left or right key 
press in response to the colour of a green or red circle appearing left or right of screen. In 
congruent conditions, the key press is the same side as the stimulus; in incongruent, it is the 
opposite, requiring participants to inhibit an automatic response. A second Flanker task was then 
carried out to compare to baseline (as confirmation that the Simon task had impacted inhibitory 
control) before participants immediately completed the AUT. The experimental manipulation 
involved changing the cognitive demand of the Simon task: on one testing occasion demand was 
high with 50% of trials being incongruent, while on the other it was low, with only 10% 
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incongruent trials. The results showed that participants exposed to the high inhibitory demand 
condition (i.e., whose inhibitory control was more depleted as shown by poorer performance on 
the second Flanker task, going into the AUT) had significantly higher fluency and originality 
scores on the AUT than in the low demand condition. There was no effect on flexibility nor 
elaboration. When the team replicated the experiment (swapping Simon and Eriksen tasks so that 
Simon became benchmark and Eriksen manipulation), they found similar results; participants in 
the high demand still had significantly higher fluency in the AUT, though this time coupled with 
higher flexibility rather than higher originality. The researchers do not report the use of 
Bonferroni or other methods for correction of multiple comparisons.  
• The evidence described reflects the state of contradiction in the field regarding the role of 
inhibitory control in divergent thinking. For present purposes, it means there is not a solid 
empirical basis from which to make strong predictions for what we will find.  
Divergent thinking tests: methodological conundrums 
There has been a tremendous amount written about divergent thinking tasks and the conceptual 
and practical problems with them (e.g., Abraham, 2018; Dietrich, 2015; Forthmann et al., 2018; 
Plucker et al., 2014; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019; Runco, 2008, 2014, 2017b), some of which has 
already been outlined. The decision to use them here, despite their many problems, is based first, 
albeit circuitously, on the fact they remain by far the most used tests in creativity research with 
reasonably well-established reliability, second that they are suitable for children and finally, as a 
fledgling researcher, for the need to situate my findings in the familiar.  
The reliability of DT tasks depends on many factors such as domain (verbal or figural), time 
given, and familiarity with the stimuli used (Forthmann et al., 2016) as well as the instructions 
given (Nusbaum et al., 2014). For these reasons, researchers emphasise the importance of 
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assessing performance using multiple DT tasks, rather than relying solely on one (Reiter-Palmon 
et al., 2019); in the current study, to try to improve reliability as suggested, three different DT 
tests (two verbal and one figural) will be used. We are still left with the vexed problem of the sub 
scores and the obscurity of the information they are conveying. Let us take an example: 
divergent thinking tasks are sometimes misconstrued as being entirely generative in nature 
(Dietrich, 2015). In fact, producing ideas for alternative uses of an object involves both 
generation and evaluation – baldly, having an idea then deciding if it is any good (Runco, 2014) 
such that the divergent / convergent distinction is really more a continuum (Eysenck, 2003) and 
it is almost impossible to think of a creative task which does not (at least potentially) use both 
types of process. The difficulty comes when we try to use scores to differentiate mechanisms; a 
child who produces one answer might only have generated one idea, or they might have 
generated 10 but ruled 9 of them out. In both cases, they would receive a fluency score of 1. If 
we then look at the relationship with EC components, what are we really looking at? In the case 
of the first child, we would be looking primarily at idea generation (likely to be less EC 
dependent) and in the second, primarily at evaluation (likely to be more EC dependent) but we 
have no way of knowing which it truly is. There is a good deal we cannot deduce from the 
scores. Nonetheless, fluency remains our best available clue about generation.  
Originality presents its own challenges, as have been outlined, of both a mathematical and a 
conceptual nature (Forthmann et al., 2020a, 2020b; Plucker et al., 2014; Reiter-Palmon et al., 
2019). Again, the mechanisms by which originality can be achieved are multiple and scores do 
not enlighten us about processes, but we can make some inferences. Let us take another example. 
A child coming up with alternative uses for a pencil, produces the response ‘Use the lead in it to 
poison my sister’. That response would be certain to score highly for originality, whether it is 
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scored by raters or by statistics, because it is an unusual and imaginative answer. What 
difference does it make if that response is the child’s only response or just the most original 
among 10 responses? In terms of scoring, the difference could be profound; if using a summing 
approach, the more fluent child would benefit greatly; if using a ratio approach, they would be 
severely penalised. But even setting aside the complex question about which child really is the 
more original (i.e., what scoring method best represents their originality) can the scores help us 
make any reasonable assumptions about the processes which lie behind them? It seems 
reasonable to assume that the child with only one brilliant answer has exerted more evaluation to 
produce it than the fluent child, who might have produced it through the sheer exuberance of 
their generative abilities. On this basis, originality – with the important caveat that it be scored 
according to ratio methods - is our best proxy for evaluation. 
The other two measures will be discussed in less detail. The flexibility measure is a hybrid, lying 
between the quantity measure ‘fluency’ and the quality measure ‘originality’, making it doubly 
hard to interpret, although easier to score. Elaboration is largely a measure of the level of detail 
in responses, something which most consider less a critical component of ideation (Hornberg & 
Reiter-Palmon, 2017; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019); it is a reliable measure which, though time-
consuming, is relatively straightforward to score. 
Developmental trajectories 
On the EC measures, we would expect to see a steady development of working memory over this 
age group (Anderson, 2002; Diamond, 2013; Huizinga et al., 2006). For flexibility and inhibitory 
control, we would also expect to see improvements with age, but possibly with a less smooth 
trajectory, reflecting greater variation in the timing and rate of maturational change (Huizinga et 
al., 2006; Lee et al., 2013). On the creativity measures, we expect developmental trajectories to 
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be bumpier (Barbot et al., 2016; Beghetto and Kaufman, 2010; Saggar et al., 2019; Said-
Metwaly et al., 2020) and potentially to see distinct trajectories for different tasks, particularly in 
different domains (Claxton et al., 2005; Runco, 2016; Said-Metwaly et al., 2020). Considering 
sub measures, elaboration is founded on better dexterity, language improvements, more 
experience and faster processing and as such is a clear candidate for straightforward 
improvement through the primary school years (Kim, 2011). Fluency, too, should improve as 
older children have accumulated more experience to act as substrates for ideas (Charles & 
Runco, 2001; Runco & Acar, 2010), though this might be mitigated by older children feeling 
more self-conscious and more reluctant to offer up non-conformist ideas (Barbot et al.,2016). 
Originality is the hardest to predict since there is the most conflicting evidence regarding its 
trajectories and a lack of longitudinal data. Based on the assumption explicated above that 
originality is our best representation of evaluative skills, we would expect to see improvements 
(Charles & Runco, 2001; Lau & Cheung, 2010), but issues related to testing, particularly 
children’s perception as they reach mid childhood that ‘tests’ of any kind must involve 
predictable answers (Runco, 2016), as well as emotional factors such as increased self-awareness 
and a desire to conform (Barbot et al., 2016), might suggest the opposite.  
Aims and objectives 
This study is a first step towards answering the overall thesis question of how control processes 
contribute, positively or negatively, to children’s creativity, by looking at trends in base 
correlation patterns between the constructs and their developmental trajectories across the 
primary school years. Some specific questions it will seek to address are: 
• What are the patterns of correlation between sub measures, within and between divergent 
thinking tests, and within and between verbal and figural domains?  
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• Are there significant correlations between EC components and creativity sub measures? 
(this will involve both planned comparisons, based on the hypotheses above, and 
exploratory comparisons, using Bonferroni corrections) 
• What are the similarities and differences in the developmental trajectories of EC and 




The study was given ethical approval by the Departmental Ethics Committee of Birkbeck’s 
Department of Psychological Sciences, reference number 161744. Safeguarding procedures were 
carried out in accordance with Birkbeck and Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development policy 
documents and online advice from the Care Quality Commission and the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children. If children became upset or did not want to continue with a 
particular test for any reason, they were allowed to stop immediately without question. 
Power analysis 
This study had an opportunistic element, since it involved participants at voluntary public 
outreach events, and it was not known in advance what the numbers and demographics of 
participants would be. Power analysis (Cohen, 1992) was carried out using G*power 3.1 (Faul et 
al., 2007). The main analysis of interest here was the correlation between EC and creativity 
measures, effects for which there are no well-established benchmarks of expected size in 
children. A medium effect size (at 80% power and a probability level of .05) of .3 correlation 
would need a sample of 84 for reliable detection (low correlation, e.g., .1, would require a 
sample size of 782; high correlation e.g., .5 would require 29). In practice, given the guidance 
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limiting safe attendance and logistical constraints such as the time taken for testing and breaks, 
the number of participants was limited to 49. Given this, the study was statistically somewhat 
under-powered, and results should be considered with that in mind.  
Participants and recruitment 
Forty-nine primary school children were tested at university outreach events held over several 
days in two half term holidays. Children were recruited through flyers given to schools, 
nurseries, play centres and local public spaces (a sample flyer is included in the Appendix). 
Participants spent a half day at the university engaged in group-based, brain-related pedagogical 
activities, as well as taking part individually in research. Data were collected by a team of 
researchers; I collected all the creativity data; a fellow researcher collected all the EC data and 
research assistants collected cognitive ability data. The whole event was carried out in a fun, 
playful manner, to ensure children were at ease and to create as un-test-like an environment as 
possible.  
Four children had incomplete tests and were excluded from the analysis. The final sample was 45 
children, aged between 4.95 and 11.36 years (M = 7.97; SD = 1.82); 24 were girls. The numbers 
















Table 2. 1 Age breakdown of children in the sample 
Written consent was given by the child’s parent/guardian and verbal consent was also sought 
from the child, after fully explaining each procedure, at each of the testing sessions. 
Design and procedure 
The design was cross sectional, involving children across the primary school age range.  
Children were tested individually in labs at Birkbeck’s Psychological Sciences department in 
half hour sessions – one each for creativity tests, EC tests and cognitive ability tests. In the 
creativity tests, particular emphasis was put, through the instructions and demeanour of the 
researcher, on playfulness – the games were just for fun, had no right answers and no emphasis 
was given to time limits. For the verbal tests, children answered out loud with the researcher 
recording their responses (so that writing ability/speed was not an impediment). If a child 
stopped responding, they were given non-specific prompts or encouragement (‘You’re doing 
really well’, ‘Good job, keep going’). If, after three separate prompts, they still said they had no 
more ideas, the test would be ended.  
Between testing sessions, children participated in semi-structured crafts and games designed to 
learn about the brain e.g., making a papier-maché brain or neural networks from pipe cleaners.  





The Alternative Uses Test (AUT, Guilford, 1967a) requires participants to generate as many 
‘interesting and unusual’ uses for an everyday object within a time limit. Children were given 3 
minutes to respond. Answers were scored for fluency (total number of answers), flexibility (total 
number of categories) and originality. As we have discussed, there is ongoing debate about the 
optimal method for scoring originality (Forthmann et al., 2020a, 2020b; Plucker et al., 2014; 
Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019). Here, originality per response was scored by four independent raters, 
instructed to score each answer on a scale of 1 (not creative) to 5 (highly creative), taking into 
account their ‘sense of the originality and inventiveness of each response, in one holistic 
measure’. Participant scores were calculated as the mean response originality score (i.e., total 
originality divided by fluency). Given the extent to which findings can be influenced by scoring 
choices (Forthmann et al., 2018, 2020a), an alternative, statistically based method calculating the 
rarity of responses within the sample was also used for comparison.  
The Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT, Torrance, 1974, 2016) are comprised of several 
tests in verbal and figurative domains. The verbal test used in the current studies was the ‘Just 
suppose’ test of divergent thinking ability, which requires the child to initiate creative thought 
from an imaginary situation (e.g., ‘Imagine that clouds have strings attached to them which come 
all the way down to the ground’). As with the AUT, fluency, flexibility and originality are 
scored, this time according to the TTCT manual. Fluency and flexibility are scored as before but 
here originality is scored according to an in/out system; each response not listed in the manual’s 
list of common responses receives 1 point for originality and score per child is the sum of 
response scores. Children had 5 minutes to complete each test in the TTCT. 
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The only exclusions for fluency were responses which repeated the instruction wording (e.g., 
giving the response ‘writing’ after the instruction, ‘A pencil is usually used for writing or 
drawing’). Inter-rater reliability (IRR) for fluency, calculated on 25% of the sample, was α=1 for 
AUT and α=.99 for Just Suppose. Inter-rater agreement for flexibility, defined as a ‘change or 
shift in attitude or focus’, was reasonably high (α = .89 for ‘strings’, α = .69 for ‘fog’). 
Originality for the AUT was rated by four blind raters (two researchers involved in the study and 
two external raters). Raters were asked to ‘take into account their sense of originality and 
inventiveness of each response, in one holistic measure’ and score each answer on a scale from 1 
(not at all creative) to 5 (highly creative). The score awarded was the mean of the four raters. 
Interrater reliability was high (α = .80 for ‘pencil’, α = .82 for ‘bottle’).  
The TTCT figural tests are simple paper and pencil drawing games in which children complete 
drawings around a range of starting stimuli (sample tests are included in the Appendix). The tests 
were scored according to the TTCT manual instructions, for fluency (number of completed 
pictures), originality (number of completed pictures not on the list of exclusions for common 
responses), elaboration (number of details added to picture) and overall creative strengths - 
specific bonus points for signs of creativity in 13 categories (emotional expressiveness, 
storytelling articulateness, movement or action, expressiveness of titles, synthesis of incomplete 
figures, synthesis of lines or circles, unusual visualisation, internal visualisation, extending or 
breaking boundaries, humour, richness of imagery, colourfulness of imagery and fantasy). Given 
the specific nature of the scoring instructions in the manual, figural tests were scored by just one 
researcher. 
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Description of EC measures 
Tests of inhibitory control 
Animal size Stroop  
  
Fig. 2. 1 Examples of Animal Size Stroop trials, congruent (left) and incongruent (right) 
 
A child-friendly version of the original Stroop test (Catale & Meulemans, 2009; Morris, 2020; 
Stroop, 1935) programmed in Matlab 9.1.0, was used. The design was based on Merkley et al. 
(2016). Children were presented with two animal pictures, one large, one small, on a screen. 
They had to decide which animal is larger in real life, irrespective of picture size. This meant that 
they had to inhibit the perceptual characteristics of the stimulus itself and answer in terms of 
their knowledge of the animals’ real relative sizes. This inhibition is more difficult (that is, takes 
longer) when the relative sizes of the animals are incongruent (e.g., the lion image is smaller than 
the ladybird). Children responded by pressing a key on the keyboard (marked with a coloured 
sticker, to avoid inaccurate presses and children having to remember which letter) on the left or 
right side, corresponding to the large animal. The stimuli were photographs of animals on a 
white background; the large animals were lion, horse, cow, and elephant; the small animals were 
mouse, frog, rabbit, and ladybird. Large images were 72mm x 54mm in size; small images were 
29 mm x 21 mm. Each trial lasted a maximum of 3 seconds, after which an error was recorded, 
and the next trial presented. Fixation times between trials varied between 600 and 1400ms to 
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deter anticipatory or automatic responses. The images were presented in pairs on a computer 
screen at a distance of 50cm, in a quiet room away from the main activities. Children were asked 
to try and respond as quickly as they could while trying to answer correctly. Reaction times and 
accuracy were recorded.  
Simple Flanker 
  
Fig. 2. 2 Examples of Simple Flanker trials, congruent (left) and incongruent (right) 
 
The Flanker is a test of selective attention (Eriksen, 1995), in which respondents must press a 
key corresponding to the direction of a central arrow (Rueda et al., 2004); here the version used, 
based on Anwyl-Irvine et al. (2020a) was programmed in Gorilla (https://gorilla.sc/) and used 
brightly coloured fish as the stimuli instead of the usual arrows. Children were presented with a 
horizontal row of fish in the middle of the screen, see Fig. 2.2; they had to decide which way the 
central fish was swimming (left or right) and respond with a corresponding left or right key press 
(as in the Stroop above). Sometimes the central fish is surrounded by fish swimming in the same 
direction (congruent condition), sometimes the surrounding fish are swimming in the opposite 
direction (incongruent condition). Research with this paradigm has consistently shown that 
reaction times in congruent trials are quicker than in incongruent trials; this additional time taken 
to distinguish target from distractors is often referred to as ‘conflict resolution’ posited to be 
carried out by the ‘conflict (Anwyl-Irvine et al., 2020a; Eriksen, 1995; Massonnié, 2020; Rueda 
et al., 2004).   
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As with the Stroop, fixation times between trials varied randomly between 600 and 1400ms. For 
each trial, a fixation cross was displayed for 1700ms followed by the screen showing the fish, 
which remained on screen until a response was recorded. There were 12 practice trials, where 
children received immediate feedback, followed by four blocks of 24 trials each, with a pause 
between blocks; children pressed a key when they were ready to continue. 50% of trials were 
congruent, 50% incongruent and trials randomised the direction in which the central fish was 
swimming. Again, children were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Accuracy (proportion of correct trials) and reaction times (RTs) for correct responses were 
recorded.  
Working memory 
Verbal working memory 
This was tested with a backwards digit span task (St Clair-Thompson & Gathercole, 2006).  
Children were seated facing the researcher and had to repeat out loud, in reverse order, a list of 
numerical digits said out loud by the researcher. List length began with two digits and there were 
four trials at each list-length level. Children had to answer correctly on three or more trials to 
move on to the next level, in which list length increased by one digit. They kept going until they 
failed at two or more trials in a level. The total number of correct trials was recorded.  
Visuospatial working memory 
Children’s visuospatial working memory ability was assessed using a child-friendly, 
computerised variant (Morris, 2020) of the Corsi block task (Corsi, 1972). The design was 
similar to that used by Morales et al. (2013) though here a reverse recall was used. Participants, 
as before, were seated 50cm from a computer screen in a quiet room. They watched a frog make 
a series of jumps on a 3x3 grid of nine lily-pads (see Figure 2.3) and were instructed to click on 




Fig. 2. 3 Example stimulus for visuospatial working memory (VSWM) Corsi block task 
 
the lily-pads in reverse order, using the computer mouse, to indicate the lily pads where the frog 
had jumped. Children had up to 5 practice trials, with a sequence of 2 jumps, to make sure they 
understood the task, before moving on to the test trials. Test trials began with a sequence length 
of 2, with 4 trials at each level. Children progressed to the next level, in which the sequence 
length increased by 1 jump, if they answered at least 3 from the previous block correctly. They 
continued until they made 2 or more mistakes at any level. The total number of correct sequences 
was scored.  
Flexibility (switching) 
A test for switching was introduced only after the first outreach event. Based on a child-friendly 
version of the Wisconsin Dimensional Card Sort (Berg, 1948), children are shown two bivalent 
target cards (i.e., two colour types, two shape types), then must sort a newly presented card 
according to changing rules of colour and shape (Zelazo, 2006; Diamond & Kirkham, 2005). 
Since less than half the sample completed this test, it is not included in further analysis.  
Standardised tests of cognitive ability 
A verbal and a non-verbal measure of ability was assessed, primarily to benchmark the sample 
for cognitive ability across the age range. Both tests were assessed according to manual 
guidelines.  




Fig. 2. 4 Illustration of the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-III) 
 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale version 3 (BPVS-III) (Dunn et al., 1997), a test of 
receptive vocabulary, requires the child to choose which of four pictures corresponds to a word 
read aloud by the researcher. The words get progressively more challenging and testing stops 
when the child makes 8 errors within any block. Raw scores were recorded. BPVS-III norms for 
children 3-16 have a reliability of .91 (Dockrell & Marshall, 2015).  
 
Fig. 2. 5 Illustration of a Raven’s progressive matrices task 
 
Non-verbal abilities were measured using Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven, 2000) which 
require the child to select from a range of missing elements in an abstract pattern series. The test 
has split-half reliability of r = .85 for 5-8year old children (Carlson & Jensen, 1981). Raw scores 
were recorded. 
 




The results will be broken down into sub-sections. Firstly, the general cognitive ability data will 
be considered, by way of benchmarking the sample, since the tests used have norm scores and 
established developmental trajectories. Next, the constructs of creativity and EC will be 
considered separately, by examining consistency across different tests within each. Then 
development of creativity and EC will be considered, again separately, looking at the pattern of 
change across the age range. Finally, the relationship between creativity and EC will be 
examined. 
General cognitive ability 
The descriptive statistics for scores on the BPVS and Ravens are shown. Expected norm scores 
and their ranges for both tests are given on the basis of our sample’s mean age of 7.97 years.  
 Mean Norm score 
mean (75% CIs) 
SD Min Max 
BPVS 114.44 108 (85, 115) 26.03 29 157 
Ravens 27.63 25 (17, 33) 6.16 12 34 
Table 2. 2 Means, SDs and range of scores on BPVS and Ravens (raw scores) and norm 
equivalents 
 
Simple regression analyses were carried out to test whether, as expected, age predicted outcomes 
on each of these cognitive ability measures. Results clearly showed that it did for both. 
 B SE(b) β F(1,44) p R2 
BPVS 10.54 (7.52, 13.55) 1.49 .74 49.75 <.001 .55 
Raven’s 2.40 (1.65, 3.14) 3.04 .71 42.36 <.001 .51 
Table 2. 3 Simple regression analyses of age on each measure of cognitive ability 
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Constructs of creativity and EC 
Creativity tests 
Verbal creativity results pre-processing 
Since verbal creativity test data were also being collected for another study (looking at the effect 
of noise on verbal divergent thinking; Massonnié et al., 2019), each test was carried out in 
silence and in noise, with items counterbalanced. For the current analysis, only silence scores 
were used. To check there was no difference between items (i.e., between bottle and pencil for 
the AUT and between clouds and fog for Just Suppose) in any of the sub scores, independent 
samples T-tests were carried out. There was no significant difference between any of the sub 
scores. AUT fluency t(44)=1.43, p=.160; AUT flexibility t(44)=0.64, p=.530; AUT originality 
t(44)=0.69, p=.491; JS fluency t(44)=0.77, p=.443; JS flexibility t(44)=0.51, p=.625; JS 
originality t(44)=1.26, p=.217.  
AUT results 
All children came up with at least two ideas for alternative uses for everyday objects. There was 
wide variation in scores, particularly in fluency and flexibility, whereas originality scores were 
constrained by the method of scoring. An example of an answer scoring highly for originality for 
bottle was ‘use it as a stress ball’; a low scoring example was ‘flip it’. For pencil, a high scoring 
 Mean  SD Min Max 
Fluency 8.61 4.32 2 21 
Flexibility 6.87 3.46 0 17 
Originality 2.72 0.63 1 4 
Table 2. 4 Means, SDs and range of scores in AUT 
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example was ‘eat it if you’re dying of starvation’; a low scoring one was ‘poke holes in paper’. 
There was a very high level of correlation between fluency and flexibility r=.92, p<.001 while 
correlations with originality were lower and not significant: fluency/originality r=.12, p=.431, 
flexibility/originality r=.25, p=.092.  
Just suppose results 
 Mean  SD Min Max 
Fluency 11.13 6.37 1 34 
Flexibility 4.17 3.27 0 16 
Originality 8.61 5.72 0 29 
Table 2. 5 Means, SDs, and range of scores in Just Suppose test 
 
There was wide variation in performance for all sub measures but a very high level of correlation 
between them. Pearson’s correlations were: fluency/flexibility r=.82, p<.001, fluency/originality 
r=.95, p<.001 and flexibility/originality r=.84, p<.001. These highly correlated results made 
attempts to distinguish and interpret differences between fluency and originality more 
challenging. An example of a response receiving an originality point for ‘clouds’ was ‘You could 
make hammocks between the clouds’; one not receiving one was ‘Planes would get tangled up in 
the clouds.’ 
Correlations between the verbal creativity tests 
The two verbal creativity tests have different starting points – one stimulus is a concrete object 
while the other is an imagined situation. The following correlations give a sense of whether, 
despite these differences, the sub measures are tapping similar constructs in the two tests. The 
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correlational evidence suggests some solidity in the constructs of fluency and flexibility while 
the cross-test originality scores show a much weaker relationship.  
 JS flu JS flex JS orig 


















Table 2. 6 Correlations between sub measures across the two verbal creativity tests (Pearson’s r 
and corresponding probability estimates) 
 
 
Figural creativity results 
All children completed two out of three possible figural tests, with each being scored for fluency, 
originality, and elaboration. Total scores were simple sum scores from the two tests. In addition, 
the children’s total figural output (i.e., all their drawings together) was assessed for creative 
strengths, as previously described and according to the Torrance guidelines, to produce a 
‘creative strength’ score.  
 Mean SD Min Max 
Fluency 5.48 1.68 2 12 
Originality 4.28 1.87 1 11 
Elaboration 5.43 2.33 2 11 
Creative strength 2.78 2.19 0 9 
Table 2. 7 Means, SDs and range of scores in TTCT figural tests 
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Correlations between sub measures showed inconsistent relations. Some significant correlations 
are likely a by-product of scoring: for example, awarding strength scores (for various types of 
expressiveness) generally requires there to be a certain amount of detail in drawings, explaining 
the strong correlation with elaboration.  


















Figural elaboration    .65** 
<.001 
Table 2. 8 Pearson’s correlation coefficient and related significance levels for TTCT figural sub 
measures 
 
Creativity as a construct: correlations between different domains 
We next turn to a comparison of scores between the verbal and figural domain, to better 
understand the degree of domain generality of creativity in our sample. Again, the picture is 
mixed. Some sub measures are highly correlated across domains (e.g., figural elaboration with 
most verbal measures) while others appear quite separate; neither fluency nor originality in the 
figural domain is significantly related to its counterpart – or indeed any other sub measure -  in 
the verbal tests.  

























































Table 2. 9 Correlations between sub measures across verbal and figural domains. Pearson’s r and 
corresponding significance levels 
Executive Control  
Working memory  
Results for the two measures of working memory (visuospatial and verbal) are shown. 
Correlations between the two measures were significant and moderately high: Pearson’s r=.41, 
p<.001. 
 Mean SD Min Max 
VSWM  7.32 4.39 0 15 
VWM 8.24 2.85 0 13 
Table 2. 10 Means, SDs and range of scores for visuospatial and verbal working memory 
 




Pre-processing of inhibitory control measures 
Accuracy was at ceiling (>92% for congruent and incongruent trials) for both the Flanker and 
Stroop tasks so reaction times (RTs) for correct answers were used as the main measure for both 
tests. RTs shorter than 200ms were excluded as probable anticipatory reactions, being shorter 
than considered possible for the perception of the stimulus and generation of a response (Anwyl-
Irvine, 2020a; Whelan, 2008). RTs more than three standard deviations from the mean for each 
participant were also excluded so that extreme values did not affect results (Anwyl-Irvine, 
2020a; Whelan, 2008). 
There are different approaches in the use of RT measures to represent inhibitory control. For 
example, some researchers (Hobbiss, 2019; Levy et al., 2018) have found that the degree of 
individual RT variability is the best predictor of self-reported distraction in children. For current 
purposes, the traditional measure of ‘Stroop cost’ and ‘Flanker effect’ i.e., the difference in RT 
between incongruent and congruent trials, was used.  
Analyses of variance, with congruency as a within-subject factor, were carried out. For the 
Flanker task, RTs were significantly longer for incongruent (M = 941ms) than congruent (M = 
897ms) trials (F(1, 40) = 12.36, p = .001, η2p = .24). For the Stroop task, RTs were also longer 
for incongruent (M = 1048ms) than congruent (M = 968ms) trials (F(1, 40) = 38.45, p < .001, η2p 
= .50).  
For each participant, an RT cost score was calculated as the mean RT for correct incongruent 
trials minus the mean RT for correct congruent trials. Higher scores thus represent poorer 
inhibitory control (i.e., a relatively longer time is taken to overcome the prepotent sensory 
response in incongruent trials).  
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 Mean SD Min Max 
Stroop RT diff 75 90 -136 290 
Flanker RT diff 43 79 -50 352 
Table 2. 11 Means, SDs and range of scores (ms) for inhibitory control tests 
Pearson’s correlations were used to look at the relationship within and between measures of the 
two EC factors of inhibitory control and working memory. Results showed that tests within the 
same factor showed significant correlations while those between factors did not. The negative 
direction of correlations between WM and IC measures is to be expected given that high WM 
and low IC scores both represent better performance.  
 VSWM VWM Stroop Flanker 















Stroop RT diff    .31* 
 
.050 
Table 2. 12 Pearson’s correlations and significance values for EC tests 
 
Development: How do scores change with age? 
Creativity 
After carrying out checks for normality and examining scatterplots, to check that relationships 
were not best fit by non-linear functions, simple linear regressions were carried out to test 
whether age significantly predicted scores on each sub measure of both verbal and figural 
creativity tests. Results for each of the creativity measures are shown below, in Table 2.13 and 
Fig. 2.6. 
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 B (95% CI) SE(b) β F(1,44) p R2 
AUT fluency 0.24 (-0.48, 0.95) 0.36 .10 0.44 .512 .01 
AUT flexibility 0.48 (-0.08, 1.04) 0.28 .25 3.01 .090 .06 
AUT originality 0.15 (0.06, 0.25) 0.05 .44 10.56 .002 .19 
JS fluency 0.97 (-0.05, 1.99) 0.51 .28 3.65 .063 .06 
JS flexibility 0.56 (0.04, 1.08) 0.26 .31 4.66 .036 .10 
JS originality 0.75 (-0.17, 1.68) 0.46 .24 2.68 .109 .06 
Fig fluency 0.12 (-0.16, 0.40) 0.14 .13 0.75 .392 .02 
Fig originality 0.15 (-0.16, 0.46) 0.15 .14 0.94 .339 .02 
Fig elaboration 0.43 (0.06, 0.80) 0.18 .34 5.54 .023 .11 
Fig creative strength -0.06 (-0.43, 0.30) 1.48 -.05 0.11 .737 .00 
Table 2. 13 Simple regression analyses examining age (in years) as a predictor of each creativity 
variable.  
It is notable that AUT originality showed the clearest age-related improvement and was the only 
measure scored subjectively by external raters. As we have discussed previously, originality can 
be scored in terms of objective, statistical rarity or subjective rater scoring, with much debate as 
to best approaches. Further exploration of the effect of scoring method on AUT originality scores 
  





Fig. 2. 6 Scatterplots showing fluency (left) and originality (right) scores plotted against age, for 
AUT (top), JS (middle) and figural tests (bottom) 
 
was carried out. Following the first round of data collection (i.e., after the first outreach event) 
participating children (n=28) were also scored according to the frequency method i.e., through 
statistical frequency of responses. The sample size for frequency scoring should ideally be a lot 
bigger (100 or more is typical), to provide a sufficient number of responses to differentiate 
statistical rarity; the small numbers here mean the following was purely exploratory. 
Correlational analyses between the two different measures of originality found that they were not 
significantly correlated (r=.34, p=.073) using Pearson’s correlations, but non-parametric 
correlation (using Spearman’s) suggested that they were (r=.42, p=.027). A simple linear 
regression looking at whether age significantly predicted AUT originality scored by the 
frequency method found that, unlike with the rater scoring, it did not (b=0.19 (-0.58, 0.97), 
SE(b)=0.38, β=.10, F(1,26)=0.27, p=.608, R2=.01). The implications of this will be addressed in 
the discussion. 
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The other robust improvement over the age range was in figural elaboration, largely a measure of 
the amount of detail in drawings, an indicator of expected age-related progress. Flexibility in the 
JS test also showed significant improvement with age. 
EC 
Simple linear regressions sought to ascertain whether age significantly predicted scores for 
working memory and inhibitory control. Three of the four EC measures showed significant 
improvements with age. Performance on the Flanker did not significantly improve with age. 
 B SE(b) β F(1,44) p R2 
Verbal WM 0.87 (0.47, 1.27) 0.20 .56 19.67 <.001 .31 
Visuospatial WM 1.42 (0.74, 2.10) 0.33 .58 18.11 <.001 .34 
Flanker -9.59 (-23.00, 3.82) 6.64 -.22 2.09 .156 .05 
Stroop -16.58 (-31.68, -1.48) 7.48 -.33 4.91 .032 .11 
Table 2. 14 Simple linear regressions testing age prediction on each EC measure 
 
Relationship between EC and creativity measures 
The final step of the analysis was to consider the relationship between each EC and each 
creativity variable, controlling for age. Given the large number of variables considered, caution 
is advisable in interpreting findings - as with any case of exploratory study of multiple 
comparisons.  
Working memory and creativity 
Only AUT originality showed significant correlation with both WM tests. JS measures were 
piecemeal. None of the figural test sub measures showed significant correlations with WM. 
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 AUT JS Figural 














































Table 2. 15 Correlations between working memory and creativity measures. Pearson’s r and 
significance values, n=46 
 
Inhibitory control and creativity 
 AUT JS Figural 









































Table 2. 16 Correlations between inhibitory control and creativity measures. Pearson’s r and 
significant values, n=46 
The general picture was a lack of significant correlations between both inhibitory control 
measures and all creativity sub measures, both verbal and figural. The only exception was a 
significant moderate correlation between Flanker and figural originality. 
 




This study sought to better understand how EC and creativity are related, by examining 
correlations between components of each, in a cross-sectional study of 4-11year old children. 
The preliminary step was to investigate whether there were clear relationships at this 
componential level which would point to directions for more fine-grained investigation. Clear 
relationships, however, did not emerge. After using cognitive ability measures to validate the 
sample as typical for the age range, the constructs of EC and creativity were first examined 
separately. The EC measures showed strong correlations between different tests of the same 
construct (IC, WM) but no significant correlations between them. Performance on 3 out of 4 EC 
tests improved significantly with age. The creativity measures presented as more of a mosaic: 
there were inconsistencies in patterns of correlation between constructs (e.g., originality) and 
between tests both in the same (verbal) and in different domains. The majority of creativity 
measures did not show age related improvement. The mixed nature of the results for different 
sub measures meant that contemplating the relationship with EC raised questions of which scores 
to consider representative. From a theoretical point of view, it seems most reasonable to assume 
that a combination of noisiness of measures (particularly RT measures for EC and originality for 
creativity) and the small sample size are chiefly responsible for inconsistencies. In practice, the 
general pattern of correlations showed little discernible relationship between EC and creativity 
components. The exception was AUT originality which showed significant correlation with 
working memory. More detail and interrogation of these findings follows.  
Benchmarking the sample 
Performance on general cognitive ability tests served to validate the sample. Raw scores from 
both tests fell within the range set out by normed scores and, also in line with expectation, 
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improved significantly with age. A further validation, more specifically of performance on the 
AUT, comes indirectly from a comparison of findings in this study with a recent study in adults, 
using a very similar testing protocol (Wang et al., 2017). Results were consistent across both 
studies, although children’s scores in the present study were higher for both fluency and 
originality than their adult counterparts. 
 Current study Wang et al. (2017) 
Sample size 45 35 
Participants Children 5-11 Adults (Chinese undergraduates) 
AUT fluency 8.61 (2,21) (SD=4.32) 6.26 (2,12) (SD=2.97) 
AUT originality 2.72 (SD=0.62) 2.04 (SD=0.23) 
Table 2. 17 Comparison of results from current study with similar study in adults (Wang et al., 
2017). Scores, range (where given) and standard deviations are shown. 
 
Constructs of creativity and EC 
The purpose of deconstructing the creativity measures was to establish the best sub measures for 
use in further, more detailed research and to explore, based on theory, differences in how sub 
measures relate to EC components. Two outcomes could have clarified next steps: high 
correlation between specific sub measures (e.g., consistency in ‘originality’ or ‘fluency’ in 
different tests) would have bolstered the notion that, despite scoring differences, the originality 
measure represents a common underlying process, whose relationship with EC could be explored 
and even experimentally manipulated. Alternatively, high correlation between sub measures 
would have suggested a lack of discriminability between underlying processes and measures 
could have been collapsed into a composite ‘creativity’ score, encompassing quantity and 
quality. In practice, neither scenario transpired. Most verbal measures did show high correlation 
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but AUT originality did not, it stood alone – making it difficult to justify collapsing scores. But 
neither did originality scores show significant correlations across the different verbal tests, 
making it difficult to convincingly argue that it presented a process-consistent measure. Figural 
scores further complicated the picture. Elaboration served as a useful validation measure: older 
children are more dexterous, have more drawing experience, can work more quickly, and have a 
more developed sense of representational accuracy, all meaning age-related improvement would 
be expected (Kim, 2011) - and was seen here. Across domain, figural elaboration and AUT 
originality were the only measures which were significantly correlated – and which both showed 
clear age-related improvement. Within the figural domain, some correlations (or lack of them) 
can be explained by trade-offs – for instance, in a limited time, it might not be possible to 
produce both a large quantity of drawings and a high level of detail within them, explaining low 
correlation between elaboration and fluency. Similarly, it is hard to achieve scores for creative 
strengths without the elaboration needed to render a drawing humorous, emotional, or 
expressive, so correlations here were high. Fluency and originality are related partly as a 
consequence of the scoring method; originality scoring is by binary (i.e., a response either is or is 
not on the exclusion list) and an originality point can only be given to a drawing also scored for 
fluency, making certain results, such as high originality coupled with low fluency, impossible. It 
is also worth noting that, due to the large number of sub measures, multiple comparisons were 
made. If the data were nothing but noise, simple chance might lead us to expect to see some 
significant, but non-meaningful correlations. 
Before we evaluate where this leaves us, let us turn to the more straightforward EC findings. 
Working memory measures showed good construct correlation and significant age-related 
improvement, as expected (Anderson, 2002; Diamond, 2013; Huizinga et al., 2006). The two 
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inhibitory control tests were also significantly correlated, despite the fact they are tapping the 
different processes of selective attention (ignoring distractors) and cognitive inhibition (resolving 
internal conflict; Nigg, 2017), suggesting possible overlapping processes. The EC factors of WM 
and IC were not correlated in this sample, suggesting different mechanisms are in operation 
(Miyake et al., 2000). 
Development of creativity and EC 
Most measures we expected to see improve with age did: general cognitive ability, working 
memory and inhibitory control represented by the Stroop (Anderson, 2002; Diamond, 2013). 
Flanker did not improve with age. This finding was not completely unexpected given that others 
have found that IC shows less steady improvement with age (Huizinga et al., 2006; Lee et al., 
2013) particularly when measured by RT difference (since these measures compound the 
noisiness inherent in RT measures; Draheim et al., 2019). The finding here is in line with another 
study which found no age differences in RT difference in a similar inhibition test with children 
aged 6-9 years (Rueda et al., 2004). Ceiling level accuracy meant that the test was not highly 
sensitive to improvements with increasing age, though the differences that were seen indicated 
an upward trend in performance.  
Creativity improvements presented less clear age-related improvements. To some extent this 
was, again, not completely unexpected given evidence of turbulent progress (Barbot et al., 2016; 
Beghetto and Kaufman, 2014; Saggar et al., 2019). It was reassuring that measures known to 
show more consistent linear development with age, such as figural elaboration (Kim, 2011), did 
so here. The only other measure to show robust improvement with age was AUT originality. 
This exception will be explored below. 
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Why did so many of the sub measures not improve with age? Older children have more 
knowledge and experience, which should lead to greater fluency (Charles & Runco, 2001; Runco 
& Acar, 2010), but did not here, perhaps because they were more self-conscious about their ideas 
(Barbot et al., 2016) and self-edited. If so, did they conceive ideas and just not state them or did 
inhibition act earlier in the process? Their scores alone cannot tell us. It is also interesting that 
creative strength scores did not improve with age, despite the fact they were correlated with 
figural elaboration which did. Torrance himself (1974) emphasised the importance of the 
creative strength measure and expected it to improve with age, alongside better understanding of 
one’s own and others’ emotions. 
Improved with age No improvement Borderline 
AUT orig AUT flu JS flu 
Fig elab JS orig AUT flex 
VWM Fig orig JS flex 
VSWM Fig strength  
Stroop Flanker  
Table 2. 18 Summary of age-related changes for creativity tests/sub measures and EC tests 
 
Relationship between creativity and EC 
The correlations between working memory and creativity measures were generally non-
significant, with two exceptions: a significant positive association between AUT originality and 
verbal WM and a slightly larger (.42 vs. .36) negative one between Figural originality and verbal 
WM. This latter association might reflect the fact that working memory is less important in 
drawings since responses do not have to be kept in mind, but are offloaded to the environment 
(Barr et al., 2015) – although why this might only pertain to originality is unclear. Previous 
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literature would lead us to expect that fluency would be the most likely beneficiary of better 
verbal WM (Benedek et al., 2014a; De Dreu et al., 2012; Zabelina et al., 2019). The association 
between AUT originality and verbal WM could be explained by the fact that, to produce original 
answers, one has to keep in mind obvious answers, previous answers and some estimation of the 
sort of answers likely to be given by others (Beaty et al., 2014; Benedek et al., 2014b; De Dreu et 
al., 2014; Nusbaum et al., 2014; Zabelina et al., 2019). Alternatively, the correlation could be 
related to improved verbal elaboration, with age as a mediating factor (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011) 
and general knowledge and intelligence also playing a role (Benedek et al., 2014a; Kleibeuker et 
al., 2016; Lee & Therriault, 2013; Sternberg, 2006). Either explanation is imperfect in failing to 
explain why a similar relationship was not seen in the Just Suppose task, another test of verbal 
divergent thinking.  
There were mostly no significant correlations between both tests of inhibitory control and 
creativity sub measures. The only exception was a moderate association between Flanker and 
figural originality. Given the lack of any theoretical underpinning for such a relationship, it 
seems likely a chance result from the multiple comparisons. The lack of consistent relationships, 
positive or negative, between inhibitory control and creativity measures made it difficult to get 
clues to resolve the conflicting evidence base (Edl et al., 2014; Mayseless et al., 2015b; Radel et 
al., 2015).  
Indirect evidence regarding the relationship between creativity and EC comes from looking at 
their developmental trajectories. As we have seen, development of EC skills was shown, in 3 out 
of 4 tests, to improve steadily and significantly with age. The great majority of creativity sub 
measures did not show such improvement. If EC is an integral feature of creative thinking, this is 
an incongruous finding.  
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What have we learned? Conceptual and methodological considerations 
Divergent thinking tests 
With the experience of just one study, I can appreciate the debates that have raged about 
divergent thinking tests for more than half a century (Baer, 2011a, 2011b; Barbot et al., 2016; 
Cropley, 2000; Dietrich, 2007a, 2015; Kaufman, 2003; Kim, 2006, 2011, 2017; Plucker et al., 
2011; Runco, 2008; Runco et al., 1987, 2010; Silvia et al., 2008; Simonton, 2000; Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2001; Torrance, 1972; ). There is not space to go into all the intricacies. Instead, we 
will focus on three areas germane to this research since they affect what we are really interested 
in – namely, the creativity-relevant processes underlying test scores.  
Scoring issues 
AUT originality was the only verbal creativity measure which improved with age. Some argue 
that this is to be expected, since age-related gains in knowledge, intelligence and working 
memory will all contribute to greater originality (Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Benedek et al., 2014a; 
Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Sternberg, 2006). A problem with this argument is that it should 
equally apply to originality in the other verbal DT test – which showed no age-related 
improvement, and which was scored differently. AUT originality was the only measure 
subjectively scored by adult raters, something which could have affected outcomes (Runco, 
2008). Exploration of the effect of a different scoring method, based on an objective measure of 
rarity of responses showed no improvement with age. Although this exploration was not 
statistically robust, it nonetheless points to the need to treat findings from subjective measures 
with an extra degree of caution (Forthmann et al., 2020a; Plucker et al., 2014; Reiter-Palmon et 
al., 2019; Runco, 2008). Do adult raters score older children’s answers more highly because they 
are likely to be richer in detail (like figural elaboration, verbal elaboration improves with age; 
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Barbot et al., 2016)? Let’s take an example: one child, aged 10, gave as an AUT response for a 
plastic water bottle, ‘Dress it up as a Barbie and give it to your sister as a present.’ For this 
response she scored 4.75, one of the highest scores in the sample. Another child, aged 7, gave the 
response ‘Make a puppet’, which scored 3, just over the sample mean. Both have reimagined the 
plastic bottle as a lifelike toy figure. Is there really a difference in the originality of their 
responses? Or is the difference primarily one of elaboration?  
The problem here is the potential contamination of ‘originality’ (a sine qua non of creativity) 
with ‘elaboration’ (a contested component of it) and, more importantly for the current study, 
obfuscation of the true relationship of originality with EC components.  
Instruction issues 
For all DT tests, verbal and figural, children are given ambiguous instructions; the exact wording 
varies with task but consistently contains the idea of producing ‘as many interesting and unusual 
ideas as’ they can (Torrance, 1974; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). What is measured thus depends on 
how each child has chosen to interpret those instructions (Forthmann et al., 2016; Nusbaum et 
al., 2014). If they prioritise quality (‘interesting and unusual’), there needs to be more evaluation 
of ideas, checking each against expectations of what constitutes usual and boring. If on the other 
hand, they prioritise quantity as the key determinant of success (‘as many as you can’) the focus 
is firmly on maximising generation of ideas, with less, if any, need for their evaluation. These 
decisions are likely to differentially evoke EC in their realisation.  
The fluency/originality balance is of relevance not only to test scoring (Forthmann et al., 2016; 
Kim, 2006) but to creativity in the real world. While some see fluency and originality as 
antithetical, such that, in limited time, it is not possible to excel at both (Forthmann et al., 2016; 
Nusbaum et al., 2014), others, including many real-world creatives, suggest the optimal way to 
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achieve originality is via fluency; historiometric studies have found high productivity to be a 
characteristic feature of highly creative people (Simonton, 1999) e.g., Emily Dickinson wrote 
1800 poems in her lifetime but only published 10 (Emily Dickinson museum archive, 2018) and 
the twice Nobel winner, Linus Pauling, spelled it out, “The best way to have good ideas is to 
have lots of ideas and throw away the bad ones’ (correspondence with David Harker, 1961).  
Monolithic constructs 
In this study, creativity and EC were deconstructed to look in more detail at relationships 
between specific aspects of each. This deconstruction could go further. For EC, we looked at 
WM and IC but as has been shown (Nigg, 2017), there are at least 8 different kinds of inhibition, 
each of which might affect creativity differently. By way of illustration, the table below (Table 
2.19) uses responses given by children in this study to speculate about ways in which ‘failures’ 
of inhibitory control could have aided creative ideation.  
For EC measures, it is conceptually possible to break them down and empirically assess the new, 
more clearly defined components, because there is at least a degree of clarity in what the 
components represent in terms of cognitive function. What about creativity? Are its sub 
measures (fluency, originality, etc.) any more than approximations of quantity and quality, of 
abstruse relevance to brain processes (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010)? We have seen from examples 
that underlying scores can be achieved via a number of different cognitive pathways. Even if one 
could break them down more, it is unclear how this would illuminate means rather than ends.  
 
Chapter 2. Cross-sectional exploration of the relationship between creativity and EC across primary school ages 
115 
 
Table 2. 19 How ‘failures’ of inhibitory control could theoretically lead to ideational success 
 
Limitations 
Much of the discussion has already been given over to limitations in this type of study. In 
addition, here, were the small number of participants covering a wide age range, the omission of 
a test for flexibility and several issues concerning time. These ranged from the difficulty of 
having to stop children mid-flow whilst also maintaining an un-test-like environment, through to 
Type of inhibition How failure might facilitate ideation Example (from AUT bottle) 
Motor Embodiment might help ideation ‘You could balance it on your shoe’ 
Selective attention Distractions might spark ideas ‘The noises helped me think of an 
instrument’ 
Behavioural inhibition Emotional and physiological needs 
could be sources of ideas 
‘You could wee in it’ 
Social inhibition 
 
Lack of social self-consciousness 
could mean expression of more ideas 
‘You could squash it in someone’s 
face to annoy them’ 
Cognitive inhibition – 
proactive 
Overly broad suppression could rule 
out fruitful sub-categories  
‘You could use it to water flowers’ 
Cognitive inhibition – 
retroactive 
Previous ideas could lead to new ones ‘Make a torch…Make a shadow’ 
Interference control Over-blocking irrelevant items could 
rule out potential answers 
‘You could use it to make palm trees 
in a desert’ 
Oculomotor inhibition Visual search could prompt ideas ‘Use it to make a door handle’ 
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having to prompt children repeatedly over the 5 minutes of a verbal test when it was clear their 
enthusiasm had diminished after just 1 or 2. 
Conclusion and next steps 
In summary, this study sought evidence of clear relationships between EC and creativity 
components. Largely, these relationships were not found and even when they were (e.g., a 
significant correlation between VWM and AUT originality) there were reasons for misgivings as 
to their veracity. The findings suggest DT tests must be used in a more targeted way to examine 
creativity and we propose two potentially fruitful ways forward. The first is to use these tests, not 
as the means to examine differences between individuals, but to examine within-individual 
change in performance over time. In Chapter 5, we will do this, by means of a school-based 
training intervention which will seek to improve EC and then consider concomitant effects on 
creativity. Test-retest reliability is reasonably high (between .50 and .93 for TTCT; Kim, 2006) 
and consistencies in creative approach are more likely within the same individual.  
The second is more of a leap; children’s responses in a DT test contain a great deal more than the 
substrate for a score, they contain detail and potentially useful ‘thought probes’ for information 
about the processes underlying their origination. So, the second approach to a potentially 
productive use of creativity tests is not to answer the question ‘How creative is this child?’ but to 
ask, ‘How is this child creative?’ It is to this question that the following qualitative investigation 
will now turn. 
 
  








Chapter 3. A qualitative analysis of how EC processes contribute to creativity in children 
aged 6 to 10 
  




In this section, I will briefly outline the need for qualitative work to fully confront the thesis 
topic, then focus more tightly on the reasoning behind the specific methodology used here. The 
broader issues, particularly regarding epistemological consistency, will be touched on, but these 
will be tackled more fully in the next chapter, when quantitative and qualitative findings come 
together. The methodology used here will be justified both from a theoretical position and a 
practical one, with reference to exploratory pilot studies. As regards the ongoing debate about the 
value of first-person reports in giving insight into cognitive processes, I will present the sceptical 
position, the refutations of others who reject its pessimistic conclusions and steps I have taken 
here to maximise the validity of verbal reports as a route to thought processes.  
Why a qualitative study? 
The previous chapter highlighted many well-known problems with quantitative lab tests for 
creativity (Forthmann et al., 2020a; Lubart & Besancon, 2017; Plucker et al., 2004; Reiter-
Palmon et al., 2019; Runco & Charles, 1993; Runco, 2008; Silvia et al., 2008). These include 
issues caused by the test-like settings themselves, such as the difficulty producing creativity on 
demand and stress affecting creativity, time constraints, poor correlation between test items, lack 
of intrinsic motivation and an undue focus on divergent thinking. In addition, much good data 
from these tests are effectively wasted when interesting answers, potentially revealing of 
underlying mechanisms, are converted into binary scores. There are also problems, which have 
been previously discussed (Anderson, 2002; Cepeda et al., 2001; Luna et al., 2004; Wallisch et 
al., 2018) with lab tests of EC. These include there being many aspects to each EC factor but 
rarely time to test them all, ecological validity issues, poor correlations between test items and 
the conceptual problem of whether small, focused computer-based tasks (e.g., for ‘switching 
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flexibility’) are reliable guides to the broader implementation of control / switching which might 
be germane to our research questions.  
The problems with creativity and EC measures become still more onerous when we consider the 
relationship between these constructs during the creative process. Their relationship is likely to 
be dynamic, altered by task factors, individual factors such as motivation and personality, and 
environmental context (Amabile & Pillemer, 2012; Amer et al., 2016; Barr et al., 2015; 
Ivancovsky et al., 2018; Pinho et al., 2016). Static behavioural tests are not equipped to capture 
this dynamism and complexity. Mapping test outcomes (measured as products) to processes 
depends on the ingredients of that process having been comprehensively charted, something 
which is distinctly not the case for the creative process in children. 
The strength of qualitative research is in providing the tools to look at process. It can reflect the 
unfolding of a thought process over time, be it seconds, minutes, or hours. This contrasts with 
quantitative creativity studies, in which time is often seen as an irksome complicating factor. 
Qualitative analysis allows us to consider both micro and macro levels. We can consider details 
within a child’s specific response to a specific question and we can analyse their entire set of 
responses, to interpret clues at a different level: did their approach vary at different times or in 
different contexts? While quantitative research can help us answer questions about what children 
did, qualitative can give us insight into how they did it. Exploiting the benefits of both 
approaches carries the potential advantage of convergent evidence from diverse sources, while 
simultaneously reducing the limitations inherent in any single method (Johnson et al., 2007).  
Not everyone would agree with this position. Some suggest that the positivist, scientific 
approach which underlies much quantitative research is simply incompatible with the 
interpretive, constructivist approach characterising qualitative research (Yardley & Bishop, 
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2008). However, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative is far from black and white. 
Rather these are shorthand terms for a whole array of different methodologies and 
epistemologies (Midgley, 2006) with as much diversity within the categories as between them 
(Hammersley, 1996). This is particularly true for creativity research, where a ‘pure’ quantitative 
approach is unattainable: subjectivity and value judgements are, simply to judge what counts as 
creative, a definitional part of it. Throughout this thesis, my approach is one of pragmatism 
(Fishman, 1999; Johnson et al., 2007; Morgan, 2014; Yardley & Bishop, 2008), a 
methodological approach (discussed more fully in the next chapter) that aims to transcend the 
dualisms of subjectivity/objectivity, induction/deduction, and specificity/generalisability. As 
Morgan expresses it, “In a pragmatic approach, there is no problem with asserting both that there 
is a single ‘real world’ and that all individuals have their own unique interpretations of that 
world” (Morgan, 2014, p. 72). Every method conceals some things and reveals others (Yardley 
& Bishop, 2008) and we must only ask what we can learn from each (Eisner, 2003) and, as 
Saldana (2015) suggests, take as our starting point the best methods to research the questions we 
are interested in.  
Children’s verbal reports as data  
Do children have the abilities necessary to report on their thought processes? A prerequisite for 
qualitative methodologies resting on verbal report is that the target is a deliberative phenomenon. 
Recent research has challenged the orthodoxy that metacognitive awareness emerges at 8-10 
years (Whitebread et al., 2010), suggesting rather that children as young as 3-5 use self-
regulation strategies (Whitebread et al., 2009). Verbal qualitative techniques have been shown to 
be an effective means, in terms of producing meaningful data, of assessing them in children of 
primary school age (Meier & Vogt, 2015; Morgan et al., 2007; Vandevelde et al., 2015).  
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Two qualitative techniques were piloted to evaluate their effectiveness in providing insight into 
children’s thought processes as they created. The ‘think aloud’ protocol (Ward & Traweek, 
1993) involves continuous out-loud verbal expression of thoughts concurrent with task 
completion (Sowden et al., 2020); it has been used previously in the assessment of creativity 
(Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Gilhooly et al., 2007) and with children (Camp et al., 1977; Davey et 
al., 1993) though its use in young children is limited (Vandevelde et al., 2015).  
The other method tested was stimulated recall (Bloom, 1953; Calderhead, 1981; Després, 2021; 
Lodge et al., 2000; Morgan et al., 2007). The method is underpinned by the idea that people can 
vividly relive a situation when they are presented with sufficient cues to the stimuli which 
characterised the original (Bloom, 1953); the technique often involves the use of audio or video 
recordings to aid recall (Després, 2021; Henderson & Tallman, 2006). It too has been 
successfully used in children (DeWitt & Osborne 2010; Järvelä & Volet, 2004; Lyle, 2003; 
Määttä & Järvelä, 2013; Meier & Vogt, 2015). Here, both the piece of work produced (e.g., a 
picture) and the video data served as stimuli for a semi-structured interview immediately after 
completion of the work.  
The pilot work pointed to stimulated recall as the more effective tool for this study. While think 
aloud might be useful when studying clearly delineated activities (e.g., thinking aloud while 
solving arithmetic problems), in pilot studies here, children had great difficulty maintaining the 
sort of focus required for an open-ended creativity task while simultaneously reporting their 
thoughts. The effect was that the task itself took on different features (most noticeably, a 
reduction in productivity) compared to when no think aloud was involved. This is problematic 
because, as will be seen later, in Chapters 5-7, we will seek to compare findings from qualitative 
and quantitative data derived from the same tests. We wish to ensure that the processes evoked in 
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the qualitative interviews are equivalent to those at work when tests are being used to generate 
quantitative findings – in short, to compare like with like.  
Specific features of stimulated recall can help maximise its validity. Morgan and team used 
stimulated recall to study classroom learning in children aged 3 to 7. They recommend that 
interviews be conducted as soon as possible after the session (ideally within 48 hours), that only 
individuals rather than groups should be interviewed and that children be given some agency 
over playback (Morgan et al., 2007). Meier and Vogt (2015), who used a combination of 
inductive and deductive approaches for their analysis (a similar approach to the one that will be 
taken here) further emphasise that questions need to be authentic, with researchers genuinely 
open to any response; children must not be given the impression that any answer might be right 
or wrong.  
Scepticism and refutation: can first person reports give insight into cognitive processes? 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, discussion of the reliability of first-person reports as 
instruments for assessing cognitive processes has been a vexed one in psychology, and one we 
need to confront. Since Nisbett and Wilson’s stark conclusion that ‘There may be little or no 
direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes’ (1977, p. 231), many 
psychologists have written off introspective tools altogether. Is such pessimism justified? 
Nisbett and Wilson’s work is comprised of both a review of literature and their own large set of 
novel experiments. They begin by reviewing a hefty body of introspection-relevant evidence 
from diverse sources. These include cognitive dissonance studies (e.g., Zimbardo et al., 1966) in 
which participants must seek to justify acting on instructions to do essentially unpleasant things 
(such as administering electric shocks) and in so doing alter their explanations; they include 
complex psychosocial experiments (e.g., Goethals & Rechman, 1973) where participants are 
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manipulated into dramatically changing their attitudes (in this case about whether children 
should be bused out of their locales for school in order to reduce racial segregation) but who then 
fail to acknowledge any attitude shift; and they include problem-solving experiments in which 
participants are given enormous clues to help them solve the problem (e.g., swinging a rope to 
give a clue how to solve Maier’s two string problem) which they nearly all fail to acknowledge 
in their explanations of their success (Maier, 1931).  
The validity of many of these experiments can be questioned on the basis of ethics, unfair 
manipulation, ego-involvement, pressures to abide by social norms and more - and a strength of 
this paper is that Nisbett and Wilson do precisely that, before proceeding to devise a raft of their 
own new experiments, free from all these problems, to prove the same point - that people’s self-
reports are demonstrably erroneous. Though perhaps theirs are not entirely problem-free; one 
experiment involved asking participants to explain their preferences for stockings and 
nightgowns in a lingerie department - an environment loaded with social unease. Others involved 
tapping into unconscious biases (which are often socially problematic to report) and most 
involve a high level of external manipulation. Most importantly though, all involve asking 
participants to report on the ‘whys’ rather than the ‘hows’ of their thinking – in other words, to 
justify rather than to describe. In their conclusions, Nisbett and Wilson state, “We also wish to 
acknowledge that the studies do not suffice to show that people could never be accurate about the 
processes involved. To do so would require ecologically meaningless but theoretically interesting 
procedures such as interrupting a process at the very moment it was occurring, alerting subjects 
to pay careful attention to their cognitive processes, coaching them in introspective procedures, 
and so on” (p. 246, italics in original).  
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Contemporary researchers have taken up the use of just such ‘theoretically interesting 
procedures’ and honed and developed tools to make meaningful use of introspective reports to 
study cognition (Braboszcz, 2012; Braboszcz & Delorm, 2012; Fazelpour & Thompson, 2015; 
Petitmengin, 2006; Petitmengin & Lachaux, 2013; Petitmengin et al., 2009, 2013). In a 
persuasive study, Petitmengin and colleagues (2013) reproduced protocols developed by 
Johansson and team (2005) which aimed to consolidate and build on the ideas of Nisbett and 
Wilson. Their (Johansson and team’s) study involved showing participants paired sets of pictures 
of women’s faces and asking them which one in each pair they found most attractive. In the 
protocol, participants are then reshown the picture and asked to explain the reasons for their 
choice - but in some cases, the picture they are shown for this explanation phase has been 
swapped i.e., it is in fact the face they did not choose. In 73% of cases, participants fail to spot 
the substitution and go on to give explanations based on the choice they did not make. The other 
27% spot the substitution. Petitmengin’s team, using the same procedures and even the same set 
of pictures as Johansson et al., introduced a new condition in which an ‘elicitation interview’ was 
carried out between making the choice and being asked to explain it, for one of the participant 
groups. The rationale for the technique, according to the authors, is that “our natural tendency” 
when asked to describe a cognitive process, “is to slip surreptitiously from the description of our 
actual experience toward the verbalisation of justifications, beliefs, explanations, generalisations 
and abstract knowledge about our experience” (Petitmengin et al., 2013, p.656) but that this 
tendency can be avoided through detailed elicitation of the actual process. By using specific 
prompts and questions, participants can be guided to avoid generalities and stay focused on 
thoughts situated in a specific time and space. ‘Why?’ questions are avoided, with questioning 
instead along the lines, ‘When you see the pictures, what happens?...What happens after 
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this?...When you look at the face on the right, what do you look at first?’ and so on. In other 
words, it is firmly description rather than interpretation or justification which is sought. Applying 
this technique to the Johansson team’s protocols, Petitmengin’s team found that their control 
group (i.e., those without the elicitation interview) detected the manipulation at very similar rates 
to the original Johansson study, but with the elicitation interview, the detection rate was 80%. 
The conclusion from this and other similar work is that, although our naïve descriptions of our 
decision making are often inaccurate, they can be improved with training: verbal reports can be 
informative if properly elicited. Indeed, similar work has been coupled with neuroimaging to 
gain insight into mental functions including consciousness in the field of neurophenomenology 
(Bagdasaryan, 2013; Fazelpour & Thompson, 2015; Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Varela, 1996). For 
the current work, there are some further points of relevance: 
• some of the habits which can make reports inaccurate (i.e., sense of social norms and 
expectations) might be less developed – and so less of a problem - in children  
• there is likely to be a difference between thought processes which involve EC (often 
deliberate, well explicated) and those which do not (more likely to be spontaneous, 
unconscious) in terms of their immediate accessibility to verbal report, something which 
can be exploited to aid differentiation between EC-dependent and EC-independent 
processes in the current work 
• in the current research, children are spontaneously producing a new creative work, for 
which there is no prototype and no expectation, external or internal, so there is no 
obvious recourse to norms-based justifications  
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Aims and objectives 
The primary aim of the study was to assess, using children’s own descriptions, the extent and 
nature of involvement of executive control in their creative process. To be clear, even though this 
study developed from a perceived deficiency of divergent thinking tests, the goal here was to 
look more broadly at executive involvement in the full creative process, in a naturalistic setting, 
with a task that children were highly engaged in. The goal was not to assess EC involvement 
solely in DT tests but rather to avoid many of the shortcomings of lab-based studies through not 
imposing time limits, maximising motivation, and agency by allowing children to select the 
domain, materials, and stimuli and in having no judgement of the finished work. At the same 
time, it was important to ensure that the task met criteria for creativity by being novel (ensured 
by the use of the ‘sparks’ described below, which children had never seen before) and valuable 
(in meeting the goal of producing a piece of work according to the instructions).  
The subsequent thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) combined an exploratory approach, 
based on the fact that children’s own accounts and experience is not currently well described in 
the literature, with a theoretical approach, based on the fact that certain features of the creative 
processes well documented in adults are likely also to occur in children. The analysis was, as 
counselled by Braun and Clarke, ‘grounded in’, yet ‘going beyond’ the data; that is, it was 
analysis rather than simple description. As far as I know, this is the first study which has used a 
stimulated recall technique to evoke children’s accounts of their creative process. 
 




Research design overview 
Fourteen children were interviewed. The children, drawn from a larger sample who had already 
completed lab tests for creativity and EF (the ‘Bright Sparks’ sample presented in Chapter 2), 
chose whether to do a storytelling or a drawing activity and were given ‘sparks’ to ensure that 
their produced work was novel. They could complete their chosen creative activity with minimal 
rules and an explicit lack of time constraint and were videotaped doing it. Immediately 
afterwards, they were interviewed about their work, using both the playback of the video, the 
sparks and their picture or story as stimuli to prompt their recall of their thoughts at the time of 
execution. Interviews, which were audio-recorded, were subsequently transcribed and analysed 
within a theoretically grounded thematic analysis framework.  
This task design was chosen to ensure both that children were well motivated for the task and 
that they had enough time to become immersed in it. The interview set-up was designed to strike 
a balance between not interfering during the creative process itself but minimising the time lag 
between engaging in the process and recalling the thoughts had while doing it. The choice of 
analysis was based on two main factors. Firstly, theoretical thematic analysis sought a balance 
between deduction from a robust theoretical foundation built on the adult evidence and induction 
based on an openness to the possibility that children might give accounts or insights not 
predicted by the adult literature. Secondly, given this study sits within a mixed methods 
approach, it was based on epistemological consistency across the qualitative and quantitative 
work – namely, a pragmatic approach which posits that access to reality is always mediated by 
analysis involving at least some degree of interpretation (Morgan, 2014).  
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Recruitment and participants 
The children involved had all previously participated in the Bright Sparks event, at which parents 
had been asked whether they would like to be contacted about further research opportunities. All 
parents who had expressed an interest were contacted by email and further telephone 
conversations arranged with those who responded positively. During the phone calls, I talked 
through the study in terms of its purpose and logistics and gave parents the chance to raise any 
questions or concerns. Parents then discussed the study with their child and responded to say 
whether they would like to go ahead. In all but one case, children chose to be interviewed at 
home, at weekends or early evenings after school; the final child was interviewed in a room in 
the university since her parent worked nearby. 
In total, fourteen children took part, 4 boys and 10 girls. The socioeconomic status of their 
families (as measured by maternal education) ranged from those who had left education after 
secondary school to those with post graduate level education (Hackman et al., 2015). They were 
all neurotypically developing and none had statements of educational need. Their age ranged 
from 6 to 10. Details are shown in Table 3.1. 
Children were told at the point of commencing that the study was attempting to understand their 
creative process and that they were the experts, since only they knew what was in their heads. It 
was emphasised that there were no wrong answers. Efforts were taken to ensure that they felt not 
only comfortable but empowered, through giving them agency in choice of materials, domain, 
timing, and choice of location. The details of what would happen were carefully explained and 
time was given for children to ask any questions they had. Effort was taken to put children at 
their ease; this was made easier because we had met before at the Bright Sparks outreach event 
and they expressed positive memories of that experience. I took time to chat with them 




Table 3. 1 Description of participants in qualitative study. SES measure based on maternal 
education scale 1 to 5. Pseudonyms were names chosen by the children to protect their identities. 
 
 
beforehand and create a relaxed environment, for example by letting them play with the video 
camera and audio recorder and having them select and set out drawing materials etc. Parents or 
carers generally stayed in a neighbouring room or were doing chores around the house while the 
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study took place so only myself and the child were present during both the drawing / storytelling 
and the subsequent interview. In one case, a parent asked to sit in during the interview stage, and 
in another, a child who spoke English as a second language called upon a parent to help with 
some tricky translation. 
All the children were given a craft activity book as a thank you for taking part as well as a 
certificate; these were both given at the end of the session. In order to protect their identities, all 
children chose their own pseudonyms.  
Ethics and data protection 
Written consent was first sought from parents/guardians once they fully understood what was 
involved. On the day of testing, verbal consent was also sought from the children. They were 
reminded that they could stop at any time without having to give a reason. 
All data were stored, in line with BPS guidelines and General Data Protection Regulations 2018, 
on an encrypted drive to which only I knew the password. Physical materials were kept in a 
locked filing cabinet to which only I had access. Data issues were fully discussed with 
parents/guardians. 
The research received ethical approval from the Departmental Ethics Committee, Department of 
Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College University of London, approval number 161762. 
Testing protocol 
The children were asked if they would prefer to do a storytelling or a drawing activity. For both, 
I told the children that I would like them to make something new and creative and that they 
would have as long as they wanted to work on it. I explained that to help them come up with 
ideas I had brought some idea ‘sparks.’ These were picture stimuli, selected based on their 
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frequent appearance in children’s stories, produced as colourful, visually appealing versions. The 
images are included in the Appendix. They were presented on small cards which the children 
could handle. The stimuli fell into four groups: 
• Places: a castle, a house, a tepee, mountains 
• Animals: a lion, a parrot, a frog, a camel 
• Objects: a present, a candle, a crown, a cake 
• Imaginary characters: a witch, a mermaid, an alien, a dragon 
The children were presented with one group at a time and invited to choose one item from each, 
to make four items in all – a place, an animal, an object, and an imaginary character. For the 
storytelling activity, the sparks were fully recognisable pictures. For the drawing activity, they 
were evocative shapes (see Appendix) which might suggest the intended target (e.g., a lion) or 
something else and were chosen following earlier piloting (with a different group of children) 
using simple word equivalents of the pictures. The piloting showed up two problems: firstly, the 
children found the word cards less appealing and secondly the children became preoccupied with 
veracity of reproduction (“I won’t choose that because I don’t know how to draw a castle”). The 
use of the more enigmatic shapes got around both problems as well, as will be seen later, as 
providing some rich ground for studying divergent thinking. 
In practice, the selection and choice of stimuli were not strict rules. In some cases, children 
wanted two from one set, or none from another and that was perfectly acceptable. I also 
explained that how they used the ‘sparks’ was entirely up to them – if the spark led to another 
thought, that was perfectly ok, that was why they were called ‘sparks’ – they might light up 
something else. Equally, if they wanted to use the sparks as they were, that was also totally 
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acceptable. The primary guiding principle was to make sure that children were motivated. 
Secondarily, the sparks encouraged at least some degree of novelty (as opposed to the children 
recreating a story or drawing entirely from memory). 
The children carried out their activity without any interruption from me and they told me when 
they had finished. Including the time taken to view and select ‘sparks’, the storytelling usually 
lasted for 15-20 minutes and the drawing for 30-45 minutes. Example stories and drawings are in 
the Appendix. 
Data collection procedures 
The first stage of data collection was making the video which would form the basis for the 
subsequent stimulated recall session. While the children were engaged in their creative activity, 
they were filmed on one camera for the storytelling or on two cameras if they chose to draw. For 
the drawing, one camera was positioned on a tripod capturing a shot wide enough to include both 
the child and their evolving picture (for future reference during the analysis phase). The second 
camera sought to reproduce as closely as possible the child’s own point of view (POV) while 
they were doing the drawing. This camera was usually handheld and positioned behind the child, 
to frame both their drawing hand and the wider canvas. It was this second camera which was 
used for the subsequent stimulated recall interview. In the case of storytelling, the camera was 
positioned as discretely as possible (to minimise children’s self-consciousness), close to me, on a 
mid-shot (head to waist level) to capture story narration and any gesticulations. This first stage of 
data collection was for the sole purpose of gathering the material on which to base the interview, 
which would then become the primary data source. 
The second stage of data collection took the form of a semi-structured interview carried out 
immediately after completion of the creative work. The interview was audio-recorded on a small 
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portable device. The POV video was replayed on a projector direct from the camera onto a wall 
(usually a source of great fascination) and children were encouraged to ask to stop at any point 
during the playback to talk about their thinking. I also stopped the tape to ask them questions. At 
other times, for example if there was a long period of colouring in, the video would continue 
running in the background alongside the interview. A core list of questions was asked of all 
participants; these are included in the Appendix; other questions were in reaction to specific 
responses from each child.  
The emphasis in the questions was on process rather than explanation – ‘How? What? When?’ 
rather than ‘Why?’ questions. Children were guided not to focus on why they had made 
particular decisions or to justify anything that they had done, but rather to focus on the 
mechanics and dynamics of where particular thoughts came from, how one idea led on to 
another, the order in which things happened in their brains and so on. Except for one very quiet 
child, the children seemed to be enthusiastic, able, and willing to engage at this level and their 
descriptions were fluent and rich. Children seemed to enjoy the novelty of being asked this sort 
of detailed, process question; one child even remarking rather ruefully, ‘Adults never usually ask 
this type of thing’.  
The whole process, including production of the creative work and the interview took between 90 
and 150 minutes, with 2 hours being the average length of time. Each child was seen on one 
occasion only. There was a short follow up, carried out by telephone or email, to reiterate thanks 
and occasionally check a detail such as a date of birth or the spelling of a pseudonym.  
The primary data were the interview and its transcript. Secondary data included the creative 
work itself (i.e., the picture or story produced), the stimuli selected as ‘sparks’, the video of the 
child producing the work, field notes taken at the time (reflecting on contemporaneous 
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observations and broader contextual cues such as the environment, noise and other distractions) 
and familiarisation notes taken at the time of producing the transcripts. 
Analytical method 
The analysis involved several stages which built up iteratively and recursively. The first stage 
involved listening back to the interview recordings three or four times before transcribing them 
in full. After each transcript was written, a familiarisation document recorded the most salient 
points arising from the interview, noted aspects hard to capture in words such as tone of voice or 
signs of fidgeting and gave a short account of first impressions. Transcripts were then printed, 
line-numbered and centred to leave space on each side for notetaking in the subsequent analysis. 
All analysis was initially done by hand (i.e., without qualitative analysis software tools). The 
following section describes the process in its entirety. 
The first step was to read through the whole transcript. In some cases, several weeks had passed 
between interview and analysis. The first (left side) stage of analysis involved going through the 
whole script one line at a time, recording everything evoked by each line. Sometimes this was an 
interpretation of what the child meant, sometimes a question it prompted or a memory of what 
the child was doing at the time, or occasionally a comment about how a particular line might fit 
(or not) with other aspects of that child’s account. This was an open, unfettered, comprehensive 
process, written in free-flowing prose, which was a useful way of corralling all the secondary 
data sources outlined above into the primary data as a record. This process could extend to 
several days’ work for each interview.  
The second (right side) analysis began with a clear focus on the research question: How do 
control processes contribute, positively or negatively, to X’s creativity? Again, the process 
involved dissecting the script line by line, but this time with a spotlight on how the child’s 
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account revealed something about the influence of control processes. In this stage, unlike the 
first, there were sometimes passages where nothing was noted because nothing helped to answer 
the research question. The nature of the record here was a shorthand, a brief description of what 
a line conveyed; some researchers might refer to it as a ‘code’, but I prefer the term ‘description’, 
as less clinically cold. 
I should report that this was not the way I initially intended to analyse data. I had spent some 
time before data collection developing an ‘a priori’ framework for coding (included in the 
Appendix). When analysing the data though, applying these codes felt more a rather coarse 
labelling exercise than an analysis. Moreover, starting with the children’s actual words often 
better captured their experience of the process than a code. For example, several children 
referred to ideas ‘popping up’ or ‘popping into’ their heads, to describe the experience of having 
ideas appear spontaneously without deliberate effort, technique, or strategy. Using descriptions 
such as those, which served both to address the research question and to represent children’s 
words more directly, gave a substrate for analysis with greater authenticity and depth.  
The purpose of thematic analysis is to identify and understand recurrent patterns which occur 
across data sets – within an individual and between them. Here, the units of analysis were 
generally phrases though sometimes whole sentences and even whole transcripts were 
considered, since this analytical method allows ‘zooming out’ as well as ‘zooming in’. For 
example, an account might, in one part of the interview, describe high involvement of control 
processes when planning what to do, but then, in another part of the interview, describe low 
involvement or even processes apparently exempt from control, for example while telling the 
story or drawing. In such instances, descriptions might emerge not from the child’s words per se, 
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but from a comparison of their accounts at different times. This is one way in which the dynamic 
nature of the relationship between control processes and creativity could be captured.  
After completing all the descriptions and referring back to the secondary data sources and the 
‘left side’ notes to ensure nothing had been omitted, they were transferred to an excel document, 
with the columns: page number, line number, description, and relevant quote from transcript. 
Quotes which were subject to more than one interpretive description were documented twice 
(this was a relatively rare occurrence). After repeated readings, descriptions were gradually 
brought together into themes of similar meaning.  
The subsequent analytic stages involved a recursive shuttling between descriptions and themes, 
refining, renaming, and finessing themes and checking the best fit of descriptions within each 
theme. Theme descriptions developed over time, with balder descriptions (e.g., ‘Excessive focus 
can block ideation’) gradually maturing into more evocative wording, often flavoured with 
children’s descriptions (e.g., ‘Don’t think…act’). Some descriptions would be left, even late on 
in the process, without thematic homes. This meant three possible outcomes: the orphan 
description leading to a regrouping and renaming of themes to allow it to fit; the orphan 
description, in capturing something vital not yet encapsulated in another theme, being elevated to 
theme status itself (an example of this was for Snowy and the theme ‘Go in with eyes open, only 
later switch on judgement’); or the orphan description being deemed an idiosyncratic or 
uninformative one-off, in which case it being dropped from further analysis (an example was 
‘Remembering and applying a creative rule from a teacher’).  
This process normally resulted in the production of between 9 and 15 themes per child. The next 
stage of the analysis again involved a recursive process to group themes into fewer, meaningful 
over-arching themes – the primary themes. The process is a more contained version of the 
Chapter 3. A qualitative analysis of how EC processes contribute to creativity in children aged 6 to 10 
137 
 
preceding one, in the sense that the numbers are much smaller. The final number of these 
primary, over-arching themes was between 3 and 5 per child.  
 
Fig. 3. 1 Levels of analysis from raw interview data to final themes 
 
Once the analysis for a child was complete, a summary document was produced which included 
a tree diagram showing their primary themes, the secondary themes which comprised them and a 
quote to illustrate the essence of that theme. In addition, an idiographic narrative was created for 
each child, with illustrative quotes focused on the research question: How do control process 
contribute, positively or negatively, to this child’s creativity? Four illustrative idiographic 
narratives follow in the Findings section and the remaining 10 are in the Appendix.  
As the analysis proceeded through multiple children, there evolved a more reciprocal 
relationship between induction and deduction and between themes and descriptions. In other 
words, as there was more familiarity with the material and an observation of recurring themes, it 
became possible to ‘see’ a theme quite early on in analysis and to spot descriptions which would 
fit within it. Obviously, one must be slightly cautious of this approach and continue to be 
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of descriptions to them. The final stage of the analysis involved pooling the data from all the 
children to see similarities and differences across their accounts and to draw out the group level 
primary and secondary themes.  
Methodological integrity 
Given there remains scepticism regarding the validity of introspective techniques applied to 
cognitive thought and that this type of approach with children is novel, I wanted some way of 
‘stress testing’ my data. I developed a checklist, ‘The 7 Cs’, to aid a critical approach to 
assessing the validity of the data. I would ask whether each child’s data was sound in terms of: 
• Cooperation. Was the child willingly and happily involved? 
• Consistency. Did the child’s account at different times match up? 
• Confirmation. Did their accounts concur with secondary evidence (e.g., the video 
evidence demonstrating the order in which events occurred)? 
• Corroboration. Did the child’s account corroborate well-evidenced descriptions in the 
creativity literature (e.g., functional fixity)? 
• Contradiction. Did the child correct my version of their account, thereby showing a 
greater degree of certainty of their own?  
• Coherence. Did the child’s responses make sense? 
• Confidence. Did the child articulate their thoughts with certainty? 
The 7Cs were used as a general guide in checking each child’s account. All seven were not 
necessarily present in every account (sometimes there were not examples to test, for example, 
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‘contradiction’) but there were always at least five. Perhaps more importantly, the process of 
checking meant that validity was under regular critical review.  
 
Findings and analysis 
The analysis distinguished three primary themes into which children’s thought processes fell. I 
will use these to frame the presentation of the results, the analysis and discussion which follows.  
• First are those descriptions of thought which appear to be spontaneous, free-wheeling, 
and uncontrolled. Ideas, refinements, or adaptations arise without deliberate effort, from 
the senses, from memory or from new associations being spontaneously made.  
• Second, there are those descriptions of thought which appear controlled or focused; these 
are ideas being deliberately elaborated, planned out, evaluated, adapted, or even formed 
anew in a deliberate, strategic way.  
• Third is the category that describes processes concerned in various ways with adjusting 
the balance between spontaneous and controlled processes; these include managing and 
adapting constraints, switching between spontaneous and controlled processes either 
spontaneously or deliberately and also include those dimensions which describe failure at 
the extremes, specifically, an excess of control leading to a lack of free flowing ideas or 
overly strict censorship, or an excess of spontaneity leading to an overload of ideas and 
difficulty selecting from amongst them.  
These themes are illustrated in Fig. 3.2 below, to show the relationship between them. The 
relationship is conceived as a balance beam, with spontaneous processes at one end, control at 
the other and balance processes as the means by which the beam is moved.  




Fig. 3. 2 The three primary themes of creative thought, with illustrative quotes.  
 
Figure 3.3 shows the three primary themes and the secondary themes which comprise each of 
them. Each theme will be outlined in the analysis that follows, with illustrative quotes from the 
children, written verbatim. The overview serves to situate each theme within the overall analysis 
framework. 
         
Fig. 3. 3 Overview of primary and secondary themes 




Theme 1. Spontaneous processes 
The description of ideas as ‘popping’ into children’s heads was almost ubiquitous: 
Snowy, ‘I just got a popped up in my head’  
Dooda, ‘They just pop up’  
Maria, ‘Oh yeah that idea popped into my head’  
Betty, ‘This one popped into my head really quick’  
Alex, ‘The antler popped into my head’ 
Kitty, ‘I think it just pops up when you look at stuff’ 
Children used this term to describe the experience of an idea, an association or a new thought 
just arriving unbidden into their heads, apparently exempt from planning or effort. For some 
children, this seemed to be their predominant type of creative thinking, often coupled with 
sensory acuity and ideas flocking in from the senses, particularly the eyes:  
[Is there anything that makes it hard to have ideas?]  
Snowy, ‘Yes. Closing your eyes. Or looking at a blank screen’ 
Lexy, ‘When I’m in my bedroom and it’s dark and I’m nowhere and I can’t find anything to give 
me inspiration’  
1.1 Spontaneous ideation: ideas from the senses 
For some children, this spontaneous ideation was primarily driven by the immediate 
environment, by perceptual experience in the here and now.  
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Dave, ‘[When I] look outside there are there’s birds in the sky, so I think I’ll draw a few birds’ 
Snowy, ‘If I’m seeing it gives me an inspiration what’s around me’ 
Kitty, ‘When you look you see stuff and you just like combine it together’ 
Some children were clearly aware that their senses were the main source of idea input. When 
asked where ideas come from:  
Dave, ‘…you might like see or hear or any other of your senses, like see or hear are the easiest 
ones, and you see something and then you say “Aha” I wanna do that’ 
The contribution of the immediate sensory environment extended to ideas coming from the body, 
with several descriptions of the body leading the mind, without apparent inhibition from the 
brain. In some cases, this embodiment appeared to kick start the creative process: 
Alex, ‘When I started to like actually draw I actually got the idea what I was gonna do’.  
Other children described how the physical movements involved in drawing led to other ideas:   
Kitty, drawing waves in an ocean which ebbed and curled said, ‘I think that’s when it came…I 
think my hand was going first…my hand just went up and down….’ 
Harriet, talking about how she had drawn a chimney on a tree instead of the roof of a house 
explained, ‘My hand did it because my brain kinda hadn’t caught up with me’.  
The notion of the body kickstarting the brain was also referenced in the context of how children 
would remedy a feeling of being stuck. The way, it seems, to get out of a rut is not to think, but 
to act:  
Snowy, ‘I just said some random words…it just helped me with what I was going to say’ 
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Dooda, ‘When I start drawing it gives me ideas’  
1.2 Tales of the expected: ideas from memory 
Children also described their ideas coming from a range of memory sources, including life 
experiences and memories from stories. When asked where their ideas came from: 
Harriet, ‘from thinking of all the ideas I’ve had…all the books I’ve read which are a billion’  
Imagination Creation, ‘from things you do, read, watch, anything like that’  
Betty, ‘I might use the same ideas from the movie…I just change a few things’  
Silky, ‘We’ve been reading this book called erm ‘The magic faraway tree’ by Enid Blyton and I 
decided to draw it here’ 
Maria, ‘My cat sleeps on the bed upstairs so that’s how I got that idea’ 
1.3 Ideas without effort: free association 
The final type of spontaneous process consistently described concerned the forging of new 
associations, connecting elements from memory, or from the senses, or a combination of both.  
Snowy, ‘The blackberry popped in from the TV and this abacus here - because the TV is how 
black the blackberry was and one of these balls is how small the blackberry was’ 
Imagination Creation, ‘I was actually like thinking I like superheroes and I like powers 
duplicating things and also the one that could shape shift that also came, I was also going to do 
broccoli but if I did corn that could turn into popcorn so that was enough so yeah ….if its corn 
then its popcorn so it’s kind of like a real shape shift.’  
Ben Ten, ‘Then it made me thought of Heat Blast because the sun’s fire and Heat Blast is made 
out of fire’ 
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Betty, ‘The idea popped into my head to do the hawk I realised that because the chicken is a type 
of bird’ 
Dave, ‘Well I did have the idea of a robin that’s why I did red’ 
Not all ideas which arose by this spontaneous associative process were ultimately selected, 
suggesting that more deliberate evaluative processes came into play immediately following the 
spontaneous ones. 
Silky, ‘I thought of a monkey but I didn’t really want to do a jungle so I chose a frog’ 
Lexy, ‘I thought if I draw a fish I need to draw water and if I draw water I need to draw more 
things and that would take for ages’ 
1.4 Open to the new 
The final catalyst for spontaneous creative expression was more a trait-like theme of broad 
openness and receptiveness. Several children alluded to their liking for things which were new, 
unusual, even strange - and which might arise from the senses, from memory or from freshly 
made chance associations.  
Dooda, ‘I’ve drawn a lot of rabbits and I know I like rabbits and I want one as a pet and I like 
them but I want something new and different’ 
Harriet, ‘I just like strange things… cos they’re interesting’ 
Imagination Creation, ‘That’s kind of my thing I just love unusual stuff… like when it’s usual 
it’s boring’ 
New things have the potential, quite simply, to bring about new thoughts and ideas. 
Snowy, [Why do you like new things?] ‘Because they get your brain working’ 
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Theme 2. Control processes: fitting in 
On the flip side of these spontaneous, open, freer processes are those which fall under the broad 
category of control: those aspects of the creative process which are deliberate, effortful, or tightly 
focused.  
2.1 Ideas through effort: you can force it 
There were several accounts which suggest that, albeit relatively rarely, ideas can emerge not 
through spontaneous ‘popping up’ but through deliberate effort. This might be through such 
strategies as exploring broad categories or by dismantling or rearranging parts of a fledgling 
idea. 
Dooda, ‘I’m trying to think of a shape that it’s in, and what it’s got on to like for ears…I’m 
thinking of all the animals that have small ears’ 
Roxy, ‘I just try and like…maybe swap parts of it or look at it from a different angle or step back 
and see if I can see something else’ 
Many children recognised that creativity was judged in part by its unusualness or even wackiness 
and strove to achieve this goal through strategies, such as deliberately selecting for weirdness. 
Harriet, ‘I wanted it to be strange colours so I made sure I didn’t do the leaves green… I was just 
like taking…a random pen to make it look like an unusual colour’ 
Imagination Creation, ‘At the back [of my brain] are the crazy bits but like here [forehead] yeah 
like here is sensible and… I have to push a way through to the back’ 
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2.2 Planning and focus  
Nearly all the children were very focused on producing their creative work, concentrating for 30-
55 minutes without a break. Several talked about the need to plan out their work. 
Maria, ‘If you pick up the colour…it looks one way and then when you try it out if looks a 
different colour and it might be that you didn’t want that colour so you have to test it out to see if 
you like it first’ 
Dooda, ‘I want to take my time I don’t want to rush it’ 
Silky, ‘I was focused on my picture most of the time…When I was drawing my dock erm and I 
hadn’t drawn fishes I decided to add fishes but finish what I was doing first’ 
Betty, ‘I knew I had to go back over things so I thought to just do it at the end’ 
Some children had clear awareness of the way in which they needed to work in order to 
accomplish the task most effectively. 
Dooda, ‘It would be harder if I went like castle then table then castle table castle table I might as 
well on by accident do something wrong if I forget my plan but I don’t want to forget my plan so 
I do it in order’  
2.3 Puzzling it out: evaluation and analysis 
There were notable differences in how children described the process of evaluating candidate 
ideas for selection. For some, idea generation - predominantly a spontaneous process - and idea 
evaluation - predominantly a control process - appeared to be quite distinct, while for others they 
were almost coincident, with a ‘kind of overlapping in my mind’ (Imagination Creation).  
Dooda, exemplified the first type, describing how ideas first piled up and then:  
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Dooda, ‘I feel very confused because I I’m not sure which one to take’  
By contrast, for Imagination Creation, idea generation and evaluation were sometimes barely 
distinguishable, with ideas emerging, being judged and the next idea appearing without pause: 
Imagination Creation, ‘Camel I was thinking about sand but no but monkeys with bananas yeah I 
like that’.  
Children sometimes invented elaborate devices for evaluating ideas, sometimes bringing reality 
back into imaginary scenarios to judge ideas 
Lexy, ‘A house could be in the background but who would want to live behind a Viking ship 
with Vikings shooting cannons? No one’  
Sometimes several evaluative tools were used simultaneously. Dooda, explains her complex 
algorithm for evaluation:  
Dooda, ‘So for an example, if I had a castle and London Bridge, London Bridge is a landmark… 
and the reason I would want to take it is it is a landmark and landmarks are interesting. But I 
would also want to take a castle it’s because houses are my favourite so I thought which reason 
was the best and I thought I think the house one was the best and so I chose the castle.’  
Just as the word ‘popping’ was the trademark of the spontaneous generation of ideas, ‘fitting’ 
was the word nearly all children used to describe controlled evaluation. For Imagination 
Creation, 9, creativity came in the form of a jigsaw puzzle, requiring methodical thought for the 
best fit. 
Imagination Creation, ‘Yeah like in my mind I had to match it, like it doesn’t fit there and like 
yeah how about here then I thought what I can do there and place it in the data’ 
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Betty, expressed a simpler, more serene variant of a similar approach: 
Betty, ‘I chose it because um mermaids are normally in the sea and that would fit with my lake’ 
Logic played a big part in many children’s descriptions, with many expressing active dislike for 
things which did not make sense according to their experience of normality.  
Dave, ‘Do pigs live in sandy places? No. Would a witch want to be in a desert to do a spell? I 
don’t think so’ 
Maria, ‘You also should need a window in your house…because otherwise it would be really 
dark’ 
Lexy, ‘I knew I wanted to pick the sun because what’s a picture with no moon no sun cos if I’m 
doing something outside I need to add something for the sky’ 
It was also in the evaluation of ideas that descriptions of working memory were often evident, as 
multiple ideas were worked with simultaneously.  
Snowy, ‘My brain fits loads of things at once for example I could think of a kangaroo and a 
million elephants’ 
Roxy, ‘My mind… was a frenzy…when your brain’s so full of it you find it hard to like to like 
get down to earth again’ 
Some children had the know-how to offload some of this cognitive burden onto the environment:  
Maria, ‘Sometimes you forget your ideas so I’m going to jot it down as soon as possible.’ 
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2.4 One small step for creativity: elaboration and adaptation  
Control processes were widely in evidence in the small elaborations, adaptations and refinements 
that are customarily part of the creative process. The elaboration phase is often a time for ‘taking 
a step back’ and trying to look at your work with new eyes, scrutinising it for imperfections or 
places with scope for greater precision, detail, or flourish. As illustrated by Harriet’s quote 
below, it can also sometimes mean simplifying, stripping back rather than adding layers. 
Silky, ‘I tried the white one but it didn’t work… I tried it on top of another one and it worked’ 
Ben Ten, ‘I made this bit a bit shorter because last time it went too long and I curved more 
because last time I went straighter’ 
Harriet, ‘Well first I thought of the steps and then I thought I’d do it like the tree trunk is cut in 
half so you could see the steps but then I decided that was too difficult so I just did a normal tree 
trunk’ 
2.5 Lack of openness 
There were many levels at which a lack of openness was made manifest – from the sort of 
cognitive fixity widely recognised in design research all the way up to the broader sort of social 
inhibition which prevents deployment of an idea which might appear silly, wrong, or just plain 
weird.  
Alex, ‘No I I like no I don’t like things that are too odd’ 
Dooda, ‘I was going to pick it but I said no to myself…I thought how about we put more of those 
but I said no’ 
Lexy, ‘I don’t want to draw a chicken bone cos that’s weird’ 
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Dave, ‘I knew that I wasn’t going to use that one because that doesn’t make any sense at all’ 
Kitty, ‘I didn’t want to do it like that because that would just be weird’ 
Functional fixity – the well-established finding that it is hard to see an object in a different way 
having first experienced its primary function, was very well expressed by one child. 
Roxy, ‘Once I’ve got one image in my mind…I kind of find it like a bit harder to like find a 
different one you know what I mean? When I see it again I think ‘That’s a hand what else can it 
be hmmm… I know… a hand!’ 
Theme 3. Balancing control and spontaneity 
The final component in the triad of thought processes is that concerned with modulating the 
balance between spontaneity and control. The modulation exhibited and described by the 
children was sometimes deliberate, sometimes (for example in response to distraction or 
accident) spontaneous. For some it was determined by a change of domain (for example, a 
different control/spontaneity balance in drawing vs. planning), for others by a change in the 
degree of freedom or constraint (for example, application of a rule shifting the balance to higher 
control). For still others it was determined by the stage of the creative process, with earlier more 
generative stages being freer and more open, and later stages more rigorously controlled.  
3.1 Spontaneous AND controlled: balancing act 
Several children described a quite deliberate shift between a primarily controlled and a more 
spontaneous thought process, pointing to sophisticated metacognitive awareness: 
Betty, ‘I normally just concentrate… then I realise I’m concentrating too hard and then that’s 
when normally when my mind goes blank and then I sit back and then I relax and then after it 
comes back to me… so it’s like my mind is telling me to stop working and then when I relax it 
Chapter 3. A qualitative analysis of how EC processes contribute to creativity in children aged 6 to 10 
151 
 
comes, the idea comes back to me…I think maybe my mind just does it cos it’s cos it’s telling 
me to just relax’ 
For Roxy, the balance shift was clearly in response to the stage of the creative process she was 
engaged in. She describes how her freewheeling approach in the idea generation phase was 
followed by a cooler controlled approach once it was time to evaluate those ideas:  
Roxy, ‘If I was thinking of a subject immediately like loads of ideas come to my mind so then I 
try and like ‘Caaaaalm down’ and just find one that really captures me’  
For Imagination Creation, as was characteristic of his multitasking approach, there was less a 
specific shift between control and spontaneity and rather the ability to use both simultaneously: 
Imagination Creation, ‘I’ve got like this core thing where…when I’m saying I can also think 
about things… so I can kind of do it while I’m doing other things… while I’m saying lalala I can 
also think about what’s going to happen next’ 
He further described this pot pourri of thought processes with the analogy of a video projector in 
his head which brought ideas from the far reaches of his brain ‘it just came from deep inside let’s 
say’ to the front for a systematic review: 
‘I have more like this… screen here [holding up imaginary screen on forehead] and then pictures 
– whoop! No oh maybe yes no do the next one next next next maybe yes maybe no then another 
one here another one here then swap it… [Int: and you’re pointing to your forehead…] IC, 
‘Yeah!’ 
For Lexy, it was often her distractibility which precipitated a new, unplanned idea – but quickly 
after it would be evaluated, adapted, and selected or rejected:  
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Lexy, ‘That’s just a mummy cheetah and a baby cheetah what’s going to get a bed to sleep on 
[Int: Where did that idea come from?] I I because when my cat walked past I remembered and 
then I thought cheetah’s in the cat family so I wanted to draw that’ 
Even one of the youngest children, Dooda, (7) gave descriptions which showed a high awareness 
of the need to sometimes augment the control side: 
Dooda, ‘I wanted to rush but I said no I don’t mind Cathy said “Take your time” and it’s good to 
take your time just like an artist would do’ 
3.2 Controlling the controller: managing constraints 
Many sources, both internal and external, led to a temporary or permanent change of constraint. 
In managing these changes, children demonstrated their ability to tip the balance beam towards 
more controlled and more spontaneous processes. The role of the imagination came into play 
here for several children. Evocatively described as ‘Idealand’ by Dooda, the imagination is seen 
as a place of increased freedom from constraints. Others agreed: 
Dave, ‘There’s no such thing as a giant bird…unless you’ve drawn one’ 
Alex, ‘If… like a bird pops into my head but that doesn’t really look like a wing I could say erm 
it was like going to be a mythical bird or something’ 
Dooda, ‘When I thought of Dover castle it didn’t really have bricks but I thought that it doesn’t 
matter I’m not drawing Dover castle’ 
A small change in perceived rules, even something as simple as which way up a stimulus shape 
was held, could be enough to prompt a loosening of control:  
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Dave, ‘That’s only pretend things I can make out of that one… I can only… but if I moved that 
piece around [turning it upside down] and I put it there that could be a leg and if I put four more 
it would be like the legs of an animal and that would make sense’ 
Alexandra, [When did you decide to have the paper that way up?] ‘When erm when you said we 
don’t have rules’ 
Roxy elaborated further on this theme, talking explicitly about how the introduction of a 
constraint (e.g., having to draw a picture about something specific rather than anything at all) has 
differential effects on different aspects of the creative process. In particular, it illustrates how, 
from her point of view, there is no control over ideas coming in, but control plays a role in the 
subsequent selection from those ideas.  
Roxy, [When there’s something that you have to include, does it make it harder to come up with 
ideas?] ‘Well… it doesn’t make it harder to come up with them, it makes it harder to find the one 
that will work’ [And what about if you’re given nothing, no rules, how would that have felt?] 
‘Then my mind would have been a frenzy!’ 
Accidents and mistakes played their part in offering up new opportunities which were often met 
with a freer, more open, more spontaneous response, even from children previously more tended 
towards control:  
Alex, ‘Like if you get something wrong you can always like er it doesn’t really matter because 
you can just turn it into something else…like in this picture I was about to rub out the roof but 
then… I thought that it would be cool if it was like this side was haunted and this side was like 
really cool like good…and like the worms are escaping from the unhappy side and then going to 
the good one’ 
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Harriet, ‘Well the chimney was a bit weird because it’s sticking out of the tree rather than the 
house…my brain kinda hadn’t caught up with me so I just drew it on the tree and then I realised 
that I just wanted to keep it like that’ 
Maria, ‘I didn’t plan that to happen!’ 
For Lexy, who had previously described a positive creative outcome from distraction by her cat, 
was also aware that succumbing blindly to every distraction was probably not a winning strategy. 
She describes how, at another point of distraction in her drawing, when a car’s horn started 
beeping loudly in the street below, she had to tip the balance back towards greater control:  
Lexy, ‘So I was trying not to do that [get distracted] so I was drawing but if I heard the beeping 
noise it would remind me of a car and I might start drawing a car on water…I didn’t do it 
because I reminded myself I was doing that.’ 
3.3 Creativity fails at the edges (excess control or excess freedom lead to failure) 
There is the risk of failure at both extremes of control and spontaneity, each with distinct 
implications for creativity. Excess control limits the free flow of ideas, reducing quantity and 
thereby reducing the chances of surprising, novel associations and ideas. It therefore means 
risking failure primarily on the originality dimension of creativity. Excess freedom, on the other 
hand, produces sufficient quantity and diversity of ideas but without sufficient control could lack 
the ability to select meaningfully and effectively from them. It therefore carries the risk of failure 
on creativity’s value dimension. Children showed examples of both.  
Excess control often meant a head empty of ideas, either through prematurely shutting down 
avenues to early-stage ideas or, maybe due to a feeling of pressure, neglecting to produce ideas at 
all.  
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Alex, ‘I just couldn’t think of anything…I thought like the sun but that’s a bit boring’  
Betty, ‘My mind went blank a few times’ 
Kitty, ‘I was feeling nervous because… I didn’t know what to do’ 
By contrast, too little control (excess freedom) was suggested by descriptions evoking a head full 
of ideas flying around with no way for ground control to call them in:  
Roxy, ‘They were all zooming around and I was just yeah maybe I was a bit indecisive’ 
Dooda, ‘When you think of lots of things well my head just start hurting and I just had a 
headache’ 
Imagination Creation, ‘A bit cloudy because things were overlapping with stories and stories I’ve 
read…kind of overlapping my mind’ 
There were a few examples where children could see, after the event, that they had been either 
excessively controlled or excessively free. Kitty, talked rather ruefully after finishing her picture 
about some of the missed opportunities she could now see: 
Kitty, ‘I could have used different colours…I could have changed the colour of the sea and the 
mountains the sun and the moon I could have changed the gas in the clouds… but I didn’t… I 
just wanted to draw a creative picture but I don’t think I did one so I think I’ve just done a 
normal picture’ 
By contrast, Snowy, who overflowed with ideas said, before watching the video playback, ‘I’m 
so scared to see my story’ as if what she had produced moments before could be a surprise. This 
suggests she had been deploying thought processes immune from control – or acting without 
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thinking. After we had finished watching the video, when I asked if she would change anything 
about her story, she said ‘Lots’. Like what? 
 Snowy, ‘Like the raspberries the basket the lion the present the mountains raspberries 
strawberries parrot’  
In short, almost every component of her story. Only after the fact could controlled evaluation 
take place. 
3.4 Jack of all trades (spontaneous association, effort, senses, memory) 
The shuttling between freedom and control described by the ‘Jack of all trades’ theme is harder 
to illustrate with single quotes, since it arises more as a feature of certain children across their 
whole transcript. In other words, it describes children who, over the course of producing their 
creative work deployed several diverse approaches to creative thinking, some controlled, some 
spontaneous, sometimes exploiting the immediate sensory environment, sometimes exploiting 
memory.  
Lexy provides an illustration of this. While she was drawing, she accidentally knocked a star-
shaped paperweight off the table and it fell with a thud onto the floor. She immediately picked it 
up, placed it in the sea of her picture and drew around it. When asked about incorporating the 
star, she said: 
Lexy, ‘I didn’t have the star in my mind I only had the star when I dropped the star’, showing 
how she moved from concentrating on her picture, to an accident bringing about a spontaneous 
idea to a controlled inclusion of that idea in her evolving picture.  
Similarly, Dave, described a subtle shift between freer, associative, and controlled, logical 
thought processes:  
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Dave, ‘I chose the sun because it looks exactly like a sun… I started to have an idea that it would 
be really hot… that’s why I was drawing the sweat on the camel.’  
[What happened here when you drew a smiley face on the camel and then rubbed it out?]  
Dave, ‘I changed it to a huffh [making panting face] and that was because I thought it would be 
really hot and would you have a smiley face if you were really hot? I don’t think so’ 
These sections have illustrated the primary and secondary themes of the analysis as they pertain 
to the group as a whole. There were many aspects which were common to the group – for 
example, a greater evocation of spontaneous processes in the generation of ideas and of control 
processes in their evaluation. But there were also differences. The following section adds to this 
analysis by looking in more detail at four individual children. 
Idiographic thematic narratives 
Short summaries were produced for each child, using a combination of my analysis and 
observations and the children’s own words, to illustrate their individual creative approach. The 
purpose of these is to provide an alternative lens through which to view the same analysis; it 
focuses less on the commonalities of the creative process within the group and more on the 
differences between individuals. Four narratives are included below; the rest are included in the 
Appendix.  
Lexy 
Single line summary: Distractions can beget ideas, but they can also be…distractions  
Lexy is very open to ideas (‘I just find ideas everywhere’) and has no difficulty, when presented 
with a new stimulus, in fluent divergent thinking (‘I thought this one this looks like a flag 
actually it looks like a record player and then it looks like candy floss’) without apparent effort. 
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Her description of what would make it hard to have ideas was striking and poetic (‘…in my 
bedroom and it’s dark and I’m nowhere and I can’t find anything to give me inspiration and 
there’s no one to give me some clues… only myself and a blank head… so I can’t think of 
anything’) and captures both the sensory and the social dimensions of creative thinking. 
She appears open to possibilities which arise by accident (‘I didn’t have the star in my mind I 
only had the star when I when I dropped the star’) and from events happening in the world 
around her, even if they shift her planned creative path (‘Because when my cat walked past I 
remembered and then I thought cheetah’s in the cat family so I wanted to do that’) whilst also 
recognising the danger that blindly incorporating distractions could lead to undesired results (‘If 
I heard the beeping noise it would remind me of a car and I might start drawing a car on water’). 
During the interview, she was frequently distracted by things going on around her (‘I don’t know 
I just wanted to…. So can it project anywhere?’) and restlessly played with different toys. 
The downside to this ability to see endless possibilities in the world around her is the effort it 
takes to decide whether or not to process that information (‘[My mind] wandered to my water 
bottle… then I thought em… I don’t need water’). She was sufficiently familiar with this need to 
monitor and contain distractions (‘I do this all the time’), that she recognised it and acted on it (‘I 
didn't do it because I reminded myself that I was doing that’) in a way that suggests a 
metacognitive awareness of the need to activate her control processes. 
In evaluating ideas, a slightly different picture emerged. She was a harsh critic of her own ideas, 
having no truck with ideas which were too fanciful (‘who would want to live behind a Viking 
ship with Vikings shooting cannons and mountains?’), too boring (‘I thought why should I draw 
a feather duster because that’s not very interesting’) or too odd (‘I don’t want to draw a chicken 
bone cos that’s weird’) or on the basis of rules she had set for herself (‘I went to Italy there was a 
Chapter 3. A qualitative analysis of how EC processes contribute to creativity in children aged 6 to 10 
159 
 
castle with a mountain and then I thought I shouldn’t copy’). There was a lot of creative thinking 
in her evaluation of ideas (‘who would leave a Viking boat out at sea floating with no Vikings?’), 
suggesting that her imagination played a part in both divergent and convergent aspects of the 
creative process. 
In short, she is in some ways the ideal creative: open to all possibilities when it comes to input of 
ideas, then highly critical of which to feed into output. Freedom and control in harmony. 
Alex 
Single line summary: Default is handbrake on, but accidents, mistakes and action can ease it 
off  
Alex presents a complicated story. For him, creativity is an effort, something that must be 
concentrated on and worked at, rather than something spontaneous and effortless. There seem to 
be a number of self-imposed constraints – things cannot be too ‘crazy’, too ‘weird’, too ‘wonky’. 
In other settings, notably at school, he would rein things still further (‘I wouldn't do it as crazy as 
this’). He shows patience and controlled planning (‘Mostly yeah I knew what I was going to 
draw’). Ideas are not in abundance (‘I just couldn't think of anything’) and there is little evidence 
of spontaneous generation or combining of idea fragments. 
When he starts drawing, the rules seem to change. He is distracted (‘I forgot about it when I was 
actually doing the picture’), prone to error (‘I drawed the house big by accident’) and open to the 
possibility of changing direction (‘I always like change what my initial plan is when I actually 
draw’). In short, the relationship between creativity and control seem entirely to change. 
His default position seems to be having his control handbrake fully engaged. He prefers creative 
activities with rules (‘I just er go on the internet and have a step by step guide like how to draw 
Chapter 3. A qualitative analysis of how EC processes contribute to creativity in children aged 6 to 10 
160 
 
it’) and to keep within limits (‘No I I like no I don't like things that are too odd’), resulting in a 
head quite often empty of ideas (‘I didn't really actually have any ideas to draw’). But when there 
is the possibility of releasing constraints, for example by moving from the real to the imaginary 
world (‘That doesn't really look like a wing I could say erm it was like going to be a mythical 
bird or something’) his creativity seems to flow more freely. It is still not necessarily 
spontaneous; rather, he gets into situations where he is forced to get out through creative problem 
solving. It is almost as if he needs this pressure in order to think creatively. To put it another 
way, he will accidentally get into creative trouble, then effortfully, logically and analytically get 
out of it. (‘If you think about it like you concentrate and you think about it you're probably going 
to get an idea’). His creative strength is more convergent than divergent.  
A good example was his submarine. He was in a quiet meditative moment, colouring the waves 
in blue. Because he was somewhat distracted, he didn’t realise he had drawn the waves under the 
submarine (i.e., as with a boat) instead of above it. (‘I was gonna make the submarine be like 
underwater but then I accidentally drawed it like that so I had to just erm draw this that it's like 
coming back in to the village’). He came up with a story for why the submarine was above the 
water –it was returning to shore, a novel aspect not in the blueprint. Another example was in the 
mistake of the asymmetric roof, again part of a doodling, slightly absent process which meant 
that the two halves of the roof were uneven. Rather than reject this, he took it as an opportunity 
to create a story, here making a parallel between physical and moral asymmetry and turning one 
half of the house ‘good’ and the other ‘bad’ (‘I was about to rub out the roof but then… I thought 
that it would be cool if it was like this side was haunted and this side was like really cool like 
good…and like the worms are escaping from the unhappy side and then going to the good one’). 
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This was arguably the most creative aspect of his picture, and one that was brought about by a 
cocktail of error, openness to change and a pleasing example of creative thinking in metaphor. 
Imagination Creation 
Single line summary: Crazy ideas at the back corralled by control at the front 
Imagination Creation seems caught in a moment to moment battle between spontaneity and 
control. This makes it hard to characterise different control processes operating on each stage, 
since the overall picture is a multi-tasking, open-minded strategic thinker who is switching 
continually between contrasting thought processes (‘While I am saying lalala I can also think 
about what’s going to happen next’). Idea generation and idea evaluation are often almost 
coincident. 
Very open to ideas, (‘That’s kind of my thing, I love unusual stuff’) Imagination Creation has an 
appreciation of and an appetite for the fact that ideas can come from everywhere, particularly for 
children (who still know how to ‘play around’ with ‘ideas sucking into their brains’). These 
stimuli are picked up and played with both unconsciously (‘well that actually tumbled out of my 
mouth’) and deliberately (‘I had to match it, like it doesn’t fit there and like yeah how about here 
then I thought what I can do there and place it in the data’). For him, creativity is a puzzle 
solving exercise, where pieces, absorbed from the environment, are then slotted together using 
learned tools and techniques in a strategic and controlled manner (‘yeah so start middle twist, I 
actually got that from a movie’). The considerable effort required for this juggle is clearly felt, as 
illustrated by the ‘cloudy head’ which comes when ‘too many ideas are overlapping’, or in the 
fight to get past the ideas ‘at the front’ to the ‘crazy ones at the back’ which seems like a 
description of suppressing control in order to travel further afield, to exciting unexplored nodes 
in associative networks (‘It just came from deep inside let’s say’). 
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The overcrowding suggests a working memory sometimes stretched to full capacity and then 
strategically offloaded to the environment. The consequence of the overcrowding means that 
sometimes well planned moves are imperfectly executed in practice (‘I erm I forgot to say they 
pressed another button…’) Inhibitory control is harder to characterise; some evidence of it in 
action, for example in rejecting ideas for being ‘too weird’ but in other ways it seems to be 
deliberately suppressed in order to maximise ideational input and the ‘good stuff’ at the back 
(‘Well bad ideas are still goo…are still ideas, they might be useful for something else’). 
Similarly, he seems in some ways flexible, shifting rapidly from generation to evaluation, 
deliberate and spontaneous thinking – but in others, not; for example, in ‘not being ready’ for a 
change of direction when I invited him to add to his story. Simultaneously nervous, primed for 
action (‘kind of butterflies in my stomach… actually in my head… everywhere’) and calm, even 
cool, and relaxed (‘oh it just goes through lots of ideas yeah selecting things out’). 
There is a good deal of talking in imagery and metaphor on many levels. His description of ideas 
as images hurtling from the back of his brain to the film projector at the front which flashes them 
up on his forehead for selection or rejection, is wonderfully vivid. And evokes a sense of idea 
generation being based on finding distant associative connections from all over the brain (‘it 
wandered everywhere really looking for parts’) which are then formally evaluated and assessed 
at the front of the brain (‘to see that it fits into my story’). The story he created, with its examples 
of spontaneous combining, shape shifting, running out of control then taking control back again 
(plus a bit of magic and a rogue monkey) is a wonderful metaphor for his own creative process. 
[The story is included in the Appendix.] 
Snowy 
Single line summary. Go in with your eyes wide open 
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Snowy was uninhibited in terms of the spontaneous generation of ideas (‘a hat can be a lady’). 
She enjoyed seeing the world from different angles (often literally, doing gymnastics, 
somersaults off the sofa) and having ideas butt in and interrupt her whilst she was in the middle 
of talking (‘kind of also like a roly-poly… or a leaf it goes up into the air and flies somewhere’). 
She often spoke of things ‘popping up’ to describe how ideas arose (‘I just got a popped up in 
my head’, ‘the flower popped up from his eye bulb’) apparently without effort or concentration. 
She was highly sensorially alert – wide open eyes hoovering up stimulation from the 
environment (‘if I’m seeing it gives me an inspiration’). She understood this reliance on visual 
input; what would make ideation hard would be ‘closing your eyes. Or looking at a black 
screen’. 
She gave several examples of spontaneous associations, for instance in the substrates for the 
poisonous blackberry in her story (‘the blackberry popped in from the TV and this abacus here 
because the TV is how black the blackberry was and one of these balls is how small the 
blackberry was’). She would sometimes deliberately act without planning or forethought, saying 
that doing rather than thinking would help progress (‘If I just started it would make more ideas 
come’) and spoke of the utility of her physicality (‘it goes zzzz it goes all excited and it just 
brings fresh ideas into my head’). The state she described when fully involved in her creativity 
suggested a kind of flow (Were you concentrating hard? ‘Not really’), a focus without deliberate 
effort. 
There was evidence of large working memory – both from her own account (‘My brain fits loads 
of things at once, a kangaroo a million elephants’) and from her impressive extemporising using 
many characters and elements from her story, sometimes in long repeated lists. There was not 
much evidence of advanced planning, with events seeming to tumble on from one another quite 
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haphazardly (‘I might use the lion because it popped up in my head and I think I will make a 
really good story with the lion’). 
Control processes played a significant role in the evaluation of the story, but only after the event 
(‘I’m so scared to see my story’). Only too late, after watching it back, did stricter judgement 
come in as she insisted she would change ‘everything…the raspberries the basket the lion the 
present the mountains raspberries strawberries parrot’.  
 
Discussion 
Determining the brain basis of creativity hinges on understanding creative behaviour and the 
cognitive components which underpin it. Qualitative research, with its focus on process rather 
than product, has potential value in informing cognitive theories of creativity, using children’s 
accounts of creative process to generate hypotheses. This study set out to examine the 
contribution that executive control processes made to children’s creativity, using video 
stimulated recall of their thought processes while they were involved in the production of a novel 
creative work. The subsequent theoretically driven thematic analysis found that children’s 
descriptions fell into three broad themes: spontaneous processes (ideas arising unbidden, 
unprompted associations), control processes (planning, evaluating, strategic approaches) and 
processes which described the balance between these two extremes. Put most simply, these 
processes can be characterised as those that occurred outside of executive control, those that 
were tied to executive control and those that determined the extent of executive involvement.  




Fig. 3. 4 Illustration of the three main themes derived from the analysis and how balance 




The notion that non-executive (associative) and executive (analytic) processes are involved in 
creativity has been widely recognised by creativity researchers over several decades (Beaty & 
Silvia, 2012; Bowden et al., 2005; Mednick, 1962; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). More recently, 
neuroimaging studies have provided evidence of these disparate processes at play during the 
creative process (Beaty et al., 2018; Limb & Braun, 2008; Liu et al., 2012). Some researchers 
have even sought to enumerate the contribution of these different processes to creative cognition 
for example by using analysis of semantic distance of responses to represent associative 
processes and fluid intelligence measures to represent analytic processes (Beaty et al., 2014). The 
combination of these two ingredients also lies at the heart of several influential cognitive models 
of creativity, including the ‘Geneplore’ model (Finke et al., 1992) introduced earlier, which 
primarily describes a recursive shuttling between association (generation) and analysis 
(exploration).  
The finding in this study that these processes also appear to be core components of the creative 
process in children suggests that similar processes are at play as in adults. This is perhaps not 
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hugely surprising. What is more interesting is the idea that the balance between these processes – 
and the flexibility to modulate that balance – might also be a key part of the process. As others 
have suggested (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010a) creative success might depend less on executive 
control ability per se and more about an individual’s flexibility to modulate it according to task 
demands. The children in this study exhibited and described many manifestations of such a 
modulation. It was sometimes deliberate - precipitated by the metacognitive realisation that a 
change in approach was needed, and sometimes spontaneous – happening, for example, in 
response to distraction or by accident. For some children, it was governed by a change of domain 
(for example, a different balance between control and spontaneity was seen when planning what 
to draw than when actually drawing); for others, a change in the degree of freedom or constraint 
tipped the balance (for example, having to apply an explicit rule shifted the balance away from 
spontaneity and towards higher control); for still others, it was determined by the stage of the 
creative process, with earlier more generative stages being freer, more open and spontaneous, 
and later stages more rigorously controlled.  
This characterisation has some striking parallels with recent models derived from the adult 
literature (Chrysikou et al., 2014; Mekern et al., 2019; Nijstad et al., 2010; Pringle & Sowden, 
2017b; Zhang et al., 2020). To my knowledge, there are no equivalent models for children. 
Consideration of our findings in light of adult models will beg questions as to whether there are 
differences in children, given their less mature control processes, fewer, less enriched long-term 
memories, and possibly greater reliance on the immediate sensory environment. The nature of 
this study – its small number of participants (typical for qualitative work) with a wide range of 
ages, coupled with the high level of individual variability in creative approach (as illustrated by 
the idiographic narratives) – will make it tough to answer such questions. At this stage, we will 
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mostly concern ourselves with broad consistencies between adult models and current findings. A 
fine-tuned analysis of differences between children and adults, for example analysing verbal 
reports of their approaches when completing the same creative task, would make a fascinating 
future study.  
Over the last few years, several researchers from disparate fields, including computational 
modelling, neuroimaging and cognitive psychology have presented models which ascribe a 
central role to the ability to shift between processes which are controlled (though variously called 
‘analytic’ ‘persistent’ or ‘highly filtered’) and those which are spontaneous (‘associative’, 
‘flexible’ or ‘low filtered’). The ecological validity of such models is bolstered by evocative 
similar accounts from real world creatives.  
Pringle and Sowden’s ‘Mode Shifting’ model (see Figure 3.5 below) portrays a ‘shifting 
mechanism’ (proposed to be the ‘salience network’) which alters the dominance of either 
associative (equivalent to ‘spontaneous’) or analytic (equivalent to my ‘control’) modes of 
thought. Their ‘mode shifting index’ seeks to quantify both the frequency of shifting and the 
metacognitive awareness of it using self-reports.  
 
Fig. 3. 5 Pringle & Sowden’s Mode Shifting framework (2017b). 




The researchers emphasise that, although associative and analytic modes sometimes act in 
competition, they can also work cooperatively, so should be seen as a balance. They also stress 
that the need to shift may vary according to context and domain. Both of these accounts chime 
with children’s descriptions, particularly in the sub-themes of the balance processes, which 
reflect both the ‘balancing act’ of spontaneity and control and the ‘controlling of the control’ 
which modulates the balance in response to contextual demands. 
Chrysikou and team’s 2014 ‘Matched filter hypothesis’ is based on a synthesis of evidence from 
situations in which complex cognition (of which creativity is an example) does not benefit from 
greater cognitive control. Their model (see Fig. 3.6), which seeks to give a developmental 
account of the role of the prefrontal cortex (the seat of cognitive control), incorporates both trait 
(organism) and state (task) components to the flexible modulation of control. Their model 
suggests that the “optimal level of cognitive control is task-dependent, with high levels of 
cognitive control best suited to tasks that are explicit, rule-based, verbal or abstract, and can be 
accomplished given the capacity limits of working memory and with low levels of cognitive 
control best suited to tasks that are implicit, reward-based, non-verbal or intuitive, and which can 
be accomplished irrespective of working memory limitations” (Chrysikou et al., 2014, p. 341). 
The account from children suggests that the determination of this ‘optimal level’ might operate 
not just at the broader task level but at a more granular level, within tasks and over very short 
time periods. For example, several of Lexy’s responses touched on her relationship with 
distractions, which often involved moment to moment rebalancing between the openness needed 
to see the possibilities they might offer (‘when my cat walked past I…thought cheetah’s in the 
cat family so I wanted to draw that’) and then the discipline to rule them out (‘If I heard the 
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beeping…I might start drawing a car on water…I didn’t do it because I reminded myself’). 
Children’s accounts also point to examples of when this optimal level might not be reached, 
either through an excess of control (e.g., Kitty’s post mortem realisation of the many 
opportunities she had missed to take a more open, less controlled approach) or too much 
spontaneity (e.g., Roxy’s description of untapped idea overload leading to failures of evaluation, 
‘They were all zooming around and I was just yeah maybe I was a bit indecisive’). 
 
Fig. 3. 6 Chrysikou et al.’s Matched filter hypothesis (2014) 
From a different approach, computational modellers have devised models which attempt to unify 
evidence from divergent and convergent thinking studies in creativity research. Some of these 
also involve the imposition of some kind of metacontrol ‘balance system’ in order to keep 
control and spontaneous processes in check. Mekern et al.’s ‘Metacontrol state model’ (2019), 
like the matched filter model, incorporates both state and trait differences. It proposes that 
individuals differ in their creative tendencies (due to social, cultural, and genetic 
predispositions), such that some people naturally operate using a more controlled approach and 
some a more spontaneous one. In addition, particular tasks and situations will make different 
demands on the balance between control (persistence) and spontaneity (flexibility). 




Fig. 3. 7 Mekern et al.’s metacontrol state model (2019).  
 
Again, this model has much in common with the current analysis. The idiographic narratives 
show that some children e.g., Snowy, tend to a very spontaneous creative approach while others 
e.g., Alex, are controlled by default, while others, e.g., Lexy and Imagination Creation, show 
much more moment-to-moment flexibility in their approach. Most children changed the 
emphasis put on control processes at different points in the task or when operating in different 
domains (e.g., moving from preparatory planning to drawing). There are also some differences 
between this model and the current analysis; in particular, the idea of persistence (defined as ‘in-
depth exploration of only a few categories or perspectives’; Nijstad et al., 2010) was not 
something that really appeared in children’s accounts. While ‘persistence’ describes a 
determination in sticking with a particular approach or ideational path, children’s reports of 
control processes were more concerned with ruling out ideas that didn’t pass muster and moving 
on, as opposed to tenaciously burrowing through them and onwards to better ones. Perhaps this 
sort of industrious, unwavering focus is simply too demanding for children’s less developed 
control systems.  
A final model with resonance for the current study is again derived from computational models 
integrating divergent and convergent thinking processes but here with a neuroscientific twist, 
proposing the brain basis for different approaches. “The key idea is that flexibility is promoted 
by weak activation of the DLPFC (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and T/PC (temporal/parietal 
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cortex) together with a strongly activated left IFG (inferior frontal gyrus), whereas persistence 
would be characterised by the opposite pattern” (Zhang et al., 2020). Again, the similarity with 
children’s accounts is notable, though the words are very different: ‘At the back yeah they’re the 
crazy bits but like here (forehead) yeah like here is sensible and if ever I want to have sensible 
ones (I have to) push go back go back’ (Imagination Creation, age 9). 
 
Fig. 3. 8 Zhang et al.’s proposed neurocognitive framework for metacontrol of creative 
cognition, 2020. 
 
All these models, in common with findings in this study, alight on the idea that cognitive control 
is not straightforwardly beneficial, but that its benefits accrue when it is used in a manner 
appropriate to the task in hand. In addition, most share a characterisation of individual 
differences both in the underlying tendency to approach creativity in more spontaneous or more 
controlled ways and in the flexibility to modulate this tendency. 
The idea that creativity is characterised by an ability to flexibly shift between extremes of 
approach seems also to be understood by real world creatives. The playwright Stephen 
Beresford, interviewed about Ingmar Bergman’s drama, ‘Fanny and Alexander’, observed that 
“People often characterise the story as the conflict between the wildly imaginative Alexander 
and the despotic controlling bishop. I think what they forget is that, for an artist, both things must 
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be alive. You have to be wild and freewheeling and imaginative as an artist, but you also have to 
have ruthless rigid control and discipline.” (Interviewed by Tom Sutcliffe on Start the Week; 
BBC Radio 4, 2018). The iconic actor and comedian John Cleese echoes this, “Creativity” he 
says “is a way of operating. We need to be in the open mode when pondering a problem, but 
once we come up with a solution, we must switch to the closed mode to implement it” (‘Cleese 
on Creativity’ lecture, 1991).  
Limitations  
Although efforts were made to ensure the naturalism of the study, there were still limits. Only 
two domains of creativity were offered and all but two of the children chose to draw, possibly 
because the performance aspect of storytelling made it daunting. In the drawings, further 
constraints were put on children by the materials, the setting, and the need to include the sparks. 
This might have affected their intrinsic motivation, an aspect of the creative process that is 
potentially very important but hard to assess in a scientific study (Amabile, 1982b, 1983). The 
children appeared to be well motivated in their creative endeavours, but the task was nonetheless 
imposed. Related to the issue of naturalism is the fact that the children were being filmed. Again, 
all but one of them (one girl said that the video made her feel uncomfortable so only audio was 
used) seemed to be relaxed with being recorded, but a feeling of being observed might have 
affected their process in unknown ways. 
The use of introspective methods runs the risk of verbal reports being confabulated. Efforts were 
made to bring rigour to the data with the use of the ‘7Cs’ checklist. These checks aimed to 
address both the accuracy (e.g., confirmation, contradiction) and the validity (e.g., confidence, 
consistency) of the data. More broadly, the validity of introspective reports came through the 
specific and particular approach to questioning.  
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The level of creativity achieved in their products was not assessed. Beyond the assertion that the 
children were all by definition engaged in the creative process because they produced something 
novel (using new ingredients to ensure work was not a simple facsimile of a previous work) and 
appropriate in that they met the goal in hand, there was no attempt to distinguish between highly 
creative and less creative work. This was quite deliberate in that to fairly assign value would 
have conflicted with other more important goals (lack of rules regarding time, domain) i.e., it 
would have been impossible to judge like with like - but it is a limitation in the analysis that we 
do not know if responses are reflecting a process underlying more or less successful creativity. In 
particular, our spontaneous-controlled balance beam model begs the question of whether being in 
different positions on the beam, or more or less agile in changing that position, is associated with 
more creative outcomes. To some extent, relating creative process to creative performance will 
be the job of the next chapter.  
As mentioned, most (12 out of 14) children chose to draw. The subsequent analysis was thus 
largely an account of the creative process of drawing. Whilst there did not appear to be obvious 
differences in the processes described by the children who did storytelling from those who drew, 
the extent of individual differences in approach make it hard to be certain differences do not 
exist. In a similar vein, it should be noted that the majority (10 out of 14) of the participants were 
girls, something which, although there is no obvious evidence for it, might have influenced 
findings. 
 
Conclusions and next steps 
This study was motivated by two ideas: the first, which was bolstered by the experience of using 
DT tests in the study presented in Chapter 2, was that quantitative lab tests of creativity are 
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insufficiently precise to reveal underlying mechanisms, since they can be completed in such a 
variety of ways. In addition is the concern that lab tests, in their excessive evocation of EC, 
might not represent the role of EC in the creative process in the real world. This idea pointed to 
the need to consider alternative tools in order to understand process. The second motivation was 
the sanguine view, boosted by seeing the quality and breadth of the responses they produced in 
those same tests, that children’s verbal reports could potentially reveal important information 
about the underlying mechanisms that allowed them to arrive at those responses. This first-
person account of the creative process in children is currently missing from the literature. 
The findings of this study represented progress in answering one of the main research questions 
of the thesis, i.e., to what extent are there individual differences in the role that EC plays in 
children’s creativity? The answer based on this evidence seems to be ‘a great deal’. The analysis 
demonstrated wide individual variation both in the extent to which children naturally tended to a 
more or less EC-led approach in their creativity (i.e., a trait difference in spontaneity vs control) 
and in their ability to modulate the extent of that deployment (a trait difference in flexibility). In 
addition, there was much variation in the deployment of EC in creativity depending on context, 
task demands and domain (i.e., state differences). This variation raises important issues for later 
work when we will study the effect of improving EC on creative performance through an EC 
intervention (in Chapter 5). It seems likely that intervention effects will vary depending on 
children’s tendency to use EC heavily or lightly in their creativity, though exactly how remains 
an open question: is a child with a ‘low EC’ approach likely to have their creativity bolstered by 
improving EC or might the improvement disrupt their preferred creative approach and so reduce 
their creativity? Or is a child with a ‘high EC’ tendency going to benefit from further EC 
improvements in augmenting their chosen approach – or might it tip them over into failures 
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resulting from excessive control? We will address these questions in Chapters 5-7 which present 
quantitative, qualitative, and triangulated data from an EC intervention.  
Addressing the second thesis question - does inhibitory control have a detrimental effect on 
children’s creativity? – cannot be fully answered solely using data from the current study, since 
we have no measure of children’s level of creativity. There are clues that inhibitory control had 
detrimental effects in some instances e.g., as described by the theme ‘Creativity fails at the 
edges’, but this theme also included reports of failures caused by excessive spontaneity. To get 
better traction on the question of the effect of inhibitory control on performance, we have two 
ways forward. The first is through studying the effects via the intervention study described 
above. The second involves bringing together the current study’s accounts of process with data 
from the quantitative tests these same children completed earlier (in the Bright Sparks study in 
Chapter 2). Chapter 4 will now turn to this task of data triangulation.  
  








Chapter 4. Bringing quantitative and qualitative data together 
  




In this chapter, I will introduce mixed methods and the rationale behind them, before outlining 
some of the epistemological and practical issues raised by attempts to bring highly diverse data 
sets together. I will present strengths and weaknesses of different approaches in general and 
introduce the specific ‘third paradigm’ approach taken here, one based on a set of principles 
drawn but distinct from its quantitative and qualitative counterparts. Different methods for 
practically combining the current data will be discussed and some of the problems illustrated 
with reference to some early unproductive attempts, before presenting the methods and findings 
from the approach finally chosen.  
What are mixed methods? 
Mixed methods (MM) are increasingly being seen, alongside quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, as ‘a third major research paradigm’ (Johnson et al., 2007, p.112; also see Creswell, 
2009; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber & Johnson, 2015; Morgan, 2007; Tashakorri & 
Teddlie, 2009, 2010). The adoption and discussion of MM (and related multimethod approaches) 
has seen significant growth in the last twenty years (Schwandt & Lichty, 2015). MM research 
refers, most simply, to the collection and combination of both quantitative and qualitative data to 
address the same research question (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Its chief motivation is a 
recognition that all methods have limitations and weaknesses and that combining different 
approaches “increases the likelihood that the sum of the data collected will be richer, more 
meaningful, and ultimately more useful in answering the research questions” (Preskill, quoted in 
Johnson et al., 2007, p. 121). The approach, for some, represents an enthusiasm and belief that 
science needs to progress beyond single method approaches, which are sometimes deemed 
insufficient. Small observes, “Dissatisfaction breeds creativity. Empirical researchers have been 
Chapter 4. Bringing quantitative and qualitative data together 
178 
 
unhappy with the natural limits of conventional methods, including experiments that do not 
uncover mechanisms… Their efforts have given rise to a large, diverse literature that combines 
or integrates either data collection techniques or analytical approaches from multiple 
perspectives” (Schwandt & Lichty, 2015, p. 79). The methodological approach to any research 
depends on the questions being asked. At one extreme are questions which can only be answered 
qualitatively (‘How did your first day at secondary school feel?’); at the other, are those 
demanding a quantitative approach (‘How quickly can children react to a new visual stimulus?’). 
Our research questions here, which concern the contribution of EC to creativity, concern two 
constructs which are highly multifaceted, with performance in both depending on a range of 
situational, motivational, and emotional factors as well as cognitive ones. For these reasons - to 
gain better traction on complex interrelated dimensions - a mixed methods approach is deemed 
most appropriate here. 
There is more than one rationale for the use of mixed methods and a huge array of design 
typologies (Creswell and Clark, 2011, suggest at least 15). In addition to the broad idea of 
enriching information through multiple perspectives, MM can be used to: 
• Study causality at different levels of description (Johnson et al., 2017) 
• Allow one approach to inform another (e.g., qualitative findings might inform better 
quantitative tests or quantitative results might suggest where to research in more depth 
qualitatively)  
• Look simultaneously at product and process  
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• Cross-validate. Finding similar phenomena using very different approaches increases the 
likelihood that they are real (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Johnson et al., 2007; Tashakorri & 
Teddlie, 2010; Yardley & Bishop, 2008).  
Epistemological issues  
The question of how to bring the multiple perspectives of MM research together has no simple 
answer. It raises issues of both an epistemological and a practical nature and requires ‘navigation 
across a turbulent borderland’ (Hesse-Biber, 2015). Epistemic tensions (dubbed ‘paradigm wars’; 
Tashakorri & Teddlie, 1998; Teddlie & Tashakorri, 2008) have raised questions about whether 
quantitative and qualitative researchers have the necessary skills, tools and philosophical 
openness to engage with ‘the other side’. Purists believe that quantitative and qualitative 
approaches are fundamentally unmixable (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) being founded on different 
beliefs about the nature of knowledge, and debates about mixed methods approaches have raged 
more or less stormily for two decades (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber & 
Johnson, 2015; Tashakorri & Teddlie, 2009, 2010). 
Before we get drawn too deeply into these debates, it is perhaps worth going back to some basics 
regarding this study. The goal is to understand the role that executive control processes play in 
children’s creative process and the mixed method proposition is that both quantitative and 
qualitative data can contribute valuable information to address this question. The shortcomings 
of both the quantitative approach – chiefly problems with psychometric tests of creativity - and 
of the qualitative approach – persistent questions regarding the validity and accuracy of verbal 
reports as cognitive data – have been discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 3. I have endeavoured 
in both cases to set conclusions in the context of conservative limits of how far we can 
Chapter 4. Bringing quantitative and qualitative data together 
180 
 
reasonably extrapolate the respective data. The new challenge presented in this chapter therefore 
concerns the extent to which these data can be integrated, theoretically and practically.  
I am not a methodological purist; in fact, I would argue that taking an oppositional stance to 
qualitative and quantitative approaches is, apart from being unhelpful, an inaccurate portrayal of 
their true nature. ‘Quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ labels tag a huge array of methodologies and 
epistemologies (Midgley, 2006) with as much variation within type as between (Hammersley, 
1996). Consideration of the epistemic basis of any data should be a component of any study, not 
only those which seek to combine data. ‘Pragmatism’, the foundation of the current approach 
(based on Morgan’s (2014) definition, outlined below), has many meanings even within the MM 
field. The pragmatic approach taken by many MM researchers (Creswell & Clark, 2011) focuses 
less on their own epistemological perspective and more on what is needed to best answer the 
research question (Hesse-Biber, 2015). According to Creswell and Clark, pragmatism is often 
associated with MM because it focuses on “the consequences of research, on the primary 
importance of the questions asked rather than the methods” (quoted in Hesse-Biber, 2015). The 
flexibility of pragmatists to countenance research from multiple perspectives, using all available 
tools has led some to caution of ‘interdisciplinary opportunism’ (Patai & Koertge, 1994), the 
suggestion that researchers who dabble in new fields do so in a random or uncritical way. Others 
suggest that pragmatism, although founded on firm philosophical ground (primarily stemming 
from the work of John Dewey; Hickman & Alexander, 1998), sometimes morphs so as to 
become synonymous with merely ‘practical’ or ‘expedient’, with insufficient consideration of the 
basis of knowledge (Hesse-Biber, 2015). What is billed as ‘methodological eclecticism’ in reality 
just represents ‘muddled thinking’ (Mutch, 2009).  
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With the aim of replanting pragmatism in healthy philosophical soil, Morgan has proposed a 
heuristic which moves “beyond dualistic thinking (e.g., deduction vs. induction, subjectivity vs. 
objectivity, idiographic vs. nomothetic conclusions) toward more practical choices” (Morgan, 
2014, p. 70) whose epistemological position is nonetheless defined. The table below illustrates 
this new pragmatic paradigm. 
 
Fig. 4. 1 Morgan’s pragmatic approach to MM (2014, p.71). 
 
Pragmatism is here characterised by critical flexibility, by a view that positions represented as 
binaries are better seen as ends of continua, and by a dynamism in viewing the research 
endeavour as an ongoing, recursive, and communicated process. Abductive reasoning shuttles 
between induction and deduction, as theories are tested by gathering data which in turn informs 
new theories and so on. The usual forced dichotomy between subjective and objective is 
similarly replaced with the notion of ‘intersubjectivity’ which is happy to assert “both that there 
is a single ‘real world’ and that all individuals have their own unique interpretations of it” 
(Morgan, 2014) and finally any absolute distinction between the specific and the universal is 
rejected, in favour of a critical approach which interrogates the extent to which any finding can 
be applied to other settings and circumstances (Morgan, 2014; Schwandt & Lichty, 2015; 
Yardley & Bishop, 2017). Within the framework of such an approach, it is acceptable to lean a 
little more towards a positivist approach in quantitative work and to a constructivist one in 
qualitative work (Creswell & Clark, 2011). The current research is theoretically grounded in the 
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sort of pragmatic approach Morgan outlines. This still leaves open questions about the logistics 
and practicalities of bringing together disparate data.  
Practical issues  
There is an array of approaches used to bring together the data in mixed methods research 
(Creswell & Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber & Johnson, 2015; Tashakorri & Teddlie, 2009, 2010). A 
key feature of any sound approach must be that it “maintains the integrity of both method and 
findings” (Sandelowski, 1995, p. 573). Some argue that the only way to do this is to keep 
different types of data and different types of analysis essentially distinct. For example, Mason’s 
‘facet methodology’ (Mason, 2011) positions the overall research question as a gemstone, whose 
facets each reflect different ways of seeing and different research processes. A fuller 
understanding of the research question comes not from trying to force facets together, but from 
responding to the way in which the different facets give “flashes of insight” (Mason, 2011, p.75). 
The mosaic approach also stops short of full integration but is a step closer. In Johnson et al.’s 
‘causal mosaic’, the image carried by the mosaic (i.e., the area of research under investigation) 
only appears when its constituent tiles are appropriately arranged (Johnson et al., 2017). The 
mosaic is produced by taking a pluralistic approach, which endeavours quite deliberately and 
with clear articulation of assumptions at each level, to seek evidence at different levels of 
description. The Bradford Hill guidelines for establishing causality in epidemiological and 
medical research which have been used for half century are an example of the mosaic approach 
(Hill, 1965; Johnson, 2017). 
Inching closer to integration of data, the word ‘triangulation’ is frequently used as a shorthand 
for describing the joining together of qualitative and quantitative data. In its original meaning 
(from engineering surveys) triangulation is “a means to establish the location of a point from two 
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other points of known distance” (Sandelowski, 1995, p. 571) - that is, it implies the existence of 
knowledge from which other knowledge can be derived. The cleanest type of triangulation 
involves different but complementary data on the same research topic being brought together 
(Morse, 1991); cross verification from quantitative and qualitative perspectives on the same topic 
make it theoretically possible to produce findings which are both generalisable and ecologically 
valid (Creswell & Clark, 2007; Fielding, 2010). 
There are many types of triangulation design (e.g., see Creswell and Clarke, 2007 p.63; also, 
Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2008) which it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully examine. 
Instead, within the broad triangulation framework, I will endeavour to explain the reasoning 
behind the specific choices made here. 
Why triangulate data? 
The first step in triangulation involves asking some key reflexive questions: what do these data 
tell me and crucially, not tell me about? What is the strength of, and how convincing is the 
claim? How can I make best sense of different forms of data in a way that is consistent with 
these previous questions? (Mason, 2017). The first questions have been dealt with in detail in 
previous chapters so the focus here is on the third. There are various possibilities: 
• Following up similar themes in the different data sets (e.g., comparing whether children 
who have low inhibitory control in quantitative lab tests also give accounts in their 
qualitative interviews which suggest low levels of control) 
• Generating testable propositions and asking them of different data sets (e.g., if the 
quantitative data show a child has high fluency coupled with high inhibitory control, then 
the qualitative data could be used to look at how she is achieving this difficult balance 
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according to her own report. Or the other way around: does a child who describes in her 
qualitative account a very spontaneous approach show evidence of high levels of fluency 
in quantitative lab tests?)  
• Using different data sources to address a topic from different angles (e.g., at a higher 
level of description, do children who are at the extremes of the control / spontaneity 
continuum present distinguishable profiles of scores in lab tests of EC and creativity?) 
Research questions 
The findings of Chapter 3 showed that children varied a great deal in the quantity and quality of 
EC involvement in their creativity; also, that there were trait and state differences in their 
flexibility to shift between more and less controlled approaches. What those data alone could not 
tell us was whether there was any relation between the approach taken and the creative level 
achieved – bluntly: were there better or worse ways of ‘doing creativity’? This is the first broad 
question that the triangulation will attempt to address. It is important to state at the outset that we 
would not expect simple cause and effect, e.g., that high inhibitory control will mean poor 
creative performance, because there are many, many other factors contributing to creativity – 
motivation, engagement, memory, knowledge, experience, sensitivity, openness and more. Even 
if inhibitory control plays an important role it is very unlikely to tell the whole story. We are 
looking at relative rather than absolute performance, tricky when comparing between rather than 
within children. Nonetheless, triangulation could give clues to such associations. 
The model derived from the qualitative study proposes that there could be creative failure at 
extremes. Is there evidence of this from our quantitative results? i.e., do those children at the 
extremes of ‘spontaneity’ or ‘control’ as evidenced by the qualitative work show failures, as 
proposed, in value and originality respectively? Again, here we must acknowledge an obstacle, 
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discussed in the earlier critique of divergent thinking tests: there is no explicit measure of value. 
The rater method of scoring might carry a small, inadvertent benefit here since raters are 
instructed to ‘take into account their sense of originality and inventiveness of each response, in 
one holistic measure’, making value to some extent implicit; though since this same score is also 
the measure of originality, distinguishing between these two will be problematic. In addition, the 
rater method of scoring was only used for the AUT. Despite the problems, triangulation could 
provide some tentative evidence to support the prediction of failure at extremes of spontaneity 
and control. 
Additional questions deal with cross-validation between approaches; to what extent is EC or 
creative fluency as reported in qualitative interviews correlated with EC or fluency performance 
in quantitative tests? 
 
Methods 
Participants and data overview 
The children whose qualitative and quantitative data will be considered for triangulation are all 
those from the qualitative study except one. Alexandra (aged 9) had an incomplete set of 
quantitative tests and is not included. The final sample is the remaining 13 children, who are 
fully described in Chapter 3.  
The quantitative data available for triangulation are: 
• EC scores: Flanker, Stroop, visual and visuospatial working memory 
• Creativity scores: AUT, Just Suppose, TTCT Figural test scores 
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• Demographic data: age 
Qualitative data: 
• Individual level thematic analyses of interview data 
First attempts  
There is no right way to do triangulation and one of the challenges of mixed methods is that each 
study has unique combinations of data presenting unique complications (Creswell, 2009; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). In learning about mixed methods, I have at times wished to see 
more of the reasoning behind the methods ultimately chosen and not just the fait accompli; it is 
with this in mind – a belief that there is value in openly sharing knowledge won from experience 
– that I will briefly outline some of the false starts to the process here.  
The first attempt at triangulation involved using the qualitative data to make predictions about 
the quantitative results. I ranked each child as low/medium/high on inhibitory control, working 
memory and creativity measures from their qualitative report and classified them into terciles on 
all scores from the quantitative data, to arrive at similar low/medium/high categories. I then 
compared categories, awarding points for exact (e.g., high/high) or near (e.g., high/med) 
matches.   
The results showed very poor prediction (close to and even below chance) for EC measures and 
somewhat better prediction for creativity measures, but the findings themselves are not really the 
main point for showing this. Through doing this analysis, I realised this was an example of 
‘muddled thinking’ rather than methodological eclecticism (Mutch, 2009) or, worse, that its 
spurious precision was ‘positivism dressed in drag’ (Giddings, 2016). First, I had treated the 






Fig. 4. 2 Tables illustrating the first, naïve approach to triangulation 
 
qualitative findings simply (yet inaccurately) as a validation of quantitative results. Second, I had 
strayed far from the actual qualitative analysis to a merely impressionistic assessment of EC and 
creativity. And third, I had failed to grasp that findings, even had they found perfect prediction of 
quantitative from qualitative findings could not, given their uncertain foundation, have improved 
understanding of the research question. 
The second attempt, which I saw as the qualitative counterpart to a statistical Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), was an attempt to delineate specific sub-groups of children who 
shared particular underlying characteristics in their creative approach. Again, starting with the 
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qualitative interview data, I sought to define children according to the principal components of 
the creative process they described, beginning with their position on a control/spontaneity axis. 
The difficulty of this approach was in limiting analysis to this single dimension when there were 
many other factors contributing to the child’s creativity, some of which I had experience of 
through seeing them in action. Sometimes it was these other features, which don’t come into 
focus through the control/spontaneity lens, which seemed key to their approach e.g., Betty whose 
ideas come from a meticulous memory for detail, or Harriet who is very self-controlled and also 
has a passion for ‘weird things’, or Imagination Creation whose ideas were supported and 
inspired by his vivid mental imagery. In the end, then, the groups were led by control/spontaneity 
categorisation but with other features also playing a role. The table below shows the sub-groups 
derived from this analysis. 
 
Fig. 4. 3 Subgroups derived from principal components of creative approach  
 
Group name Shapeshifters Handbrakes Freewheelers Enthusiasts Introspectives
Group members Imagination Creation Alex Snowy Harriet Betty 
Lexy Ben 10 Roxy Dooda Maria
Silky Kitty (Dave) (Dave)
Characteristic features
Score highly on 
spontaneity but 
also exhibit at times 
high levels of 
control. They can 
and do show both 
approaches at 
different times or 
under different 
constraints. Some 
flex between them 
almost 
simultaneously (IC) 





tend toward a high 
level of control, in 
association with 
low levels of 
spontaneity. 
Freestyling ideas is 
difficult for them 
because they are 
primed to reject 
before they even 
begin. NB Alex is a 





overflowing in this 
group, sometimes 
to an overwhelming 
extent. Ie they can 
have problems 
selecting from the 
abundance and 
sometimes don't 
see the wood for 
the trees. Ideas just 
seem to happen to 
them and can be 
provoked by the 
least prompt. They 
sometimes describe 
taking action to 
stop the incessant 
flow
The enthusiasts 
might be at risk of 
blockage from 
excessive control 
were it not for their 
love of new ideas. 




and mean that 
failures of 
originality can be 
averted
The introspectives 
are harder to read 
and are the most 
mixed bag. They 
tend towards 
control in how 
their creativity 
operates and are 
rather inflexible. 
Control is more 
trait than state - 
they don't know 
another way. They 
live in their heads 
rather than seeking 
the new or 
unexpected
Likely point of failure None Originality Value None (originality 
failure thwarted)
Originality
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Again, various problems were identified with this approach: as with the first attempt, it moved 
too far from the analysed qualitative data, making use of other data such as observations, field 
notes, impressions, which had not been properly explicated, thus undermining the qualitative 
work. From the point of view of triangulating results (a stage I did not proceed to, realising the 
flaws), the groups only contained 2 or 3 children covering a wide age and ability range - so 
trying to use the widely varying quantitative results to delineate group differences seemed a 
fruitless exercise – i.e., triangulation would not have added information, even if the sub-groups 
were accurate portrayals of creative types. In the end, I felt that this analysis, whilst possibly of 
interest to other research questions, was not an appropriate basis for triangulation to address the 
current ones. 
Without a clear direction, mixed methods provide an almost infinite set of possibilities to explore 
(Hesse-Biber, 2015). The two attempts described share two key features which impaired them: a 
failure to stay close to the data and a failure to properly articulate research questions. The third 
iteration which follows attempts to address both of these shortcomings.  
Final approach taken 
In the analysis I finally settled upon, I set out to answer the following research questions: 
• Is there a correlation between children’s use of control, spontaneity, and flexibility in 
their creative process (as qualitatively described) and their age? 
• Is there a correlation between children’s use of control, spontaneity, and flexibility in 
their creative process (as qualitatively described) and their quantitative results in lab tests 
of EC and creativity? 
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• Is there evidence of creative failure, as measured in quantitative tests of creativity, at 
extremes of the control/spontaneity axis? 
The first step was to rank each child on each of the three qualitative dimensions: control, 
spontaneity, and flexibility. This meant going back to the individual child’s thematic analysis 
and assigning them a score (on a 1 to 10 scale) for each of these aspects, on the basis of the 
importance of each of those themes for them. For example, while all the children had some 
examples of spontaneous processes – ideas ‘popping up’ – for some this was a rarity, whilst for 
others it was the most prominent aspect of their descriptions. Flexibility was the hardest to rate, 
since the ways in which children were flexible were the most varied e.g., Imagination Creation 
was flexible on a moment-to-moment basis, whilst Betty was flexible over a much longer time 
frame and Alex was flexible in one domain but not in another. Scoring children in this way also 
raises conceptual problems. For example, is the more controlled child the one who notices a lot 
of distractions but articulates the fact that they have blocked them out or the one who doesn’t 
even appear to notice them? So, this approach is by no means unproblematic. Nonetheless, on the 
basis of the scores, the children were then ranked on each of the three dimensions. 
The quantitative data were also prepared for the triangulation analysis. To control for age 
differences, standardised residuals from age-predicted linear regression analyses were calculated 
for each EC and creativity variable. Although some sub measures did not show age-related 
change, the most consistent approach was to control for age for all variables. The next step was 
to enter all the rank scores from the qualitative results alongside the standardised residual scores 
for each EC and creativity variable as well as other demographic information and carry out 
Spearman’s correlations on all relevant variables. The qualitative data are no longer being used 
to ‘predict’ or ‘test’ findings against the quantitative data, but rather both types of data are being 
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considered on a par, with a simple question being asked about their correlation. This change of 
language represents a subtle shift in the methodological approach away from one in which 
quantitative data dominates by default. Finally, on this analysis, it should be noted that finding 
no correlation between qualitative and quantitative measures carries alternative possible 
meanings. It could mean that there really is no relationship between quant-measured lab EC and 
qual-measured real-world EC, it could mean that one or other measure is too noisy, or invalid, or 
it could mean that they are measuring different things. Interpreting such a finding is not 
straightforward.  
To address the final question, that of potential failure at extremes, rank scores were used for both 
the qualitative and the quantitative data, to best tackle questions of relative performance, e.g., 
were the children who were most spontaneous also the most creatively fluent? Were those who 
were most controlled also the least creatively flexible etc.? The analysis, the results of which are 
presented visually, compares the four children ranked highest for spontaneity with the four 
ranked highest for control, with the predictions that those ranking highest for spontaneity in the 
qualitative analysis will be amongst those scoring highest for fluency, flexibility and originality 
in the quantitative tests, while those ranking highest for control in the qualitative analysis will be 
amongst the lowest scorers on these variables. 
 
Findings and analysis 
The first step of the analysis was to see if age was correlated with the rankings for spontaneity, 
control and flexibility derived from the qualitative analysis, to get a clue as to whether age-
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related changes (for example, in the development of EC) were driving differences. The findings 
showed no significant correlations between age and the qualitative dimensions. 







Table 4. 1 Spearman’s correlations (and corresponding p levels) between qualitatively derived 
rank scores and age. 
 
The qualitative rank scores were next compared with standardised residual scores on each of the 
lab tests of EC. Despite expectations of associations between the control dimension and 
measures of inhibitory control in the lab, no significant relationships with any of the lab EC 
measures were found. 
 Flanker Stroop VWM VSWM 
Spontaneity .36 -.04 .02 -.05 
 .222 .892 .961 .866 
Control -.08 .37 -.46 .10 
 .795 .212 .159 .738 
Flexibility .41 -.10 -.36 -.20 
 .163 .748 .275 .517 
Table 4. 2 Spearman’s correlations (and corresponding p levels) between qualitative derived rank 
scores and EC test scores 
 
In the next step, the qualitative rankings were compared with the standardised residual scores on 
the three creativity tests. The results showed that spontaneity was significantly and highly 
correlated with scores for fluency and flexibility (but not originality) on the AUT, but not with 
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the other creativity tests. Control rankings, by contrast, were negatively correlated with fluency 
and originality (but not flexibility) in the Just Suppose test. Correlations between control 
rankings and AUT fluency and flexibility were also negative and close to the significance 
threshold of .05 (.067 and .051 respectively) and it is notable that out of 9 correlations, 7 were 
negative. The probability of this number of negative correlations happening by chance, under a 
simple binomial distribution, is .070. Flexibility rankings showed a similar pattern to 
spontaneity, with positive correlations with fluency and flexibility on the AUT and no other 
significant correlations. It is notable that only the verbal tests showed any significant 
correlations; the figural tests showed no evidence of a relationship with any of the qualitatively 
derived dimensions. The tables included here involve multiple comparisons and with the small 
participant numbers involved, no attempt was made to correct for these multiple comparisons. 
This should be borne in mind when interpreting the reported significance of relationships. 
 Just Suppose AUT Figural tests 
 Flu Flex Orig Flu Flex Orig Flu Orig Strength 
Spontaneity .29 .40 .28 .77** .75** .18 .32 .37 .53 
 .332 .176 .353 .002 .003 .550 .284 .213 .065 
Control -.64* -.49 -.60* -.52 -.55 .02 -.23 .08 -.47 
 .017 .086 .032 .067 .051 .946 .460 .792 .103 
Flexibility .15 .25 .15 .67* .59* -.07 .21 .28 .30 
 .626 .419 .635 .013 .032 .814 .495 .364 .329 
Table 4. 3 Spearman’s correlations (and corresponding p levels) between qualitatively derived 
rank scores and creativity sub scores, n=13. Flu=fluency. Flex=flexibility. Orig=originality. 
Strength=overall creative strength. * significant at .05 level. ** significant at .01 level 
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An alternative way of looking at these data is to start with the behavioural outcome (the lab test 
product) and compare qualitative strategy (the reported creative process), i.e., begin with the 
quantitative and then look at the qualitative findings: was there evidence that children who 
achieved the same test scores did so by similar means? The illustrations below are for originality 
in the AUT and in the figural tests, two measures which showed no significant overall correlation 
with qualitative rank scores. There were four children who, by chance, all scored the same for 
AUT originality (a score of 3, just above the mean of 2.93). The figure below (Fig. 4.4), in which 
each coloured line represents a child, shows their relative positions on axes of spontaneity, 
control and flexibility (with highest scores on the outside). It suggests that, although their output 
was equivalent, the process for producing it was different for each of them. It also demonstrates 
how considering only product measures presents only a partial picture. 
 
Fig. 4. 4 Four children who all scored 3 for originality in the AUT took different approaches to 
their creativity.  
 
A similar finding is shown below (Fig. 4.5), this time for originality in figural tests. Again, some 
children achieved identical scores for this measure: three children all scored 4, just below the 
mean of 4.15. Once again, their approaches appeared distinct. 




Fig. 4. 5 Three children who all scored 4 for originality in the figural tests took different 
approaches to their creativity.  
 
The final set of analyses considered the difference between performance of children who operate 
at the extremes, comparing those ranked most highly for spontaneity with those ranking most 
highly for control on the creative indices. Findings are presented figurally (Figs. 4.6 and 4.7), 
with red spectrum colours depicting highly spontaneous and blue spectrum highly controlled 
children. The results show that, for fluency and flexibility, all four ‘spontaneous children’ 
outperform all four ‘control children’ in all these measures across both verbal and figural tests. 
 
Fig. 4. 6 Comparison of the four children ranked highest for spontaneity (shown in red spectrum 
colours) with the four ranked highest for control (shown in blue spectrum colours) on measures 
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of fluency and flexibility across verbal and figural tests. Note that the measures of ‘Spontaneity’ 
and ‘Control’ are qualitative rankings while the others are quantitative scores. 
 
 
Fig. 4. 7 Comparison of the four children ranked highest for spontaneity (shown in red spectrum 
colours) with the four ranked highest for control (shown in blue spectrum colours) on measures 
of originality across verbal and figural tests. Again, note that the measures of ‘Spontaneity’ and 
‘Control’ are qualitatively derived, while the others are results from quantitative tests. 
 
Turning to a similar comparison with originality scores, the results are more mixed. In the Just 
Suppose test, the same pattern was seen as with fluency, i.e., the spontaneous children outdid 




This triangulation analysis sought to maximise the value of quantitative and qualitative data by 
using the combined data to address new questions. Specifically, it investigated whether the 
qualitative assessment of relative degree of control, spontaneity, and flexibility that children 
deployed in their approaches to creativity associated with their performance in quantitative tests. 
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The goal was to gain traction on the question of whether there are better or worse ways of going 
about creativity – i.e., as opposed simply to different ways of going about it. Although the results 
were not consistent across all creativity tests (with figural tests in particular failing to show any 
notable relationships with any qualitative dimension), the pattern was broadly in line with 
predictions: namely, greater spontaneity tended to be positively associated with creativity 
variables while greater control tended towards a negative association. There were no significant 
correlations found between qualitative measures and lab tests of EC. And while there was no 
evidence of failure at extremes of spontaneity, there was some evidence of failure, in fluency and 
flexibility, at extremes of control.  
What did we learn about control? 
The expectation had been that triangulation findings might help simplify the next stages of 
research. For example, a possible outcome was that qualitative and quantitative findings would 
be tightly related so that ‘control’ as conceived through qualitative work would approximate 
‘control’ as measured in lab tests. This would make potential further work much simpler: the 
qualitative work would essentially have served to validate the quantitative tests as representing 
the processes of interest, allowing lab tests (which are much more practical for larger studies) to 
be used as a shorthand for children’s likely creative approach. This expectation was not realised; 
there was no correlation between the qualitative dimensions and performance in any of the EC 
tests. 
There are various possible explanations for this lack of correlation:  
• Control as presented qualitatively describes a much broader set of activities than the more 
granular and specific processes represented by inhibitory control measures in lab tests. 
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There are many other factors at play between these levels of description which is why no 
evidence of a relationship is seen (Astle & Scerif, 2008). 
• These particular tests of inhibitory control did not get to the aspects of control most 
salient to the control deployed in creative work i.e., selective attention (Flanker) and 
cognitive inhibition (Stroop) are simply not the most relevant of the many aspects of 
control (Nigg, 2000).  
• Children deploy control differently in different contexts. EC is sometimes even 
characterised by adaptability to different situations and contexts (for example, in the 
‘matched filter hypothesis’ described previously; Chrysikou et al., 2014). 
• Poor inhibitory control is easier to define than good inhibitory control. While poor 
inhibitory control is evident and can be articulated (‘I was distracted by the noise’, ‘I just 
couldn’t help blurting it out’), good inhibitory control might be more obscure, even to the 
person whose brain it is activated in. For example, a child might be so effective at 
blocking out potential distractions that they are unaware of them. To make things still 
more complicated, we could even say that the ‘goodness’ of good inhibitory control is not 
synonymous with strength of control but rather lies in the ability to apply strong or weak 
control as required by the context (Amer et al., 2016; Storm & Patel, 2014). 
What did we learn about the creative process? 
Another purpose of triangulation was to provide evidence regarding the relative effectiveness of 
different creative approaches (i.e., the extent to which the creative process is control-led, 
spontaneity-led or flexible) in achieving creative success. First, we examined the possibility that 
control processes would be negatively associated with creativity measures. While most of the 
correlations were indeed negative, they were not consistently statistically significant – for 
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fluency and originality in the Just Suppose test, they reached significance, while in the AUT 
(fluency and flexibility) they did not. Associations with figural sub-scores were all weak and not 
significant. The general notion that the influence of control on creativity can be a negative one 
aligns with evidence from other sources (Beaty et al., 2016; Carson, 2011; Chrysikou et al., 
2014; Limb & Braun, 2008; Radel et al., 2015) though the dissimilarity of findings for different 
creativity tests still needs explaining. Just Suppose is a task based in an imaginary situation 
(‘Imagine that clouds had strings attached to them…’) whereas the AUT is based on an 
everyday, familiar object (a pencil, a plastic bottle) which perhaps makes it easier to solve 
through a controlled, strategic approach. As Gilhooly and colleagues showed through protocol 
analysis, there are several ways to produce AUT answers which involve deliberate strategy rather 
than reliance on memory or the immediate sensory environment (Gilhooly et al., 2007) – that is, 
through controlled approaches. For the Just Suppose task, by contrast, it is perhaps difficult for 
those with a highly controlled approach to make the necessary imaginative leap to get going; 
there are fewer paths to strategic approaches to answers when operating in an ill-defined problem 
space (Dietrich, 2018).  
By contrast, spontaneity and flexibility were both highly positively correlated with fluency and 
flexibility in the AUT but showed no significant relationship with any sub-scores in Just Suppose 
or the figural tests. Again, the general notion that flexibility in particular is positively associated 
with creativity is supported by previous research (Nijstad et al., 2010; Vartanian et al., 2020) 
though the reasons for the inconsistencies in different tests are not immediately obvious. Perhaps 
the different starting points of divergent thinking could also have been relevant here; an ease 
with tapping into memory and sensory processes might have been helpful in the concrete world 
of the AUT but could have foundered more when confronted with an imaginary scenario. The 
Chapter 4. Bringing quantitative and qualitative data together 
200 
 
account of the role of EC in creativity might be one that crucially depends on the details and 
specific requirements of each task. This puts the onus on researchers to specify and characterise 
creativity task types and indicate the relevance of EC to each.  
Whilst there is some evidence that particular approaches to creativity might generally be 
successful, it is important to remember that there is a great deal of individual variation, as 
evidenced by very diverse approaches which can result in identical scores. In fact, there is a 
danger that looking at overall results can obfuscate individual-level information. This can be a 
problem with certain types of mixed method triangulation (Bryman, 2007; Hesse-Biber, 2010) 
and a similar phenomenon has also been described in neuroimaging experiments, when the high 
level of noise in the data is reduced by averaging results from a large number of trials across 
different participants. Some have pointed out that this can obscure rather than reveal the 
processes underlying behaviour. “A wealth of relevant information is hidden, and potentially 
invalidated, when data are averaged across subjects…we consider between-subject variance in 
brain function as data rather than noise” (Seghier & Price, 2018, p.517). Using group-level 
results such as averages can mean that results, whilst true for the group, are not true for any 
individual within it. “In typical multisubject neuroimaging studies, tasks are assumed to be 
performed in the same way… however, many tasks are unconstrained, allowing subjects to adopt 
their own strategy…the estimates from the group might not actually describe anyone well” 
(Seghier & Price, 2018, p. 519). They argue that much greater attention should be paid to 
individual strategies and approaches, an observation which chimes loudly here, for an evolving 
model which suggests there are many means by which creative goals can be achieved i.e., that in 
extremis, every individual might have their own unique approach. 
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A proposed model 
A model of creativity which emerges from the literature is one which involves both control 
processes (also called evaluative or analytic processes) and spontaneous (also called associative 
or sensory) processes (e.g., the Geneplore model; Finke et al., 1992; Finke, 1996; Ward et al., 
1997). In this sort of model, control and spontaneous processes are both essential components 
since the creative process involves a recursive shuttling between the two. By implication, the 
system also requires flexibility to move between approaches.  
 
Fig. 4. 8 Model 1. Control and spontaneity are both needed for creativity, as is the flexibility to 
move between them.  
 
An alternative model proposes that creativity can be achieved through diverse means, with the 
approach taken depending on multiple factors, such as domain knowledge, memory, and 
motivation. The combination of factors mean that for any creative task, some favour a more 
controlled, strategic, analytic approach and others an open, spontaneous one, steered by memory 
and senses. An example of this sort of model is Nijstad and colleagues’ dual account which 
suggests that different individuals favour either ‘flexible’ or ‘persistent’ approaches (Baas et al., 
2013; De Dreu et al., 2008; Nijstad et al., 2010). This model, and the other models considered, is 
presented as static, but ideally we would also want to consider such a model within a 
developmental framework. 




Fig. 4. 9 Model 2. There are many distinct creative approaches, determined by the personality 
and temperament of the child. 
 
The findings from the current research suggest a third possible option, which combines elements 
of both models 1 and 2. Key features of this new model are: 
• Trait differences suggest that individuals tend to favour different creative approaches - 
some more controlled, others more spontaneous 
• These trait differences are not completely fixed and can be moderated by state differences; 
changes in domain, context, task demands, level of constraint, mood and more can change 
the relative emphasis on control or spontaneous processes 
• Individuals who operate at the extremes run the risk of failure – in originality if stuck at a 
control extreme, and in value if stuck in spontaneous mode 
• Flexibility remains, as in model 1, a key component since it acts as a protective buffer 
against becoming stuck at control/spontaneity extremes and allows adaptation to the 
demands of different tasks, contexts, and constraints 
• By extension, this means that the most flexible individuals are best equipped to be the most 
creative 
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• Many other factors (e.g., knowledge/expertise, perceptual sensitivity, attitude to risk, 
tolerance of ambiguity, openness, memory, motivation) also contribute to the creative 
process. So, while an individual’s position on the control/spontaneity continuum and their 
level of flexibility is important for how likely their creative success, it is by no means fully 
predictive of it 
 
Fig. 4. 10 Model 3. Proposed model for creativity based on the current work. Trait and state 
differences determine children’s position on the control/spontaneity axis and their level of 
flexibility determines their ability to shift that position. 
 
In the following chapters, this model will be considered in the light of an EC training 
intervention. There are many ways in which such a training could influence creative outcomes 
(assuming successful training and some degree of transfer – both of which assumptions will be 
scrutinised in Chapter 5). For example, training macro-level flexibility, i.e., improving 
metacognitive switching ability, should be advantageous to everyone since flexibility is 
positioned as straightforwardly beneficial to creativity. By contrast, training specific aspects of 
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inhibitory control (e.g., training children to ‘stop and think’ before responding) could have 
negative consequences for those who are already operating at a control extreme and have 
insufficient flexibility to adapt their approach.  
 
Limitations 
The exercise of triangulation presented several challenges, many of which have already been 
acknowledged - and some of which are an inevitable result of bringing diverse data together. 
Many assumptions were made, including that the creative process as described qualitatively (in a 
task completed at home, without time limits and with freedom from many constraints) is 
equivalent to that in action in quantitative tests (in tasks completed in a lab, with many imposed 
constraints of time, domain, materials and more). Since the qualitative findings show that the 
creative process can be affected by changing domains, constraints and so on, this assumption is 
undoubtedly problematic. This limitation will be addressed in subsequent studies by yoking the 
quantitative and qualitative research more tightly together, so that like can be more meaningfully 
compared with like. 
While the best-case scenario of triangulation is mitigation of the weaknesses of single methods 
alone, the worst case is their amplification. While separate findings can be contextualised within 
the expectations and limits of their respective frameworks of study, in triangulation, findings 
must in some respects be hardened and taken out of context to be compared with others. Within 
the quantitative study, for example, much has been said about the problems with AUT originality 
scoring – but for triangulation, the scores have simply to be used as they are, without question. 
Similarly, in preparing qualitative analysis for triangulation, subtle shades must be repainted as 
bold colours e.g., in order to quantify which of two spontaneous children is the more 
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spontaneous. These problems are exacerbated by the absence of clear, external procedures for 
validation – a side effect of the fact that every mixed methods study is unique. This means that 
there is often, as here, only one person with full familiarity of both sets of data - one reason why 
transparency is so essential in mixed methods research. I have tried to be as candid as possible 
here about the processes involved and their imperfections. Transparency in this study involved 
reporting false starts in the analysis, respectively: i. deriving rankings of qualitative data 
equivalent to the quantitative variables and seeking to correlate rankings in both versions of each 
variable; ii. grouping children according to a small number of analysed and observed dimensions 
within the qualitative data, analogous to a PCA; before deciding upon iii. ranking the children 
according to stricter criteria of qualitatively analysed data relating to the three dimensions of 
control, spontaneity, and flexibility, then relating these ranks to rankings of the quantitative 
variables. Even within this third approach, there remained the tension of relying on parametric or 
non-parametric statistics – i.e., tension arising through the fact that while qualitative work 
presses for depth and consequently has small participant numbers, quantitative research depends 
on larger, representative samples. When alerts are sounded as to the risks of spurious findings 
through multiple comparisons or non-significant associations are found, it is not obvious whether 
normal quantitative rules or alternative, more flexible interpretations should prevail.  
 
Conclusions and next steps  
In this chapter, the quantitative data from Chapter 2 and the qualitative data from Chapter 3 were 
brought together to seek new insights. With the caveat of the several limitations already 
described, there were four headline findings: first, the predictions about the benefits of 
spontaneity and the harms of control were at least in part born out, with evidence of 
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(respectively) positive and negative correlations with outcomes in creativity tests. Second, there 
was also evidence of the predicted failure at the extreme of control. Third, there was evidence 
that different creative means could result in identical products (i.e., test scores), suggesting both 
that there is no simple answer to the ‘best’ way of going about creativity, and that any 
mechanistic model must be flexible enough to sanction multiple approaches. Finally, there 
appeared to be no correspondence between the broad level ‘control’ asserted in qualitative data 
and the more narrowly defined control measured in lab tests, a finding to be carefully considered 
in designing tests and procedures for an appropriate EC intervention.  
The rationale for the EC intervention, which will be the subject of Chapters 5 – 7, is that it will 
allow us to see, at the individual level, what happens to children’s creativity when their level of 
EC is increased. Looking at individual change is important given the large number of other 
factors, also varying between individuals, which contribute to creativity. By trying to keep these 
other factors constant, but manipulating EC, any causal claims about ensuing changes are 
potentially strengthened. More intriguingly, by nesting a qualitative study within the 
intervention, we can endeavour to map the creative approaches of individuals, about whom we 
can then make predictions regarding the effect of the intervention. So, the levels of question 
regarding the intervention are first, does EC training have any impact on creativity? If it does, 
does the impact differ between individuals? If it does, can that differential impact be attributed to 
differences in creative approach? And finally, if it can, is it possible to accurately predict the 
impact at the individual level? By the end of Chapter 7, the goal is to provide solid answers to all 
these questions. 
A final musing, as we emerge from the sometimes-bewildering process of triangulation, is to 
remember that really getting to grips with any complex issue is almost sure to involve integrating 
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multiple viewpoints and perspectives, methods, and analyses. We need to become comfortable 
with straddling boundaries and being at ease in a new liminal space. “Creativity will never be 
fully understood using the traditional scientific approach,” according to one of the field’s most 
esteemed scholars (Runco, 2008, p. 93). And according to another (and paraphrasing the classic 
quote from the movie ‘Jaws’), “To capture the mechanisms of creative thinking, we’re gonna 
need a bigger boat” (Dietrich, 2015, p.40).  
 
  








Chapter 5. Does training executive control affect children’s creativity?  
A mixed methods, school-based intervention study 
  




In this chapter, the rationale for an EC training intervention will first be outlined, including 
explanation of how studying within-individual change over time potentially reduces some of the 
identified problems with creativity tests. The potential for cognitive transfer – the tendency for 
training one skill to improve performance on other skills – will be discussed, as well as some 
methodological issues raised by efforts to evaluate programmes designed to improved EC. The 
specific requirements for an appropriate EC intervention here, and the difficulty finding 
programmes which meet those requirements, will be outlined, before the methods and procedures 
used here are presented. Results will be broken down into sub sections addressing specific 
research questions and the discussion will end with a consideration of what the results mean for 
the evolving model of the role of EC in the creative process.  
Background 
Earlier chapters have described some of the problems with the scientific study of creativity, in 
particular the shortcomings of divergent thinking tests (Forthmann et al., 2019; Plucker et al., 
2014; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019; Runco,2008) and issues concerning motivation, time and 
domain (Abraham, 2018; Dietrich, 2018). The findings of the cross-sectional study in Chapter 2 
showed that any use of DT tests needs to be carefully targeted and two suggestions were made 
for productive approaches. The first was to use these tests to examine change within individuals 
(as opposed to differences between them); individuals are likely to be at least somewhat 
consistent in their creative approach and test-retest reliability is reasonably high (e.g., between 
.50 and .93 for the Torrance tests; Kim, 2006). The second proposal was to use DT tests as a 
conduit to verbal reports to compare different creative approaches within the same discrete and 
bounded task (as in e.g., the protocol analysis of the AUT utilised by Gilhooly et al., 2007). Both 
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of these approaches will be exploited here: the training study in this chapter and a qualitative 
verbal report study in the following one (Chapter 6). Both sets of data will be brought together in 
the final study chapter (Chapter 7). 
What is the evidence that EC can be trained? 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there has been great interest over the past two decades in the potential 
to improve EC through direct or indirect training (Boot et al., 2008; Goldin et al., 2014; Green & 
Bavelier, 2008; Rueda et al., 2005; Wass et al., 2011). Several regimens have been tested, 
including training activities as diverse as mindfulness, aerobic exercise, yoga, video game 
training and martial arts, as well as more direct computer-based approaches (see Cardoso et al., 
2018 for a review of interventions in children; also, Blair & Raver, 2014; Diamond & Ling, 
2016; Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Jha et al., 2007; Karbach & Unger, 2014; Klingberg, 2010; 
Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013; Neville et al., 2013; Paananen et al., 2018; Zelazo et al., 2016). 
Judging the success of such programmes has been complicated by the fact that “there is not an 
explicit and widely-agreed upon consensus around the best methodological practices” (Green et 
al., 2019, p. 2), making it hard to evaluate effectiveness rigorously and consistently. Green and 
colleagues liken the question ‘Does cognitive training work?’ to the question ‘Do drugs work?’ 
i.e., one that is impossible to answer without much greater precision about dosage, delivery, 
scheduling, recipient population, definition and duration of beneficial effect, existence of side 
effects and more. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Diamond and Ling (2016) reviewed 84 recent studies which 
met certain criteria (presence of comparison groups, publication in a peer-reviewed journal, 
measurement beyond immediate effects, evidence of benefit beyond improvement on the trained 
task itself and ruling out studies which were solely correlational). The implied background of the 
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analysis (the title of the paper suggests that some EC programmes have been ‘hyped’) is that 
some claims about EC training constituting a kind of holy grail – a practical, bounded 
intervention with rivers of cascading benefits – have been overblown. Their own conclusions 
were more modest; whilst the evidence shows that EC can certainly be improved with training, 
transfer effects (i.e., the extent to which improvements extend beyond the precise task trained 
on) tend to be narrow. “People improve on the skills they practice and that transfers to other 
contexts where those same skills are needed” (p.36) but not beyond. Training on working 
memory, for example, will not improve self-control or flexibility (Melby- Lervåg & Hulme, 
2013). Gains also depend on practice – both in quantity (higher dosage being more likely to lead 
to greater gains) and quality (effective practice requiring steadily increasing difficulty levels 
which consistently tax EC skills; Ericsson & Towne, 2010) and gains tend to diminish once 
practice stops (Klingberg et al., 2005). Diamond and Ling also emphasised the importance of 
seeing EC not as some separable ‘bolt-on’ set of functions but as a highly connected and 
particularly vulnerable part of brain function. “Prefrontal cortex and EFs [EC] suffer first and 
most if you are stressed, sad, lonely, or not in good physical health” (Diamond & Ling, p.41). 
Training will be most effective if it is scaffolded in programmes which also work to support 
emotional and social health and well-being. 
Training studies have a broad range of goals, from those which seek to understand the mental 
processes underlying training-induced change to those more concerned with understanding what 
methods of training are most effective in the real world. Green and colleagues suggest that more 
clarity and candour about these goals could help specify the most appropriate methods and 
establish best practice (Green et al., 2019). For example, ‘mechanistic studies’ are less interested 
in whether cognitive enhancement works and more in how it works, an emphasis quite different 
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from an effectiveness study which lets an intervention out into the wild (e.g., a school) and 
examines whether it achieves its desired impact. These different goals immediately suggest 
different best practice – for example, while a mechanistic study might prefer an active control 
group as a way of specifying and testing the ‘active ingredient’ of an intervention, an 
effectiveness study might be more interested in a ‘business as usual’ type control group, which 
would be better positioned to address the question of whether the intervention constitutes 
improvement on current practice. 
Principles of EC training relevant to the current work 
EC is not a single entity and evidence points to a differential involvement of distinct EC 
components to creativity (Beaty & Silvia, 2014; Benedek et al., 2014a; Vartanian et al., 2020). 
For example, flexibility might make a positive contribution to creativity through allowing 
tractable examination of alternative ideational pathways, or through more meta-level flexibility 
allowing for fluidity of movement between evaluative and associative processes (Nijstad et al., 
2010; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010a). Inhibitory control, by contrast, might make a negative 
contribution through its excessively restraining effect on the potential ideational field such that 
potential idea candidates are either not considered or are considered and ruled out (Cheng et al., 
2016; Radel et al., 2015) - though other studies report beneficial effects of inhibitory control 
(Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Mayseless et al., 2015a). Evidence from the earlier cross-sectional study 
(Chapter 2) partially supported previous findings from the literature of a positive role for 
working memory in verbal DT tests (Benedek et al., 2014a; Zabelina et al., 2019) but also 
suggests that creativity does not steadily improve with age in the same way that EC does (Barbot 
et al., 2016; Runco, 2016). The qualitative study (Chapter 3) suggested three relevant pieces of 
evidence: a key role for flexibility in allowing fluidity of movement between more and less 
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controlled approaches, a potentially detrimental effect of excess control and the finding that 
children vary a great deal in the level of effortful control they deploy in their creativity. In short, 
there is evidence, both from the current work to date and the wider literature, which implicates 
different aspects of EC differentially in creativity rather than clear evidence regarding just one 
component. This was one reason for seeking a training intervention which trains EC broadly. 
Another important reason was, given the primary goal of evaluating far transfer to creativity, to 
maximise the chances of this effect by adopting a broad ‘whole child’ approach rather than a 
more limited one focusing on a single narrow skill (e.g., targeting working memory).  
This means, per Green et al. (2019), that one goal here is feasibility – most simply, we are testing 
the viability of this training regime. However, given that we are also interested in the effects on 
creativity of specific EC components (something we can only do indirectly, through looking at 
pre and post-tests on those components, and which is thus necessarily more speculative), 
understanding mechanism is also a goal. It should be acknowledged that this dual-purpose 
design, does not fully adhere to the best practice advised by Green et al.  
The list of whole-class interventions which train multiple aspects of EF, are suitable for a short 
intervention and have a strong evidence base of proven effectiveness is short. Many programmes 
which seek to improve EC do not explicitly train it but rather use exercise, mindfulness, action 
video games as indirect / implicit trainings (Diamond & Ling, 2016; Green & Bavelier, 2008; 
Karbach & Unger, 2014; Zelazo et al., 2016). Others are so embedded in the whole school 
approach that they are hard to extricate e.g., Montessori (Lillard & Else-Quest, 2006; Lillard et 
al., 2017). Some train parents to train their children (e.g., Neville et al., 2013). Many lack 
specificity so might include EC training but not exclusively EC e.g., ‘reasoning training’ or 
‘speed training’ (Mackey et al., 2011) or metacognitive and working memory training (Cornoldi, 
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2015) or ‘higher order cognitive strategy training’ with effects on EC (e.g., Motes et al., 2014). A 
contrasting set train only one EC factor. Many of the best-known programmes focus solely on 
working memory (e.g., CogMed; Shinaver et al., 2014; Shipstead et al., 2012), others on 
inhibitory control (Zhao et al., 2018) and still others on cognitive flexibility / task switching 
(e.g., Karbach & Kray, 2009). Some are focused on helping specific children e.g., those with EC 
deficits (mostly ADHD; e.g., see Spencer-Smith & Klingberg, 2015, for a meta-analysis) or very 
young children (e.g., Tools of the Mind (Barnett et al., 2008) or the Chicago School Readiness 
Programme; Watts et al., 2018b), without evidence of effectiveness beyond those groups. Others 
are too invasive in terms of frequency / duration / parental involvement (e.g., Braingame Brian is 
25 x 50-minute sessions; Prins et al., 2013), cost (e.g., SMARTS programme is $599 per teacher) 
or requirement for expert administration (e.g., Braingame Brian, e.g., Vugs et al., 2017). Other 
reported programmes have methodological issues such as a lack of active controls, self-selecting 
groups, or findings which have not been published in peer-reviewed journals (Diamond & Ling, 
2016). 
Details of the current EC intervention  
The programme selected as most appropriate for this study uses a specially designed set of small-
group and individual games, each targeted at specific components of EC (Benzing et al., 2019; 
Röthlisberger et al., 2012). The programme has evidence of effectively improving EC in children 
as young as 5 and as old as 12. In the first reported study of its use (Röthlisberger et al., 2012), 5- 
and 6-year-olds were trained in daily sessions of 30 minutes over 6 weeks, a total dosage of 900 
minutes. Pre and post-tests, which measured working memory through an object recall task, 
interference control with a simple Flanker test and flexibility with the mixed Flanker, suggested 
the intervention had brought about improvements (albeit differentiated by age group and EC 
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factor) of small to medium size of effect (Cohen’s d between .42 and .59). A major shortcoming 
was the use of waiting list controls so, as the authors acknowledge, the Hawthorne effect cannot 
be ruled as the catalyst for improvements.  
The second study (Benzing et al., 2019) involved 10- to 12-year-old children. The dosage was 
lower than the previous study, involving two 30-minute sessions a week for 6 weeks, i.e., a total 
dosage of 360 minutes. The control group was again a group of children on a waiting list, who 
continued with ‘business as usual’ classroom lessons.  Pre and post assessment tested the same 
triad of EC components as the previous study, using very similar tests. Effects of small to 
medium size (partial η2 of .03 and .06 respectively) were found for improvements of the training 
group in updating (working memory) and shifting components. 
This intervention programme met the search criteria in most ways; the main shortcoming of the 
studies was their use of waiting list controls, something which will be addressed in the current 
study. Further detail regarding the content and procedures of the training will be detailed in the 
Methods. 
Choice of control  
As mentioned, there is currently active debate in educational neuroscience regarding the best 
kind of control group in randomised controlled trials (Green et al., 2019). In an ideal world, there 
would be two controls – one ‘active’, matched as closely as possible on everything except the 
proposed active ingredient of training and the other ‘business as usual’, to ascertain whether a 
training is an improvement on current practice. This is to help distinguish between three main 
candidate explanatory factors for performance change pre and post-test: namely, practice effects 
(improvements explained by tests being completed for the second (or third or more) time), 
developmental effects (improvements explained by non-training specific improvements in other 
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test-relevant factors e.g., faster processing speed, larger vocabulary) and training effects 
(improvements explained by the intervention itself). The Hawthorne effect (which describes 
behaviour modification in response to being observed; see Levitt & List, 2011) is also a potential 
source of performance improvement. A business-as-usual control facilitates assessment of 
developmental and practice effects, while an active control seeks, using the strictest criteria (i.e., 
improvements beyond those seen in a group actively engaged with tasks comparable on all 
dimensions except the specific one of interest), to assess the direct effects of training. Here it was 
unfortunately not practically possible to include both types of control (none of the primary 
schools in the recruitment area had three classes per year group; additional separate schools 
would have meant additional unknown / unmeasurable factors). Since this study is concerned 
with the mechanisms and processes involved in creativity, a closely matched active control group 
was chosen. Earlier cross-sectional data (presented in Chapter 2) will provide proxy evidence of 
developmental effects (i.e., the size of improvements that might be expected over the time course 
of the study for this age group) while studying children within a narrow age range will also seek 
to minimise these effects. Practice effects, which will be considered in the light of evidence from 
the creativity literature (Abraham, 2018; Barbot, 2019, Runco, 2008) must still be considered as 
a possible explanatory factor of any improvements in performance.  
 
Methods 
Aims of study 
The study sought to investigate causality in the EC/creativity relationship, progressing from the 
correlational approach of the studies described in Chapters 2 and 3 to establish more directly 
whether improvements in EC, brought about by specifically training it, might have far transfer to 
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creativity. In terms of expectation, there are theoretical grounds to believe that an overly 
controlled approach - one that might be induced by EC training - might have negative creative 
consequences, primarily through placing excessively tight constraints on the domain for potential 
ideas. There is some limited laboratory-based research that corroborates this, while studies in 
more natural environments are rare (Cheng et al., 2016; Limb & Braun, 2008; Radel et al., 2015). 
Findings from triangulating qualitative and quantitative data here concur with the idea that too 
much control can have negative effects on fluency and flexibility as well as, though less 
consistently, on originality. There is also reason to believe that improving cognitive flexibility, 
generally considered a key EC component, could have positive consequences for creativity, 
which also benefits from a flexible approach (Nijstad et al., 2010; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010a). 
Given the intervention targets EC broadly, training might also help children to apply and 
maintain concentration on the creativity task. 
In practice, there are barriers. EC training has been widely shown to be effective in improving 
the immediate targets of training targets but even local transfer of EC training improvements 
appear hard to attain while evidence of far transfer is scant (Boot et al., 2008; Diamond & Ling, 
2016; Goldin et al., 2014; Green & Bavelier, 2008; Rueda et al., 2005). Since here the goal was 
to assess far transfer from EC training to creativity performance, expectations of large effects 
were necessarily modest. However, given the emphasis currently placed on training EC skills in 
children, it is important to investigate possible side effects of such an approach.  
In this randomised controlled trial, half the children were given a programme of training 
designed to improve EC skills and the other half – the controls - were given a matched 
programme without the explicit EC component. The first aim of the study was to see whether the 
training intervention achieved its desired goal of improving EC, measured by testing 
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performance on EC tests before and after the intervention. This led to the second aim of the 
study, and the primary interest, which was to ascertain, again using change in scores before and 
after the intervention, whether any aspects of creativity were affected, positively or negatively, 
by the EC training. More specifically, the study sought to further test the hypothesis that 
increased levels of control negatively impact creativity. 
Ethics 
The study was given ethical approval by the Departmental Ethics Committee of Birkbeck’s 
Department of Psychological Sciences, reference number 181989. Safeguarding procedures were 
carried out in accordance with Birkbeck and Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development policy 
documents and online advice from Care Quality Commission and the National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children.  There was nothing in the previous experience of testing or in 
the publications regarding the intervention to suggest any negative consequences, most children 
reporting finding both fun and engaging. If for any reason during testing, children became upset 
or did not want to continue with a particular test, they were allowed to stop immediately and 
without question.  
Recruitment and participants 
State schools, with their mixed ability intake, allow findings to be extrapolated most broadly and 
all state primary schools in the researcher’s local London borough were approached to take part. 
Schools showing initial interest were prioritised according to those with at least two classes per 
year group, to allow matching of intervention and controls with children of the same age. After 
meetings with several head teachers to discuss the intervention and work out feasibility and 
scheduling issues, two schools were chosen for the study.  
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Parental / carer consent was sought in conjunction with the schools. Letters were sent to all 
parents / carers of children in the research classes well in advance of the research starting and 
open meetings held with parents / carers to discuss any questions and concerns. In addition, all 
children were given letters before the study commenced to tell them about the research and let 
them know they could decide whether or not to take part. (Copies of letters are in the Appendix). 
No participants opted out of the training programme, which was delivered as part of normal 
lessons, to whole classes. On the days of testing, additional verbal consent was sought from all 
participating children. On two occasions, a child did not wish to complete one or more of the 
tests involved. 
Participating children were in school years 4 and 5, between 8 and 10 years of age. This age 
group was selected because children are young enough for EC still to be developing (and still 
pliant to training) but old enough to be able to write and read instructions independently (a 
practical consideration) and for suitability of the training programme. Unlike the first study, 
which covered a wide age range, here the age group was narrow, to reduce the likelihood of 
significant developmental effects over the four months that the study took place. 
A total of 156 children in six classes took part in the intervention, 83 girls and 73 boys. The 
mean age was 9.27 years, with a range from 8.10 to 10.29 years. Eighteen children had 
statements of Special Educational Need, 8 in control group classes and 10 in EC training classes. 
The training, both EC and controls, was designed for whole classes of mixed abilities and all 
children were included. 
Power analysis 
A priori power analysis (Cohen, 1992) was carried out using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to 
ascertain the sample size needed for repeated measures 3x2 ANOVA with two between-subject 
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groups and three time points. Effect sizes were conservatively estimated on the basis of previous 
research using the same training materials (Benzing et al., 2018; Röthlisberger et al., 2012). The 
analysis indicated that, to detect an effect size of 0.18 (i.e., the lowest of the effect sizes in the 
previous research, converting Partial η2 to Cohen’s d), with 90% power and an alpha of 0.05, a 
sample size of 138 would be needed. It should be noted that accurate a priori power analysis is 
not specified for multilevel mixed models, so an estimate based on repeated measures ANOVA 
was used as the closest approximation. Nonetheless, the power analysis suggests that the study 
was appropriately powered to detect the expected effects. 
Design 
The study examined the effects of an EC training programme on children in years 4 and 5 of two 
primary schools. Whole classes were randomly assigned within year groups and schools to either 
intervention or control groups, as shown in Table 5.1  
Pre-test assessments were carried out in the two weeks prior to the start of training. Training took 
place over a 6-week period, in three 30-minute sessions per week, in children’s usual classrooms  
 Year 4 Year 4 Year 5 Year 5 












Table 5. 1 Distribution of classes and schools and participants per class, in intervention and 
control groups 
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with their regular teachers plus assistance from the research team. The total dosage of training 
was 540 minutes (9 hours). After the training, all children were re-tested within two weeks of 
training completion and finally a third time 6-8 weeks later.  
Procedure  
 
Fig. 5. 1 Schedule overview 
 
Pre, post, and follow-up tests were all conducted in the same way. Six children were tested at a 
time; they came out of their class to a nearby room (usually the art room) and were seated at 
tables arranged so it was hard to see each other’s work. All children carried out creativity tests 
first, using paper and pencils provided, then were tested on computerised tests of EC, tests being 
administered on either Apple i-pads or Kindle fires. Response measurements on Gorilla 
(described below) have been shown to be highly consistent across these different platforms 
(Anwyl-Irvine et al., 2020b). Since the focus of interest was individual change over time, 
complication of order effects was avoided simply by always administering tests in the same 
order, namely: creativity tests, Simple Flanker, Complex Flanker, Animal Stroop. The only 
exception was the working memory test, which some children completed before and some after 
the other EC tests. WM testing was done individually, in a quiet area outside the main room.  
It was not possible for the researchers to be blind to condition during the training. However, all 
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Details of training programme 
The training programme centred on small group games, played in groups of 4-6 children. The 
games involved memorising and applying rules (e.g., if the moon is showing, name the nocturnal 
animal; if the sun is out, name the diurnal one), switching between rules within a game (e.g., sort 
insects by number, then by species), inhibiting prepotent motor responses (e.g., slap the card 
with the red spider but not the black one), keeping and working with information in mind (e.g., 
remember a list of animals, which are injured and which can fly), maintaining visual attention 
(e.g., spotting a previously highlighted item which is now missing) and so on. There were five 
games in total.  
  
Fig. 5. 2 Examples of EC intervention games ‘Insect collection’ and ‘Day and night’ 
 
In the first three weeks of training, new games were introduced each week. By the second half of 
training, the games were known, but got harder. Each game consisted of multiple levels; once 
early stages were mastered, new rules and adaptations meant that children’s EC was continually 
taxed with greater levels of difficulty. In addition, children switched groups and player roles 
frequently, meaning they had constantly to adapt to new adversaries. Children spent half of one 
of the weekly sessions playing individual games, also designed to train EC and with gradually 
increasing difficulty levels (e.g.,  dot-to-dot type puzzles, which required them to find and match 
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dots joining pairs of minutely differentiated shapes, amongst an increasing number of distractor 
shapes, rather than simply follow a numbered sequence of dots).  
A full guide to all the games and activities of EC and control groups is in the Appendix. 
For the control classes, the structure, dosage, timing and incrementally increasing difficulty 
levels were all matched as closely as possible. This was to isolate the hypothesised ‘active 
ingredients’ of EC training, i.e., those aspects specifically concerned with training EC such as 
inhibiting prepotent responses, switching between rule sets, juggling information in working 
memory and striking a balance between speed and accuracy. In the control group, traditional card 
and board games were used – children played Snakes and Ladders, Uno, Scrabble, Brainbox and 
Rummikub.  
  
Fig. 5. 3 Examples of control games ‘Snakes and ladders’ and ‘Scrabble’ 
Just as with the EC training group, the games were introduced at a simple level, with extra 
elements and rules gradually added, so that children were constantly having to meet new 
challenges. Again, as with the training group, one half of one weekly session was given over to 
individual worksheets (including word searches and crossword puzzles).  
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It is important to point out that having whole classes of children learning and successfully 
playing any kind of small group games almost certainly invokes executive control. Games 
invariably involve turn-taking, waiting, learning, and applying rules, managing emotions and 
more. It was thus a consideration that the control group was somewhat ‘impure’ in that it too was 
likely encouraging children to exercise and practice EC. The design was such that the additional 
specific EC-targeted elements of the training group would elevate improvement above and 
beyond this. For example, in one EC game, children learned that a speedy reaction to turning 
over an ‘awake snake’ card earned them a bonus, whereas a similar reaction to ‘sleeping snake’ 
brought a penalty; the EC games were full of these sorts of requirements, in which components 
of EC (here, reacting quickly to inhibit a prepotent motor response) were specifically rehearsed. 
Teachers in both training and control classes were fully trained in all the games and given a 
programme instruction manual, detailing when children should move up from one level to the 
next, the rotation of the games etc. It became clear that administering small group games in 
mixed ability classes of 30 children required a minimum of two adults, particularly when new 
games were being taught. In practice, this meant that the researcher (myself and/or a research 
assistant) were present in all the sessions, to ensure that the training was properly administered. 
To avoid the confound of having an additional person present for one condition but not the other, 
the same set up was replicated for control classes. 
The games were not designed to measure performance directly; instead, children’s performance 
was indirectly assessed through their successful completion of all levels over the training period. 
Teachers maintained class completion sheets for each training session, constituting evidence that 
the training was completed. With the exception of occasional absences due to illness, all children 
attended all training sessions. 




Executive control measures 
The EC measures were mostly the same as those in Chapter 2, where they are fully described. 
Here, only a brief description and details of any change in protocol will be outlined.  
Working memory 
Working memory was tested using the backward digit recall test (St Clair-Thompson & 
Gathercole, 2006), in which children are asked to repeat back, in reverse order, a sequence of 
digits read aloud by the researcher. The protocol was adjusted slightly from the previous study, 
to allow tests to be completed in a shorter time; here, three rather than four trials per list level 
were given and children moved up to the next level if they answered correctly for at least 2 out 
of 3. This is one fewer trial per list than outlined by Gathercole and Pickering (2000) but one 
more than has been used in many other studies (e.g., Clark et al., 2004). In all other respects, 
testing was the same. Since the focus here is on individual change over time, the fact that scores 
are not directly comparable to the previous study should not be a concern.  
Inhibitory control tasks 
Animal size Stroop 
A child-friendly version (Catale & Meulemans, 2009) of the original Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) 
was used, as described in Chapter 2. The stimuli, timings, and proportion of congruent to 
incongruent tests were all as before. The differences were that this time the test was programmed 
using the Gorilla Experiment Builder (www.gorilla.sc) and children completed the test on Apple 
i-pads or Kindle fires rather than on desktop computers. Reaction time measurements have been 
shown to be reliably equivalent across these different platforms (Anwyl-Irvine et al., 2020b). The 
number of trials was also fewer, again to allow testing within necessarily stricter time 
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constraints. There were 8 practice trials, in which children were given feedback, followed by 24 
non-feedback trials. Reaction times and accuracy were recorded.  
Simple Flanker 
The same child-friendly version of the Flanker task (Eriksen, 1995), adapted from Rueda and 
colleagues (2004), was programmed and delivered on the Gorilla Experiment Builder 
(www.gorilla.sc). The differences from previous testing were, as with Animal Stroop, that 
children used Apple i-pads or Kindle fires rather than desktop computers and the number of trials 
was reduced. There were 8 practice trials, in which children received feedback on their answers, 
then 16 trials where they did not (a further 16 followed immediately after with the addition of a 
new rule, as outlined below). Reaction times and accuracy were recorded.  
Switching task 
Complex Flanker 
The complex Flanker was an additional test added to assess switching flexibility. The version 
used here was a dimensional sort (Diamond & Kirkham 2005) akin to the ‘Dots’ (Diamond et al., 
2007) or the ‘Hearts and flowers’ (Diamond & Wright, 2014) task in which different cue colours 
or shapes point to different rules for how to respond. In this procedure, the task followed directly 
from the simple Flanker with the introduction of a new rule; if the fish were blue rather than 
orange, children had to answer for the direction of the surrounding rather than the central fish. If 
fish were orange, they continued as before. They were still instructed to answer as quickly as 
possible while trying to get the answer right, but now had to keep two rules in mind and switch 
between them. Although this task involves working memory (to remember rules) as well as 
inhibition (to stop to consider which is the appropriate rule) the key measure extracted here was 
the so-called ‘switch cost’ – the difference in reaction time between switch and non-switch trials. 
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Research consistently shows that switch trials, which involve shifting from one rule to another, 
reliably take longer than non-switch trials, in which the same rule continues (Monsell, 2003). 
There were 8 practice trials, in which children received feedback on their answers, then 16 trials 




Fig. 5. 4 Complex Flanker: the four permutations of rule type (focus on central or surrounding 
fish) and congruence (surrounding fish are swimming the same or different direction from the 
central fish).  
Creativity measures 
Creativity was measured in two domains, verbal and figural. To help make for as un-test-like an 
environment as possible (Runco, 2008, 2014; Runco & Acar, 2012), creativity tests were carried 
out first i.e., to minimise a sense of time pressure and to emphasise levity and fun. Children were 
encouraged to use their imagination to come up with unusual ideas and it was emphasised that 
there were no right or wrong answers.  
Alternative Uses Test 
The AUT (Guilford, 1978) requires participants to generate as many ‘interesting and unusual’ 
uses for an everyday object within a time limit. This time, answers were scored for fluency and 
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originality. Additional measures of flexibility and elaboration were not included, since previous 
work has shown flexibility to be so highly correlated with fluency (Forthmann et al., 2018; 
Plucker et al., 2014; Rieter-Palmon et al., 2019) and elaboration was deemed a less fundamental 
aspect of creativity. The objects chosen as targets were (in order): plastic water bottle, pencil, 
and sock. 
As discussed in detail previously, there is vigorous debate about the best way to measure 
originality. Here, the sample size allowed for use of the frequency method, as outlined by 
Plucker and colleagues (2014) and deemed to be the most objective method of scoring 
(Forthmann et al., 2018; Plucker et al., 2014; Runco, 2014). Responses are scored according to 
their statistical rarity; here, responses scored 2 points if given by fewer than 2% of respondents, 
and 1 point if given by between 2 and 5%. Responses given by more than 5% of respondents 
received no points for originality. The overall originality score is, following from Forthmann and 
colleagues (2020a, 2020b) a ratio score, calculated as the sum of individual response points 
divided by the number of responses. Fluency was a simple count of responses, discounting any 
repeats or copies of the prototypical stated use (e.g., for a pencil, ‘drawing’ or ‘writing’).  
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
The TTCT figural tests (Torrance, 1974, 2014) are simple paper and pencil drawing games in 
which children complete drawings from a range of starting stimuli. A test involving the 
production of multiple pictures from the same repeated starting point, was used here. Measures 
of fluency (number of responses) and originality (points for responses not on a pre-determined 
list of exclusions) were used; these are the core creativity sub-measures and allow comparison 
across domains. Since the Torrance tests only have two versions, a third was created for follow 
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up, with comparable starting stimuli. Details of this and issues relating to it are considered in the 
Results. The starting stimuli were (in order): parallel lines, circles, and triangles. 
 
Fig. 5. 5 Example of TTCT figural sheet, with parallel line starting stimuli 
 
Results 
A total of 156 children were included in the analysis, 83 girls and 73 boys. The mean age was 
9.27 years, with a range from 8.10 to 10.29 years. Eighteen children had statements of Special 
Educational Need (SEN), 8 in control group classes and 10 in EC training classes.
 



























The results will be presented in sections, to answer the following questions: 
• Did training take place in accordance with instructions?  
• Did the test measures work as expected? 
• Were there changes in the relationship between EC and creativity over time? 
• Were there changes in performance over time and were they differentiated by condition?  
• Did additional factors, e.g., age, gender, affect outcomes?  
Did training take place in accordance with instructions? 
The training involved 3 x 30-minute sessions for 6 weeks i.e., 18 sessions in all. Completion 
rates were high. All year 5 classes (both EC and control in both schools) completed all 18 
sessions. Both year 4 classes (one EC and control) fully completed 17 out of 18 sessions and 
partially completed the one other session (it ran for 20 minutes instead of 30 minutes in both 
cases). No children opted out of the training. 
Did the test measures work as expected? 
In this section, the primary goal is to establish whether the measures used to test EC were 
reliable, and to critically evaluate the scoring of the creativity tests. 
Pre-processing of computerised EC measures 
Measurement impurity is ‘a ubiquitous problem in cognitive assessment’ and not one that can be 
definitively solved (Willoughby et al., 2018) but efforts can be taken to minimise noise. The 
noisiness of reaction time data is compounded when RT difference scores are used (comparing 
mean RTs for congruent and incongruent trials), since they conflate the noise of both measures. 
Noise reduction is often achieved by increasing trial numbers, but here practical constraints made 
high trial numbers difficult. Instead, to minimise noise, median reaction times were calculated 
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for each child, in addition to accuracy scores. The table below shows percentage accuracy and 
median RT means for congruent and incongruent correct trials in Animal Stroop and Simple 
Flanker for each measurement time point.  
   T1 T2 T3 

















Cong Mean 97.8 1057 99.3 1005 98.0 890 
 SD 8.6 443 2.9 339 7.2 227 
Incong Mean 95.5 1191 97.2 1120 97.0 997 
 SD 7.9 429 6.5 453 10.1 247 
Diff  Mean 2.3 127 2.1 115 1.0 106 
  SD 11.9 260 5.9 268 6.2 147 
Simple 
Flanker 
Cong Mean 87.6 1213 95.9 975 96.4 860 
 SD 21.3 741 10.6 390 10.9 307 
Incong Mean 76.5 1458 90.0 1122 92.0 1021 
 SD 32.2 1340 22.8 825 18.6 693 
Diff Mean 11.1 188 5.9 118 4.4 155 
  SD 20.9 213 20.3 647 13.8 509 
Table 5. 2 Descriptive data: median RTs and accuracy scores for Stroop and Simple Flanker at 
all time points (n=156). Cong = congruent condition; Incong = incongruent condition. T1 = pre-
test (baseline); T2 = immediate post-test and T3 = follow-up 
 
As expected for this age group, accuracy scores were close to ceiling in both tests, with many 
children scoring 100% accuracy in both conditions (congruent / incongruent) even at baseline. 
51.1% of participants scored 100% accuracy in both conditions in the Flanker and 61.5% in the 
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Stroop. These high numbers mean that accuracy measures will not be sufficiently sensitive to 
detect change over time; consequently, only RT measures will be considered in further analyses. 
Correlations between EC measures  
The first table shows correlations between EC measures at baseline (T1). The expected 
correlation between the two EC tests theoretically tapping similar inhibitory control processes is 
not seen. Nor does there appear any correlation between working memory and the other 
measures, unexpected given the composite nature of EC.  
 Stroop RT diff Simple Flanker RT diff 




Stroop RT diff   -.08 
.331 
Table 5. 3 Pearson’s correlations (top) and related probabilities (below) between Flanker and 
Stroop reaction time (RT) differences at baseline.  
 
The subsequent tables assess test-retest reliability through correlations between RT differences 
within the same test over time.  
 Stroop RT diff T2 Stroop RT diff T3 




Stroop RT diff T2  .25** 
.002 
Table 5. 4 Correlations between Stroop RT difference over time. Here, and in all subsequent 
reports,  
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* represents significance at <.05 level and ** significance at <.01 level. 
 
Again, correlations are much lower than would be expected for a fully reliable measure, with 
only one combination (Stroop T2 / T3) showing significant correlation. Table 5.4 shows 
correlations for the Stroop. Table 5.5 shows correlations for the Flanker: 
 Simple Flanker RT diff T2 Simple Flanker RT diff T3 




Simple Flanker RT diff T2  -.12 
.133 
Table 5. 5 Pearson’s correlations between Simple Flanker RT difference over time.  
 
Scatterplots of T2 scores plotted against T1 suggest the reason for this lack of correlation: there 
is a great deal of clustering of scores around zero.  
 
Fig. 5. 7 Scatterplot of RT difference scores in Stroop test plotting T1 baseline against T2 post-
test. 
 
Some prominent outliers in these data warranted further investigation. The figure below shows 
the Cook’s distances (a measure of the influence of data points on results in regression analysis) 
for the sample for the Stroop test. Although Cook’s distances suggest strong influence of 
particular data points, they do not point clearly to where a cut-off for outliers should be. For this 
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reason, and the fact that the study involved a real-world intervention for children of highly varied 
ability, no outliers were removed.  
 
Fig. 5. 8 Cook’s distances for regression of RT differences scores of Stroop time 2 on time 1.  
These longitudinal data suggest that RT difference is not a sufficiently reliable and valid measure 
here. Its noisiness means it will be unable to reliably detect training effects i.e., it has insufficient 
test-retest reliability to pick up change over time, the key indicator needed.  
Instead, an alternative measure was evaluated: median reaction time for incongruent trials 
(correct responses). This measure should theoretically still capture the relevant EC component of 
inhibiting a prepotent response (i.e., because such control is only required for incongruent trials), 
but has the confound of incorporating base level individual differences. Since the analysis will 
consider within-individual change over time, to some extent this confound is controlled for. 
Bivariate correlations suggest this new RT incongruent measure is more reliable for Stroop: 
 Stroop RT incong T2 Stroop RT incong T3 




Stroop RTincong T2  .62** 
<.001 
Table 5. 6 Pearson’s correlations between RT incong over time for Stroop.  
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And also for Simple Flanker: 








Simple Flanker RTincong T2  .67** 
<.001 
Table 5. 7 Pearson’s correlations between RT incong over time for Flanker 
This also produces significantly correlated scores in the different, though theoretically related, 
variables of Stroop and Simple Flanker, at all time points. Whilst these cross-measure 
correlations are reassuring with respect to the robustness of the measures, it should be borne in 
mind that they might equally reflect baseline respond speed (i.e., as opposed to the more specific 
underlying EC construct). 
























Table 5. 8 Pearson’s correlations between RT incongruent trials in Stroop and Flanker at all time 
points 
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To ensure that the Stroop / Flanker effect is still present (i.e., despite the problems with RT 
difference scores), paired samples t-tests were carried out on accuracy scores to compare 
performance on congruent and incongruent trials. In all cases (i.e., both tests and all time points), 
the differences in accuracy were highly significant. 
  T1 T2 T3 
Animal Stroop t 3.20 4.41 2.41 
df 155 155 155 
sig  .002 <.001 .017 
Simple Flanker t 4.40 3.64 4.03 
df 155 155 155 
sig  <.001 <.001 <.001 
Table 5. 9 Paired sample t-tests, comparing accuracy difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials for Stroop and Flanker at the three test time points 
 
The distributions for RT incongruent scores showed problems of deviation from normality for 
both Stroop and Flanker so the data were log transformed. This transformation also addressed the 
fact that RT scores do not follow a linear trajectory to zero, but rather an L shape to the limit of 
possible reaction speed. Given the high correlation between Stroop and Flanker RT incongruent 
scores, a combined mean score was created to reduce noise. In all subsequent analyses this single 
combined measure was thus used to represent the inhibitory control component of EC. These 
combined scores (both raw and log versions) over time and by condition are shown in Table 5.10 
below. The final correlation matrix for the selected EC variables is shown in Table 5.11. Note 
that the correlation between working memory and inhibitory is negative since better performance 
is reflected by a higher WM score but a lower inhibitory control score. 
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  RT incongruent 
T1 
Mean (SD) in ms 
RT incongruent 
T2 
Mean (SD) in ms  
RT incongruent 
T3 
Mean (SD) in ms  
Inhibitory control 
combined raw score 
TOTAL 1327 (746) 1105 (486) 1006 (407) 
EC 1363 (824) 1079 (422) 968 (316) 
Control 1281 (675) 1093 (511) 969 (354) 
Inhibitory control 
combined log score 
TOTAL 3.06 (0.16) 3.01 (0.14) 2.97 (0.13) 
EC 3.07 (0.17) 3.00 (0.13) 2.96 (0.12) 
Control 3.05 (0.15) 3.00 (0.13) 2.96 (0.12) 










































log score T1 








log score T2 
    .79** 
<.001 
Table 5. 11 Pearson’s correlation matrix for final working memory and inhibitory control 
measures used for subsequent analysis 
 
Complex Flanker 
No significant difference was found between reaction times for congruent and incongruent trials 
in this test. There were large individual differences in RT difference scores, with almost half 
children not showing any switch cost (i.e., incongruent trials did not incur longer RTs than 
congruent trials). Similarly, accuracy scores failed to show the expected switch cost, with no 
significant difference in accuracy between trial types; only half the children had higher rates of 
accuracy on non-switch than switch trials. Alternative measures had insufficient trial numbers or 
too many children at ceiling to consider. This measure, for reasons which will be elaborated in 
the discussion, did not work properly here and it was decided not to include it in further analyses.  
Working memory 
This score is a simple count of correct responses. The distribution of scores was normal with no 
outliers, so raw scores were entered without further processing into subsequent analyses. Scores 
for the whole sample, and the different condition groups, are shown in the table below. 
 T1 T2 T3 
Total 7.07 (2.75) 8.16 (3.11) 8.64 (3.37) 
EC 7.14 (2.59) 7.92 (2.73) 8.61 (3.18) 
Control 6.87 (2.93) 8.32 (3.57) 8.59 (3.68) 
Table 5. 12 Working memory raw scores, means (SDs) by condition, over time 
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To summarise, two final EC measures will be used for all further analyses: the log score of the 
combined median RT for incongruent trials and the working memory raw score.  
Creativity measures 
TTCT figural tests 
Scoring of this test was carried out as outlined by Torrance (1974) using the most recent scoring 
guide (2016) with some adaptations. Firstly, responses were scored only for fluency and 
originality (the full Torrance scoring also includes elaboration and a points system for creative 
strengths, applied to the complete test battery). Fluency is a simple count of the number of 
responses minus excluded responses; responses are excluded if they fail to incorporate the 
starting stimulus, are only abstract patterns or duplicate previous responses. Originality is 
measured by summing the number of responses given which are not on a pre-defined list of 
common responses. The list which determines originality scoring was adapted from the Torrance 
scoring guidelines for several reasons: 
• Despite being the most recent edition, the list is outdated, particularly in the area of 
technology. Several common responses for modern items are missing from the exclusion 
list e.g., ‘phone’ for parallel lines, which was given by more than 5% of respondents 
• There are other puzzling omissions e.g., ‘pizza’ for circles, which was given by more 
than 10% of the sample, but is missing from the list (whereas ‘pie’ is included) 
• Conversely, some items on the list of common responses were not given by any children 
in the current sample e.g., ‘gift’ or ‘picture frame’ for parallel lines or ‘coin’ or 
‘stoplight’ for circles 
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• There is some cultural specificity in that certain responses are likely only to be given by 
certain populations e.g., the ‘Illuminati’ sign was given by more than 5% of the current 
sample because it is currently popular in youth social media memes, but is not on the list 
• The Torrance lists have 18 exclusions for parallel lines and 29 for circles with no 
explanation for this large difference in number 
• The Torrance has only two forms, but here there were three test points. A third test, and 
its exclusion list, had to be created to allow comparison across the three testing sessions – 
so it was logical to create consistent exclusion lists for all test points. 
The new lists were based on the statistical frequency of responses, while maintaining the 
binary scoring of the Torrance approach. A response given by fewer than 4% of the sample 
received one point for originality while a response given by more than 4% received zero. 4% 
was chosen as the cut off to give a quantity of exclusions comparable to the Torrance list. 
The exclusion list for each test was: 
 
Table 5. 13 List of responses given by >4% of children and receiving no points for originality 




It is notable that just as the Torrance scoring method fails to differentiate an extremely common 
from a somewhat common response (both types appearing on the exclusion lists), it also fails to 
differentiate a highly original response (e.g., ‘Man jumping on a pogo stick over lines’) from a 
slightly original one (e.g., ‘Church’). The per-child score is calculated as a simple sum of all the 
originality points. The nature of this scoring method means that, while it is possible to have high 
fluency coupled with high or low originality, it is very difficult to achieve high originality 
coupled with low fluency. A child who produces only a few responses of a highly original nature 
is not highly rewarded - in contrast to AUT scoring. All scores showed normal distributions and 
the finite number of starting stimuli constrained possible outliers.  
  T1 (pre) T2 (post) T3 (follow up) 
Fluency Total 3.83 (2.09) 4.63 (2.84) 4.94 (2.57) 
EC 3.60 (2.15) 4.53 (2.79) 5.03 (2.68) 
Control 4.01 (2.02) 4.71 (2.93) 4.83 (2.47) 
Originality 
 
Total 2.74 (1.69) 2.36 (1.99) 2.73 (2.07) 
EC 2.60 (1.68) 2.49 (2.10) 2.87 (2.07) 
Control 2.83 (1.67) 2.23 (1.91) 2.58 (2.07) 
Table 5. 14 Scores for TTCT figural tests at the three time points, whole sample and by 
condition. Means and standard deviations (brackets) are shown.  
 
Alternative Uses Test 
This test was also scored for fluency and originality. Fluency was calculated as a simple sum of 
responses, minus any exclusions. Exclusions were of three types: a repeat of the stated 
prototypical use (e.g., ‘drink water out of it’ for water bottle), an overly generic response (e.g., 
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‘do something with it’) and repeats (e.g., ‘wash your hands with it’ followed by ‘use it to wash 
your hands’). Exclusions are not made by judgment even if it is unclear how the object might be 
used in that way (e.g., a water bottle as ‘a jumper’).  
The issues raised by originality scoring have been discussed previously (see Chapters 1 and 2; 
also, Forthmann et al., 2020b). There is continued, vigorous debate about how best to score it 
(Forthmann et al., 2020a, 2020b; Plucker et al., 2014; Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Said-Metwaly et 
al., 2017; Simonton, 2018) often linked to different theoretical positions about the process by 
which creativity is achieved. Issues such as sample size also affect scoring decisions – for 
example, frequency-based measures can be unreliable for small samples (Reiter-Palmon et al., 
2019; Silvia et al., 2008). Here, originality was assessed by the objective measure of statistical 
rarity of responses (Cropley, 1967; Mayseless, 2015a; Runco, 2008), with the application of a 
scoring formula to each response as follows: 
 >5% respondents give the answer 0 points 
 2-5% respondents give the answer 1 point 
 <2% respondents give the answer 2 points 
Scores are then summed for that participant and divided by their fluency score – to produce an 
overall originality score per child. In contrast to the TTCT, this scoring method makes it harder 
to achieve high originality with high fluency than with low fluency (though low originality can 
be achieved with both high and low fluency). Some would argue this is the most accurate 
reflection of real-world creativity: in a short space of time, it is difficult to produce a large 
number of high-quality ideas (Silvia et al., 2008; Torrance, 1966). An advantage of having two 
different emphases in originality scoring across the two tests is that it increases the credibility of 
any finding common to both.   
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  T1 (pre) T2 (post) T3 (follow up) 
Fluency Total 3.40 (2.41) 4.26 (2.91) 5.08 (3.02) 
EC 2.99 (2.02) 4.31 (3.27) 5.31 (3.52) 
Control 3.78 (2.69) 4.18 (2.53) 4.86 (2.43) 
Originality  Total 0.92 (0.58) 0.90 (0.56) 0.70 (0.51) 
EC 0.88 (0.63) 0.94 (0.57) 0.79 (0.58) 
Control 0.95 (0.52) 0.86 (0.55) 0.61 (0.43) 
Table 5. 15 Fluency and originality in AUT at three time points, full sample and by condition. 
Means and (standard deviations).  
 
Some examples of particularly original responses for each stimulus are shown below (original 
spelling is retained): 
Table 5. 16 Verbatim responses scoring highly for originality for each stimulus object.  
 
There was a high level of correlation between sub measures both within each domain and also 
between verbal and figural domains. This cross-domain correlation is by no means always the 
case with creativity measures which often appear domain specific (Baer, 2010).  
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 TTCT originality AUT fluency AUT originality 


















  .45** 
<.001 
 
Table 5. 17 Pearson’s correlations and related significance values between creativity measures at 
baseline 
 
Having established the details of the EC and creativity measures, we can now move on to look at 
change over time.  
Was there change in the relationship between EC and creativity over time?  
Before coming on to the effect of condition on change over time, we report here an analysis 
considering change in the correlations between EC and creativity measures over time. This 
analysis will become more relevant when we come on to discuss the main findings regarding the 
effects of training. The following considers all participants, collapsing EC and control groups. At 
baseline (T1), there was no strong relationship between EC and creativity variables, with only 
working memory showing a small significant correlation with originality in the verbal domain.  


























p <.001 .147 .423 .157 .026 






r  .01 -.02 .05 -.09 
CI 
(95%) 








p  .900 .796 .559 .267 
Table 5. 18 Pearson’s correlations between EC and creativity measures at baseline (T1). 
By T2 and T3 (post-test and follow up) most correlations between EC and creativity measures 
became stronger and highly significant. The following tables show results using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients, but the more conservative Spearman’s correlation coefficient produced 
very similar results.  






























R  -.20* .01 -.28** -.25** 
CI 
(95%) 








P  .013 .926 <.001 .002 
Table 5. 19 Pearson’s correlations between EC and creativity measures at post-test (T2). 
The final table (5.20) shows results for T3: 
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R  -.22** -.23** -.26** -.03 
CI 
(95%) 








P  .006 .004 .001 .702 
Table 5. 20 Pearson’s correlations between EC and creativity measures at follow-up (T3). 
 
The general trend is an increase in correlations over time, most clearly seen with the correlations 
between working memory and fluency, which increase steadily over the three time points, in 
both figural and verbal domains. The correlation of TTCT originality with both EC measures 
also increases, though less consistently (the increase is seen between T2 and T3 but not T1 and 
T2). AUT originality differs; it is the only measure with lower correlations with both EC 
measures at the end of testing than the start. This is shown graphically below in Fig. 5.9.  




Fig. 5. 9 Change in correlations between EC and creativity variables over time. Blue spectrum 
colour lines show correlations with fluency measures, red spectrum with originality measures. 
For ease of reading, polarity of inhibitory control correlations has been reversed. The black 
dotted line shows the critical significance level for p=.05, for the sample size of 156 at r=.16 
 
Were there changes in performance over time and were they differentiated by condition?  
This section analyses whether there were significant changes in how children performed in the 
EC and creativity tests over time, and whether this differs between the EC intervention group and 
controls. Each outcome variable was analysed with a linear multilevel mixed model, to account 
for the nested nature of the data – both within individuals and between them, since different 
classes and schools were involved. In each case, to account for correlated random effects, 
participant and class were specified as random factors with random intercepts, and the correlated 
residuals within the repeated measures were accounted for using an autoregressive covariance 
structure (i.e., the assumption that adjacent time points are likely to be the most highly 
correlated). This covariance structure was chosen on the basis of theory and after checking that it 
improved model fit, as measured by a lower AIC (Akaike information criterion). 
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Experimental condition (EC or control), time (baseline, post and follow up) and the 
condition*time interaction were specified as fixed factors. Age was not included as a covariate 
here but was represented by the inclusion of class in the model. School was not included since 
there were only two schools (insufficient for random effect modelling) and since school variance 
was accounted for by including class in the model. Results are reported first for EC variables and 
then for creativity variables. Standardised betas are not typically produced in this kind of 
analysis but for ease of interpretation and for the benefit of those unaccustomed to LMM 
reporting, they have been calculated (by running the analyses with the variables z-scored) and 
are shown here - estimates are shown in italics. Note that the other, non-italicised values in each 
table refer to the unstandardised scores. Best practice suggests that the most accurate main 
effects are produced by models which exclude interaction terms; however, in practice those 
results were almost indistinguishable from those which included the interaction term, and in the 
following tables, the main effects of time reported are from the full analysis. Time and condition 
are dummy coded relative to baseline for time and to the control group – so the intercept refers to 
control group scores at baseline (T1). Change over time is also represented graphically for all 
measures, in Fig. 10, following the LMM reports. 
EC variables 
Working memory 
The resulting model showed a significant effect of time F(2, 203.73) = 36.32, p < .001 but no 
significant difference between conditions F(1, 6.21) = 0.01, p = .920 and no significant 
interaction between condition and time F(2, 203.73) = 1.17, p = .311. 











T Sig Confidence 
intervals 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept -.32 6.88 0.58 11.91 <.001 5.52 8.23 
Condition .06 0.18 0.82 0.22 .831 -1.74 2.10 
Time-post .44 1.38 0.30 4.67 <.001 0.80 1.97 
Time-follow up .53 1.67 0.26 6.37 <.001 1.15 2.18 
Interaction-post -.19 -0.62 0.42 -1.47 .144 -1.44 0.21 
Interaction-follow up  -.06 -0.17 0.37 -0.47 .639 -0.91 0.56 
Table 5. 21 LMM estimates of effect sizes for change in working memory scores 
There was significant variation both within and between participants. The different sources of the 
observed variation is indicated in the table below. 
 Estimate Standard error Wald Z Significance 
Within participant  3.72 0.72 5.15 <.001 
Between participants 4.93 1.05 4.70 <.001 
Between classes 0.67 0.53 1.27 .205 
Table 5. 22 Estimates of covariance parameters for WM 
Inhibitory control 
The model showed a significant effect of time F(2, 207.18) = 46.89, p < .001 but no significant 
difference between conditions F (1, 6.20) = 0.06, p = .816 and no significant interaction between 
condition and time F (2, 207.18) = 0.21, p = .809. Estimates of effect sizes are shown in the 
table. 











t sig Confidence 
intervals 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept .31 3.06 0.02 123.13 <.001 3.00 3.12 
Condition .12 0.02 0.04 0.47 .653 -0.06 0.10 
Time-post -.30 -0.05 0.02 -2.78 .006 -0.08 -0.01 
Time-follow up -.59 -0.09 0.01 -6.32 <.001 -0.12 -0.06 
Interaction-post -.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.58 .560 -0.06 0.03 
Interaction-follow up  -.09 -0.01 0.02 -0.58 .561 -0.05 0.03 
Table 5. 23 LMM estimates of effect sizes for change in inhibitory control scores 
There was significant variation both within and between participants.  
 Estimate Standard error Wald Z Significance 
Within participant  0.01 0.00 4.64 <.001 
Between participants 0.01 0.00 2.65 .008 
Between classes 0.00 0.00 1.16 .248 
Table 5. 24 Estimates of covariance parameters for inhibitory control 
Creativity measures 
TTCT fluency 
There was a main effect of time F(2, 224.09) = 16.66, p < .001. There was no main effect of 
condition (1, 5.86) = 0.13, p =.730 and no interaction between condition and time F(2, 224.09) = 
1.17, p = .311.  











t sig Confidence 
intervals 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept -.18 4.01 0.35 11.37 <.001 3.22 4.80 
Condition -.16 -0.42 0.50 -0.83 .426 -1.53 0.70 
Time-post .28 0.71 0.31 2.30 .023 0.10 1.31 
Time-follow up .33 0.83 0.28 3.03 .003 0.29 1.38 
Interaction-post .08 0.19 0.43 0.44 .658 -0.66 1.05 
Interaction-follow up  .22 0.57 0.39 1.47 .144 -0.20 1.34 
Table 5. 25 LMM estimates of effect sizes for change in TTCT fluency scores 
 Estimate Standard error Wald Z Significance 
Within participant  3.88 0.62 6.25 <.001 
Between participants 2.23 0.69 3.22 .001 
Between classes 0.14 0.17 0.81 .420 
Table 5. 26 Estimates of covariance parameters for TTCT fluency 
TTCT originality 
There was a main effect of time F(2, 221.95) = 4.11, p = .018. There was no interaction between 
condition and time F(2, 221.95) = 1.37, p = .257, nor a main effect of condition F(1, 5.98) = 
0.06, p = .820. Note that the effect of time here did not represent straightforward improvement 
(as it has with other performance changes so far presented), but rather a decline between T1 and 
T2, followed by recovery between T2 and T3. 











t sig Confidence 
intervals 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept .11 2.59 0.33 7.82 <.001 1.84 3.35 
Condition -.11 0.22 0.47 0.47 .651 -0.85 1.29 
Time-post -.32 -0.14 0.22 -0.64 .525 -0.58 0.30 
Time-follow up -.13 0.23 0.25 0.94 .348 -0.26 0.72 
Interaction-post .25 -0.47 0.31 -1.52 .131 -1.10 0.14 
Interaction-follow up  .25 -0.49 -.35 -1.40 .165 -1.18 0.20 
Table 5. 27 LMM estimates of effect sizes for change in TTCT originality scores 
 Estimate Standard error Wald Z Significance 
Within participant  2.54 0.42 6.10 <.001 
Between participants 0.90 0.43 2.10 .036 
Between classes 0.20 0.16 1.23 .219 
Table 5. 28 Estimates of covariance parameters for TTCT originality 
AUT fluency 
The model showed a significant effect of time F(2, 236.15) = 28.95, p < .001 as well as a 
significant interaction between condition and time F(2, 236.15) = 4.05, p = .019. Both groups 
improved their scores over time, but the EC group improved more, starting with lower scores 
than controls at baseline but producing higher scores by follow up. Overall, the main effect of 
condition was not significant F(1, 6.19) = 0.01, p = .926.  











t sig Confidence 
intervals 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept -.17 3.77 0.36 10.36 <.001 2.97 4.57 
Condition -.27 -0.76 0.51 -1.48 .167 -1.89 0.37 
Time-post .14 0.40 0.33 1.22 .225 -0.25 1.04 
Time-follow up .38 1.08 0.31 3.43 .001 0.46 1.70 
Interaction-post .32 0.92 0.46 2.00 .047 0.01 1.84 
Interaction-follow up  .43 1.23 0.45 2.77 .006 0.36 2.11 
Table 5. 29 LMM estimates of effect sizes for change in AUT fluency 
 Estimate Standard error Wald Z Significance 
Within participant  4.18 0.55 7.65 <.001 
Between participants 3.37 0.73 4.65 <.001 
Between classes 0.11 0.17 0.63 .530 
Table 5. 30 Estimates of covariance parameters for AUT fluency 
AUT originality  
The model showed there was a main effect of time F(2, 255.69) = 9.46, p < .001. Note that here 
the change over time was a reduction in scores. There was no main effect of condition F(2, 
255.69) = 1.20, p = .313. While the overall interaction between condition and time was not 
significant, F(2, 255.69) = 2.22, p = .111, there was a significant interaction between T1 
(baseline) and T3 (follow-up), as shown in the Table 5.31 below.  
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t sig Confidence 
intervals 
      Lower Upper 
Intercept .19 0.95 0.67 14.23 <.001 0.81 1.08 
Condition -.10 -.06 0.09 -0.61 .546 -0.25 0.14 
Time-post -.16 -0.09 0.08 -1.08 .279 -0.26 0.07 
Time-follow up -.61 -0.34 0.08 -4.22 <.001 -0.50 -0.18 
Interaction at post .27 0.15 0.12 1.25 .215 -0.09 0.38 
Interaction at follow up  .43 -0.24 0.12 2.10 .037 0.02 0.47 
Table 5. 31 LMM estimates of effect sizes for change in AUT originality scores 
 Estimate Standard error Wald Z Significance 
Within participant 0.28 0.03 8.99 <.001 
Between participants 0.02 0.03 0.68 .494 
Between classes 0.00 0.00 0.51 .612 
Table 5. 32 Estimates of covariance parameters for AUT originality 
 
To summarise these results, for all variables there was a main effect of time. In the case of WM, 
IC and both fluency measures, change in time represented better performance. In AUT 
originality, performance declined over time and in TTCT originality, it declined from T1 to T2, 
then improved from T2 to T3. There was no interaction with condition for the EC measures, nor 
for either TTCT measure. There were interactions with condition seen with both AUT measures. 
For AUT fluency, while both groups showed improvement over time, the EC group showed 
significantly greater improvement between all time points; for AUT originality, while the 
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Working memory Inhibitory control 
  
TTCT fluency TTCT originality 
  
AUT fluency AUT originality 
  
Fig. 5. 10 Change in EC and creativity variables over time, by condition. Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals. Red lines show the EC training group, blue lines the control group. 
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interaction with condition was not significant for the overall model, there was a significant 
interaction at follow up, the decline in performance being significantly greater for the control 
than the EC group.  
Did additional factors e.g., age, gender, SEN status, significantly affect outcomes?  
The general approach in examining additional factors was to aim to reduce the chance of false 
discovery by only including extra covariates in models if there was a firm theoretical justification 
for doing so. Evidence from the existing literature suggests that gender is unlikely to be an 
important covariate (Baer & Kaufman, 2011; Runco & Yoruk, 2014) and no significant effect of 
gender was found here. Children with SEN, as would be expected, tended to perform at a lower 
level than children without SEN but their trajectories of improvement over time were very 
similar i.e., there were differences in intercepts rather than slopes. The figure below for working 
memory is typical: 
 
Fig. 5. 11 Change over time in working memory scores, by SEN status 
Given the small numbers involved and the even distribution of children with SEN in training and 
control groups, this covariate was not included in further models. 
The factor of age presents the greatest challenge for analysis since there are two conflated factors 
to account for – the random effect of class and the fixed effect of age. The uneven distribution of 
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classes and year groups within schools (i.e., the fact that School 1 had 4 classes: 2 year 4s and 2 
year 5s, while School 2 had only 2 year 5 classes) made separation of these factors more 
complicated (i.e., because age was not covered evenly) as the graphs which follow illustrate. 
Again, taking working memory scores as an example, the first graph shows scores at the three 
measurement time points, separated by year group (as a proxy for age). For cognitive 
performance measures, we would generally expect better performance in older children, and this 
was the picture seen here. While scores are lower in younger children, the trajectories of change 
over time appear similar for both age groups.  
 
Fig. 5. 12 Change over time in working memory scores, by year group as a proxy for age. Error 
bars show 95% confidence intervals 
The next graph, again showing WM scores over time, breaks down results by class.  
 
Fig. 5. 13 WM scores over time by class. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Chapter 5. Does training executive control affect children’s creativity? 
258 
 
It shows that year 5 children at School 2 (the school in which only year 5s participated, classes 
5M and 5Sv, represented by yellow and mint green lines) outperform year 4 children at School 1 
at all time points, including base levels. But within School 1, there is no clear difference in 
performance, despite the age differences, between year 4 and year 5 children, even at baseline. In 
both cases, the trajectories of change appear broadly similar for all classes. 
Representing this in a statistical model is not straightforward. Including both age and class (and 
the relevant interactions) overfits models and causes failure to converge, whilst including either 
one alone means it absorbs the variance on behalf of both factors e.g., including age in place of 
class in the model means age apparently explains variance which in reality stems in part from 
differences between classes. Given that i. the main interest is the effect of different conditions, ii. 
that there is no theoretical reason to believe that different age groups would respond differently 
either to the intervention or control group training and iii.  that inspection of graphs showing all 
relevant variables broken down by age gave no reason to suspect age significantly affected 
outcomes, age was not considered further. The complications caused by the uneven coverage of 
age within schools will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Discussion 
This study set out to examine, through a randomised controlled trial in six classes of two primary 
schools, whether EC training affected outcomes in measures of creativity. Both intervention and 
control groups were actively involved in playing small group games over the course of several 
weeks; the difference was that the intervention group’s games were specifically designed to tax 
EC. Results showed that both groups improved performance in EC measures (verbal working 
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memory and inhibitory control) and in creative fluency in two domains (verbal and figural) over 
the course of the study. By contrast, creative originality did not improve; in the figural domain 
there was no overall change in originality and in the verbal domain, it declined. If both 
interventions (i.e., EC and active control) improved EC, these data would be consistent with the 
view that creative originality was negatively impacted by EC training. 
The discussion will explore possible explanations for these findings which are surprising for 
several reasons: first, that changes were almost completely consistent across training and control 
groups (in AUT fluency the training group show significantly greater improvement than controls 
and in AUT originality, the training group showed less decline by follow up than controls); 
second, that there appear to be some ‘far transfer’ effects on creativity, and third, that this 
transfer was differentiated such that there was a positive effect on fluency and a negative one on 
originality. The discussion which follows will mirror the sectional structure of the results, before 
broadening into more general discussion, linking findings to previous studies and the wider 
literature, and relating findings to the model of creativity being developed across this thesis. 
Did the measures work as expected? 
Some of the issues which arose with the measures were a result of the trade-off between ideal lab 
practice and the practical constraints of a real-world study. The example of trial numbers in EC 
tests is a good illustration of this – the lab ideal suggests a large number of trials to minimise 
noise but the practical necessity of testing a large number of children in a short space of time 
makes this difficult: teachers do not want children out of class for longer than necessary and 
children completing a large test battery inevitably tire. In the case of inhibitory control, RTs of 
incongruent trials served as an acceptable substitute for the traditional RT difference scores. But 
in the case of the switching test, it is likely that the small number of trials was largely responsible 
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for this measure failing to work. Given the proposed importance in the model of a broader level 
‘flexibility’ (broader in suggesting movement between thinking approaches rather than between 
task sets), it is disappointing not to have a measure which reflects flexibility in its narrower EC 
definition. By contrast with computerised tests, WM was straightforward to test and evaluate, as 
were the creativity tests. 
Explaining change in performance over time 
Performance on the intervention was not measured directly (i.e., children were not tested on how 
well they did in the games, only on the fact that they completed the training) but instead, a ‘near 
transfer’ effect of training to other EC tests, as well as a ‘far transfer’ to creativity were 
measured. For EC, results showed that both working memory and inhibitory control improved 
with time. The overall effect sizes of improvements, in an analysis that combined groups, were 
.19 for WM and .24 for inhibitory control, both very much in line with previous studies (Benzing 
et al., 2019; Röthlisberger et al., 2012). Fluency in both domains also improved with time, 
though the effect sizes were smaller (.10 for TTCT and .15 for AUT), as would be expected 
given the further transfer. Originality in the AUT declined significantly whilst in the TTCT, it 
was static overall.  
We will shortly consider the findings in which differences were seen between experimental 
groups. But first, we will consider the findings of improved performance in both conditions 
symmetrically as was seen for most measures. There are various possible explanations for such 
findings, including  one or more of: 
• Practice effects. These suggest that children do better on tests second / third time around 
due to “undesirable influences on test scores relative to the repeated exposure to the test” 
(Barbot, 2019b, p. 204). 
Chapter 5. Does training executive control affect children’s creativity? 
261 
 
Some practitioners are pessimistic about such effects: “Practice effects on cognitive tests are not 
a minor nuisance but a major potential problem,” according to Wesnes and Pincock (2002, 
p.473) since their contribution to outcomes is hard to decipher. These researchers argue that even 
if an intervention group improves more than controls, practice effects cannot be ruled out, 
because it might be that the intervention facilitated practice effects. This gloomy view is not 
shared by everyone. In a recent study (Kavanaugh et al., 2019), practice effects were calculated 
for a large number of participants (roughly 1000 in total, varying by test) involved in 
computerised cognitive training programmes. Practice effects (results for tests completed 
approximately 1 month apart, prior to intervention) were calculated for very similar measures as 
used in the current study. Repeated measures ANOVA found no significant differences for a list-
sort working memory recall task and a small but significant difference in Flanker incongruent 
RT, with an estimated effect size of partial η2 of .009, a considerably lower effect size than 
observed here. This evidence suggests that practice effects are unlikely to fully explain the 
effects seen for EC tests here. 
The issue with creativity tests is somewhat different. A unique feature of creativity research is its 
requirement for originality - meaning that novel tests must be used at each time of testing. 
Practice effects thus differ in important ways here compared to EC tests, since practice is not on 
exactly the same test (in fact, when exactly the same tests are used, DT scores have been shown 
to decrease on second testing (McCrae, 1987) a finding attributed to the functional fixedness 
induced by prior exposure). Whilst in some ways, this is helpful in reducing the likely impact of 
practice effects (though not eliminating them, since similar strategies and procedures might still 
be deployed; Barbot et al., 2016) the use of ‘alternate forms’ ushers in a new problem, that of 
‘stimulus dependency’ (Barbot et al., 2019b). This refers to the fact that there might be 
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differences in difficulty of alternate forms of tasks (Forthmann et al., 2016) or simply that some 
participants might be more inspired by, for example, a pencil than a sock.  
• Familiarity effects. This is a more speculative suggestion, arising from observations 
during testing. 
Familiarity effects (my term rather than a commonly used one) overlap with practice effects in 
referring to issues arising from repeat testing, but operate at a broader, ‘whole participant’ rather 
than purely cognitive level; effects refer to factors such as increased comfort in the setting, 
familiarity with the researchers, lower anxiety and less stress. In other words, these describe 
effects caused by improvements to an environment in which relevant cognitive skills flourish, 
something that might be of particular relevance to EC (Diamond & Ling, 2016; Zelazo et al., 
2010). To my knowledge, there are no specific data on such effects. 
• Developmental effects. These suggest that children do better on tests as they get older 
because the cognitive processes involved in completing the tests have become more 
developed, more diverse, or faster.  
Approximately 8 weeks separated pre and post-tests, and another 6 weeks post and follow-up 
tests, meaning children were roughly 4 months older at the end than the start. The ‘slumpy, 
bumpy’ (Barbot et al., 2016) nature of creative development makes reliable estimates of 
expected developmental change over such a period hard to generate. Evidence from the earlier 
cross-sectional study (Chapter 2) showed improvement in AUT originality with age, whereas 
most creativity measures did not significantly improve, even over the much wider age range 
considered there. Numbers in that study were, as discussed, rather small. A recent large-scale 
meta-analysis considering more than 40,000 participants from 41 studies, found an overall slow 
upward developmental trend of DT across grade levels (Said-Metwaly et al., 2020) while a small 
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longitudinal study (Claxton et al., 2005) which tested 25 children at three time points (grade 4, 
grade 6 and grade 9) did not find significant change in total divergent thinking scores over that 
time period. In individual sub factors, fluency showed no change, though there was a decline in 
originality between grades 4 and 6. This finding is in line  with the ‘fourth grade slump’, first 
proposed by Torrance (1968), which suggests there is a decline in creativity around the age of 9 
associated with children entering a ‘conventional stage’ (Runco, 2014). Many dispute that such a 
consistent slump really exists (Barbot et al., 2016; Said-Metwaly et al., 2020), and it would in 
any case be pushed to explain both the size of effect here and the differential effect on fluency 
and originality. Kim (2011) using a large data set from the Torrance figural test norming 
samples, found that fluency was static over the age group considered here, while originality 
showed small increases from fourth to fifth grade (equivalent to years 5 and 6 in the UK). On 
balance, it seems unlikely that the size and direction of effects seen here could be explained by 
development alone. 
• Training effects. A final set of possible causes of improvements over time were that the 
training brought about the changes. Any explanation based on training effects must 
account for the fact that improvements were almost completely undifferentiated by 
condition. 
Unpacking a possible training effect 
In most cases, the results seen for the training and control groups were alike, i.e., there was a 
main effect of time in bringing about improvements but no interaction with condition. The 
originality decline (AUT) and decline followed by recovery (TTCT) was also symmetrical across 
conditions. The only interactions with condition were with the AUT. For AUT fluency, both 
groups improved at each time point but the EC training group improved significantly more. For 
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AUT originality there was no overall interaction with condition but the follow up declines in 
performance were less for the EC group. In other words, children largely saw the same gains (or 
losses in the case of originality) whether they were trained on a specially designed set of EC 
games or whether they played household games such as Scrabble, Uno and Rummikub. Before 
we come on to consider the contrasting outcomes for originality, what might explain the 
improvements common across training and control conditions? 
• The training was such that both EC and control groups were effectively being trained in 
EC skills and this effect transferred to performance on EC and creativity tests. This 
would suggest adaptability in the details of EC training procedures likely to be effective. 
• The training was such that EC was being trained in the EC group and something else 
(e.g., general processing speed) was being trained in the control group, which had the 
knock-on effect of improving test outcomes in much the same way 
• Both intervention and control groups benefitted from non-cognitive aspects of training – 
e.g., having fun, playing with friends, doing something joyful and unusual – and these 
social / emotional factors led indirectly to improvements 
• Any combination of the above 
Regarding the suggestion that both groups were effectively receiving EC training, it was noted 
earlier that playing almost any kind of small group games is likely to call upon EC skills – 
learning and applying rules, taking turns, waiting, resisting jumping in to respond for others, 
managing the disappointment of losing, staying focused on the game – and more. In the wider 
literature, there is some tentative evidence that playing board games can benefit cognitive 
function (Noda et al., 2019), as well as slow down cognitive decline in elderly populations 
(Dartigues et al., 2013). There is also some evidence of positive associations between board 
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game playing and EC-relevant constructs such as self-efficacy (Gauthier et al., 2018). To 
complicate matters, there is also evidence that playful, games-based approaches in education can 
improve creativity (Cremin et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2013); this would lend support to the idea 
that creative outcomes might have come about not via EC improvements but thanks to transfer of 
a playful mindset (Howard-Jones et al., 2002). However, the fact that it was only fluency and not 
originality that improved and that EC improved at the same time make this convoluted 
explanation unlikely.  
In this study, the decision to include an active control group meant there were many, deliberate 
similarities between intervention and control groups. Both groups played the same number of 
games in small groups, rotated games regularly, endured increasing levels of difficulty, regularly 
changed playmates, had to learn, master, and improve on the same number of games and were 
mostly learning new games. Scheduling of training – dosage, frequency, timing - were also 
matched across groups. It is a real possibility that the efforts to isolate the ‘active ingredient’ 
unique to EC training were too stringent – in other words, the room for differential improvement 
in the intervention group alone was too narrow. Unfortunately, the attendant lack of a ‘business 
as usual’ control makes it extremely difficult to test this theory. It should be noted that, despite 
the fact that improvement in both conditions was contrary to expectation and complicates 
explanation, there is potentially a silver lining for those interested in improving children’s EC. 
Namely, the current evidence points to an affordable, easily available, fun means by which to 
achieve that goal – simply by having whole classes play board games for three short sessions a 
week. As we shall shortly discuss, however, this might come with a cost to creativity.  
Mechanistically, the proposal would be that EC training (across both groups) improved 
children’s ability to stay on task, ignore distractions, simultaneously work with multiple ideas, 
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and attend selectively to appropriate information; these improvements were transferred quite 
directly to tests of WM and inhibitory control which tapped similar processes. They also led 
more broadly to improvements in fluency, again through improvements in the ability to juggle 
more ideas, inhibit previous or exemplar-repeat ideas and apply more strategic search for ideas 
(e.g., think about what worked before) i.e., the training improved the effectiveness or speed of 
the reiterative cycle of idea search / retrieval / inhibition (Finke, 1996; Ward et al., 1997). 
Perhaps the specific EC training (i.e., the EC group not the control group) was particularly 
effective at these broader level improvements to control and planning, which is why this was the 
one place where this group saw significantly greater gains. The finding that better EC led to 
improvements in fluency is contrary to expectation; the prediction from the triangulation study 
was that greater control would tend to produce generally adverse creative outcomes (i.e., 
decreases in scores for all sub measures: fluency, flexibility, and originality).  Perhaps that view 
was an over-simplification and greater EC might instead affect the nature of the creative process 
i.e., shifting from the search for ideas being open and far-reaching to being strategic and narrow. 
Or there might be two factors at play: EC training might allow children to stay on task longer 
(resulting in greater fluency) but attenuate the generation of high-risk, unusual ideas (resulting in 
reduced originality). 
More evidence suggesting better EC was the basis of fluency improvements comes from the 
change in correlations between EC and creativity over time. Correlations of both working 
memory and inhibitory control with fluency in both domains significantly increased from pre to 
post to follow up, suggesting greater yoking of these processes as time went on. This same 
increased correlation was not seen with originality. Any valid explanation for the cause of 
changes post intervention must account for the fact that while most outcome measures saw gains, 
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originality did not. In terms of creativity, the changes were quite specific: after training, children 
had more, worse ideas. And whether or not it was the training that improved EC, the subsequent 
test results showed that improvements in EC co-occurred with a deterioration in creative 
originality. Why might this be? 
Dissecting originality 
To restate: the results showed improvements in both measures of creative fluency but decline in 
AUT originality and a lack of overall change in TTCT originality (a significant decline post 
training was offset by subsequent recovery at follow up). Can this finding for originality be 
explained simply by its relationship with fluency i.e., is it a side effect of the interdependence of 
fluency and originality in both tests? These measures are linked in that originality is not possible 
without at least some fluency (one must first have an idea for it be original) and much has been 
written about the cross-contamination of sub scores in divergent thinking tests (Acar & Runco, 
2019; Barbot et al., 2019a; Forthmann et al., 2016, 2020a; Plucker et al., 2014; Reiter-Palmon et 
al., 2019; Runco, 1991, 2008, 2014). There are several reasons to question this as the explanation 
here. 
In the AUT, originality is inversely related to fluency (originality points are divided by the 
fluency score, so other things being equal, greater fluency would reduce originality) whereas in 
the TTCT, originality is positively related to fluency (i.e., greater fluency would, other things 
being equal, lead to greater originality) – so if the finding were purely a side effect of fluency, it 
would be expected to result in opposing outcomes in each test. Further evidence from fluency / 
originality correlations at different time points also suggests this is not the key explanation. In 
the AUT, fluency and originality show significant correlations at all time points, but the strength 
of the correlation declines from r = .45 at baseline, to r = .24 post intervention and r = .18 by 
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follow up. In the TTCT, there is barely any change in the level of correlation over time between 
fluency and originality scores (r = .79 at baseline, to r = .78 post intervention and r = .79 at 
follow up). 
What else could explain this finding? As previously mentioned, creativity is unusual in repeat 
test scenarios; given the requirement to ‘produce something original with value’ (i.e., the 
definition of creativity; Runco & Jaeger, 2012, the exact same test cannot be repeated. Instead, 
tests have different forms – i.e., while the test remains the same, the stimuli change, for example 
from a pencil to a sock for the AUT. Could it have been the case that the starting stimuli were 
more challenging in later tests – or the first ones were (by chance) the most likely to spark 
original ideas? Such an explanation would have to align with the finding that more ideas are 
produced in both cases, since it is only originality which has declined, not fluency.  
A related notion is that repeat testing might lead to better fluency but not better originality for 
reasons other than the decreasing appeal of stimuli. Imagine an instruction: “Work as efficiently 
as possible, without too much ‘thinking outside the box’”. Followed strictly, this would produce 
more, less original ideas. Previous studies bear this out; the counterpart to the ‘be creative’ effect 
(the robust finding that the instruction to be creative results in fewer, more original answers) 
(Forthmann et al., 2016; Nusbaum et al., 2014) is the ‘be fluent’ effect which improves quantity 
at the expense of quality (Forthmann et al., 2016; Runco & Acar, 2010). This was, emphatically, 
not the instruction given here, which was ‘Come up with as many interesting and unusual ideas 
as you can’, i.e., an instruction suggesting both quantity and quality. However, there are 
situational reasons why, despite these instructions, the children might have inferred that quantity 
was the more important attribute: 
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• The seating arrangements were such that children could see each other’s work but were 
not close enough to read words or see pictures clearly. From afar, the only measure of 
competitive success was thus the quantity of work others had produced, not its quality. 
• The papers they were given contained many empty lines (for AUT) and many empty 
shapes (for TTCT). This conceivably cued children that volume mattered most. 
• Relatedly, quantity is simply easier for children to judge than quality; they can be sure of 
the number of ideas they have produced, but it is harder to be confident about whether 
those ideas are any good.  
• More subtly, might the idea of working efficiently within clearly prescribed limits chime 
the most with children’s school experience in other subject areas? This is the basis of 
much schoolwork, from spelling tests to maths lessons to writing stories which must 
include prescribed grammatical components.  
Another possibility is that children are censoring themselves; they are thinking of unusual ideas 
but ruling them out before writing them down. This could broadly be seen as increased inhibition 
(Duckworth et al., 2013; Munakata et al., 2011). This might happen if they have been primed to 
doubt the validity of an answer, something that could conceivably emerge as a result of playing 
games with penalties for incorrect responses. This inhibitory priming might be stronger as a 
result of the public nature of the games i.e., the broadcast censure of mistakes. It is possible that 
this would affect originality specifically rather than fluency as well, since particularly 
nonconformist ideas might invoke a stronger need for inhibition. A complicating factor for this 
explanation is that the correlation between fluency and originality in the TTCT is constant.  
Or could inhibitory control perhaps have worked at a less conscious and deliberate level to block 
imaginative responses? Evidence from previous chapters has suggested that being stuck at 
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extremes could lead to creative failure; more specifically, the model predicts that failure at an 
extreme of control would lead principally to a failure of originality. It is possible that children 
already vulnerable to a position of too much control (too closed, too blocked) in their creative 
approach were pushed to this creative cul-de-sac.  
A final possible explanation is that wide individual differences are producing the result, less 
because all children are tending to a similar direction, and more because individuals are 
responding very differently to training – and the adverse effects on those negatively affected 
outweigh the positive effects for those who benefit. This relates to the idea in previous chapters 
that there are many means by which creativity can be achieved. This can be seen by looking at 
the covariance parameters and the percentage of variation coming from different sources, which 
are summarised in Table 5.33 (note that totals do not add up to 100 since the random variation 
due to class is not included). 










Within  40% 60% 62% 70% 55% 93% 
Between  53% 35% 36% 25% 44% 6% 
Table 5. 33 Summary of variance within (top) and between (bottom) children on each variable 
 
The graphs below (Fig. 5.14) illustrate the point visually. While changes in EC measures over 
time are fairly consistent between individuals, originality scores appear chaotic.  
Does this point to something unreliable about this measure? Or would it be more accurate to say 
that what is being measured is itself ‘unreliable’ – that is to say, inherently fragile, mercurial, 
even ephemeral? As Simonton says, chronicling the habits of eminent creatives, “at any given 
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time, the performance outcome for a particular work…will be contingent on a chaotic mixture of 




Fig. 5. 14 Graphs showing individual differences in change over time for WM, IC, TTCT 
originality and AUT originality. Each coloured line represents one child. 
 
product at the right place and at the right time” (Simonton, 2000, p.313). Guilford (1950) himself 
noted that “creative people differ considerably in performance from time to time,” (quoted in 
Barbot, 2019, p.209). This points to a suggestion that there are many, small, unmeasured yet 
influential factors, differing by person, which contribute to someone’s creativity, particularly to 
their ability to be original. And while it is not a totally surprising finding that originality is 
unstable – after all, we do not expect to conjure brilliant ideas at will - what is surprising is that it 
seems particularly vulnerable to improved EC. So, the positive suggestion that this study might 
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point to, a potentially affordable, achievable means of training EC, must be tempered by the 
evidence that such an intervention might effectively train children away from original thinking.  
 
Limitations 
The first, most obvious limitation was the absence of a ‘business as usual’ control. This made it 
very hard to distinguish between the training having no effect (the effects being caused by 
practice / development) and the training having an effect that was the same across conditions. 
This represents a stark difference of interpretation between ‘Nothing worked’ and ‘Everything 
worked’. However, given the change seen in both EC and creativity measures across the time 
period, and previous evidence suggesting this is unlikely to be due to developmental change, the 
balance of probability is that the effects seen were due to change brought about by shared 
elements of both training conditions. 
The limitation of RT measures has also been discussed. Although the relatively small number of 
trials in EC tests was a known compromise – in the sense of it being a response to practical 
considerations – it was a great shame that we had no measure of flexibility here. The problem of 
the small number of trials might have been exacerbated by the fact this was the final test in the 
battery; children being tired, bored, or otherwise off-task, might have contributed to the fact this 
measure did not work. There were similar trade-offs between lab-ideal and real-world testing in 
creativity tests; while every effort was made to create an ‘un-test-like’ environment, children are 
observant; they are aware that there are time limits, that their peers might be producing more 
answers, that, ‘fun’ notwithstanding, they are being required to produce ideas on demand. Even 
if it is possible at the first testing session to maintain an element of surprise, it is very difficult 
thereafter.  
Chapter 5. Does training executive control affect children’s creativity? 
273 
 
Conclusions and next steps 
This study further explored the EC / creativity relationship, moving beyond correlation to study 
causation, by assessing the effect of EC training on creativity in a randomised, controlled trial. 
Outcomes were very similar in both the EC training and active control group; the most likely 
explanation for this is that the control children’s EC was also being trained, by playing 
traditional games. The findings suggest that the training brought about improvements in EC 
(working memory and inhibitory control) and in creative fluency, but also that it caused 
deterioration in creative originality. After the intervention, children had more, worse ideas. 
In the next two chapters, we will investigate these findings further, using different tools. The first 
step will be to document the processes involved when children complete divergent thinking tests. 
As in the previous qualitative study, stimulated recall (this time using AUT responses as cues) 
will form the basis for structured interviews which will be analysed thematically. Again, the 
positive and negative contribution of EC processes to creativity will be considered with the aim 
of establishing more specifically how, when and what type of control processes are detrimental 
or beneficial. Since the children in this qualitative study were all also part of the intervention, 
quantitative and qualitative data from the same participants completing the same tests will then 
have been gathered - and the job of the subsequent chapter will be to bring all these data 
together. The goal will be to make predictions of possible differentiation of the effects of EC 
training on creativity across children, dependent on their individual creative approach. This will 
be the opportunity to interrogate some of our evolving hypotheses e.g., regarding detrimental 
effects of excessive control, or protective effects of flexibility on creativity. These differential 
predictions will then be directly tested against the quantitative results of the intervention, with 
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the aim of better understanding how and why particular children’s creative performance changed 
when their EC improved.  
  








Chapter 6. A thematic analysis of children’s cognitive processes while completing the AUT 
What are the positive and negative contributions of EC to their creative process? 
  




In this study, we return to qualitative methodology, this time to analyse the creative process of a 
divergent thinking task in the school setting. The broad rationale for using qualitative tools and 
mixed methods to understand the creative process was outlined in chapters 3 and 4 respectively, 
where the validity of using children’s verbal reports as data was also discussed. Here then, we 
will focus on the new and specific aims and objectives of the current research. 
The purpose of this study is twofold. The first is as a standalone piece of qualitative research, 
exploring and analysing the mechanisms involved in the process of children’s completion of the 
AUT, the most commonly used test of divergent thinking (Forthmann et al., 2018; Runco, 2014) 
which is often used as a proxy for creativity (Runco, 2008). A better understanding of the 
processes lying behind the test’s completion will help to address some of the gaps in 
understanding which arise when quantitative data scores alone are used (Gilhooly et al., 2007).  
The second purpose stems from the study’s being nested within the large quantitative 
intervention study described in chapter 5. This facilitates relating findings from the qualitative 
analysis meaningfully and directly to outcomes in the EC intervention study; in turn, this leads to 
the possibility of drawing firmer conclusions as to whether EC improvements affect creative 
outcomes differently depending on a child’s creative approach. In addition to these broad goals, 
the qualitative findings may help to shed light on some of the unanswered questions raised by the 
results of the intervention, in particular the fragility of originality and the mechanisms by which 
improving EC might have fluency-specific benefits.  
Experience from the previous qualitative work, as well as evidence from the wider literature 
(Meier & Vogt, 2015; Morgan et al., 2007; Vandevelde et al., 2015; Whitebread et al., 2009, 
2010) suggest that children are able to articulate and describe their mental processes. This is 
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likely to be particularly true of EC processes, which are often deliberately considered and so 
more accessible to verbal description (Bryce & Whitebread, 2012; Whitebread et al., 2009, 
2010). Clearly children are unlikely to evoke EC in the lexicon of psychology. A failure of 
selective attention might be articulated by a statement such as ‘I could hear clattering next door 
and it made my mind go blank’; exercising flexibility by ‘I’d already done one like a hairclip so I 
thought I should try and do something different’; a glitch in working memory by ‘Did I already 
do that one?’. The fact that some translation of meaning will be needed carries the risk of 
misinterpretation, an issue familiar to qualitative researchers (Swartz & Rohleder, 2017; Willig 
& Rogers, 2017). Tools and strategies to minimise these risks will be outlined in the sections that 
follow. 
Two techniques for verbal protocol analysis were again piloted to find the best tool for the 
research: these were simultaneous think aloud (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Gilhooly et al., 2007; 
Ward & Traweek, 1993) and immediate post-test stimulated recall (Bloom, 1953; Calderhead, 
1981; Lodge et al., 2000; Morgan et al., 2007). Both were evaluated using AUT prompts as 
stimuli. A primary concern in this study was to achieve consistency across qualitative and 
quantitative work; specifically, the goal was to maximise the likelihood that the processes 
involved in the completion of the test in its quantitative and qualitative strands were similar and 
consistent. This way, in later triangulation, the characterisation of the EC-basis of children’s 
approaches, founded on their qualitative responses, could be compared with their quantitative 
outcomes pre and post intervention. It was therefore important that the verbal reporting did not, 
for example, slow down the rate of producing responses or lead to thoughts that would not have 
arisen without vocalisation. Largely for this reason, simultaneous think aloud was again ruled out 
here; not only did verbalisation make it hard for children to stay on track (for example, one child, 
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distracted by stumbling over a word, segued into a monologue about tongue twisters), but there 
was also a reduction in the fluency of responses caused by the extra burden of having to 
simultaneously report thoughts. Stimulated recall did not suffer such problems and was, as 
before, selected as the best tool for the current work, with several steps taken to maximise 
validity (Meier & Vogt, 2015; Morgan et al., 2007), including the following: 
• The interview took place immediately. To minimise burden on memory, there was no time 
lag between the creation of the stimuli responses and their use to evoke recall 
• The stimuli themselves were tangible, specific, and newly generated by subjects themselves 
• The duration of time over which recall was required was short - 3 minutes, and focused - the 
children were highly consciously engaged in the activity. This is very different from 
stimulated recall studies in which participants are asked to give retrospective reports of more 
distant and unfocused activities, such as their thoughts on a journey to work earlier in the 
day (Smirnov, 1973), which have reduced validity due, amongst other things, to problems of 
memory retrieval (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) 
• Expertise of questioning. As Petitmengin suggests (2006, 2011), the nature of questioning is 
key to eliciting accurate responses which focus on individual specifics not norms-based 
generalities 
• As before, the ‘7Cs’ checklist (Cooperation, Coherence, Confidence, Consistency, 
Confirmation, Contradiction, Corroboration), fully described in chapter 3, was used during 
the process of transcription and early analysis in efforts to improve rigour 
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Although ‘think aloud’ was not considered appropriate here, some of the ideas from Gilhooly 
and team’s (2007) think aloud analysis of the AUT in adults were used, specifically the 
categorisation of idea responses according to their provenance.  
The creative task being used as the basis for analysis – the AUT – differed in many ways from 
the task in the earlier qualitative study in chapter 3. Firstly, it involved completion not of a free-
ranging piece of creative work but of a much more constrained divergent thinking test - limited 
by time, by materials, by rules and by more specific goals. The timing and environment also 
changed from an evening or weekend at home to a classroom during normal school hours. As 
well as potentially affecting the level of EC involvement in the process (higher constraints 
tending to increase the need for executive involvement; Beaty et al., 2017), these changes are 
also likely to have wider effects on motivation, engagement, and the emotional response to the 
task (Agnoli et al., 2018; Collins & Amabile, 1999). The final crucial difference was that the task 
under examination was the same for all children. This allowed a more detailed and systematic 
examination of similarities and differences in approach, and crucially (in the next chapter) 
comparison of scores and approaches for triangulation.  
The structure of this study is conceptually somewhat complex. Not only is the qualitative study 
already nested in a larger quantitative intervention study, but within the qualitative study itself 
several analytical tools were used to tackle specific research questions. The first part, addressed 
in this chapter, is the simplest: it is the thematic analysis which aims to describe and analyse the 
processes involved in the execution of the AUT. It includes an analysis of the nature and level of 
EC involvement in the entire creative process, i.e., both the productive parts (those which led 
directly to the production of a response) and the non-productive parts (for example, how a child 
approached occasions when they felt stuck and no responses were forthcoming).  
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The second part, addressed in the next chapter, comprised several components which sought to 
translate the same data more directly into EC-relevant components and to quantify them. The 
components included, first, an analysis of the directly productive aspects of the creative process, 
categorising given responses according to their provenance (e.g., memory, the immediate 
environment, ‘popping up’). Second, it involved quantifying key qualitative responses (such as 
the extent to which there was mind wandering, different levels of concentration, reference to 
self-edited ideas etc.). Finally, it involved a purely quantitative component: directly scoring AUT 
responses. These three elements combined to characterise children into creative sub types, for the 
purpose of generating predictions about how they might have differentially responded to the EC 
training. The methods and research questions described below form the basis of all these 
elements, although their analysis is divided between this and the subsequent chapter.  
Research questions 
A number of research questions, building on work in previous chapters, inform the current work. 
Some of these can only be partially addressed in this study, with fuller answers dependent also 
on bringing qualitative and quantitative findings together in chapter 7.  
• Is there further evidence of individual variation in approaches to creativity, including 
state and trait differences in the extent to which control processes, spontaneous processes 
and flexibility are deployed to creative ends?  
• Is there evidence that a high level of inhibitory control is detrimental to creativity? 
• Is there evidence that a high level of flexibility is beneficial to creativity? 
• Is there evidence which helps explain the apparent fragility of originality? 
• Is there evidence of creative failure (in quantity or quality) at either extreme (too much, 
too little) of control? 





A sample of 16 children, 8 from an EC and 8 from a control class, representing just over 10% of 
the full intervention sample, were randomly selected from their class, after exclusion for children 
with a statement of SEN. All children were in year 5 of the same school. Only year 5s were 
chosen for a more homogeneous sample and for the likelihood of their being better able to 
generate verbal reports of retrospective thought processes. Children, carers, and teachers were all 
given information about the purpose and methods of the study. Following this, consent was 
sought firstly from teachers, then, in writing, from all parents/carers and finally through verbal 
consent from each child before the interview. Approaches to data storage and protection were all 
as described in chapter 3. As before, children chose their own pseudonym, an alternative name to 
be used in any writing about the research and only these pseudonyms (‘Rabbit’, ‘Squish’, ‘Pickle 
my bunions’ etc.) are used here. The research received ethical approval from the Departmental 
Ethics Committee, Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College University of 
London, approval number 161762. 
Procedure 
All interviews were conducted in the same room (a large cloakroom adjacent to the children’s 
classrooms) over the same week. Children were first asked to complete the Alternative Uses 
Task, this time with ‘paperclip’ as the stimulus object. They were given 3 minutes (as in the 
quantitative study), to complete the test on pencil and paper. Immediately afterwards, they were 
interviewed using stimulated recall, using their written responses as the stimuli to prompt recall.  
Interviews consisted of two types of questions: direct questions about the provenance of ideas 
produced in the AUT and broader EC-relevant questions about their approach to the task, 
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strategies for getting unstuck, level of concentration and so on. At the end of the interview, 
children were asked to mark any ideas which they had seen or experienced before and to choose 
their best idea. Interviews were recorded on a small handheld voice recorder (Sony ICD-PX470) 
and typically lasted around 25 minutes. Very similar questions were put to all children, with 
some small variation arising from following up specific individual responses: 
Interview questions 
• What were your first thoughts when I told you what you were going to do? 
• (Then, using the answers on the AUT as a stimulus and prompt) 
o Where did this first idea come from? 
o What did you do to the idea in your head before writing it down? 
o Where did this next idea come from? (questions repeated for each idea) 
• What happened in your head in between writing down ideas? 
• Was there anything you thought of but didn’t write down? How did you decide whether 
to write an answer down? 
• Were you ever stuck? Can you describe that feeling? What did you do to get unstuck? 
• How would you describe your concentration when you were thinking of ideas? How did 
your concentration here compare with how it is normally in class? 
• Did your mind wander? Where did it go? How did it come back?  
• How did you try to think about ideas other people wouldn’t think of?  
• How did you try and think of lots of ideas? 
• If you’d had more time, would you have had more ideas? 
• How can you tell what is a good or a bad idea? 
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• Was there anything different about doing this this time compared to before? Can you 
describe the difference? 
Transcription and analysis process  
In line with the interviews, the analysis involved two connected but separate processes – the first 
was a thematic analysis based on the entire interview transcript and the second incorporated 
quantifiable elements such as the number of evocations of a particular provenance of responses. 
The aim was to produce findings at two levels – one to stand alone as a thematic analysis and the 
second to produce findings which could triangulate, and test predictions made about performance 
in the quantitative intervention study. The thematic analysis, and related idiographic thematic 
narratives will comprise the major part of this chapter. The AUT provenance analysis and 
categorisation of children into ‘creative typologies’ will be outlined in chapter 7.  
Thematic analysis 
The underlying assumption of the analysis is that children’s descriptions of their mental 
processes can help reveal underlying mechanisms and processes. The overall aim was to 
understand the ingredients of the creative process completing the AUT. The analysis focused on 
the research question ‘How do executive control processes contribute, positively or negatively to 
children’s creativity?’ across the whole task, including unproductive as well as directly 
productive elements. The emphasis was not solely on idea generation, but also included 
processes involved in an idea being refined or reshaped, or times when no ideas were 
forthcoming. There are two reasons for this: the first is that not enough is known about the 
creative process to exclude aspects which are not directly productive (e.g., it might be that being 
stuck is the catalyst for broader search which subsequently produces more original ideas). The 
Chapter 6. A thematic analysis of children’s cognitive processes while completing the AUT 
284 
 
second is that the other aspects of the analysis (in chapter 7) will focus on the directly productive 
aspects.  
The aim was to stay close to questions pertaining to EC involvement. This meant not including 
some interesting but not directly relevant themes (e.g., the social dimension of the creative 
process or the use of visual imagery). Borderline areas (e.g., themes around stress or time 
pressure or how children define creativity) were retained, since they spoke to the validity of the 
data as a reflection of the creative process and gave additional information about how children 
understood and undertook the task. 
The analysis involved similar stages to those described in detail in the first qualitative analysis. 
As before, the process involved both induction and deduction; children’s accounts give rise to 
new themes and the researcher brings their own theoretical position (Morgan, 2014). Through a 
shuttling between these processes, the relevant components are gradually conceptualised 
(Eatough et al., 2008).  
After listening to interviews several times and producing transcripts by hand for each child, each 
transcript was approached, one child at a time, with a focus on the research question. The 
transcript was considered line by line, assigning descriptions to particular pieces of script 
(usually at the level of whole sentences, but sometimes phrases). As the process continued, 
themes and patterns developed, first at the level of the individual, then in later stages of the 
analysis at the level of the group. For this study, because all children had completed the same 
creative activity and been asked very similar questions, the move from the individual to group 
level was more straightforward than before (when children were working in different domains 
and on different time scales). The final stages again involved an iterative process, moving 
between themes, descriptions, and superordinate themes, gradually refining, and renaming.  
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The main thematic analysis findings will be supplemented, as before, with a selection of 
idiographic thematic narratives for five of the children, selected to illustrate contrasting 
approaches. The different aspects of the analysis are really facets of the same underlying process 
(Mason, 2011) and they intersect in various ways, not necessarily linearly. For example, the 
idiographic thematic narratives can be read as richer individual accounts of the thematic analysis 
or as the qualitative counterpart to the quantitative characterisation of creative sub types. For the 
sake of clarity, these aspects will be presented in sections as follows: 
In this chapter: 
• Thematic analysis. The main findings, subthemes, and superordinate themes of the 
thematic analysis 
• Case studies. Idiographic thematic narratives for a selection of children 
In the following chapter: 
• AUT performance. Scores for originality, fluency, and flexibility 
• Where did ideas come from? Analysis of the provenance of given responses 
• Characterising children according to levels of control, spontaneity, and flexibility 
• Using these characterisations to make predictions about how children might have been 
affected by the EC training intervention and testing these predictions against the data. 
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Findings and analysis 
Thematic analysis 
 
Fig. 6. 1 The superordinate themes derived from the analysis 
  
The figure above (Fig. 6.1) illustrates the three superordinate themes produced by the analysis. 
The first described the variety of children’s routes to creativity in terms of varying states of 
concentration and distraction. The second described the numerous difficulties associated with 
decisions and judgments which are an integral part of the creative process. The third described 
the risks of creative failure at extremes (too much or not enough) control. These superordinate 














Fig. 6. 2 Thematic map giving overview of themes at different levels 
 
Superordinate theme 1: Many roads to creative ends 
This describes the manifold approaches to ‘the creative process’, the finding that there is not one 
unified consistent process for all. Even within an individual, modifications in process can arise 
due to changing constraints, time pressure, idea abundance and stress. Creativity is painted here, 
not as a predictable machine in which specific substrates are added and established processes 
executed to produce optimal ends; instead, it materialises as a dynamic, mutable process which 
bends, flexes, and sometimes fails in response to myriad changing needs. Subthemes relating to 
concentration and distraction illustrate how this is true for control / focus, which is deployed in 
ways which can appear contradictory, to achieve creative goals. 
Theme 1.1: Concentration is not a monolith 
Description: Concentration has many forms and definitions, with variability both within an 
individual over time and between individuals 
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All children were asked about their state of concentration while doing the test. Given the 
commonalities of their experience – all were doing the same task, in the same setting, for the 
same length of time, with the same past experience of similar tests - there was remarkable 
variability in their responses. For some the test required deliberate, hard concentration, while 
others barely even noticed concentrating. Some differentiated between ‘tight’ and ‘loose’ 
concentration, with descriptions suggesting that, for some, concentration and distraction are not 
necessarily opposite ends of a continuum. In all the quoted responses that follow, children’s 
words have been reproduced verbatim. 
Subtheme 1.1.1: Hard problems need hard concentration 
For some children, the test presented a real challenge. The only way to meet it was with total and 
exclusive focus.  
Panda: My concentration was pretty full on because it was quite hard and I find found it a 
bit difficult so my concentration was 100% 
Jamie: Really hard like…like its SATs or something 
Many children compared their concentration to their normal classroom concentration; some 
trying for a level of concentration they recognise from lessons and others exceeding it. 
Rabbit: Erm I would say it wasn’t I’d say it wasn’t as good as I am in class with the 
concentration… so I’d say my concentration was probably about 7 out of 10 
Nutella: I think I’m concentrating differently and harder  
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Sub-theme 1.1.2: It’s different from maths 
For other children, things were very different; they spoke of a looseness of concentration and 
even a state of relaxation. The narrow focus needed for questions with a right answer (as in 
maths), did not feel appropriate to them here. Rather, what was appropriate was an openness and 
receptivity to ideas which might emerge unpredictably and from anywhere. 
Parrot: Relaxed and calm and erm and my mind would be so relaxed that it would just 
think of everything that I watched before had done at home and then I’ll just write it 
down…Like erm it didn’t have to work very hard 
Cat: I was kind of just thinking of playing with it in my mind so kind of not concentrating 
Medea: Maybe quite loose concentration if you know what I mean because I’m like 
trying to get loads of ideas at the same time…when I’m doing loose concentration my 
brain’s like ooh there’s one there’s a connection like catching fish … If I’ve got really 
hard concentration I can only see like one at a time  
Sub-theme 1.1.3: It's all about the balance 
Several children articulated the fact they could access different styles of concentration in their 
thinking. They exercised choice in their approach, whether in modulating the speed they worked 
at, adjusting the focus of their visual attention, or altering the mode of concentration itself.  
Dr Dolphin: I was kind of rushing myself but I was also kind of taking it slow...I kept on 
thinking of the saying erm… erm… slow and steady wins the race and I just kept on 
thinking about that…yeah but I also felt a bit like erm… a bit like the erm… the hare in 
the race sometimes 
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Guinea pig: Yeah… yeah … I kept on like… I think… I’m I don’t know erm… I did 
keep on looking back and towards the other things but then when I thought of one I kept 
on looking at it for a while and then I looked away again 
Medea: I just probably I stop for a sec for a few seconds and then I just go back and then 
it’s just different concentration yeah… it’s a bit weird cos my brain just changes it all by 
itself… and erm I think it just knows if it needs loose concentration or not  
Finally, one child positioned control and spontaneity as synergistic – for her, a lack of noise 
allowed for the concentration needed to allow ideas to spontaneously ‘pop up’ and then to be 
evaluated in a controlled way.  
Parrot: I prefer when it’s quieter… because then I can like concentrate and I could think 
of words that like pop into my head and then I could just write it down and make sure it 
makes sense 
Theme 1.2: Distraction is two faced  
Description: Distraction can intrude on focused search - or can act as a source of new ideas 
Distractions were seen by some children as the enemy of concentration. 
Nutella: You kind of block out everything else so you kind of make sure you’re just 
doing this and you focus on it a lot 
Panda: I kind of noticed them [banging noises] but I was trying my hardest to block them 
out cos they’re a little bit distracting  
Some hinted at the fact that concentration is what is expected at school, the correct approach, 
Ammara: Erm I wasn’t distracted at all I think I was pretty good 
Chapter 6. A thematic analysis of children’s cognitive processes while completing the AUT 
291 
 
While others saw distractions in a more productive light. 
Pickle: Listening to the noises as well like there was banging of doors and stuff…They 
helped me think of different things as well so like the door slamming think of doors and 
locks and stuff so lock picker  
This theme illustrates the diversity of approaches in the deployment of concentration and 
distraction to achieve creative goals. Concentration levels varied greatly from person to person, 
with some needing 100% focus and others a much looser, calm, relaxed mindset. But it also 
varied within individuals: several children described either spontaneous or intentional 
modulation of their concentration level during the test, often expressed through a change in 
thinking pace – taking it slow, stopping, rushing forwards – in response to changing moment-to-
moment demands. The ability to block out distractions, often seen as a core aspect of inhibitory 
control, is a double-edged sword here: for some children, distractions were nothing but a 
hindrance to clear thinking, while for others they provided useful substrate for creativity; 
blocking them resulting in negative creative outcomes.  
Superordinate theme 2: Roadblocks 
Many responses spoke to the difficulties associated with having to be creative on demand. Some 
involved the pressures of the creativity test itself. Others concerned questions of interpretation 
and uncertainty about how creativity might be assessed – both from the outside looking in and 
the inside looking out, with some children articulating internal battles about how best to judge 
candidate ideas. Finally, there were themes concerning reflective questions about what creativity 
actually is. Together, the elements within this theme suggest that, to a considerable extent, 
performance outcomes in creativity tests are determined by how an individual chooses to 
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interpret and work with task instructions. This might be of particular relevance to the AUT since 
its task instructions are especially open to different interpretations. 
Theme 2.1: Not panicking but…  
Description: Time pressure is just that – a pressure. It might spur on or it might paralyse but 
there is no pretending it is not there. 
Even in a familiar setting, with a known adult, a familiar test, reminders that there are no right 
answers and encouragement to have fun and play, creativity tests are still tests: artificial, 
stressful, and plagued by the sense of a ticking clock. 
Koala: I got sort of I was kind of like I wasn’t panicking but I was just sort of speeding 
up like just dadooodoooodoo like yeah 
Elton Van Gogh: I just thought at the beginning I just thought like I was just completely 
lost and then I thought and then like then I added to my mind that I had to be really quick 
and I was like oh my gosh   
Rabbit: I thought oh I’ve only got a few more minutes and I don’t really know what I’m 
going to do so erm I I kind of... my mind was kind of like boggling 
Nutella: You’re kind of just scrambling through your mind 
Dr Dolphin: Well because I was kind of rushing I didn’t really have time to breathe 
Theme 2.2: Letter of the law 
Description: Completing the task means assessing sometimes conflicting demands – first, the 
quantity / quality trade-off and then individual judgement about what constitutes high quality. 
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Is it better to spend 3 minutes on one brilliant answer or ten average ones? And to what extent 
are children cognisant of the trade-off? There is a genuine dilemma here with many 
interpretations and different output implications. Even once a decision (deliberate or otherwise) 
has been made about whether to favour quantity or quality, there are many subsidiary decisions. 
Should an idea which is a little unusual but highly functional be prized more highly than one 
which is very innovative but unlikely to work? Who is the audience for these ideas and who will 
be the judge?  
Sub-theme 2.2.1: Balancing instructions 
A difficulty with the Alternative Uses Test, discussed in Chapter 2, is that its instruction, 
‘Produce as many unusual ideas as you can’ points in two directions simultaneously: ‘as many 
as’ suggests maximising quantity while ‘unusual’ points to maximising quality, through rarity. In 
a limited time period, it is not usually possible to do both (although some children’s approach 
might mean that the best route to good quality is via large quantity). It largely comes down to 
personal whim or judgment as to which to favour. 
Ammara: I remembered like it’s supposed to be not just like not just like really good 
ideas it’s supposed to be like lots of ideas 
Panda: When I think I was doing the erm hairclip I thought like that would be something 
that somebody would do and I thought I tried to think of something else which is similar 
to a hairclip but I couldn’t really so I decided to just stick with it and you said do a lot 
like try and have a lot of answers I was kind of like saying to myself try and get a bit 
more done or something yeah 
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Nutella: I think because you give us me less much less time I think of much more 
improper stuff… 
Dr Dolphin: I just wanted to get loads of ideas but I also wanted to think of ideas that no 
one had said 
Pickle: There was one which was I can’t remember what it was but I didn’t write it down 
because I thought probably everyone else would have done it too 
Sub-theme 2.2.2: Judgment day 
The perceived rules of the test and the quality / quantity trade-off are one problem. For some, 
there is the additional burden of self-imposed constraints as to what constitutes a legitimate idea. 
Are they allowed to use more than one paperclip? Can they add it to something else? Does their 
idea have to actually work? The definition of creativity requires originality and value; while the 
quantity/quality trade off centres mainly on the originality dimension, this theme is chiefly 
concerned with value.  
Elton Van Gogh: There’s so many ideas I thought of like I thought of loads but they’re all 
so pointless...like a hairclip it’s like why do you need that I thought like but why would 
you need that it’s just like waaah  
Dr Dolphin: I was thinking about that I was thinking maybe it could be like a something 
that you could clip onto a bag like a keyring but it would fall off very easily…but now 
I’m regretting that I didn’t do that cos its actually really cool 
Ammarra: I half thought of it because it says a paperclip and I was just like I need lots of 
a lot more than one paperclip 
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Amber: I thought about like different ways they could hold things together but then but 
then I thought cos they’re already holding things together it wouldn’t really be a new idea 
Medea: Well maybe the one about using it as a kayak I was like that won’t work because 
not it’s not like erm it’s going to get loads of water in that’s one I probably discarded 
A change in constraint, imposed or self-generated, occasionally led to a change in the perception 
of value. Elton Van Gogh, who was previously preoccupied about whether an idea would work 
in practice, described how this stricture was loosened if he thought of an idea as ‘art’. 
Elton Van Gogh: Art's a less strict kind of not subject but like area of like like it's like a 
less like with art you can really do what you want… with art you can do loads of different 
things so that's why I think that's why I was less strict  
Theme 2.3: Battling inner voices 
Description: personal judgment about what is a good or bad idea is sometimes played out in 
‘battles within one’s own head’.  
This theme is similar to ‘Judgment day’ but here the battling inner voices describe deliberate 
involvement of higher control or metacognition. The questions are focused less on speculation 
about what, externally, might be deemed good or bad, allowed, or disallowed, and more on one’s 
own, internal dilemmas. 
Ammara: Normally when I’m about to do something I think if it’s like a good thing or a 
bad thing…there are two voices in my head and one of them’s doing the good thing and 
one’s doing the bad thing kind of like in the movies… I thought I shouldn’t do it but then 
the one of the voices in my head told me I should do it anyway so I just did it  
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Nutella: It’s kind of having an argument with me… I was kind of debating with the other 
me whether I should do it  
Theme 2.4: Wait, what is creativity?  
Description: How children rate their ‘best idea’ gives insight into how they define ‘best’.  
For some it is originality, for some surprise, for others functionality. Some also recognised there 
was a balance to be struck between competing criteria and selected an idea which succeeded on 
multiple dimensions. Several children emphasised originality: 
Amber: A good idea is something that’s very unusual and very different to a paperclip’s 
normal use 
Koala: Ukulele capo…I don’t think anyone would choose it and it’s you wouldn’t really 
think of a paperclip being used for it 
Some were more concerned with value, often measured in terms of functionality: 
Rabbit: I feel like a bookmark erm would work perfectly well 
Pickle: My favourite one I did was probably a lock picker…Because… so sometimes 
because I’m quite naughty often I get sent up to my room and I’m always trying to pick 
the lock to get out but it hasn’t worked yet 
Guinea pig: I like the zip one the most cos like it’s one that you couldn’t use that many 
things apart from it [a paperclip] to use 
And some considered multiple dimensions concurrently: 
Medea: It’s probably the most creative...I mean like not not like you see them every 
day… and because it would work as a surfboard but most people think it wouldn’t 
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Nutella: This is the strangest one out of all them definitely but I think it’s the most unique 
a wallet closer because it sounds really weird but if you kind of stuck it into the like 
leather on that side and then had like a little handle there and put it in put it through there 
it would kind of like secure it  
Dr Dolphin: The mini clothes hanger…because you can make like so many and I just find 
them really cool cos you could like put them on your own like mini shelf  
Pickle my bunions: Probably the lilo for ants…cos it’s it’s like interesting figuring out 
how would that be possible and thinking of the answer and you find that that’s so unusual 
how did I think of that 
Superordinate theme 3: Battling extremism 
A dearth of ideas is always a problem for creativity; so too, albeit more rarely, can be an 
overflow. If ideas tumble out too quickly there can be insufficient time for quality control. 
Extremes of focus / defocus can also cause ideation problems – whether through paying too 
much attention or not enough. 
Theme 3.1: Precarity of focus 
Description: Looking through too narrow a lens can mean losing ideas at the periphery. The 
‘right amount’ of focus is hard to maintain. 
Koala: When I try to focus a lot I just forget it within the first second 
Medea: If you think too long too much about like the ones that are too good you’re going 
to lose like all the good ones   
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Pickle my bunions: After say 3 minutes I just zone out and I just think that I’m in my 
own little world please don’t share this with my teacher 
Dr Dolphin: I felt confident at the start but then I started to lose ideas...when you have an 
idea you kind of forget it 
Theme 3.2: Drying up vs overflowing  
Description: Typically, in the AUT, the rate of ideation starts fast and slows with time, the well-
established ‘serial order effect’. This was the most common rate effect seen here, though there 
were notable exceptions. 
Most children reported a gradual slowing as their ideas emptied out. Some even found 
themselves physically scouring the room for extra ones.  
Panda: [Towards the end] I couldn’t think of any more ideas I was thinking like really 
really hard and no ideas came into my head I was looking around I was looking under the 
table as well 
Guinea pig: It was getting much harder I think I would have only got a few more  
Squish: I was definitely ermmmmm slowing down  
But this was not always the case, with more than one child reporting that they were just getting 
going, as a trickle became a flow, and ideas inspired new ideas. 
Ammarra: I think with more time I think I would have come up with more ideas… 
Medea: The first one was hardest and then it got easier as I got like more because like my 
brain was making connections and stuff… It feels quite quite it feels stressful because cos 
you’ve got all these ideas coming at once 
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Children’s descriptions demonstrate that, although a wide range of creative approaches can bear 
fruit, that doesn’t mean ‘anything goes.’ In particular, there are dangers at the extremes, with too 
many or too few ideas and too much or too little focus both risking loss of creative productivity.  
In summary, the thematic analysis pointed to diversity rather than unity in how children deploy 
EC in their creativity. There were descriptions of different types of concentration, from tight to 
loose, effortful to effortless, both within and, even more so, between individuals. Similarly, there 
were diverging views about concentration-relevant factors, such as distractions and mind-
wandering, which were contrastingly positioned as beneficial or detrimental to creativity. Time 
constraints and other pressures, such as feeling stuck, sometimes led to more controlled 
approaches, and were often coupled with indecision about rule interpretation, whether to favour 
quantity or quality, and how to judge originality. Finally, there was evidence of failure at 
extremes, with children reporting both an overflow or, more commonly, a dearth of ideas related 
to, respectively, excess spontaneity and excess control. These themes will now be further 
illustrated with selected individual case studies.  
Case studies  
The following idiographic thematic narratives, each focusing on a single child, are designed to 
give richness and texture to the themes above. They demonstrate some of the individual variation 
in how themes play out for different children. There are four narratives, chosen to reflect 
different approaches. The set of each child’s AUT responses and resulting scores (which will be 
fully detailed in Chapter 7) are included to give further context to the narratives, with the group 
means also included for reference. 




AUT fluency: 23 (mean 7.5)    Originality: 3.01 (mean 3)    Flexibility: 16 (mean 5.81) 
Responses: nose ring, hair clip, chain, a massive one as a surf board, a two seated swing, door 
skeleton key, fork, light switch, catapult, weight, bar, railing, paddle, mousetrap, fish hook, 
pole, sign post, arrow, bridge, two sided tightrope, ring, button, whisk 
 
Medea showed an astonishing level of fluency, the highest in the sample by a large margin. She 
showed no sign of slowing even at the end. This fluency seems to be achieved through a 
particular mode of concentration and the sequential nature of her ideation, with one idea 
catalysing others ‘cos normally when I do stuff I think of something then I think of something 
quite similar afterwards’.  
Her description of the defocused concentration needed for this kind of task is very evocative, 
‘maybe quite loose concentration if you know what I mean because I’m like trying to get loads 
of ideas at the same time… my brain’s like ooh there’s one there’s a connection like catching 
fish…’ In describing what this feels like she says ‘It feels quite stressful because you’ve got all 
these ideas coming at once…when I’m doing loose concentration… I feel like there’s netting in 
my head and it’s letting all the ideas in at once like a tsunami’.  
She contrasts this with ‘hard concentration’; ‘if I’ve got really hard concentration I can only see 
like one at a time…’ This sort of concentration might be used ‘probably in maths cos yeah 
there’s only one answer in maths’. Modulation between these different types of concentration is 
mostly automatic. ‘It’s probably when…when I just probably stop for a few seconds and then I 
just go back and then it’s just different concentration … it’s a bit weird cos my brain just changes 
it all by itself…’ But there are clues as to when a modulation might be necessary which come 
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from the type of problem being tackled, ‘I think my brain can tell when I see a question…if it’s 
got like “many” or “lots” in it, it will probably need loose concentration…and then if it’s got like 
one answer like “7 x 6” or “what is the name of this character” I’m doing not loose concentration 
I’m like narrowing it down.’ 
When she is stuck, fiddling with her hands can help to get out of a rut, ‘I like to fiddle quite a bit 
when I’m stuck…It’s just like concentrating on something else and coming back and then ha! 
…I’m looking at it with like clean eyes.’ 
There is a whole cocktail of places from where ideas emerge – e.g., with the surfboard idea, at 
first, she said, ‘I have no idea where that came from’. Then added ‘cos I think I looked at this 
[the end of the paperclip] and cos it's quite similar to a surfboard and you could stand on that and 
just go weeee’. With further effort to identify the provenance ‘I think I probably just actually I 
think I just know now cos a chain cos I was thinking of a chain ferry in the water…yes I was 
thinking to do stuff with water like chains and anchors that's probably where that came from’. 
She personified an approach to creativity seen in ideational environments, in which judgment is 
deliberately deferred, on the basis that sometimes a bad idea is a stepping stone to a good one. 
She proposed a mousetrap (score 3) an idea whose efficacy is hard to see but this was followed 
by a fish hook (score 4) a high-scoring idea which arose as a direct result of the weaker one, ‘I 
think I definitely got related to that because you normally come and tempt them with something 
to come and get the mouse and I thought ah! You could do that with fish as well’.  
There was a general feeling of pleasure and openness and several incidents of mini eureka 
moments:  she voiced 15 ‘Ah!’s, 9 ‘Oh!’s and one ‘Ooh!’. 
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Elton Van Gogh 
AUT fluency: 3 (mean 7.5) Originality: 2.92 (mean 3) Flexibility: 3 (mean 5.81) 
Responses: use it for taking out a simcard in a phone like a pin, connect to your bag to put on 
lots of keyrings, use it to make crazy artwork by putting paperclips together or using them to 
rip things like paper 
 
Elton Van Gogh produced just three ideas, the lowest fluency in the sample. The rate of 
production started slow and grew even slower ‘There’s nothing else to look for…I think I’d think 
of not many more and not very good ideas.’ This low fluency seems to be explained by two main 
factors – the first, a degree of self-limiting worry about being unable to come up with ideas ‘I 
was saying over and over in my head what do I do what do I do… I was just at a lost for ideas 
because I just thought that a paperclip really is like a random thing and that I couldn’t really 
work with it’. This made it hard for him to get going and when he did, he was preoccupied by his 
performance, ‘I felt like in my head there was like a clock ticking and I was like I was like I’m 
running out I’m running out of time’. There was little ability to ‘let go’ sufficiently to allow ideas 
to come, suggesting high self-inhibition. 
The second part of the explanation was a very high level of self-imposed constraint on what 
constituted a valid idea - so that even when ideas were conceived, they were often ruled out. The 
reasons for rejection were various; an idea might be too pointless: ‘Well I was thinking like a 
knife…(but) there’s no use in that because it’s just making something easy hard’; ‘like a hairclip 
but why would you need that?’ or it might not work well in practice: ‘you could have like 
swinging ropes like to connect them together but …I just thought like… there is something in the 
world called tying knots! You don’t need it! that’s why a lot of my ideas just like I didn’t use 
because that would be you really don’t need’. 
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There was strict evaluative rigour, ‘I was just thinking like what could make the world easier 
instead of just funner…like like what would I need that for?... but like how?... if you’re going to 
invent something… make it better than what it already is’. This suggests that the barrier to 
fluency is less in the generation of ideas ‘I thought of loads but they’re all so pointless’ but in 
their evaluation, so that many ideas which others might have ruled in were instead ruled out. 
‘This is… it’s not hard but it’s harder to like it’s just like harder to make it work’. The only time 
when the handbrake was allowed off a little was in thinking of ideas related to art; the constraints 
were loosened ‘because I think art's a less strict kind of… like area … like with art you can really 
do what you want’. 
Parrot 
AUT fluency: 3 (mean 7.5)    Originality: 4 (mean 3)    Flexibility: 2 (mean 5.81) 
Responses: you can use a paperclip for a phone holder if you bend it, you can use a paperclip 
to draw circles and ovals, you can also use a paperclip with a rubber band and attach it to the 
paperclip to make a 3D house when you stretch the rubber band 
 
Parrot had one of the lowest fluency levels in the group. All her ideas came from memory, 
perhaps part of the reason why she felt her brain ‘didn’t work very hard’ and her state was 
‘relaxed and calm and erm and my mind would be so relaxed that it would just think of 
everything that I watched before had done at home and then I’ll just write it down’. Did her mind 
wander? ‘No! It didn’t!’ 
She had an unusual and effective means of generating ideas likely to be highly original: using 
sources which she knew other children didn’t like. ‘I just thought of ideas that nobody would 
watch cos I watch a kind of erm video that’s just about hacks and that some other children just 
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think it’s kind of boring’. There was no self-editing. Asked if there were any ideas she didn’t 
write down, she said ‘Not really I’ve written every idea down that I thought of’. This differs 
from other low fluency scorers who generated many more ideas but ruled most of them out i.e., 
whose strict evaluation appeared to be the chief explanation for the low fluency. Parrot’s rate 
was slow but consistent and asked about what extra time would have meant she replied ‘I would 
have had more ideas’ and proceeded to generate another new one (not from memory) on the spot. 
The room, the environment, was used differently from most children who looked for direct ideas 
– e.g., a paperclip could replace a zip pull on a bag. For Parrot it had a less direct but nonetheless 
powerful effect on her general affect, ‘That’s what made me relaxed and calm... Because it was 
like colourful and erm and then it just popped into my head.’ 
Dr Dolphin 
AUT fluency: 6 (mean 7.5)    Originality: 3.25 (mean 3)    Flexibility: 5 (mean 5.81) 
Responses: pin, toy mini clothes hanger, tiny football goal, part of a sculpture, part of a 
picture, peg 
 
One of Dr Dolphin’s defining characteristics was the large number of ideas which he conceived 
but which did not make it on to paper. The reasons were various – some were ruled out for being 
too similar ‘one was erm a part a piece of art but a sculpture is already like a piece of art’, for not 
working well ‘I was thinking maybe it could be like a something that you could clip onto a bag 
like a keyring but it would fall off very easily’, for not obeying the instructions strictly ‘I 
remember we made erm bicycles out of pipe cleaners back in year one… so I wondered maybe 
we could make a mini bicycle but you wouldn’t have enough to do that,’ or for being too 
obvious, ‘I really wanted to do this one but I didn’t know if anyone else had done it and it was a 
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zip’. With hindsight, these were not all judged to have been good decisions ‘But now I’m 
regretting that I didn’t do that cos it’s actually really cool’ and there was a recognition that 
overall performance could, with less forgetfulness, ‘it went totally out of my mind’, have been 
improved, ’Argh! I could have done like a whole list! I just did half’. 
The limit to higher fluency seems to lie not in the generation but in the evaluation of ideas. In 
other words, the processes involved in the creation of ideas are productive but are then over-
ruled by the processes driving a harsh inner critic. There was also the sense that the number of 
possible ideas was finite, ‘Now I’ve used up all my ideas, so I look round the room’. 
In contrast to the prototypical serial order effect (in which the most obvious common ideas come 
first and more unusual ideas come later), Dr Dolphin’s early ideas were considerably more 
original, something he was aware of: ‘Well I felt confident at the start but then I started to lose 
ideas so that’s why I I erm my erm erm my fourth and my fifth one aren’t that erm aren’t that 
erm imaginative.’ One might speculate either that these early ideas were ‘allowed out’ before the 
inner critic gained too much sway or that ideas previously disallowed for being too obvious were 
later allowed once time pressure was felt.  
He reached for novel prompts to his creative efforts, for example, being led by a sense of social 
purpose; ‘I just think about all the people in my class that love football and I'm like well I could 
do a football one even though I hate it so much and then I just it just popped up in my head’. 
Descriptions of his concentration allude to the contradictory instruction to produce both lots of 
ideas and ideas that others won’t think of; ‘I was kind of rushing myself but I was also kind of 
taking it slow and erm it makes sense to me but it may not make sense to you I was rushing but I 
was also taking it slow… I kept on thinking of the saying erm… erm... slow and steady wins the 
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race and I just kept on thinking about that…yeah but I also felt a bit like erm… the hare in the 
race sometimes’. These two factors were attributed to different parts of the body ‘I was rushing 
in my head and I was thinking I have to get this done but then my hand was just going slow cos I 
need to think of more ideas’. 
His approach to getting out of ruts when stuck (which feels ‘very boring’) was quite positive and 
suggests a relaxed rather than highly controlled approach, ‘I just think about the stuff that I like 
and… I relax and take deep breaths.’ 
The idea he judged his best was ‘mini clothes hanger’ (score 3.75) rather than ‘tiny football goal’ 
(score 4.75) which was the single highest scoring response in the sample.  
 
Discussion  
This study set out to analyse the processes involved when children complete the most commonly 
used test of creativity, the AUT. The findings showed that children approach creativity with 
highly variable levels of concentration; this pertains to trait differences between individuals but 
also, as shown by some children’s descriptions of moment-to-moment changes in concentration, 
to state differences. Similarly, children differed in their attitudes to distraction and mind-
wandering, with some seeing these as detrimental and some beneficial to creativity. Questions of 
interpretation were a common theme, with many contrasting judgments about what constitutes 
creativity, whether to prioritise quantity or quality and how best to judge quality - all of which 
decisions have implications for fluency and originality. Impediments to creativity included 
excessive control (which blocked potential ideas at various stages of their progression), 
excessive spontaneous thinking (which limited thorough evaluation of ideas) and a sense of 
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pressure, mostly caused by the time limit, which was strongly felt by nearly all participants. 
Nearly all children agreed that, as a stimulus object, a paperclip was harder than previous 
stimulus objects (water bottle, pencil, sock); this was attributed to its small size, a lack of 
existing ideas from memory of previous uses (compared to the other objects which they had seen 
used in many ways) and its specific, narrowly-defined function.  
The question of whether there is an optimal way to approach creativity will be addressed in the 
next chapter – when we look at scores through the lenses of alternative creative approaches. In 
doing so, it will be important to remember that there are many other factors which contribute to 
creative success which have not been measured here – personality and temperament, mood, 
motivation to work in a particular domain, stress, tiredness, self-consciousness, engagement with 
the specific test and much more. How children deploy control is one aspect among many. 
Turning to our specific research questions,  
• Is there further evidence of individual variation in approaches to creativity, including 
state and trait differences in the extent that control processes, spontaneous processes and 
flexibility are deployed to creative ends? 
It should perhaps first be noted that, taking a ‘macro’ view of control, there were many 
consistencies between children: all children stayed seated, worked throughout the whole three 
minutes, did not talk during the test, did not doodle or write anything except the responses asked 
of them – in other words, they all completed the task according to instructions. At a basic level, 
then, were similarities in how children approached the task. When we look in more detail at the 
cognitive aspects of how they engaged in it, however, we see differences. The findings support 
the idea that there are ‘many roads to creative ends’ this emerging as the dominant theme of the 
analysis. The idea of there being a range of approaches is strongly suggested by scores alone - it 
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being highly unlikely that someone who produces 23 responses and someone who produces 3 are 
doing so by the same processes just with varying speed. The qualitative evidence enriches our 
understanding of what those different approaches might be – with some children taking a 
‘dripping tap’ approach which emphasises generation and productivity as the best route to 
originality and value, while others take a much more controlled approach in which each nascent 
idea is heavily scrutinised and critiqued.  
• Is there evidence that a high level of inhibitory control has detrimental effects on 
creativity? 
Inhibitory control, as previously discussed, takes many forms (Munakata et al., 2011; Nigg, 
2017). Here it was evoked in sensory form (e.g., to block out distracting noises), in cognitive 
form (e.g., in functional fixedness leading to a failure to ideate or in ruling out ideas not deemed 
good enough) and in behavioural form (e.g., sitting quietly and still). Again, at the broad level 
then, all children deployed some level of inhibitory control in order to successfully sit and 
complete the task, with no children ‘failing’ at this fundamental aspect of control. There was also 
some evidence that inhibitory control might have benefitted some children in more specific 
ways, such as in helping them to achieve the focus they needed to allow ideas to emerge 
spontaneously.  
On the whole, though, there was more evidence that high levels of inhibitory control led to a 
reduction in creative output: many children reported having ruled out ideas which, had they kept 
them, would have led to higher scores, certainly for fluency and likely also for originality – for 
example, an idea ruled out by Dr Dolphin was a ‘mini bicycle’, a unique response within the 
sample. Several children also exhibited inhibitory control in their self-imposed constraints on 
what constituted legitimate ideas – Elton Van Gogh was perhaps the prime example of such an 
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approach, in which it became almost impossible for ideas to measure up to the strictures and very 
low fluency was the consequence. The role of inhibitory control in blocking distractions is 
difficult to evaluate; some children reported that blocking was necessary to allow the 
concentration necessary to generate new ideas while others reported that the distractions 
themselves evoked new ideas. We can only speculate about what the effect on an ‘inhibiting’ 
child would be if they did not deploy this inhibition – would ‘allowing distractions in’ lead to 
new ideas or interfere with their chosen creative approach altogether? In a similar vein, it is 
difficult to decipher, without further research, whether individual differences arise deliberately, 
through voluntary selection of a particular strategy, or whether they represent the only option for 
a particular child. This distinction is important in guiding potential strategies for improving 
creativity, particularly in determining whether approaches based on encouraging alternative 
strategies are likely to be successful. Can an individual shift their chosen approach? This brings 
us to our next question. Is there evidence that a high level of flexibility has positive effects on 
creativity? 
Flexibility is also multifaceted (Ionescu, 2012, 2017; Nijstad et al., 2010; Zabelina & Robinson, 
2010a), here operating at a micro level e.g., facilitating the shift to new ideational categories, and 
a macro level, e.g., facilitating a shift between styles of thinking or types of concentration. As in 
the previous, more naturalistic qualitative study, several children here also spoke of a 
modulation, whether deliberate or spontaneous, between different styles and speeds of thinking, 
suggesting that flexibility is an important component. This converging evidence regarding the 
central role played by flexibility in the creative process will be considered more precisely in the 
next chapter, when data triangulation will allow us to look at the association between flexibility 
and creative performance.  
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• Is there evidence which helps explain the apparent fragility of originality? 
Children’s reports suggest myriad idiosyncratic features which can influence creative output, 
some of which likely contribute to the fragility of originality. At a broad level, children might 
feel uninspired by the stimulus (‘A paperclip… I couldn’t really work with it’), panicked (‘My 
mind was kind of like boggling’), pressured by time, (‘I didn’t really have time to breathe’) or be 
uncomfortable working alone (‘it feels a bit weird to be doing things on your own’). Added to 
these uncertainties, which might affect both fluency and originality, are specific individual 
decisions about whether to emphasise quantity or quality i.e., whether originality should be a 
focus at all. Children differ in their starting positions on this (e.g., ‘It’s supposed to be not just 
like really good ideas it’s supposed to be like lots of ideas’ vs. ‘I didn’t write it down because I 
thought probably everyone else would have done it’) and might also change their view as time 
goes on; for example, an intention to prioritise only exceptional ideas might cede to a decision to 
include more commonplace ideas later in the task (‘With the key picker, I thought… I’ve only 
done four so far so I might as well just do it’).  
The problem then is not only that good original ideas are hard to come by, but that the test leads 
to competing assessments of the extent to which originality is the goal. Furthermore, even if it is 
the goal, there might still be uncertainty with and difficulty in achieving it. Requiring children to 
‘think of ideas that no-one else will think of’ demands a high level of understanding both of 
others and the world; to produce an original idea, children must not only find successful ways of 
shouldering their way through more accessible obvious or unexceptional ideas and arriving at 
unconventional ones - but must additionally weigh up the probability that others might have 
arrived at a similar destination. 
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These qualitative findings support quantitative findings that originality is a precarious measure 
and demonstrate the manifold complex reasons why this might be so. Further work could benefit 
from trying to minimise some of this instability, for example by eliminating the quantity / quality 
uncertainty through an instruction to focus solely on one aspect. The expectation would be that a 
‘quantity’ instruction would highlight those mechanisms involved in maximising fluency, while 
a ‘quality’ instruction could help elucidate specific originality-relevant processes. It would be 
possible to test hypotheses regarding the role of EC in ‘quantity’ vs ‘quality’ creatives. For 
example, in the quantity condition, greater inhibitory control is likely to be detrimental to 
fluency, blocking the free and far-ranging associational flow of highly productive generation; in 
the quality condition, its role could be more nuanced: it might be of benefit in the evaluative 
phase in barring less original responses, but that beneficial role would only come into play if 
sufficient candidate responses were available.   
Finally, since our ultimate interest is in considering ways in which creativity, including 
originality, can be improved (by explicit instruction, practice, use of strategies or other means) , 
it is important to consider whether, despite the complexities, there are commonalities which 
benefit or dent creative effort. In the following chapter we will consider some systematic features 
of the creative process, such as a lack of flexibility, which might help explain how originality 
might founder – and which might, as we shall discuss in Chapter 8, be amenable to 
improvement.  
• Is there evidence of creative failure (in quantity or quality) at either extreme (too much, 
too little) of control? 
Although there was evidence of both, the findings suggest that ‘drying up’ is more of a problem 
than ‘overflowing’ when it comes to ideas. Only Medea, who produced 23 responses, spoke of 
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feeling engulfed by ideas, saying it felt ‘quite stressful’ with so many ideas coming at once. 
More often, children spoke of too much focus causing them to ‘forget’ or ‘lose’ ideas. Panda 
described how when she ‘was thinking like really really hard’ that ‘no ideas came’, an 
observation that will chime with those who have had to produce ideas under pressure. It is 
possible that the stress brought about through the strict time limit of the test, creates an 
environment where it is harder to access a freer, more spontaneous approach, meaning a 
controlled approach arises more by default than by design. 
Almost all children described feeling ‘stuck’ at some point during the task, with several giving 
evocative descriptions of the sort of fixedness associated with excessive inhibitory control that 
such a feeling can induce (‘I think about here I was like argh paperclips I only know one reason 
for paperclips that’s because they’re paperclips’, or ‘Yeah yeah cos I couldn’t really think and 
then… I tried to think and then I thought of ideas that I’d already thought of’ or ‘I was trying to 
say like think of a paperclip think of a paperclip but it didn’t really help’). Might this sort of 
blockage be cleared by really strong inhibitory deployment? There were no accounts from 
children which suggested such a process at play. By contrast, those who effectively escaped 
being stuck tended to do so not by specific efforts to overcome functional fixedness but by more 
direct and immediate appeal to novel input from senses or from memory, behaviour more 
suggestive of greater flexibility; ‘To get unstuck like I said I was looking around…and listening 
to the noises as well’, or ‘I was like… there must be an idea in this room that will help me yeah’ 
or ‘I I kind of thought what else was available to like what else was available what’s going on... 
like what I’ve done in my life… or like what I’m doing today’. 
Again, a quantitatively based consideration of this research question will follow in the next 
chapter. 




One of the main limitations of this thematic analysis was that, as with its factor (or principal 
component) analysis quantitative counterpart, there is a tendency to ‘get out what you put in’. 
Themes arise and are developed from the starting point of particular questions asked. This carries 
the risk that there are other potentially important themes which remain obscure, not because they 
are not important, but because they were not elicited in interview.  
Other limitations were more specific to how the research was conducted. The test environment 
presented too many opportunities for ideas available visually, potentially limiting ideas arising 
from internally directed attention. The choice of a paperclip as the stimulus object was also not 
ideal, since its nature does not really allow for disassembly, which can be a productive ideational 
strategy. 
 
Conclusions and next steps 
These qualitative data provide the strongest evidence to date that children achieve creative ends 
through different means, since even in completion of the same task, they reported diverse 
approaches. Differences extended to their deployment of EC, with some children describing the 
need for high levels of control and focus to maximise creative output and others the opposite, 
suggesting excessive control keeps the ideas out rather than allowing them in. The findings build 
on emerging ideas that changes to EC are likely to impact children differently, depending on 
where they lie on a ‘control continuum’ and their level of flexibility in moving from that 
position. We will now put those ideas to the test, by looking at how different children fared when 
the level of their EC was altered by training. 









Chapter 7. Can understanding the role of EC in children’s creativity help predict 
individual effects of EC training on creative outcomes? 
Integrating findings from qualitative and quantitative approaches 
  





The previous triangulation study (Chapter 4) outlined the main arguments in favour of a mixed 
methods approach (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber & Johnson, 2015; Johnson et al., 2007; 
Tashakorri & Teddlie, 2009, 2010) as well as some of the ongoing controversies (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989; Tashakorri, 2009; Teddlie & Tashakorri, 2008). It also described the pragmatic 
approach advocated by many in the mixed method field (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Morgan, 2014; Yvonne Feilzer, 2010) as one which essentially sees continua where others see 
dichotomies: abduction combining inductive and deductive reasoning, intersubjectivity allowing 
both subjective and objective perspectives and a critical approach to the validity of wider 
application of any findings breaking down an absolute distinction between the specific and the 
universal (Morgan, 2014; Schwandt & Lichty, 2015; Yardley & Bishop, 2017). The previous 
study also highlighted the fact that every triangulation study presents distinctive challenges, 
making transparency regarding assumptions and limitations critically important (Creswell & 
Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber & Johnson, 2015; Schwandt & Lichty, 2015; Yardley & Bishop, 
2017).  
Beyond the theory, the experience of triangulation meant learning practical lessons about the best 
approach. For example, a major limitation previously involved the many assumptions of validity 
of comparing qualitative and quantitative data derived from different creative activities, in 
different environments and under different constraints. This limitation has been minimised in the 
current study, since all these aspects were correspondent in quantitative and qualitative studies. 
The wide age range (children from school years 1 to 6) considered in the previous study added 
uncertainty regarding developmental effects, a problem addressed here by considering a group of 
children very much closer in age (all children were in year 5). Problems of noise were further 




addressed by considering longitudinal rather than cross-sectional ‘snapshot’ measures as before; 
focusing on individual change over time helped control for some of the many additional 
unmeasured factors which contribute to creativity (e.g., memory, level and detail of conceptual 
knowledge, motivation, emotional engagement etc.).  
Crucially, in attempting to answer the question of whether there are better or worse ways of 
‘doing creativity’, we can now consider a potential causal role for EC, since we are relating 
(qualitative) individual approaches to creativity to their (quantitative) individual change in 
performance over time, with only their level of EC manipulated. The first question posed at the 
outset of the intervention in Chapter 5 was whether EC training would have any impact on 
creativity. The answer - notwithstanding the important caveat that changes post training were 
seen in both EC and active control groups - was yes: creative fluency improved, and creative 
originality declined. Children had more, worse ideas after the intervention. We can now consider 
whether this impact of training differed between individuals and how any difference might be 
attributed to differences in their creative approach.  
Aims of the study 
Each part of this mixed methods study has had connected yet distinct goals. The quantitative 
study (Chapter 5) sought evidence on the effects of an EC intervention on children’s creative 
output in divergent thinking tests. The qualitative study (Chapter 6) deconstructed the creative 
process for a smaller group of the same children, using the same test to reveal diverse means by 
which creative ends can be reached. This final triangulation chapter aims to bring these two 
perspectives together. Specifically, it will set out to use data derived from the qualitative study to 
• characterise and define specific creative sub types 
• make theoretical predictions about how EC training might affect different sub types  




• test the accuracy of those predictions using the data from the quantitative study 
The first step, of characterising and defining sub types, sought to achieve the most accurate and 
detailed characterisation of children’s creative approach by maximising the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative available data, whilst ‘maintaining the integrity’ of methods and 
findings (Sandelowski, 1995). There are difficulties. In particular, it is hard to resist pressure to 
yield to the ‘lowest common denominator’ of triangulation where qualitative data are obliged to 
submit to quantitative (Hesse-Biber, 2010). The reality is that to properly answer the research 
question, a common currency is needed, and even though putting numbers to words is a 
simplification, it is the only real option available. The design of the qualitative study, and the 
decision to compromise creative freedoms by limiting the nature and conditions of the task (i.e., 
setting a constrained divergent thinking task rather than a more free and self-authored creative 
work), sought to minimise the translational journey from words to numbers. This decision, made 
in the hope of producing more robust findings, comes with its own drawbacks - most 
substantially, in the impurity of the creativity under study and concomitant uncertainty about the 
wider applicability of findings. That said, the expectation of clear answers emerging from 
triangulation were perhaps lower than they were before, given the experience of the complexity 
and compromises involved in the mixed methods approach.  
The process of triangulation remained somewhat complex given the different types of data, 
which included: 
• Scores from the AUT itself. These were the simplest ingredients, being already in 
quantitative form, but their inclusion nonetheless involved making certain assumptions 
e.g., that high fluency scores in the AUT were likely to be the result of a more 
spontaneous approach. 




• Information based on the provenance of ideas given as responses in the AUT. Again, this 
involved assumptions e.g., that ideas arising spontaneously or from memory were likely 
to elude executive control, while those involving strategic thinking such as in broad use-
based categories (‘could it be a weapon? could it be a toy?’) likely deployed EC.  
• The final information, which involved the furthest translation from qualitative to 
quantitative, came from analysing and quantifying responses children gave about EC 
relevant processes. These included their state of concentration, their level of distraction, 
whether they had considered additional responses which they ruled out, and the timeline 
of their responses – such as whether they showed evidence of the ‘serial order effect’ 
(Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Wang et al., 2017).  
 
 
Fig. 7. 1 Illustration of the core components of the creative process 
 
On the basis of earlier qualitative work (Chapter 3), as well as the wider literature (Chrysikou et 
al., 2014; Fillipetti & Krumm, 2020; Krumm et al., 2018; Mekern et al., 2019; Nijstad et al., 




2010; Pringle & Sowden, 2017b; Zhang et al., 2020), the creation of subsets was founded on 
three key dimensions of the creative process, namely: 
• how effectively children tapped spontaneous processes  
• how able they were to bring control processes to bear  
• how flexible they were in their approaches i.e., the extent to which they could modulate 
between differing approaches  
 
Methods 
This chapter, in terms of foundational method, is a continuation of Chapter 6; the participants 
and procedure for conducting the AUT test and subsequent interviews - is fully described there. 
The following section will thus elaborate only on those parts of the methods new and specific to 
triangulation. The figure below (Fig. 7.2) gives an overview of the different data sources which 
contributed to the characterising of each child’s creative approach. Methods relating to scoring of 
the AUT, the provenance of ideas in the AUT and broader answers from the qualitative interview 
will be outlined in turn. These scores, all derived from the qualitative AUT (i.e., the test 
completed by the small, nested group of children for the purpose of qualitative interview), will 
then be used to triangulate with the quantitative data from their pre and post AUT scores, carried 
out as part of the overall intervention study. 
AUT performance 
For AUT performance, each child’s responses were scored as in the quantitative study for 
fluency i.e., as a simple count of legitimate responses. Originality was scored by four 




independent raters, who were given a full, anonymised list of responses and asked to score each 
one. Their instructions were to ‘Score each answer on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all  
 
  
Fig. 7. 2 Schematic showing types and sources of data for triangulation 
 
creative and 5 is highly creative. Take into account your sense of the originality and 
inventiveness of each response, in one holistic measure.’ The rater scoring method (a different 
method from the main quantitative study) was used because the small numbers precluded reliable 
frequency scoring (Cropley & Kaufman, 2012; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019). Inter-rater reliability, 
calculated using Fleiss’ kappa, was good, IRR = .766 (p<.001). An additional sub score of 
flexibility was added, calculated as a simple count of the number of different categories in each 
child’s response set. The score is an indicator of children’s tendency to voluntarily switch to a 
new response category. It is a measure often used in scoring DT tests and was also included to 
aid categorisation of children into creative sub types.  




Provenance of ideas 
The next consideration was to try to understand the directly productive part of the creative 
process. Where did the responses produced and written down in the AUT come from? The 
approach here was based on Gilhooly et al.’s (2007) think aloud protocol analysis. Each child’s 
written responses became the stimuli to prompt recall, by asking the child where each idea had 
come from. Responses were first categorised on a per item basis, to later allow each child’s most 
frequently used approach, and their tendency to use multiple approaches, to contribute to 
category scoring (as outlined below in Table 7.1). Item responses were first classified according 
to the following a priori coding scheme: 
1. Memory use production: specific reference, concurrently or subsequently, to prior 
knowledge through direct or indirect experience. The reference was either made in 
response to interview or immediately after, when children were asked to mark any 
responses which were ideas they had seen or experienced previously. 
2. Property use production: retrieving and scanning properties of the object (e.g., ‘hard’, 
‘sharp’, ‘bendable’) and using them as cues to alternative uses requiring those properties.  
3. Broad use-based production: reviewing the object against broad usage areas such as 
‘transport’ ‘weapon’ ‘art’.  
4. Disassembly use production: taking the object apart and producing uses based on one or 
more dissembled parts.  
5. Embodiment production: scanning the current environment to gain input for ideation, or 
doodling / miming / manipulation or other physical processes to prompt a new idea 




6. Spontaneous production: idea ‘popped up’ without deliberate effort and with no 
identifiable origin 
7. Sequential production: idea directly related to and emerging from a previous given 
response (usually the immediately preceding one) 
A few additional things to note about this categorisation: 
• Property use was often used in conjunction with another strategy such as looking around 
the room. While considering the properties of the object (e.g., a paperclip is small, metal, 
bendable, can latch on to things), a set of coats and bags in a cloakroom can be scanned 
for components which might match any of these properties. 
• Sequential production. This was sometimes very direct (e.g., using a paperclip as ‘a bar’ 
followed by using it ‘as part of a railing’, in which the first imagined use was almost a 
constituent part of the second). At other times it was less direct, when a previous idea 
sent subsequent thoughts in a new direction – e.g., ‘hair clip’ arose first through property 
use production but was used sequentially to probe memory for a film in which a hair clip 
was used as a pick for a lock. 
• Disassembly use. Regrettably the choice of object (a paperclip) did not allow for this 
mode of production in the way that other items might (e.g., a bottle can be disassembled 
into a lid and a container; a pencil into wood, lead, and paint). A paperclip comprises 
only one element, moulded into a specific shape. 
• Embodiment production. The rich environment where the study took place (a cloakroom) 
meant that there were many potential ideas to be gleaned by looking around the room. 




This might have meant that children were less compelled to look internally for ideas than 
they ordinarily might be. 
These pathways to idea generation were further grouped into categories according to whether 
they were more or less EC dependent. 
• More EC dependent: broad use-based, disassembly, property use production 
• Less EC dependent: memory based, spontaneous, embodiment production 
• Ambiguous (could be either EC dependent or independent): sequential (follow up to 
previous idea could be spontaneous or strategic)  
In practice, most children made use of multiple approaches, with the difference lying in the 
dominance of a particular approach. In further analysis, each child’s most frequently used 
approach, and their propensity to use multiple approaches, were used for categorisation, as 
shown in Table 7.1 below. 
Responses in qualitative interview 
As well as completing the same creativity test, under the same conditions, children were all 
asked very similar questions in their post AUT interview. This design was to allow a direct 
comparison of responses and minimise noise in the qualitative-to-quantitative translation of 
scores. The questions from interview identified as being most relevant and tractable for 
quantification in this triangulation phase were:  
• the type and level of concentration described (tight / focused, vs loose / diffuse, vs 
variable) 
• whether any ideas were conceived but ruled out (more EC-led approaches being more 
likely to involve a higher rate of rejection of ideas) 




• the presence of mind wandering (more EC-led approaches being more likely to mean 
children staying on task with less mind wandering) 
• the approach to ‘getting unstuck’ (EC-led approaches pointing to a more strategic, 
deconstructive approach, and non-EC-led more to memory-based or spontaneous 
approaches) 
• the timeline of idea generation (the classic serial order account - the fluency rate 
diminishing and originality increasing over time - has a strong EC explanation) 
Scoring 
In the next step, participants were given scores on the basis of the elements described above. The 
purpose of this scoring was to characterise different creative sub-types, with two aims: first, for 
its own sake, to better understand diverse approaches to creativity, and second, to facilitate 
triangulation by creating quantitative scores from qualitative to compare with the quantitative 
scores derived from the intervention. After characterising sub-types, predictions were made 
about the differential effect of EC training on the performance of different sub-types and those 
predictions tested against the quantitative data. The full basis upon which scores were calculated 






















Flexible approach Flexibility 
score 
Fluency score in 
AUT 
Higher 5-9: 1pt 
10-19: 2pts 
≥20: 3 pts 












1pt Broad use/disassembly 
use / property-based 
predominant 
1pt Mix of approaches 2 or 3:1pt, 
≥4:2pts 
 
Concentration Diffuse, loose, more 
visual search, more 
movement, possible 

















but not produced 
Unlikely to see  1pt if none 
present 
Expect to see ideas 
excluded for being too 
obvious, too weird, 
they won’t work etc. 
 
1 or 2: 1pt 
≥3: 2 pts 
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Unlikely 1pt if 
absent 
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Flexible approach Flexibility 
score 
Timeline Still productive at end 
/ getting easier / 
variable  
 
1pt Easier at start, slower 
later 








Max poss. score 
 
 9pts  8pts  7pts 





As in the quantitative study, there was a great deal of variation in both the quantity and quality of 
ideas children produced. 
 Fluency Flexibility Originality  
Range 3 – 23 2 – 14 2.47 - 4.00 
Mean 7.50 5.81 3.00 
Median 6.00 5.00 2.98 
SD 4.99 3.60 0.39 
Table 7. 2 Whole sample (n=16) descriptive statistics of AUT scores 
 
Examples of ideas which scored highly (≥4) for originality 
• Use as a diving board for something small 
• A ukulele capo 
• Fishhook 
• Dip it in ink and use it as a pen 
• Whisk 
• Lilo for ants 
• Tiny football goal 
 
Provenance of ideas 
The next part of the analysis was concerned with the directly productive aspect of the creative 
process. Where did the ideas given as responses come from? 
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Provenance percentage per category 
Memory 15.8% 





Broad use 0.8% 
Table 7. 3 Whole sample summary of provenance for given responses, percentage by category, 
out of a total of 120 responses 
 
Example of each provenance category     
• Memory use. ‘Pick a lock’. “I've seen loads of movies where they just pick locks with 
paperclips and I think it’s quite cool.” 
• Property use. ‘Tweezers’. “You can straighten it out and then just half it to use it as 
tweezers cos I mean if you just want to pick something so you need to sample a rat poo 
you could just pick it up.” 
• Spontaneous. ‘Stick-on nail’. “I just thought of it like that because it just popped into my 
head and I thought hmm yeah it would be quite ok to do that.” 
• Sequential. ‘Two-sided tightrope’ (following on from 'bridge'). “Cos I probably thought 
ah that wouldn't be a very good bridge because you have to walk like really really 
delicately like on tip toes like a tightrope and then I thought it's got two sides so it could 
be like a two-sided tightrope.” 
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• Embodiment. ‘Connect to your bag to put on lots of keyrings’. “I looked at your pencil 
case and … then I thought you could connect loads of keyrings to that.” 
• Disassembly use. No examples of this (probably because a paperclip does not lend itself 
to disassembly). 
• Broad use. ‘Tiny football goal’. “I just think about all the people in my class that love 
football and I'm like well I could do a football one…and then it just popped up in my 
head.” 
Responses from qualitative interview 
These interview responses were the foundation of the thematic analysis presented in Chapter 6. 
The new element here was the conversion of specific qualitative responses to numerical scores 
for each child, as outlined in Table 7.1 above. The scores for each child, calculated according to 
those scoring rules, are shown below. 
Pseudonym Spontaneity 
(Max score: 9) 
Control 
(Max score: 8) 
Flexibility 
(Max score: 7) 
Cat 8 2 7 
Amber 2 5 7 
Koala 5 2 5 
Medea 6 5 6 
Elton Van Gogh 2 5 1 
Squish 3 2 4 
Rabbit 2 3 1 
Panda 5 6 4 
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Ammara 5 4 3 
Jamie 2 2 3 
Parrot 5 3 0 
Pickle 5.5 4 5 
Nutella 3.5 3 5 
Pickle my bunions 7 1 6 
Dr Dolphin 3.5 6 6 
Guinea pig 4 4 5 
Table 7. 4 Scores for spontaneity, control, and flexibility 
For ease of comparison, these scores are also represented graphically below. 
 
Fig. 7. 3 Scores for spontaneity, control, and flexibility (according to scoring method outlined in 
Table 7.1) by individual 
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Delineating creative sub types 
The distribution of scores did not immediately suggest straightforward sub-types into which 
children neatly fell. For example, while high flexibility was generally seen in conjunction with 
high spontaneity, some children showed the opposite (e.g., Amber, who achieved the highest 
score for flexibility but almost the lowest for spontaneity). The goal at the outset was to find a 
small number of groups, characterised according to the main criteria – for example, a ‘highly 
spontaneous group’, a ‘highly controlled group’ and a ‘highly flexible group’ and several 
attempts were made to delineate sub-groups in terms of all three main criteria of spontaneity, 
control and flexibility. It proved problematic. The smallest number of reasonably discrete groups 
deriving from such a categorisation (even including a ‘miscellaneous’ group) was six. Even then, 
groups sometimes included individuals who had widely differing scores on one of the three 
measures, or groups were so specific as to contain only one member. In short, disappointingly, 
the resulting categorisations did not seem sufficiently more informative than considering 
children individually. Returning to the theoretical basis for attempting categorisation, an 
alternative approach was pursued.  
 
Fig. 7. 4 Model of approaches to creativity, with variability between and within individuals 




In the model of the creative process (Fig. 7.4) presented in Chapter 4, the proposal was that 
flexibility should act as a ‘protective buffer’ to challenges to creativity; those challenges might 
come from operating at extremes of spontaneity or control or from new strictures presented by, 
for example, tightened constraints. This is because better flexibility offers the potential to follow 
alternative pathways, to reach creative ends through different means – for example, in ‘letting 
go’ to pursue broader, more distant associational connections or doubling down on rigorous 
evaluation (Kennett et al., 2018; Krumm et al., 2018; Nijstad et al., 2010).  
On this theoretical basis, a new, simpler categorisation was made, based on each child’s level of 
flexibility. Children were divided into three groups: a high flexibility group (scores ≥ 6), a 
medium flexibility group (scores 4 or 5) and a low flexibility group (scores ≤3). This gave the 
following distribution: 
Table 7. 5 Assignation of children to creative sub types according to their level of flexibility  
 
The next step was to consider how each sub type was likely to have been affected by EC 
training.  Predictions were limited a priori to performance on the AUT since it offered like-for-
like comparison. The original design had allowed for the opportunity to consider children in the 
EC group and the control group separately. However, since the changes effected in EC and 
control intervention conditions were largely equivalent, and our sample size here is small, the 
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participants were pooled across intervention conditions. The results of Chapter 5 showed that the 
overall effect of training was to improve AUT fluency and reduce AUT originality; predictions 
here were made about differences at the level of the delineated sub types, in light of that bigger 
picture.  
The overarching hypothesis regarding flexibility was that any creativity gains from training 
should be greater for those with higher flexibility, since they are best equipped to adapt and 
utilise different approaches. Any losses should be ameliorated since those with higher flexibility 
are better equipped to find alternate routes. The specific predictions for the three groups were as 
follows:  
High flexibility group. EC training improvements will be assimilated effectively into the creative 
process, even in those children who tend to ideate using spontaneous approaches (frequently the 
case for highly flexible individuals), since they have the flexibility to modify their approach. 
Prediction is thus for tangible gains in fluency through encouraging additional alternative routes 
to ideation. The general decline seen in AUT originality should be at its least extreme in this 
group, for the same reason - they are less shackled to one approach. Originality could even 
improve for those children with high spontaneity and low control since additional control 
resources could be deployed to better evaluate candidate ideas.   
Medium flexibility group. This is the hardest group to predict outcomes for, because it includes 
children with both high and low spontaneity levels as well as both high and low control and it is 
likely the balance of these will affect outcomes. Inevitably, predictions for how this group will 
respond to the training lie somewhere between predictions for the high and low flexibility 
groups.  If this dimension is meaningful for the effect on creativity of EC training, the results for 
this group should lie in between high and low flexibility groups. So overall, this group should see 
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modest gains in fluency, through the same mechanisms as outlined for the high flexibility group. 
They should also be somewhat protected against losses in originality, but less protected than 
their highly flexible counterparts.  
Low flexibility group. Low flexibility tends to be seen in conjunction with higher levels of 
control and lower levels of spontaneity, though this is by no means universal (e.g., Parrot in this 
group has high spontaneity and low control scores). The prediction here is that EC training is 
likely to be of least benefit to this group. Not only do they already tend to have low levels of 
ideational freedom, but their low flexibility also means that they are not very malleable to new 
approaches. Additional control could mean that those who already have a high level of control 
experience particularly steep declines in originality, through excessive blocking of potential idea 
pathways and overly strict evaluation further ruling out candidate ideas.  
These predictions concern relative rather than absolute creative outcomes in different groups. It 
would not be correct, for example, to characterise low flexibility children as having low 
creativity, since there are so many other factors impacting their creativity – everything from their 
conceptual knowledge and understanding, to their memory, to their level of motivation and 
engagement in the task. However, the predictions assume that, other things being equal, those 
with lower flexibility are likely to be less creative. 
These data concern a sample of just 16 children, with wide variance in scores. Even though we 
would ideally look to statistical tools to assess the strength and confidence of findings, a study 
such as this is not sufficiently powered to do so. By way of illustration, power analysis (Cohen, 
1992) using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to ascertain the sample size needed to detect an effect 
size of 0.25 with 90% power and an alpha of 0.05, suggests a sample of 168 would be needed – 
so we are short by a factor of more than 10. Instead, raw scores and plots (with confidence 
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intervals) will be shown - and these should be understood as being able to give only intriguing 
pointers and not statistical certitudes. To calculate the proportion of variance explained by the 
flexibility categorisation, repeated measures ANOVAs were carried out on each AUT variable, 
with flexibility sub type as the between subject grouping category. Because of the small number, 
significance levels were not considered. Results for the time*group interaction were AUT 
fluency: partial η2= .146 and for AUT originality: partial η2= .103.   
Below, we will first see the data by group, then, for a complete picture, results for individual 
children will be shown, to see whether group averages are representative of the profiles of 
individual children who make up each group. A final set of graphs (Fig. 7.7 and 7.8) show 
individuals within each grouping category.  
Triangulation results 
 AUT fluency AUT originality 











































Table 7. 6 Scores for AUT fluency and originality over time by creative type. Means and (SDs). 
 
The general pattern of change in all three groups reflected that seen in the quantitative sample as 
a whole. Namely, all three groups showed overall gains in fluency and losses in originality   




Fig. 7. 5 AUT fluency (left) and originality (right) over time, by creative sub type 
 
between first and final measurement points. However, within this general picture are suggestions 
of differences between the delineated creativity sub types. At the outset, the low flexibility group 
had the highest mean fluency and originality. By time 3 they had the lowest scores for both 
measures. The high flexibility group showed the opposite, starting lowest for both measures and 
ending highest. The large standard deviations show that there is wide score variation within each 
sub type, i.e., a great deal of individual difference is present even within the designated sub types 
and caution over-interpreting results is essential. With this caveat in mind, however, there is 
some evidence that the proposed ‘protective factor’ of flexibility does exist and operated in the 
ways predicted, accentuating the positive EC gains to fluency while ameliorating the negative 
effects on originality. 
The graphs below give a sense of the wide variation in performance change at the individual 
level. As before (in the full quantitative sample in Chapter 5), the variability in the pattern of 
change over time appears particularly unpredictable for originality. 





Fig. 7. 6 Individual variation in AUT fluency (top) and originality (bottom) over time 
 
Fig. 7. 7 Group level variation in change in AUT fluency over time, by flexibility sub type 






Fig. 7. 8 Group level variation in change in AUT originality over time, by flexibility sub type 
 
Discussion 
Triangulation addressed the question of whether understanding the role of executive control in 
children’s creativity could allow accurate predictions to be made about the specific effects of EC 
training on individual creative outcomes. Building on evidence from the EC training intervention 
study (Chapter 5) and the qualitative study (Chapter 6), which characterised EC-relevant themes 
in the process of completion of the AUT, this study brought both data sets together in a 
multistage analysis. The first step involved characterising and defining specific creative sub 
types, with creative flexibility ultimately being selected as their key distinguishing feature, based 
on the theoretical notion that flexibility is a key capability in allowing adaptation to the 
manipulation of EC level. The next made predictions about how EC training might affect those 
sub types, the crucial prediction being that high creative flexibility would bolster gains and 
ameliorate losses brought about by EC improvements. Finally, the accuracy of the predictions 
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was tested using the data from the quantitative study. With the caveat that findings must, due to 
the small numbers involved, be interpreted cautiously (and suspending expectations that they 
will be fully supported by statistical tools), predictions were accurate: the high flexibility group 
saw the greatest gains in creative fluency and the smallest losses in creative originality while the 
low flexibility group saw the opposite. These findings give further weight to the suggestion in 
earlier chapters that the creativity of individuals with low flexibility is likely to be particularly 
adversely affected by EC gains. To sum up, this triangulation exercise provided evidence that 
training EC, while likely to ‘succeed’ in terms of improving components of EC and even some 
aspects of creativity, might also ‘fail’ in terms of carrying negative consequences for creative 
originality – and that this failure might be exacerbated for individuals with a specific and 
identifiable creative approach. 
While the evidence supports the idea discussed previously, that flexibility is highly beneficial to 
creativity (Filippetti & Krumm, 2020; Kennett et al., 2014, 2018; Nijstad et al., 2010), it is 
unfortunate that the initial plan to delineate sub types according to all three aspects (flexibility, 
spontaneity and control) of the creative process simultaneously was not workable in practice. 
Characterising groups solely in terms of flexibility means the spotlight is now fully directed at a 
construct whose definition presents a confusing problem. Specifically, the fact that the two 
constructs under investigation – creativity and EC – both have a component referred to as 
‘flexibility’. To what extent are they separable? 
Even within the EC literature, flexibility is defined in multiple ways. At one end is a narrow, task 
specific flexibility, seen in tests such as the Wisconsin card sort task (Heaton et al., 1993), in 
which flexibility is prompted by external cues. This is sometimes referred to as ‘reactive 
flexibility’ (Ebersbach & Hagedorn, 2011; Eslinger & Grattan, 1993). On a broader level is 
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‘spontaneous flexibility’ (Eslinger & Grattan, 1993) the flexibility deployed, for example, in 
semantic fluency tasks and which refers to subjects’ “ability to produce a diversity of ideas and 
novel responses” (Fillipetti & Krumm, 2020, p. 772), a definition which sounds an awful lot like 
creativity (the authors themselves note a “close relationship between spontaneous flexibility and 
creativity”). The extent to which these different types of flexibility are dissociable or overlapping 
is unclear. “While the concept seems intuitive, cognitive flexibility shows itself in a broad 
spectrum of behaviors and lacks a unified definition” (Ionescu, 2012, p.190). Considering the 
multiplicity of definitions and typologies (she describes 13), Ionescu concludes that cognitive 
flexibility is better seen as a property of cognitive processes than as a specific ability. She posits 
that flexibility relies on two types of interaction, the first between cognitive mechanisms 
(attention, memory, perception etc.) and the second between cognition, sensorimotor 
mechanisms (since representations are multimodal; Barsalou, 2003, 2008) and context, in 
developmental time (p.196). How might this help us to disentangle the current findings? 
Let us consider some possible explanations: 
1. Cognitive flexibility is a ‘property’ rather than an ‘ability’ and as such, creative flexibility 
is essentially the same entity as EC flexibility. This view is given credence by the fact 
that both AUT and insight tasks are deployed as tests of both ‘cognitive flexibility’ and 
‘creativity’. By this reckoning, and assuming that flexibility training was a key ingredient 
of training (i.e., given flexibility’s position as one of the core components of EC 
(Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000 and the fact that training targeted EC broadly), 
improved flexibility contributed both to the fluency gains and the originality losses. In 
this case, we would expect to see the most flexible children (as defined in their creative 
sub types) as seeing a stronger version of these effects i.e., greater gains in fluency and 
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greater loss of originality. This is not what we found, suggesting this explanation is 
flawed. 
2. An alternative explanation says that viewing cognitive flexibility as a ‘property’ does not 
sufficiently differentiate unique features of it in different contexts – in other words, 
creative flexibility is not equivalent to EC flexibility. For example, (as per the 
distinctions outlined above), creative flexibility might be best described as ‘spontaneous 
flexibility’ (the ‘spontaneous’ reflecting a lack of external prompting to flex), tightly 
yoked to fluency. Eslinger and Grattan (1993) even define spontaneous flexibility as “the 
ready flow of ideas and answers”. EC flexibility, by contrast, is predominantly the 
reactive type i.e., a response to specific task demands or the environmental context. In 
this conception, the ‘flexibility’ that was trained in the intervention was not advantageous 
to creativity because it was essentially a different skill i.e., even if it improved, it did not 
aid the dynamic shifting between spontaneous and controlled cognitive approaches 
proposed to be key to maximising creative success (see Fig. 7. 4). In this 
conceptualisation, the results seen are explained by the protective effect of high creative 
flexibility, which meant gains could be exploited and losses mitigated.  
3. A third explanation suggests that flexibility was not the chief driver of intervention-
induced change and that other components, such as inhibitory control and working 
memory, were mainly responsible for the changes seen in performance. We know, from 
pre and post-tests, that inhibitory control and working memory both improved after 
training. (It is unfortunate that the measure for flexibility did not work so we cannot draw 
conclusions about the effect of training there.) In this explanation, the balance of changes 
seen post training are explained by a combination of the effects of individual EC 
Chapter 7. Can understanding the role of EC in children’s creativity help predict individual effects of EC training on 
creative outcomes? 
 342 
components – for example, working memory being chiefly responsible for fluency gains 
(e.g., by allowing consideration of a greater volume of idea elements), while inhibitory 
control being more responsible for originality losses (e.g., through over-blocking 
potentially fruitful remote idea pathways). In this explanation, highly flexible individuals 
were able both to maximise the gains of working memory improvements - by utilising 
more focused approaches to exploit greater working memory capacity - and also to 
ameliorate losses - by allowing adjustment to a more spontaneous, open thinking 
approach, one which facilitated the emergence of distant and surprising idea elements and 
allowed them to be generously evaluated.  
The combined explanatory power of proposals 2 and 3 accords with our overarching model, 
which suggests it is a higher level flexibility which is key to creativity. ‘Higher level’ creativity 
might be described as switching between strategies of which tasks to use, in contrast with the 
‘lower level’ flexibility of switching between tasks. This higher type of flexibility was not 
specifically trained through the intervention, whose games and activities were focused more on 
the lower-level flexibility of switching between tasks, rules, games, partners and so on; the 
training neither required nor specifically encouraged switching between different modes of 
thinking.  
This conceptualisation of flexibility is consistent with other studies of creativity in children. For 
example, Krumm and colleagues used structural equation modelling to look at the relationship 
between creativity, EC, and intelligence in 8-13year olds. The terminology is somewhat 
confusing because they define shifting as ‘spontaneous cognitive flexibility’ (i.e., high level 
flexibility) but include it within their EF measures (in which flexibility is typically 
operationalised as lower level). That problem notwithstanding, their findings show that this 
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shifting factor was the main predictor of creativity (Krumm et al., 2018). In a more real-world 
setting, albeit with adults, this depiction also aligns with portrayals of creative individuals based 
on biographical studies, such as those by Csikszentmihalyi (2014). He suggests that the key 
feature of creative individuals is not any single trait but rather their tremendous flexibility, which 
allows them to shift between introversion and extroversion, sensitivity and coldness, arrogance, 
and humility.  
The emergence of such an ability is likely to be somewhat delicate, depending as it does on a 
series of complex interactions between different cognitive processes as well as between 
cognition, sensorimotor mechanisms, and context, making it unsurprising if some struggle to 
fully achieve it. And perhaps it is often not even ‘mission critical’. Ionescu (2017) suggests we 
might consider the opposite of flexibility not as ‘inflexibility’ but rather as ‘stability’. In other 
words, for many tasks and in many contexts, the best strategy might well be a ‘business as usual’ 
one, stable and predictable. Perhaps the special effort of flexibility that is required to step off the 
familiar path and venture into the unknown is what makes creatives creative.  
There is another question to address, regarding findings on originality. Given our general 
predictions about flexibility and since “flexibility in creativity has been related to originality of 
ideas” (Kennett et al., 2018), we would expect greater flexibility to be associated with better 
scores for originality. However, the data showed that the trend for all three groups was similar: 
there were modest gains in originality immediately post intervention but these were followed by 
greater losses by follow up, such that all three groups had lower originality scores at the end than 
the start. The flexibility of the highly flexible group was insufficient to fully repel these negative 
effects on originality. However, the losses for the highly flexible group were less than for the 
other groups – their mean originality score was 1.05 at the start, rising to 1.18, then falling again 
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to 0.95, a pattern closer to stasis than the clear decline seen in lower flexibility groups. A 
plausible interpretation is that the improvements brought about as a result of training were such 
that gains in some aspects of EC e.g., working memory, proposed to improve fluency, were more 
than offset by increases in other aspects, e.g., inhibitory control, which restricted exploration of 
remoter ideational pathways and put stricter kerbs on candidate ideas. Greater flexibility allowed 
exploitation of the benefits of the former, but it was not sufficiently powerful to resist the force 
of the latter. Originality, as we have seen before, is particularly fragile. It should also be 
considered, due to the absence of a ‘business as usual’ control, that there are other possibilities, 
such as an effect of development or task repetition, which cannot be ruled out. 
There remain inconsistencies. If we return for a moment to the essential intervention findings - 
that working memory and inhibitory control both improved after training, and that alongside 
these improvements, creative fluency increased and originality decreased - there are reasonable 
questions we might raise. For example, does the fact that ideas were of poorer quality not suggest 
that evaluation, generally seen as a deliberate, controlled process (Beaty et al., 2014, 2015; 
Benedek et al., 2019) was weaker? How do we square this with the findings of increased 
inhibitory control? Perhaps inhibitory control acts earlier in the creative cycle, such that good, 
surprising candidate ideas do not have the opportunity to ‘pop up’ spontaneously in the first 
place. Or perhaps the fact that the task was no longer novel meant that children were giving less 
in terms of effort and imagination. ‘Openness to experience’, one of the Big Five personality 
factors (McCrae & Costa, 1987) and manifested in novelty, has been strongly associated with 
creativity in many studies (DeYoung et al., 2005; Dollinger et al., 2004; Prabhu et al., 2008; 
Runco, 2014). Practice had reduced novelty while giving children an understanding of how to 
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succeed at the task through the application of proximate, prosaic generation strategies. These 
allowed them to optimise for fluency, but not originality. 
There are other current theories regarding the relationship between EC and creativity which our 
data did not support – for example, the popular view that inhibitory control benefits creativity by 
blocking obvious or previous ideas (Benedek et al., 2012; Camarda et al., 2018; Cassotti et al., 
2016). “The ability to inhibit common and dominant paths of solutions to a problem seems to be 
a critical process for generating creative ideas” (Camarda et al., 2018). In our study, the evidence 
pointed in the opposite direction; greater inhibition was associated with a pattern of higher 
fluency and lower originality – an increase, in other words, of just those ‘common and dominant’ 
ideas that others suggest inhibitory control is there to outlaw.  
The role of working memory in creativity is less controversial, it generally being seen as 
beneficial (De Dreu et al., 2012; Korovkin et al., 2018; Remoli & Santos, 2017) but even here 
our data raise questions. For example, if we argue, as we have, that improvements in working 
memory facilitated consideration of a wider palate of idea elements which contributed to fluency 
gains, why did these not include the sort of further-reaching associations which are key to 
originality? Why did the benefit extend only to fluency and not to originality? Again, the best 
answer we can summon involves an appeal to the particular fragility of originality, making it 
particularly susceptible to other perturbations and perhaps particularly stimulated by task 
novelty. It might be that excessive inhibition (in its broadest conception) contributed to a failure 
to ‘let go and explore widely’, in favour of a close, familiar, goal-directed approach exploring a 
known problem space. Simply put, most children chose the safer path. 
To sum up, the findings broadly supported our hypothesis that greater flexibility promotes 
creativity, through allowing the ideational reins to be loosened or tightened according to need. 
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This ability to shift between approaches means that different facets of creativity – originality and 
value, quality, and quantity – can be maximised. We have proposed that the mechanisms by 
which this occurs rely on interactions of creative flexibility with the core components of EC, for 
example exploiting working memory to increase fluency. We also suggested that increased 
inhibitory control contributed to a loss of originality such that even the most highly flexible 
children could not completely resist. These theories need further research to uncover the relative 
contribution of the different factors and the mechanisms by which they operate. For example, 
one way this might be tackled is, following from Radel and colleagues (2015), by taxing 
inhibitory control immediately prior to a creativity task in which instructions are also 
manipulated (to compare ‘Be fluent’ with ‘Be creative’; Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Chen et al., 2005) 
and analysing differences in process and outcomes. 
Limitations 
Some of the broad limitations of triangulation have inevitably been touched upon – inevitably, 
given triangulation has many limits. The hope is that the gains in knowledge and insight 
outweigh the compromises. In this study it was a particular frustration to be unable to draw upon 
familiar statistical tools to substantiate the significance and magnitude of findings, though the 
numbers involved would make such an attempt meaningless. This knowledge does not 
necessarily quell the disquiet.  
At a more micro level were issues with coding, scoring, and devising tools to transform 
qualitative words into quantitative numbers. For example, with regard to flexibility, one 
limitation in the creation of individual scores was the conflation of scores which arose from 
reactive flexibility (e.g., points for numbers of categories of response) with those of spontaneous 
flexibility (e.g., points for multiple diverse strategies for getting unstuck). Coupled with this was 
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the limitation, already discussed, that the measure of ‘EC flexibility’ did not work, a shortcoming 
that limited the conclusions that could be drawn about the nature of this construct.  
 Another scoring compromise came from giving points according to the provenance of responses, 
since there were often multiple sources and it was not always obvious which was predominant. 
The differentiation of EC and non-EC relevant processes also meant simplifying responses which 
were complex and multifaceted into binaries. 
Clearly, the delineation of creative sub types posed its own challenges. Whether this was a 
limitation as such, or an inherent difficulty is debatable – but certainly the objective of defining 
types according to an axis from most EC (‘Control’) to least EC (‘Spontaneous’) was not 
realised. More profoundly, questions arose about the benefit of characterising groups in terms of 
a process which other evidence has suggested might be highly individual. What does or does not 
constitute a suitable group number? Whose qualities must be moulded to fit? Which elements 
should be prioritised? The end goal – to understand the mechanisms involved in children’s 
creativity in order to improve it – must always be kept in mind. 
Reflection on the process and findings of triangulation again raises the question of whether we 
learn more by bringing these data together than keeping them separate (Hesse-Biber & Johnson, 
2015; Noble & Heale, 2019; Tashakorri & Teddlie, 2009). The question presents something of a 
bind: there are undoubtedly difficulties, compromises and shortcomings involved in drawing 
conclusions derived from combining diverse data sets. But if there exist meticulously collected 
quantitative and qualitative data focused on the same research questions and gleaned from the 
same population, surely it would be a greater failing not to try? The paradox of triangulation is 
that it appears to hold the greatest potential for meaningful, thoroughgoing findings, but 
possesses the least clearly defined tools for establishing that meaningfulness (Wolf, 2010). 
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Perhaps, taking a broader view, we should remember that triangulation is “not aimed merely at 
validation but at deepening and widening one's understanding” (Olsen, 2014, p. 103) and that it 
is particularly well suited to support interdisciplinary research. The suggestion of Runco (2008) 
that creativity is unlikely ever to be understood using only traditional scientific approaches and 
given the importance of creativity to so many different fields, the trials of triangulation are surely 
worth the effort.  
 
Conclusions and next steps 
This chapter brought together the quantitative intervention data which told of change in 
performance over time and the qualitative data which gave information about children’s 
individual approaches to the creative process. The aim was to see if understanding the role of 
executive control in children’s creativity could allow accurate predictions to be made about 
individual effects of EC training on creative outcomes. Within the limits outlined, the answer 
was a tentative ‘yes’. Evidence from combining the data supported the hypothesis (derived from 
our model) that high flexibility would act as a ‘protective buffer’ for creativity, enhancing gains 
and ameliorating losses. The research also raised important questions regarding the nature of 
flexibility and the degree to which it is a specific ability or a more general process.  
In the next chapter, we will bring all the findings together. The goal will be to assess all we have 
learned about the role that EC plays in children’s creativity, with the ultimate aim of addressing 
how best to advance this most important component of ‘21st century skills.’ 
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Introduction 
This final chapter will synthesise findings and situate them in the context of education and the 
‘21st century skills’ agenda. Can what we have learnt help to define and realise best practice in 
achieving 21st century skills, particularly in a turbulent world? This thesis is being produced in 
the second year of the Covid-19 pandemic. The events of the pandemic have been so seismic that 
they have pushed even traditionalists to review the ‘business as usual’ approach to education; 
what constitutes ‘usual’ has been and continues to be redefined, as learning has moved online 
and teachers, students and parents have had to bend and flex to new rules. Where do creativity 
and EC sit in this new world? Is it possible to promote both, and if so, how? We will finally 
discuss some future research directions relevant both to aiding a better understanding of 
creativity and, our goal, maximising the chances of improving it.  
 
Summary of findings 
Research questions revisited 
The main goal of this thesis has been to understand the role that executive control plays in 
children’s creativity. The specific research questions raised at the outset are revisited below and 
concise answers given. Each will be considered in more detail, and in wider context, in the 
sections that follow. 
To what extent are there individual differences in the role EC plays?  
Evidence from both qualitative studies (Chapters 3 and 6) pointed to considerable variation in 
children’s deployment of EC in their creativity, both across the 12 children involved in a free-
ranging creative work and the 16 children who completed the AUT. Narrative reports indicated 
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that while some drew primarily upon a highly focused, EC dependent approach, others were 
primarily reliant on ideas arising spontaneously, away from the attentional spotlight. The degree 
to which children modulated from one sort of approach to another also varied widely between 
children, and for some children, also varied according to domain, level of constraint or other 
factors.  
At a broader level, there were also similarities. All children deployed EC to some extent in their 
completion of creative activities: they all attended to the task in hand, sometimes over long 
periods, they remained seated, they behaved appropriately, listening to and meeting instructions. 
Children also showed similarities in generally ascribing a greater role for EC involvement in the 
evaluation of ideas than in their generation. While there were wide differences in generative 
approaches - for some children, generation was primarily strategic and tactical (i.e., EC driven), 
for others it was highly spontaneous (i.e., EC independent) - there was more similarity in an 
evocation of EC in evaluative approaches. For example, Dave (age 6) systematically applied 
logic to decide which ideas merited inclusion, “Do pigs live in sandy places? No. Would a witch 
want to be in a desert to do a spell? I don’t think so”. This finding, of a greater role for EC in 
evaluation than generation, is in line with previous research (Beaty et al., 2012, 2014; Ellamil et 
al., 2012; Ivancovsky et al., 2019; Mayseless et al., 2015a). The demonstration of the variety of 
EC deployment in generation has been less studied and presents as a more novel finding.  
Does inhibitory control have a detrimental effect on children’s creativity?  
Different sources and types of evidence shed light on this question. The first, indirect evidence 
came from findings which showed that improvements in IC (lab measures) were not 
accompanied by creativity improvements. This disconnect was first seen in the cross-sectional 
study of Chapter 2, which found that while EC measures increased reasonably steadily with age, 
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most creativity measures did not. Only AUT originality scores bucked this general trend. Chapter 
4’s triangulation study provided evidence of negative correlations between ‘control’ (as 
evaluated qualitatively) and creative output in terms of both fluency and originality (as measured 
quantitatively). The results of the training study (Chapter 5) bolstered this finding, showing that 
trained improvements in inhibitory control co-occurred with losses in creative originality. The 
picture was not straightforward, however, since there were simultaneous gains in creative 
fluency. These findings might be explained by opposing effects of inhibitory control on different 
dimensions of creativity. Alternatively, they could be explained by opposing effects of different 
EC factors. For example, improved creative fluency might have been facilitated by 
improvements in working memory (which also improved after training) or greater flexibility 
(more speculatively, since its improvement was not measured), rather than the impact of 
inhibitory control. Finally, evidence from the qualitative study of the AUT (Chapter 6) showed 
the variety of possible negative effects brought about by inhibition, including a loss of good 
ideas through overly strict evaluation, functional fixedness, and excessive focus leading to 
creative block. More work is needed for confidence regarding the mechanisms involved, but the 
balance of evidence suggests that inhibitory control can have a detrimental effect on creativity, a 
finding supported by some previous research (Radel et al., 2015; Reverberi et al., 2005; White & 
Shah, 2006) but refuted by others (Benedek et al., 2014a; Edl et al., 2014; Groborz & Necka, 
2003). The apparently contradictory findings reported in the literature are not necessarily 
actually contradictory; as we have discussed, inhibitory control itself has many dimensions 
(Benedek et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2016; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2017) and it is 
possible, as suggested in the introduction that inhibition “can serve to enhance creative thinking 
in some instances while impairing it in others” (Storm & Patel, 2014, p. 1597).  
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To return to the research question here, the current findings suggest a negative role for inhibitory 
control in creativity, with little support for a positive one. Moreover, given the broad recognition 
– even the accepted wisdom - that EC improvements are unassailably a ‘good thing’ (Diamond 
2012, 2013; Diamond & Lee, 2011; Diamond & Ling, 2016; Huizinga et al., 2006; Peters, 2020), 
it is especially important to question this assumption and present evidence of previously 
unconsidered negative side effects.  
What is the effect of training EC on children’s creativity?  
The EC training intervention (Chapter 5) produced findings which were somewhat hard to 
interpret but considering all the possible explanations for the improvements seen in EC 
measures, the most reasonable is that the intervention training worked. The level of 
improvements to EC were considerably greater than would be expected by development over the 
test period of the study, both in terms of evidence from the wider literature and change seen in 
the cross-sectional study in Chapter 2. Ambiguities arose firstly because results were largely 
undifferentiated by group (training vs active control) – that is, the control condition showed 
improvements too, and secondly because the transfer effect to creativity was mixed. The 
likelihood, given the nature of the active control and the inevitability of implicating EC in 
learning and playing several, new games of increasing difficulty, is that it too successfully 
trained EC. With hindsight, efforts to isolate the ‘active ingredient’ of training could have been 
improved. The lack of a ‘business as usual’ control made it difficult to confidently differentiate 
training from other effects (practice, development). The quantity of output (i.e., fluency) showed 
increases alongside EC gains (as measured by tests of WM and IC) while quality (i.e., 
originality) showed decreases, an outcome seen in both verbal (AUT) and figural (TTCT) 
domains.  
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Given the novelty of this study design (i.e., the approach of training EC to explore the effect of 
EC on creativity), there is little potential for direct comparison with the wider literature – though 
the mixed nature of the findings endorses an established idea that, given that neither EC nor 
creativity are monolithic, their relationship is likely to be complex (Basadur et al., 1995; Beaty et 
al., 2016; Chrysikou, 2014, 2019; Pinho et al., 2016; Sowden et al., 2015a; Vartanian et al., 
2019, 2020). Here, it seems likely that some components contributed positively and some 
negatively. For example, as suggested above, WM and flexibility might have contributed 
positively to fluency while inhibitory control might have contributed negatively to originality. 
(Benedek et al., 2014a; Radel et al., 2015; Zabelina et al., 2019). The headline of these findings, 
however, is worth emphasising: the overall effect of EC training was to make children produce 
more, worse ideas. Given the primacy of originality in nearly all conceptions of creativity 
(Abraham, 2018; Dietrich & Haider, 2015; Runco & Jaeger, 2012), this is essentially saying that 
EC training made children less creative. Given that most schools are engaged much of the time 
in practices which demand EC (paying attention, being still and quiet, listening to and carrying 
out instructions, controlling behaviour etc.) this finding compels further investigation.  
Does the effect of training differ between individuals?  
We draw on evidence from Chapter 7 to suggest that the answer is yes, though with the caveat 
that the level of individual variation, particularly in change of originality scores, was very high. 
Consideration of the differential effect of training involved categorising children according to 
their level of flexibility, which was seen as the key feature in allowing children to follow more 
spontaneous or more controlled pathways, according to internally or externally driven cues and 
constraints. Findings showed that although the general direction of outcomes after training was 
broadly similar for all sub-groups (i.e., fluency increased and originality decreased), individuals 
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with the highest level of creative flexibility saw the greatest gains in fluency and the smallest 
losses in originality. We suggest that the explanation lies in the more flexible children being 
better able to exploit gains in WM to enhance fluency while also evading the loss of originality 
brought about by excessive control by switching to more spontaneous approaches.  
Additional findings of note 
Originality is fragile  
Producing good ideas is an unpredictable and uncertain process. This notion, which chimes with 
common sense (that is, the familiar difficulty of having to come up with a good idea on demand) 
is probably a key determinant in what makes creativity both precious and opaque (Dietrich, 
2015; Reiter-Palmon & Schoenbeck, 2020; Runco, 2014). It is nonetheless important to 
scientifically verify it (after all, the world, despite appearances, is not flat) as well as to assess 
and quantify the extent of its unpredictably. Returning to data from the EC training study, Figure 
8.1 below shows originality scores for individual children at the three test time points. The 
individuals, the context, the instruction, the setting, the task, even the time of day, the type of 
paper, the desk, the pencil, the testing team, all remained the same; the only deliberate difference 
was the stimulus – i.e., whether children were considering a plastic bottle, a pencil or a sock. 
Even taking a pessimistic view on alternate-form reliability (e.g., Barbot and colleagues (2016) 
suggest a range of .30 to .40; see also Barbot et al., 2019a; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019), the 
measures still appear chaotic, suggesting the contribution of multiple small, idiosyncratic, 
unmeasured (and possibly unmeasurable) effects to creative originality. This presents an 
enormous research challenge.  
It need not, however, mean it is hopeless to try and improve it. As we will see in the following 
sections, there is a considerable body of evidence which shows that originality can be improved 
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(Fasko, 2001; Michalko, 2001; Root-Bernstein & Root-Bernstein, 1999; Rose & Lin, 1984; 
Runco, 2014; Scott et al., 2004; Sowden et al., 2015b; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010b). By 
 
Fig. 8. 1 Originality shows a very high level of variability at different times. Pearson’s r between 
baseline and post: .07 (p=.367) and between post and follow up: .16 (p=.048), n=156. 
 
analogy, even the greatest professional golfer does not expect to achieve a hole in one on every 
hole, since there are so many variables which individually and minutely contribute to success. 
However, the odds of an amateur golfer making a hole in one are 12,500 to 1, while for a 
professional, the rate is 2,500 to 1 (US Hole in One website, 2020).  
Children appear able to report on their creative processes 
The qualitative methods used, being largely exploratory, were necessarily somewhat tentative. 
Although other studies have used some aspects of the current methods, such as stimulated recall 
(Järvelä & Volet, 2004; Lyle, 2003; Meier & Vogt, 2015; Morgan et al., 2007; Vandevelde et al., 
2015) and others have conducted similar research in adults (Gilhooly et al.,  2007; Pringle & 
Sowden, 2017a), this research was novel in using children’s verbal reports as probes to 
illuminate cognitive mechanisms. We will not restate the vigorous debate which still shrouds 
such approaches (Braboszcz, 2012; Fazelpour & Thompson, 2015; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
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Petitmengin, 2006; Petitmengin & Lachaux, 2013; Petitmengin et al., 2013) but will say that the 
experience of conducting such research and the creation of the ‘7Cs’ validity checklist, leave me 
with optimism about the potential of such approaches. If conducted with care and attention to 
detail in the nature and content of questions (as counselled by Petitmengin and colleagues; 
2013), these methods could be productively used in the future to document acts of everyday 
creativity. The importance of this would be allowing spontaneous aspects of creativity to be 
studied – and in real world environments (Amabile, 2017; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009; Runco, 
2014). As several researchers have pointed out, one of the most obdurate problems of 
researching creativity is catching people ‘in the act’ of creativity – and gaining insight into their 
mental processes as they are at it (Dietrich, 2015; Sowden et al., 2020). According to the 
editorial in the first issue of Neuroimage ever dedicated solely to creativity (Neuroimage, Special 
Issue on the Neuroscience of Creativity, 2021), it is particularly important in the early stages of a 
field to highlight “promising research directions toward stronger coalescence around methods 
and questions that have potential to catalyse basic understanding of how creativity occurs in the 
brain” (Saggar et al., 2021). Put simply, for a research area still in its embryonic stage, all 
potentially useful new tools should be generously considered.  
 
Methodological issues relevant for future research 
Flexibility could be key – but the construct needs clearer definition   
In Chapter 7, flexibility, as assessed by a scoring system which combined qualitative and 
quantitative components, was shown to relate positively to creativity, with the most flexible 
children performing the best in terms of both fluency and originality after training. Flexibility 
(also conceptualised as ‘balance’ processes) also emerged as one of the three key themes in the 
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first qualitative study in Chapter 3. For some children, the flexibility to shift thinking approach 
was deliberate (e.g., Betty, “I realise I’m concentrating too hard and… then I sit back and then I 
relax and then after [the idea] comes to me”). For some, it was related to the stage of the creative 
process (e.g., Roxy, “If I was thinking of a subject immediately like loads of ideas come to my 
mind so then I try and like ‘Caaaaalm down’ and just find one that really captures me”). For 
others, the balance seemed to shift spontaneously, with outcomes sometimes favouring an open 
spontaneous approach, and sometimes a more focused one (e.g., Lexy, “When my cat walked 
past I remembered and then I thought cheetah’s in the cat family so I wanted to draw that… [a 
few minutes later]…If I heard the beeping noise it would remind me of a car and I might start 
drawing a car on water…I didn’t do it [get distracted] because I reminded myself I was doing 
that”). 
These examples describe macro level shifts in thinking approach, as illustrated in our model of 
creativity in Figure 8.2, suggestive of the network level switching described by other researchers. 
In Gabora’s honing theory (Gabora, 2011, 2016; Scotney et al., 2020) creativity arises through 
the process of shifting between associative and analytic thought processes in response to task 
demands e.g., emphasising a shift “from an analytic to an associative type of thought when stuck 
in a rut and from an associative to an analytic process following insight” (Sowden et al., 2015a, 
p.46). Other creativity researchers have suggested that what is unique in the creative process is 
the unusual coupling between the default mode network and the central executive network, 
which normally work in opposition - that is, a stimulus-independent system has been yoked to 
attentional control. (Beaty et al., 2015, 2016; Chrysikou, 2019; Chrysikou et al., 2014; Vartanian 
et al., 2020). 
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There are still many open questions, for example concerning the mechanisms which might 
govern a change in coupling, whether it is spontaneous or under top-down control, the timescale, 
speed, and frequency of switches and much else (Barr et al., 2017; Basadur et al., 2000; 
Ivancovsky et al., 2018; Menon & Uddin, 2010; Pinho et al., 2016; Sowden et al., 2015a; 
Vartanian, 2009). 
 
Fig. 8. 2 Model highlighting flexibility as key component of the creative process, allowing the 
creative process to draw upon more controlled or more spontaneous processes  
 
In our studies, flexibility also appeared to operate at other levels. As well as the high level 
illustrated above, there were examples of flexibility at a low level, such as in seeing a shape in a 
new way or opening up ideas in a new category (e.g., Alex, “like in this picture I was about to 
rub out the roof but then… I thought that it would be cool if it was like this side was haunted and 
this side was like really cool like good” or Dave, “if I moved that piece around and I put it there 
that could be a leg and if I put four more it would be like the legs of an animal and that would 
make sense”). To what extent are these different ‘flexibilities’ the same thing? And when 
researchers argue that flexibility is beneficial to creativity (Filippetti & Krumm, 2020; Kennett et 
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al., 2018; Nijstad et al., 2010) what level of flexibility are they referring to? As Ionescu has 
pointed out, the concept of flexibility seems intuitive but has no single agreed definition and 
multiple operationalisations conflate externally driven and internally driven processes and many 
levels (Ionescu, 2012, 2017).  
These conceptual and practical problems with the construct of flexibility were well illustrated in 
our studies. Concerning the multiple levels at which flexibility operates, we saw the difficulty of 
comparing across different levels of description. For example, in Chapter 7, we calculated 
flexibility scores according to both a narrow definition of flexibility (e.g., category switching in 
ideation) and a broader one (e.g., description of different types of concentration). But are these in 
fact aspects of different skills? A second problem was a practical one concerning quantifying 
switching ability; there was only one explicit test for switching (i.e., the EC conceptualisation of 
flexibility) which used the Complex Flanker to cue children to switch between different rule sets. 
This type of switching flexibility differs from that described in the creativity context in being 
externally rather than internally cued, or ‘reactive’ rather than ‘spontaneous’, in Ionescu’s (2012, 
2017) vernacular. The bigger practical problem was that the test did not work, probably because 
there were too few trials to robustly measure the difference between switch and non-switch 
response times – so we were unable to assess whether this narrow, externally driven EC 
flexibility related to our broader internally driven creativity flexibility. This brings us to the third 
and biggest problem with the construct of flexibility – namely, that it is positioned as a central 
feature of both EC and creativity, the two constructs that we are seeking to relate.  
If we return to Diamond’s conceptualisation of EC presented in Chapter 1 (shown here in Fig. 
8.3) we see that she includes flexibility as part of the constellation of EC skills – and goes so far 
as to characterise it as ‘thinking outside the box’, a phrase normally preserved for creative 
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thinking. Clearly there is a problem here, an acute one when we are interested in the relationship 
between EC and creativity: we cannot use flexibility to simultaneously represent both constructs 
 
Fig. 8. 3 Diamond, 2013. Outline model of executive functions (EC), highlighting a definition of 
‘cognitive flexibility’ which includes ‘being able to think outside the box’, a description which 
overlaps with creativity 
 
(Benedek et al., 2014a). Sometimes, in trying to assess relationships between constructs, 
researchers employ tests which are so overlapping they only muddy the water further. Let us 
consider an illustration of the problem. Krumm and colleagues (2018), report on a study which 
attempts to elucidate the relationship between creativity, executive functions and ‘fluid’ and 
‘crystallised’ intelligence (also rather abstruse constructs). In doing so, they use three tests for 
the switching dimension of executive control. The first is a standard card sort task. The second is 
a ‘semantic fluency’ task which is often also used as a divergent thinking task (Friesen et al., 
2015) i.e., an important aspect of creativity. The third is the ‘five-point test’ (Regard et al., 
1982), a measure of visual fluency, whose features closely intersect with the sort of problem- 
solving tasks used to test convergent thinking (Danek et al., 2016), i.e., another, different aspect 
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of creativity. We can hardly expect to decipher relationships between constructs when the tasks 
being used to represent them are not separable (Dietrich, 2015). 
New approaches are needed to create order from this muddle, and if we believe that flexibility is 
important for creativity, we need to try - not least to understand a possibly fruitful means to 
improve creativity. One approach, counselled by Ionescu (2012), is to clearly distinguish 
between ‘reactive’ and ‘spontaneous’ flexibility, the former being top down, EC driven and the 
latter – the process of changing tack without needing to be told - more a feature of creativity and 
arising without planning. This separation is based on the important distinction between someone 
successfully reacting to a decreed rule change and their instinctively identifying the need to 
switch. Failure in each case looks very different: failure of ‘reactive flexibility’ is perseveration, 
i.e., sticking with an old rule when a new one should be observed. This sort of paralysis has been 
well documented, particularly in young children (Kirkham & Diamond, 2003; Morton & 
Munakata, 2002) – and is rightly seen as a negative. Failure of ‘spontaneous flexibility’ is 
different. It might in fact not be positioned as failure, but rather as stability (Ionescu, 2017): new 
avenues have not been explored, risks have not been taken, but less has been lost – there is a kind 
of safety, as opposed to simple failure. There might even be occasions in which the most 
adaptive strategy is to stick with the known, even at the cost of original thinking; it is why we 
must generally be given a push to think ‘outside the box’. Our usual focus is inside it. In the 
context of school and doing well on stable, standardised tests, perhaps this is often precisely 
what is required: to keep delivering the familiar. It seems possible that the children in our study, 
who with greater EC, produced a larger quantity of more predictable responses, were doing 
exactly that – producing more of the same, the expected. Simply, originality conflicts with 
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stability. And that is why flexibility emerged as a key factor in helping children move away from 
the stable, rehearsed, obvious responses, to produce something new.  
For a thorough cognitive account, we need to be more specific about what mechanisms might 
underpin this ‘instinctive’ need to change strategy (i.e., the kind of flexibility we are suggesting 
is key to creativity). Speculatively, there are two possible suggestions for what such an ‘instinct’ 
might comprise. The first is some kind of monitoring mechanism which compares current output 
against future goals (the sort of error detection often attributed to anterior cingulate cortex; 
Botvinick et al., 1999, 2004). A child observes their output and, weighed against some 
internalised metric, does not consider it creative enough and this triggers a change in behaviour 
or strategy which results in a more creative outcome. By way of illustration, Imagination 
Creation (a child from the first qualitative study) first said, “I was going to do broccoli…” 
(output is weighed, result deemed inadequate, strategy altered), then continued, “… but if I did 
corn that could turn into popcorn… so it’s kind of like a real shape shift”.  
The second would be more akin to the sort of reinforcement learning which evaluates trade-offs 
(in terms of rewards) between exploitation and exploration and which relies on interactions 
between the striatum and the PFC (Crone & Molen, 2004; Crone & Ridderinkhof, 2011; van den 
Bos et al., 2012). Exploitation maximises rewards from known approaches, but at the risk of 
missing out on other potentially greater rewards, while exploration is a riskier approach, giving 
up guaranteed rewards in favour of acquiring new knowledge. This involves exploring what else 
might be on offer – the rewards of novelty seeking outweighing the scant reward of being bored. 
The balance of exploitation to exploration could be conceived as a trait difference between 
children, or a state difference over time on task (as seen, for example, in the serial order effect, 
when fluency yields to originality – or in these terms, exploitation gradually shifts to 
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exploration). Kitty (another child from the first qualitative study) seems to be speaking from the 
perspective of someone who can regretfully see, post hoc, that they failed to shift from 
exploitation to exploration when, reviewing her finished picture, she said, “I could have changed 
the colour of the sea and the mountains the sun and the moon I could have changed the gas in the 
clouds… but I didn’t… I just wanted to draw a creative picture but I don’t think I did one so I 
think I’ve just done a normal picture.” Both monitoring and reinforcement learning would 
proffer mechanisms that, intuitively and neurobiologically, might crystallise the idea of 
flexibility as ‘instinctual’.  
Another approach to decongest the flexibility blockage is to get very specific about tests. For 
example, Kenett and colleagues (2018), defining flexibility as “the ability to create and use new 
mental categories and concepts to reorganise experience” (p. 867) have developed new 
computational models to test the rigour of semantic networks (see Figure 8.4 below). They point 
out that, to date, the role of flexibility in creativity has only been measured indirectly and instead 
propose a new measure based on how robust semantic memory networks are to attack, with the 
presumption that more flexibility will equate to greater robustness as individuals find alternative 
pathways.  
 
Fig. 8. 4 Kenett et al.’s illustration of the semantic networks of low (A) and high (B) semantic 
creatives, based on tests of semantic associates in 140 adult participants. Components are sized 
according to their number of nodes and numbered according to their disconnection order from 
the most highly connected component. More creative individuals, characterised by a greater 
number of associations of variable distance, have greater flexibility. 
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This concept of using stress-testing to distinguish more flexible from more rigid individuals, 
could be used in other, non-computational approaches which focus on dynamic or combined 
rather than static measures. For example, exploiting the well-established ‘be creative’ and ‘be 
fluent’ effects (Forthmann et al., 2016; Nusbaum et al., 2014), individuals could be asked to 
complete DT tests first with the instruction to ‘be creative’ and scoring only for originality, then 
with the instruction to ‘be fluent’ and scoring only for fluency. While the most flexible 
individuals might not perform the best on either test alone, they should be least impaired by the 
need to adapt approach, which would be shown in the smallest difference scores. Additional tests 
of regular EC switching (e.g., to include a card sort task) would aid disambiguation of flexibility 
types. 
Mixed methods are painful but necessary 
Some of the most important findings of this thesis came into focus only through the mixed 
methods lens. The evidence that children can arrive at identical scores in DT tests through 
applying very different approaches is a good example of the power of combining methods, as 
well as a rebuke to the power of DT tests alone ever to reveal mechanisms. Let us remember that 
the tests used to assess ‘creativity’ are those which have been the backbone of creativity research 
for the last 75 years (Guilford, 1966; Kim, 2006; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019; Torrance 1966, 
1972, 1974) and which, despite 75 matched years of criticism, retain dominance today. I am far 
from the first to critique them (Dietrich, 2015; Plucker et al., 2014; Plucker & Runco, 1998; 
Silvia et al., 2008; Simonton, 2003). However, I think the nature of my critique is new. These 
tests are purported to measure, most modestly, people’s ability to think divergently and, more 
commonly, their ability to actually be creative. But the evidence presented here demonstrates 
that individuals are engaging greatly differing processes when they are completing these tests. 
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This raises questions beyond practical considerations of scoring methods and reliability; rather, 
they bring into question what these tests are actually measuring. Certainly, the scores produced 
can tell us little or nothing about process. 
The combination of methods was also pivotal to the finding that flexibility might act as an 
important protective buffer in creativity, and, further, in characterising and specifying what 
flexibility actually comprises in the act of creating. These two examples illustrate an important 
and sometimes overlooked aspect of mixed methods: they are as useful for generating new 
research questions as for directly producing answers (Johnson et al., 2007).  
The need for mixed methods relates to a bigger, lingering problem of creativity research: that 
creativity is not a cognitive process, so much as an activity which involves the iterative use of 
multiple cognitive processes, as well as interaction with external objects and representational 
formats, over an extended period of time. This is very different from the bounded mechanisms 
operating over milliseconds which typically describe cognitive processes. Quantitative 
approaches measuring creative outputs necessarily compress this extended interactive multi-
mechanism activity into the rating of a single ‘creative product’. Qualitative approaches offer 
promise in informing the stages, the connections between them and the changing approaches to 
new iterations which comprise creative activity as a whole.  
Mixed methods undoubtedly present challenges. First and most simply, there is the extra work of 
gaining expertise in both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Second there is the 
daunting task of traversing an epistemological no-man’s land, with snipers on all sides, picking 
off weaknesses in validity, robustness, generalisability, and replicability on one side and 
shortcomings in richness, meaning, detail and depth on the other. Third, and for me most 
difficult of all, is the practical task of bringing data sets together. Here the difficulties are caused 
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by the fact that every triangulation exercise is unique, that numbers in qualitative studies will 
always be too small to offer a conventional level of statistical certainty and that the tools for 
testing validity and reliability are less well developed in what is still a new and evolving research 
paradigm (Hesse-Biber, 2015; Morgan, 2014; Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007). At the same time, 
it is almost impossible to think of a complex question which can be satisfactorily answered with 
only one tool. The level of our understanding of how creativity happens in the brain is still 
rudimentary; such a stage of excavation demands an assorted toolkit. 
The issue is particularly acute for the cognitive psychology of creativity. While social 
psychology has successfully evolved from studying creativity primarily through documenting 
eminence (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009; Simonton, 2010a) to 
understanding the traits and tendencies (e.g., tolerance of ambiguity, openness to experience) 
which facilitate everyday creativity in ‘normal people’ (Amabile & Pillemer, 2012; Feist, 2010; 
Hornberg & Reiter-Palmon, 2017; Martindale, 1989), cognitive psychology has not. With a few 
exceptions (e.g., Cotter & Silvia’s use of experience sampling; Cotter & Silvia, 2019; Silvia et 
al., 2017), it has not developed precision tools for assessing everyday creativity. The upshot is 
large gaps in our understanding of what goes on in people’s minds as they are creating, gaps that 
are even greater when it comes to children. From a developmental perspective, there is a 
profound, ongoing question about whether children become less creative with age – or whether 
the child’s part-formed concepts and categories make them appear more creative to adults, whose 
concepts – and their creative re-imaginings - are more calcified. There is scope to build novel 
research programmes from the ground up, for example, using verbal reports to generate new 
theories, which can be tested using specific and targeted quantitative experimental techniques 
(Abraham & Windmann, 2007; Dörfler & Stierand, 2020; Sowden et al., 2020). 
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Given we are ultimately interested in creativity in education, there is a pressing need for 
interdisciplinary approaches. “Educational outcomes need to be thought of in terms of the nested 
constraints that encompass the individual, classroom, school, family and society” (Thomas & 
Ansari, 2020, p. 5) – and we will need to get better at combining multiple, diverse tools to gain 
traction on multi-layered questions. The importance of “embracing complexity and giving voice 
through research methods and methodologies” (Meyer & Schutz, 2020, p.196) has rarely been 
more apparent. 
Constructs of EC and creativity 
This thesis has raised issues regarding the nature of the constructs under investigation and the 
difficulty of comparing findings from different levels of description. We have already discussed 
this in some detail with regard to flexibility. But the complexity and confusion there is not 
unique. Which version of control is the more revealing of the underlying process - a child’s 
performance on a computerised Flanker test or their saying they are ‘100% focused’? This is 
both an epistemological question for mixed methods / interdisciplinary research and a question 
regarding the nature and measurement of cognitive constructs.  
In terms of specific findings, there are some useful illustrations. First, there were no significant 
correlations between EC as measured in lab tests and EC as described qualitatively. This casts 
doubt on either or both the ecological validity of lab tests of EC and / or the generalisability of 
qualitative assessments. In turn this casts doubt on the sufficiency of even multiple measures to 
meaningfully represent the complex construct of EC.  
There was no formal evaluation of the creative products made by children outside the lab in more 
real-world conditions. This means we cannot statistically compare creativity in the lab with real 
world creativity in a similar way to EC. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to conjecture that a 
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similar shortcoming - a lack of coherence across different description levels and / or a lack of 
construct validity - is likely also a problem for creativity. Baer (2011a, 2011b) and others 
(Barbot et al., 2019a, 2019b; Silvia et al., 2008) have suggested that validity (predictive and 
discriminant) is a major problem in the study of creativity. By way of illustration, we can 
consider the examples in Fig. 8.5 below, which shows drawings made by two of the children in 
the naturalistic qualitative study. These were not formally assessed, but I think most would agree 
that the picture on the left is the more creative. Yet the child who did the picture on the left 
scored well below the mean in the AUT measures while the one on the right scored well above it. 
This is an anecdotal rather than a statistical report, but one that further suggests a lack of direct 
mapping from real world to lab creativity measures.  
  
Fig. 8. 5 Examples of drawings by children with AUT fluency scores below the mean (left) and 
above the mean (right) 
 
What gives? Ecological validity or statistical confidence?  
Deciphering and measuring the differences between lab creativity and real-world creativity 
presents a pressing and difficult problem for psychology and neuroscience, one that is 
compounded by the many specific difficulties of studying creativity, such as time, repeatability, 
spontaneity, space, and movement (Abraham, 2018). For example, while many argue that 
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creativity can happen in ways that are either deliberate or spontaneous (Dietrich, 2004) “it is 
clear that when we assess creativity under lab conditions, we are mainly assessing deliberate 
forms of creativity” (Abrahams, 2018, p.48). Several have argued for greater transparency and 
clarity in specifying and designing measurements in order to advance the field of creativity, since 
“we cannot assume that measures of creativity are interchangeable” (Reiter-Palmon & 
Schoenbeck, 2020, p. 290). A major challenge is presented by the fact that there are many 
different creative approaches. As we saw in Chapter 4 and as illustrated in Figure 8.6, the same 
scores can be achieved by different children operating with very different levels of EC 
involvement.  
 
Fig. 8. 6 Illustration of difference between creative process and creative product. All four 
children had the same score for AUT originality 
 
When we put people in the MRI scanner and ask them to produce creative work, what in their 
brains might we actually be looking at? Are we looking at an individual who is doing creativity 
with a high level of EC (e.g., Panda, “My concentration was pretty full on because it was quite 
hard and I found it a bit difficult so my concentration was 100%”)? Or one with low EC 
deployment (e.g., Parrot, “Relaxed and calm and my mind would be so relaxed… Like it didn’t 
have to work very hard”)? Or are we looking at an individual who is using EC differently at 
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different times within the task, or when completing trial 2 vs. trial 1, or with changing stimuli 
(e.g., Medea, “I just probably I stop for a sec for a few seconds and then I just go back and then 
it’s just different concentration yeah… it’s a bit weird cos my brain just changes it all by itself”)? 
If we then consider findings based on compressing all those measures into means, how realistic 
is it to think that they are telling us anything very meaningful, never mind specific or well-
defined, about the brain processes of creativity? Dietrich is not one to moderate his critique 
(Dietrich, 2007a, 2015, 2019; Dietrich & Heider, 2017), “All current psychometric tests used to 
look for creativity in the brain are based on divisions – divergent thinking, defocused attention… 
that 1) are false category formations given their exact opposites – convergent thinking, focused 
attention – also precipitate creative ideas and 2) result in constructs that still consist of many 
separate mental processes that are distributed in the brain. For neuroimaging studies, the 
combination of both theoretical problems…makes defeat certain” (Dietrich & Haider, 2017, p.1). 
Yet there remains much to be discovered. “It seems that the time has now come to start from 
scratch in thinking about how to study creativity if the goal is to relate it to brain function” 
(Abraham & Windmann, 2007, p. 46). Perhaps a rigorous and bounded interdisciplinary 
approach could provide a good starting point.  
 
Putting findings in context: Improving creativity as a key 21st century skill 
“Creativity is now considered good for economies, good for society, good for communities and 
good for education” (Burnard & White, 2008, p. 669). In the UK, there have been several 
attempts to give more attention to creativity in the educational curriculum (Wyse & Ferrari, 
2015) and fathoming and promoting creativity has also become an international project (Patston 
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et al., 2021; Sun et al., 2021). In this section, we will look at the bigger picture of creativity – in 
schools and in society. We will first address the purported ‘creativity crisis’ (Barbot & Said-
Metwaly, 2020; Kim, 2010, 2021; Runco, 2015), before considering issues faced by teachers and 
schools seeking to promote creativity, including possible conflicts with performativity and, by 
association, EC. 
Is there a creativity crisis? 
In 2011, Kim published a paper entitled ‘The Creativity Crisis: The Decrease in Creative 
Thinking Scores on the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking’. The paper involved an analysis of 
Torrance tests completed by 272,599 Americans from 1966 to 2008 to calculate norm scores. It 
looked at changes in creativity over time and changes with age, from kindergarten to adulthood. 
Among its many downbeat findings was that since 1990, while IQ scores had steadily increased 
(as described by the Flynn effect; Flynn, 1984), creativity scores had significantly decreased, 
with the greatest declines in youngest children (kindergarten to third grade). The pre-print 
research made the front cover of Newsweek ‘The creativity crisis’ (2010) with the by-line “For 
the first time, research shows that American creativity is declining - What went wrong—and how 
we can fix it” (Bronson & Merryman, 2010); and the related article suggested that “it's left to the 
luck of the draw who becomes creative: there's no concerted effort to nurture the creativity of all 
children.”  
The idea that creativity is in crisis, at least in the West, has since become widely accepted in the 
creativity and education literature (Barbot et al., 2020), with many researchers weighing in with 
their particular take – e.g., Runco (2015) has suggested that a creativity crisis is being caused by 
mal effects of technology, particularly social media, in stifling creative potential. According to 
Barbot and colleagues, all this angst is unjustified, since the basis of it - Kim’s research - is 
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“grounded on problematic empirical decisions, statistical approaches, data representation, and 
interpretation of findings”. Their own analysis of the Torrance norm sets, adopting more robust 
statistical approaches and adding another slew of data from the latest 2017 norming battery, 
leads them to conclude there is “no evidence for the notion of a generational decline of 
creativity, and even less so, for a ‘creativity crisis’ and that the very suggestion of it “represents a 
counter-productive societal and scientific myth” (Barbot et al., 2020, p.1).  
The most interesting aspect of this ongoing debate is the apparently ready appetite for the idea of 
a crisis in creativity. Similar concerns (that younger generations are somehow poor imitations of 
older ones) are also sometimes expressed with regard to literacy, numeracy, and intelligence, in 
defiance of the actual facts (OECD, 2016). According to some researchers, the tendency to 
denigrate younger generations is caused by two things: the first, a memory bias which projects 
one’s current self on to one’s past, and the second, a tendency to notice limitations in others in 
areas in which oneself excels - intelligent people are more likely to perceive a decline in 
intelligence (Protzko & Schooler, 2019). But perhaps there is also something creativity specific 
here. Many creativity myths persist (Cropley, 2016) and underlying many of them is the 
persistent idea that creativity is somehow magical, indefinable, mysterious, fragile, and remote. 
If something is fragile, it is logical to believe it might get easily broken – to be in crisis. In the 
following sections, as we consider factors which might improve or impede creativity in 
classrooms, it will be important to shed some of these myths. To understand and improve 
creativity, a necessary first step is to take it off its pedestal.  
21st century education 
The OECD has identified creativity, alongside critical thinking, communication, and 
collaboration, as one of the core competencies of the 21st century (Schleicher, 2011, 2012, 
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2018). Advocates of the 21st century skills agenda believe that creativity is an essential 
component of what will help students thrive in today’s world (Rich, 2010). The set of skills and 
abilities comprising EC are increasingly also seen as critical for successful life outcomes 
(Diamond, 2012, 2013). A large and growing body of evidence supports their positive effect on 
everything from school achievement (Gathercole, 2004b) to physical and mental health 
(Crescioni et al., 2011; Diamond, 2013), job success (Bailey, 2007) and quality of life (Brown & 
Landgraf, 2010). Given these dual targets of creativity and EC, we need to consider whether we 
can have the best of both. The findings from the training intervention in Chapter 5 show that both 
EC and creativity are changeable over time, though not for the better in terms of creative 
originality. The mixed results raise questions about how to boost both EC and creativity if they 
do not necessarily flourish in parallel.  
Cognitive regulation, essentially synonymous with EC (Munakata et al., 2011) has been shown 
to play a critical role in learning and educational attainment (Modrek & Kuhn, 2017). Both 
cognitive and behavioural regulation  have been proposed as fundamental to learning as, in the 
context of school and to put it simply, in order to learn one must first sit, listen and pay attention 
(Corno & Mandinach, 1983; Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Modrek & Kuhn, 2017; 
Zimmerman, 2000). The idea of a tension between the skills of learning to pass prescribed tests 
and creativity is not new. Half a century ago, Torrance drew attention to the fact that “Children 
are so accustomed to the one correct or best answer that they may be reluctant to think of other 
possibilities or to build up a pool of ideas to be evaluated later” (Torrance, 1970, quoted in 
Lambert, 2017, p. 1). Other researchers have described the tensions that exist “between 
evidencing subject knowledge and promoting flexible and creative learning” (Kyritsi & Davis, 
2020, p.11). And others suggest that “as schools place greater emphasis on learning material and 
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taking tests… opportunities for thoughts to flow freely are fewer now than in the past” (Tan, 
2015, p.162). Some go so far as to make a causal link between the advent of universal 
standardised tests in education and declines in creative thinking, advising that, if we wish to 
sustain creativity, “Standardization should be resisted” (Kim, 2011, p. 294). 
Others take a more circumspect view. The recent Durham commission (2019) on creativity 
and education stressed an urgent need for more creativity and cited the strong evidence that it 
can be improved, while also saying “There need be no conflict between knowledge and 
creativity in our education system. Indeed, the opposite is the case – creativity is founded on 
deep understanding” (James et al., 2019). From a constructivist point of view, one shared by 
creativity and educational psychology, the idea that knowledge is created rather than 
transmitted, also suggests potential synergy (Plucker et al., 2004). But it is nonetheless a 
persistent finding that even teachers enthusiastic about the project to improve creativity 
struggle to promote it in classrooms, and a widely held explanation is that doing so conflicts 
with predictable, test-based performance measures. A recent international study looked at 
implementation of creativity in curricula in 12 countries (Patston et al., 2021) and concluded 
that “the journey from openly acknowledging the importance of creativity to systematically and 
purposefully supporting its promotion in the classroom is a long one… despite widespread 
interest and a productive field of research in creativity, our examination reveals little support for 
teachers to turn policy into practice.”  
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How to improve creativity 
There are essentially three approaches to improving creativity: promoting and supporting factors 
that help creativity thrive; reducing the influence of factors which impede it; and training it 
directly. We will deal briefly with each. 
Supporting areas where creativity thrives 
It is important to recognise that creative thinking applies to all curriculum areas and not just to 
the arts (James et al., 2019). One need only look to recent Covid-19 vaccine development 
programmes for examples of extraordinary scientific creativity (e.g., applying computational 
language models based on natural language processing to the syntax of protein formation in 
mutated viruses; Creative Biolabs, 2021). Nonetheless, it is also true that some subjects are more 
enabling of creativity (Boden, 2010). Elton Van Gogh, aged 10, was one of the most highly 
controlled children in the Chapter 6 qualitative study, critically self-editing more potential 
responses than any other child. But there was one context in which he permitted himself greater 
rule flexibility: in artistic ideas. He said “I think art's a less strict kind of… like area. It's like… 
with art you can really do what you want, you can do loads of different things so that's why I 
think that's why I was less strict.” In other words, art was the one place where he allowed himself 
more freedom to explore and experiment. For him, as for others, art provided what might be 
described as a creativity ‘enabling environment’ (Kyritsi & Davis, 2020).  
Creative professionals echo this view. Tristram Hunt, Director of the V&A Gallery in London, 
describes the fall in the number of schoolchildren with access to art subjects as leading to “a 
perfect storm of a collapse in creativity… In the face of the fourth industrial revolution, in the 
face of the digital revolution, when we need more creativity and innovation within our education 
system, we are systematically stripping it out” (Brown, 2018). Charles Limb, neuroscientist, jazz 
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musician and surgeon agrees: “The most important thing we could do is to get the arts in schools 
and not view it as optional … because it takes away one of the best options for people to learn 
how to develop their creative minds” (Warr et al., 2018). Creativity is not all to do with the arts, 
but their encouragement for exploration, experiment and releasing strictures gives them many 
key ingredients to help students practice creative thinking.  
Not promoting things which impede it. Creativity vs performativity 
Picasso claimed that “The chief enemy of creativity is good sense”. No wonder there are 
“psychological hurdles that must be overcome when encouraging creativity in the classroom” 
(Plucker & Makel, 2010, p.48), since teachers, students and schools are daily judged on ‘good 
sense’ measures of performance. Many argue that there is inherent tension between creativity 
policies and policies that produce performance targets and league tables, and that this conflict 
“finds some practitioners frozen, as if blinded by headlights, unsure whether the changed values 
of empowerment, agency, engagement and generativity are real or imagined.” (Craft & Jeffrey, 
2008, p. 579).  
Teachers and students alike need to be supported to promote creativity, since creativity involves, 
by definition, stepping into new, unknown, original territory and deviating from the norm 
(Beghetto, 2005; Kim, 2021). Teachers need encouragement and help to work outside 
predictable safe spheres and to take risks (Burnard & White, 2008; Kim, 2021) – and they need 
to reward students for doing the same. This might mean altering some well-established practices. 
For example, currently when teachers give praise for perfect test scores, they “may inadvertently 
advocate that children 'play it safe' when they give assignments without choices and allow only 
particular answers to questions” (Sternberg, 2003, p. 115). To redress the balance, teachers need 
to not just encourage risk-taking, but to reward it (Craft, 2005, 2006). In an environment in 
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which performance measures are heavily emphasised, parents might also need encouragement 
and convincing of the importance of creativity (Troman et al., 2007). Regarding EC, perhaps the 
minds of our students need a similar extra push away from school habits of predictability, goal-
orientation, obedience, stability, and focus. 
Baer and Garrett (2010) argue that while teaching for creativity in an era of performance 
accountability can be challenging, these dual goals need not be conflicting, since creative 
thinking “requires significant content knowledge, and thinking creatively about a topic helps 
deepen one’s knowledge of that topic” (p. 6). Moreover, there are many skills relevant to 
creativity – divergent thinking for example, which can be used both to bolster creativity and to 
improve subject knowledge. But it needs highly skilled, confident, trained teachers to navigate 
these paths (Kyritsi, 2018; Kyritsi & Davis, 2020; Troman et al., 2007). In a qualitative study 
involving in-depth interviews with teachers about negotiating the twin peaks of performance and 
creativity in a Scottish primary school, one said, “I think there’s lots of strengths in the national 
curriculum. I’m not totally against it, but I think the rigidity that came in was detrimental to 
creative teaching” (Troman et al., 2007, p.559). Creativity, as we have seen in numerous ways 
throughout this thesis, requires flexibility.   
Training creativity means first taking it off its pedestal 
Harriet, one of the children interviewed in Chapter 3, described the technique she used to ensure 
her picture was interesting and original, “I wanted it to be strange colours so I made sure I didn’t 
do the leaves green and things like that, so sometimes I was just like taking the nearest pen to me 
or a random pen to make it look like an unusual colour, or I was taking them in an order and just 
colouring them in different places so that it didn’t so that, if both trunks were brown and both 
leaves were green then I think it would probably quite boring.” She had essentially created a 
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colour-randomising algorithm to make the familiar elements in her picture less familiar, because 
she knew that unusual, even weird things, were creatively prized. Was that ‘cheating’? Would a 
naïve viewer, seeing the blue trunk of her tree, feel somehow duped to discover that it wasn’t 
coloured blue to reflect melancholy or to blend with the sky in a statement about eternity – but 
just because she had picked a ‘random’, ‘unusual’ colour, which might equally have been yellow 
or red? Similar questions regarding meaning or intent arise with actual algorithms, and the 
debate about creativity by artificial intelligence (AI) – or Boden’s (2004) ‘unromantic artists.’ 
Many are doubtful as to whether, even if an AI were to create work which would be judged a 
masterpiece if made by a human, it could ever be taken seriously (Boden, 1996; Colton, 2012). 
At the heart of creativity is the notion of value. And value is unavoidably subjective - debates 
about the meaning of a creative product to its judge are baked in (Abraham & Windmann, 2007; 
Hills & Bird, 2018). Perhaps we, as judges, serve to impede progress in training and developing 
creativity because we do not want to see behind the screen and witness the trick revealed. We 
want, as judges of creative products, to impute magical meaning, to be entranced. But if we are 
serious about improving creativity, we need to let go this sentiment. Simon Colton, a 
computational creativity researcher and creator of AI creative The painting fool, says, “Creativity 
is not some mystical gift that is beyond scientific study but rather something that can be 
investigated, simulated, and harnessed for the good of society” (Colton et al., 2009, p. 12). If we 
view the instinctive, mystical components of creativity, as arising not by ‘magic’ but from non-
cortical brain structures, it is quite possible to demystify creativity without comprising its 
sometimes-instinctive origins.  
There is a considerable body of evidence which supports the idea that creativity can be trained 
(Gregory et al., 2013; Runco, 2014; Scott et al., 2004; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010b). It is beyond 
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our scope to fully expand on it, but the range of evidenced approaches includes tactical training 
(e.g., using tools such as SCAMPER (Michalko, 1991): Substitute. Combine. Adapt. Magnify. 
(re)Purpose. Eliminate. Reverse), the use of analogies (Root-Bernstein & Root-Bernstein, 1999), 
focusing on problem finding (Runco, 2014), training in divergent thinking (Fasko, 2001) and a 
range of artistic, kinaesthetic, dramatic, and multiple-component programmes (Rose & Lin, 
1984; Scott et al., 2004), some of which emphasise the spontaneous nature of creativity by 
creating environments which ‘let it happen’ (Runco, 2014). A thorough quantitative review of 
creativity training interventions decisively concluded that training is effective, with large overall 
effect sizes as well as sizable effects in components including divergent thinking and problem 
solving (Scott et al., 2004). So, what is standing in the way of doing it? As well as the barriers 
discussed (such as the conflict with performativity and perhaps a wish to preserve the magic), 
perhaps the biggest obstacle is the persistent scepticism about whether improving creativity is 
possible (Bereczki & Kárpáti, 2017). Training it means tackling myths, such as creativity being 
the preserve of the few, that it is born not made, and that it is unyieldingly chaotic and disorderly 
(Boden, 2004; Cropley, 2016). It is none of these. Using well-established techniques to improve 
it is as likely to reap rewards as going to the gym is to plump your six-pack. True, “not everyone 
will be an outstanding weight-lifter, but everyone can build muscle” (Runco, 2014, p.386). Or, as 
the renowned author, John Steinbeck, put it, “Ideas are like rabbits. You get a couple and learn 
how to handle them, and pretty soon you have a dozen.”  
We know from years of educational, psychological, and neuroscientific research that children get 
better at what they practice. And the child “does not passively absorb information, but through 
manipulating the environment, selects the experiences from which to learn” (Dumontheil & 
Mareschal, 2020, p.44). At the most basic level, are the simplest tools and experiences which 
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could improve creativity being used in schools? Children in regular classrooms should be asked 
open-ended questions as opposed to those with a single right answer and encouraged to produce 
as many answers as possible. They should be prompted to develop early ideas, considering 
implications and implementation. They could be encouraged to experiment with what happens 
when they let their mind wander, prompted sometimes to say the first thing in their head, without 
editing. They should be urged to listen to novel sounds, try new smells, look to surprising places 
as sources for new ideas, given unrelated ideas and tasked with finding a connection. They 
should be allowed, in a psychologically safe environment, to fail. Moreover, they should be 
explicitly taught that creativity can be improved, that they can learn how to get better, just as 
they can with sums or spelling (Gregory et al., 2013; Scott et al., 2004). Our educational 
strategies, in actively and consistently encouraging order, stability and conventionality are 
almost entirely focused on the control side of the balance. We need to make efforts to redress the 
imbalance.  
Limitations and future directions 
How can science possibly hope to explain the ‘fundamental novelties’ of creativity? (Boden, 
2004)? The challenge is enormous, and it is reasonable to question whether our current tools are 
up to the task. We have already said a good deal in this thesis about the limitations of many of 
the most popular tests for ‘creativity’ (in particular, the DT tests so often used as a stand in for 
creativity) and the many efforts to refine and improve them (see Chapters 1, 2 and 5; Baer, 2011; 
Dietrich, 2015; Forthmann et al., 2018b, 2020; Lubart & Besancon, 2017; Plucker et al., 2004, 
2011, 2014; Puryear & Lamb, 2020; Runco, 2008; Silvia et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the 
gravitational pull of these tests makes them hard to resist, particularly for neophyte researchers. 
DT tests seem to have got stuck in a logical black hole in which researchers continue to use 
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them, despite multiple problems, chiefly because everyone else does. Ideally, the long term will 
see the development and uptake of new, better, more reliable tests whose cognitive targets are 
more precisely defined (Dietrich & Haider, 2017). In the interim, one path to progress might 
involve using DT tests in more targeted ways, e.g., task instruction could be productively 
manipulated (Acar et al., 2020; Forthmann et al., 2016) to differentiate fluency from originality 
(and, indirectly, different cognitive approaches) and they could be used as the basis for verbal 
protocols (possibly in conjunction with manipulated task instructions) to understand process 
(Gilhooly et al., 2007). In the empirical work here, we have witnessed a fair degree of change in 
creativity, through a range of approaches including the use of DT tests but many limitations of 
these tests remain. In this thesis, the issues concerning originality scoring have been particularly 
problematic, something others have pointed out, in referring to an inappropriate quantity of 
‘researcher degrees of freedom’ on scoring methods (Barbot et al., 2019a), particularly with 
regard to originality (Reiter-Palmon et al., 2019). These issues inevitably limit the confidence 
and generalisability of findings. 
Much has also been said about the use of verbal protocols as a tool to probe cognitive 
mechanisms (see Chapter 3; Fazelpour & Thompson, 2015; Johansson et al., 2005; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Petitmengin, 2011; Petitmengin et al., 2013; Shear & Varela, 1999). I have 
attempted to justify their use and to maximise the validity of data obtained from them. 
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge some important conceptual and practical limitations 
of these methods. For example, how to answer a charge that children might be confabulating?  
Although some aspects of their account can be checked against external and other internal clues 
(for example, video evidence supporting statements about the order in which events occurred), 
when it comes down to the fine detail, it is almost impossible. It is particularly so for aspects 
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which, even with a truth serum, would be very difficult to decipher. Take Medea’s account of the 
origin of her idea to use a massive paperclip as a surfboard: at first she said, “I have no idea 
where that came from,” then, on further reflection, added, “Cos I think I looked at this [the 
curved end] and cos it's quite similar to a surfboard and you could stand on that and just go 
weeee,” and then, after still more reflection, said, “I think I just know now cos a chain [her 
previous response] cos I was thinking of a chain ferry in the water…yes I was thinking to do 
stuff with water like chains and anchors that's probably where that came from.” The problem 
here is that her responses could be at once veridical and confabulated – and it is not possible for 
the researcher to distinguish imagined from real memories. While best efforts were made, first to 
improve validity, and second, not to focus unduly on single responses but rather overall patterns, 
these profound questions remain. 
Looking to the future, new methodologies which put the ‘self, back into self-report’ are 
beginning to gain traction. For example, Cotter and Silvia report, in a recent special issue on 
creativity methodology (Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 2019) on their use of 
‘experience sampling’ to gain insight into real-world creativity. The idea is to assess people’s 
creativity in their natural environment, through prompting them at random intervals, typically 
over long periods, to record responses to particular thought probes. They suggest that these sort 
of techniques, as useful accompaniments to lab-based approaches, particularly allow fleeting and 
spontaneous aspects of creativity to be captured. The issue’s editors also note that “Self-report 
methodology has received surprisingly positive praise in this special issue,” perhaps a sign that 
creativity research methods are getting more diverse – and more creative (Barbot et al., 2019a). 
As the use of real-world and qualitative tools becomes more established, the field of creativity 
researchers will face the challenge of how to unite findings from these approaches with more 
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traditional quantitative, lab-based results. Again, the challenge of bringing mixed methods 
together has been (intensely!) experienced in this thesis (see Chapters 4 and 7), with sincere 
efforts to candidly explain the choices made. It nonetheless needs to be acknowledged that other 
choices were possible, a statement which raises questions about the nature of the knowledge 
itself. “Scientific knowledge is a social, creative, tentative human product that involves many 
different methodologies none of which relies on an automatic processing of data” (Gasparatou, 
2017, p.6). Advancing the sort of interdisciplinary approaches advocated here will require the 
sort of epistemological flexibility which will not be to everyone’s taste.  
A final set of limitations relates to development. I find myself still haunted by a picture created 
in the first study by a child of 4, the youngest in the sample. Presented with Torrance’s egg-
shaped stimulus shape (Fig. 8.6, left), most children draw some sort of figure - a person, an 
animal, an alien, a chicken, with more unusual responses being a flower or perhaps a celestial 
body. What happens in the brain of a child who produces the drawing in Fig. 8.7 (right), entitled, 
‘Somebody put a rock in the bathroom and now we can’t get to the toilet’? 
  
Fig. 8. 7 Torrance stimulus shape (left) and (right) the drawn response of a 4-year-old child 
(annotations dictated by child, written by researcher) 
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Is this just a hole in one, the apparently magical moment when, pushed by the desire of the 
imagination to be embodied (Vygotsky, 1930), originality strikes gold? Or are there particular 
clues in the fact that this child was so young? Is creativity somehow easier for the young, with 
partially formed concepts? Is there something serious to consider in the idea, attributed to 
Picasso, that “Every child is an artist. The problem is how to remain an artist once he grows up” 
i.e., the view that imagination gradually surrenders to reason and intellect, and that emotion gives 
way to knowledge? If so, is this linked to the development of EC, the scaffold on which reason is 
built? In this thesis, which has only studied children, a limitation has been that we have related 
findings primarily to adult models, with the assumption that the same processes are at play. In 
doing so, perhaps there has been insufficient consideration of the possibility that there is 




Anna Burns, winner of the Man Booker Prize for her novel Milkman, said of it, “The point is, I 
can’t intend anything in my writing, or demand anything of my writing. I have no idea what is 
going to come” (quoted in the Guardian, 2018). Joan Miró, renowned Spanish painter similarly 
claimed, “When I stand in front of a canvas, I never know what I’m going to do – and nobody is 
more surprised than I at what comes out” (Fundació Joan Miró website). Alexander Fleming, 
physician, microbiologist and inventor of penicillin, described how “One sometimes finds what 
one is not looking for. When I woke up just after dawn on Sept. 28, 1928, I certainly didn’t plan 
to revolutionise all medicine by discovering the world’s first antibiotic.” 
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These stories of creativity attest to its most surprising and spontaneous aspects – those that 
enable the magic, the thrill of the hole in one. They are an important and exciting part of the 
story. Yet any of those creators might also have spoken of the graft, the never-ending 
experimentation and failure cycle, the tenacity, the discipline, the focus needed to turn their 
magical sparks into magnificent blazes. Ferran Adrià, creator of Spain’s elBulli restaurant and 
often described as the world’s greatest chef, conjures these other aspects when he says, “Our 
work is systematic: you have to be very organised to achieve a sense of anarchism… Last year 
we ran 4,000 tests and only about 300 of them panned out…The important thing is to have lots 
of ideas simmering” (Hoffman, 2009). And the artist Louise Bourgeois (quoted in Intimate 
Geometries, Storr, 2016) captures both aspects when she says, “The realistic drawings are a way 
of pinning down an idea. I don’t want to loose it. With the abstract drawings, when I’m feeling 
loose, I can slip into the unconscious.”  
Through this thesis, we have seen this duality play out in the contribution that EC makes to 
creativity. Its effects can be positive - both broadly, in keeping children on track and on task, and 
narrowly, through juggling multiple ideas and ruling out those which don’t make the grade. They 
can also be negative, denying the ‘letting go’ sometimes needed to find remote and unusual ideas 
and add surprise. In the context of schooling, and education systems which focus on 
performance, good behaviour and standardisation, this sort of ‘letting go’ might not only be hard 
to achieve, but even counterproductive, in view of the designated goals. While there is 
considerable emphasis on training EC-relevant skills in schools, there is no equivalent 
prominence given to training spontaneous thought processes. Some might even deem the notion 
of ‘training spontaneity’ oxymoronic. But it is not. And not only is it possible, it is vital, if we 
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Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking: Figural tests 
FIGURAL ACTIVITY 1 
 
On the page I’m going to give you is a shape. Think of a picture or an object which you can draw 
with this shape as a part of it. 
Try to think of a picture that no one else will think of. Keep adding new ideas to your first idea to 
make it tell as interesting and exciting a story as you can. 
When you have finished your picture, think up a name or title for it and write it at the bottom of 
the page – or I can write it for you. Make your title as clever and unusual as you can and use the 
title to help your picture tell a story. 
You will have 5 minutes to do your picture. 















FIGURAL ACTIVITY 2 
 
I’m going to give you a piece of paper with lots of unfinished shapes on it. By adding lines to 
these shapes, you can draw some interesting objects or pictures. Try to think of pictures that no 
one else will think of. Also try to make your picture tell as complete and interesting a story as 
you can, by adding to and building on your first idea. Make up an interesting title for each 
picture and write it at the bottom of each one – or I can write it for you. 







FIGURAL ACTIVITY 3 
 
I’m going to give you a piece of paper with lots of pairs of straight lines on it. By adding to these 
lines, you can draw some interesting objects or pictures. The pair of lines should be the main part 
of whatever picture you make but you can draw between the lines, on the lines and outside the 
lines – whatever you want to do your picture. Try to think of pictures that no one else will think 
of. Make as many different pictures as you can and put as many ideas as you can into each one. 
Make up an interesting title for each picture and write it at the bottom of each one – or I can 
write it for you. 
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Example creative works. 
Imagination Creation story transcript.  ‘A new species’ 
[pictures chosen: teepee, (monkey), dragon, candle] 
One day there was a mad scientist and he was he was trying to do experiment to duplicate, 
duplicate objects and things like that and so he had need a lot of emotions and he also needed 
heat. And then he was in his um one day he was in his um peetee? teepee working out what, how 
it might work and then he but he I think he put something or he he pressed the wrong button and 
then a teleporting wall appeared and then a dragon flew out with a speed and it knocked him out. 
And then and then he the dragon wandered around in the jungle and then monkeys came and 
pressed the button that duplicated bananas, and then bananas started falling like rain. And then 
they turned into corn because it was a very hot day and they wanted to watch a movie but there 
was no popcorn and then their… seeds? – what are they called the popcorn things? Corn? I think 
it was corn, yeah and it was very very hot so they baked them and the corn into popcorn and 
there was chaos, everyone was fighting around for popcorn and then it was movie time and then 
the scientist woke up and he made everything all right. So he put the dragon back into there and 
then he told the monkeys not to do that again, he also watched the movie though so he was a bit 
naughty and then he put everything right and then he knew how to duplicate things and 
everything came out well. But there was still one animal seeking round from the teleporter. It 
was a… it was a… because when the monkey hit a button it hit it didn’t only hit a button, hit a 
banana it also hit a snake and a chameleon and a lion and they combined and that was but it was 




[Int. The end?] 
Yeah there was a new species 
[Int. Is that really the end. Can’t we hear what happened then?] 
Next chapter. Next year erm, next year hmm, there’s now, there was completely a new species, it 
is – no, what do you say lots and lots of years later? 
[Int. decades later? Centuries later?... Millennia?] 
Millennium later, millenniums it’s like lots of years later and now the species has grown and 
now there’s not no more animals animals that are now, there are different animals: kangaroo 
monkeys, hmm let’s see, fish, fish, fish jellyfish, erm, camel sharks and yeah. And then 
something went wrong in their mind and they started helping mere humans. No no not nothing 
wrong with their mind but something changed in their minds and they kind of helped humans 
and so yeah they helped build spaceships things like that and kind of like the animals the nature 































Core questions for interview 
What did you first think when I told you what you were going to do? 
Did you understand what you had to do? (follow up) 
How did you feel about what you would have to do? 
What were your thoughts when you first saw the pictures/words? (encourage to talk precisely 
through each stimulus in turn, reasons for rejection / selection / modification etc.) 
Did you like some pictures/words more than others? What happened in your head? 
What was the order of your thoughts? Can you talk me through them? 
Did some pictures/words help you think of stories/pictures more easily? What happened in  your 
head? How was it different? 
Can you tell me where these thoughts came from? How did these thoughts lead to the next ones? 
Did you ever feel stuck? What did that feel like? What did you do then? 
Did you ever think of something for the story/picture but then decide not to do it?  
What happened in your head then? 
Do you like reading stories / doing drawing at home? 
Do you ever make up your own stories / pictures? 
What sort of stories/pictures do you make up? 
Where do the ideas come from? 
How did you find it to make up this story / drawing? 
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How were you concentrating when you were thinking about your story / picture? Can you 
describe it? 
Did you find your mind wandering to other things? What things? 
What do you think an idea is? 
Do you sometimes think of good ideas and sometimes bad ideas? 
Tell me more about that 
How can you tell what’s a good idea? 
Would it have been any different doing this at school instead of at home? How?  




A priori coding framework  
Aspect of 
interest 
Subcomponents  Illustrative example (what child 
might say in Alternative Uses Test 
or TTCT Figural) 
Name of code 
Creativity 
components 
   
Memory Short term I just saw the door handle and it looked like the 
same shape as a pencil 
Short term 
memory 
 Long term I read a story about a boy who made a rocket 
using an old water bottle 
Long term 
memory 
 Direct experience 
- something the 
child has done 
I used pencil sharpenings to make a collage of a 




experience - via 
stories, films, 
hearsay, cartoons 
In a movie I saw, a girl sent a message to a pirate 
and she used an empty bottle 
Indirect 
experience 
Association Combining two or 
more elements to 
make a new idea 
I thought of a bottle holding things then I thought 
it could hold air and I suddenly thought of a diver 
with a tank of air on their back 
Association 
Extension Getting to new 
idea VIA another 
idea 
At first I saw it as a stick but then I thought it 
could actually be a whole tree 
Extension  
Insight Sudden moment 
of seeing an idea 




which shed light 
on the topic being 
considered 
I thought of lots of pencils lined up and in my 






of the stimulus to 
I thought what if the pencil was absolutely 




manipulation see it in a 
different light 
traffic light or a flagpole outside Buckingham 
Palace 
Theory of mind Putting yourself 
in someone else’s 
shoes to come up 
with ideas 
I thought about what my friend Charlie might 
think of because he’s really crazy and always 
comes up with crazy ideas 





I could think of a lots of different ideas for things 
you could put in a bottle 
Evaluation 
process 
 Testing against 
demands 
I think ‘my granny’s teeth’ is the best idea cos 
other people won’t say that 
Evaluation 
decision 





The pencil fell on the floor with a crash and then I 





out for the first 
time 
I haven’t ever drawn a ladder but it’s just really 









I always keep a bit of the eye white so it looks 
like it is shiny 
Repetition  
Imagination Involvement of 
something that 
does not exist in 
real world 
I prefer drawing imaginary things because then 




Getting out of a 





I was stuck and so I just drew some random lines Don’t think…act 
Divergent Having lots of As soon as I saw it just loads of ideas came into Divergent 
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thinking ideas in very 
quick succession 
or simultaneously 




best of candidate 
ideas 
It took me ages to think about all the ideas and 












being able to see 
around an idea 
Once I’d seen it as a moustache I couldn’t think 
of anything else it could be 
Fixedness 
 Deliberately 
ruling out obvious 
answers 
I thought it looked like a tree but then I thought 




 Failing to rule out 
obvious answers 
I could use it as a container for pebbles, or a 
container for buttons or a container for stones 
Not inhibiting 
obvious 
 Ruling out 
previously given 
answers or ideas 
I’d already done one which looked like a building 
so I thought I should try and do something 
different for this one 
Inhibiting 
previous 
 Failing to rule our 
previously given 
answers or ideas 




Sitting still, being 
quiet 
When I started I was thirsty but I thought I’ll do 
this and then I can get a drink after 
Behavioural 
inhibition 
 Not sitting still or 
being quiet 









might sound silly 
or embarrassing 
didn’t think that would be very nice to say! 
 Saying answers 
which might 
sound silly or 
embarrassing 
It could be for poo and wee in an emergency Lack of social 
inhibition 
Attention Selective attention 
- ignoring 
distraction 
I could hear clattering next door and I wondered 
what they were doing but my teacher tells us to 
try and ignore that sort of thing 
Acting to stop 
distraction 
 Lack of selective 
attention 
I could hear clattering next door and it made my 
mind go blank 
Being distracted 
 Distraction 
leading to an idea 
I heard all that clattering and that made me think I 






I was concentrating really hard the whole time 
and the time just went so fast 
Sustained 
attention  
 Lack of sustained 
attention 
At first I was concentrating but then I just found 
my mind jumping around all over the place and 





moving on to a 
different subset 
when one set 
exhausted 
I couldn’t think of anything else to do with 
making the lines into people so I stopped thinking 
about people and made myself think about types 
of transport instead 
Task switching 
 Switching from 
deliberate to 
associative mode 
of thought or vice 
versa 
I stopped trying to really think hard and just sat 
back for a minute 
Mode switching 
Goal planning Consciously 
scheduling an 
I couldn’t think of an idea for this one so I went 








I was drawing so quickly and thinking about the 




Using idea still in 
working memory 
to combine or 
adapt to produce a 
new idea 
I thought they could climb up the clouds and then 
I thought about mountain climbers having a new 
kind of competition to see who could get up the 
clouds the quickest 
Working 
memory ideation 
 Putting an idea 
down as word or 
picture to get it 
out of WM 
I just put a bit of a line there to remind me to do 
the fishing rod later 
Working 
memory offload 




deciding on one 
I was stuck and I tried different things like 
thinking what my teacher would say, or screwing 
up my eyeballs 
Strategizing 
ideation 
Taking a step 
back 
 
Taking a moment 
to get an overview 
I kind of sat back to see what the whole thing 
looked like 
Step back 
 Taking a moment 
to switch off 
My brain was just too busy so I decided to just 






Positive affect Excited, happy, looking forward Positive affect 
 Negative affect 
 
Anxious, nervous, worried Negative affect 







state of mind 
Inactive state My mind was blank, I had no ideas Blank brain  
 In a very active 
state 
 





I always love trying out new things Open to 
experience 
 Tolerance of 
ambiguity 
 
I accidentally did that guy’s face upside down but 
then I decided it looked good like that 
Tolerant of 
ambiguity 
 Risk taking 
 
I had no idea what I was going to draw so I just 
jumped in and hoped for the best 
Risk taking 
 Perseverance It took ages to get it to look right but I really 







It would be great doing it at school cos we have 






If I was doing it at school I wouldn’t have done as 
much crazy fun stuff 
 
Negative school 
Help factor Reference to 
factor which helps 
creativity 








If I am just sitting in a dark room then I won’t 






Constraint Reference to rules 
or constraints 
There are too many things to try and fit in so I just 
ended up not having a single idea 
Constraint  




 Negative self 
value 
I normally hate what I do because I’m not really 




Value by others Positive value 
awarded by others 
I sometimes show my pictures to my mum and 




 Negative value 
awarded by others 
If I think it is good I might show it to my friends 
but if they say they don’t like it then I don’t know 





   
Physicality Using physical 
movement 
deliberately 
I had run out of ideas so I just started doodling to 
get some more 
Doodle 
 Body leading the 
mind 








Idiographic thematic narratives 
Ben 10. A free flow of great ideas – but mostly they are not allowed in 
Ben was very clear about what he was going to draw before we even began (I know what I’m 
going to draw) because he is very taken with particular subjects (I felt mmm more into 
superheroes). To that extent, his interview is less informative than some as to creativity as it 
more represented reproduction from memory.  
The way in which he approached the sparks was more to look for something that would ‘go’ 
rather than looking for new ideas (It’s because they all don’t really look like… like one I really 
want). He was not keen to incorporate new ideas into this schema (not really much tents in 
superheroes) and on the occasions when he was tempted by one of the stimuli it was because it 
gelled with his pre-existing plan (I could have chosen it [alien] because Vilgaxe is an alien). 
There were one or two occasions on which this approach was successful through a triumph of 
spontaneous associating (The sun. Cos I could use it for a for a mask on one of them so like draw 
a sun then draw some eyes in it. But then it made thought me of Heat blast because the sun, the 
sun’s fire and Heat blast’s made out of fire). As such his approach represented, in terms of dual 
process theory, an approach to creativity based on persistence (ploughing the same seam at 
increasing depth) rather than flexibility, something he found hard (you could do that but I’m 
more into stick men) 
He produced some highly original ideas which emerged apparently spontaneously from seeing 
the sparks (this one looks like a pond with a raindrop going in; this one looked like a giant foot; 
(this) made me think of… Rip jaws because he goes under the sea and his claws are really sharp 
and that looked like a king’s crown but it was more sharp). But in evaluation he was very strict. 
If it didn’t go, it wasn’t in. So in some ways, he represents an ideal of creativity – very open to 
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original and bold ideas in generation and very exacting in evaluation. But perhaps the bases of 
his evaluation was too limiting – it essentially had to be in Ben 10. Despite his young age (6) he 
was aware of the slight paradox he faced in coming up with plenty of ideas but none of them 
quite gaining traction (It’s because nothing really went in my drawing well but it did put ideas).  
 
Dooda. Metacognitive control and creative problem solving  
To describe Dooda’s creative thinking seems to describe the mental workings of someone much 
older than 7. Enthusiastic about new things (I just wanted to give it a first shot) she appreciates 
that only through experimentation and practice will she learn and improve (if try something 
that’s new then I can draw it again in other pictures that I do) but this exploration does not come 
easily (I was feeling a bit scared). Nonetheless, she strikes a balance, generally favouring 
experiment (what if something goes wrong and they’re not the same size? But then I said ok I’m 
just going to try).  
She seems naturally to produce ideas both spontaneously (a frog!) and with effort (I’m trying to 
think of a shape that it’s in…) and both with success in finding ideas beyond the obvious. She 
recognizes that ideas feed in from experience (in a museum you’ve got different types of things 
like ancient Egypt, dinosaurs…it really gets my brain to think) and also from direct action (when 
I start drawing it give me ideas and the more further it comes the more ideas it gives me). The 
only trouble with ideas is when there are too many to decide on (when you think of lots of things 
well my head just starts hurting and I had a headache) though even here she managed to produce 
a great metaphor (you know when you keep on saying [ie speaking], your throat hurts…that’s 
how my head hurts). 
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The ‘beyond-her-years’ part is particularly when she is evaluating ideas. She is unusual in 
bringing generative creativity to this part of the process, creating new categories which form the 
basis for judgement (I, first I think of one reason why and then I think which one is the best 
reason and then I pick that one), often formulating complex algorithms for decision-making. This 
allows her to scrutinize each idea meticulously (I was going to pick it but I said no to myself). 
She was highly aware of time and efficiency throughout the process (It’s good to take your time 
just like an artist would do) and, based on previous bad experience (it just ends up a big mess 
because I always rush) told herself on several occasions to take her time (I wanted to rush but I 
said no) and to stay true to her well-conceived plan (if I went like castle, then table, castle table 
castle table, I might do something wrong, if I forget my plan, but I don’t want to forget my plan, 
so I do it in order). 
She has a poetic turn of phrase, partly a product of her young age (It looks like a bird like when 
its beak is down and it’s coming into its wings or [of candlesticks] they glow… but at night you 
have to candle them up) as well as creating the notion of Idealand in her brain as the place where 
all ideas come from (Idealand… that’s in my brain). 
 
Silky. Walking the tightrope of freedom and control 
I feel less confident drawing conclusions about Silky since she was so quiet in the interview. 
There was not a huge amount of spontaneous talk, it was more coaxed talk (‘not that much’, 
‘sometimes’, were very common answers). 
With that caveat, some observations can be made. The first was a very high degree of 
concentration throughout her drawing. She took nearly an hour to complete it, during which time 
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she appeared completely absorbed in her work, despite many distractions going on around her 
([did you notice your mum reading your brother a story?] not that much). She was in a state 
which I think could be fittingly described as flow ([were you having to make an effort to 
concentrate? I was just concentrating), in the zone, in the moment. She did not look up and 
worked continuously and conscientiously throughout.  
So was this a picture of simple control? Some evidence suggests not. She showed great freedom 
of expression with her materials, with a range of movements from very precise and gentle to big 
and vivid. She was the only child who didn’t mind in the least the pastel dust all over her fingers 
and made no attempt to wipe it off – in fact she explicitly liked smudging and blurring (I like 
doing the smudging). She started with a definite idea that she wanted to do a drawing from an 
Enid Blyton book but was open to incorporating new stimuli which weren’t in the original (I just 
added it) and was happy to proceed without a plan ([The other ideas came as you were doing the 
picture? S. Yeah). In short, she seemed content to balance a degree of control with several 
degrees of freedom and a recognition that things yet unknown might prove worthy of her 
attention. Similarly, she balanced a propensity for the imaginary (I like using make believe 
things) with certain self-imposed constraints (I thought of a monkey but I didn’t really want to do 
a jungle so I chose a frog) as if it were impossible to envisage a monkey in a make believe 
scenario. In other ways, she was happy to adapt (I used them in my different ways by adding a 
bottom to this one and adding like a playground sort of like at the bottom here). When things 
went wrong, she calmly problem solved her way out of it, showing both emotional control and 




I would characterize Silky as a quietly confident creative, with a naturally experimental nature 
coupled with the problem-solving abilities to get herself out of a hole (I smudged it with my arm 
by accident but I…I put the dark green on my frog so that if I put my arm on it, it wouldn’t 
smudge). 
 
Maria. Balancing control and spontaneity, with control usually winning out 
Maria combined high motivation (I was just excited and pleased that I would get to do drawing) 
with a desire to produce high quality work (you want it to be really good). She went about the 
task with a very high level of planning (you have to test it out see if you like it first) even 
investing in a labelled test area separate from her drawing. This control included acting to 
prevent unforeseen errors ([if] you don't like that colour you can't erase that with those pens). On 
occasions when small errors did, inevitably, arise, her responses favoured control over flexibility. 
In one case, she applied experience from memory (sometimes if you do that…if you kind of 
draw another line then it goes even more wrong) before deciding to accept the error (so I just left 
it as it was); in another, she resisted an opportunity to go in a new direction, preferring to keep to 
the original plan (I wanted to stick with blue).  
She describes a balance between control and spontaneity (I knew what bits of it might look like 
but when I got into it I just started doing it as I went along), recognizing the need, at least in 
execution, to sometimes go with the flow. This perhaps applied particularly to a sense that 
sometimes the body might know better than the mind (it's easier to do it with your hand instead 
of squinting and looking at it). In her description of a tightly controlled protocol for drawing a 
cat (that technique is kind of stuck in my head) she outlined five or six strict rules, before 
allowing for a small degree of freedom (you can colour it the way you want it). Similarly, in 
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drawing windows on her house (you need a window… because otherwise it would be really 
dark) and applying logic in what you could see out of them (if you look out of one window 
upstairs you're more likely to see it downstairs as well) she made the concession of leaving out 
the traditional cross (cos I want to see straight forward into the mountains). In short, there was 
little room for spontaneity or the unexpected. On the rare occasions when ideas arose uninvited 
(oh yeah that popped into my head) she acted quickly to control them (sometimes you forget 
your ideas so I’m going to jot it down as soon as possible). 
She had little time for things which were weird (that would just look kind of weird and not very 
nice), disorganized (it's all mixed up and higgledy piggledy) or too much trouble to execute (I 
just wanted it simple and straightforward). Rather, in line with her preference for control, she 
preferred things to resemble reality (I used the pastels and smudged it to look like it was actually 
real; it looked much nicer and more real). 
 
Alexandra. Drawing from memory is the safest way to ensure creative success 
[NB English was not Alexandra’s first language and some issues might have been the result of 
trouble finding the words] 
Alexandra’s approach to the task was based on an apparently vivid memory of a particularly 
scene (in my house in Greece when we go swimming the sea… I watching lot of hills). She 
wanted to recreate this image - and not for the first time - rather than to attempt something new 
and experimental (I have already my picture). As such, stimuli were chosen very much to fit in 




There was one example where she did something unusual – which was to turn the paper so that it 
was portrait rather than landscape orientation. When I asked her about this she said she decided 
to do that when I inadvertently made it possible (when you said that we don’t have rules), 
suggesting that her idea of rule-breaking is quite modest. Her manner was quiet and 
contemplative- and the fact that her ideas for the picture came from processed memories rather 
than spontaneously created novel ideas, suggests that this might be typical for her (When I was 
stuck, I think a little bit and then I draw). Her descriptions of how she absorbs the world around 
her also gives a picture of someone who is non-impulsive, who takes time to take things in and 
digest them (sometimes in London where I am sitting and reading I watching of the window the 
sun and go down and I thought…if you will get very near the sun it will be big).  
She was very concentrated and silent throughout the drawing process, which took quite a long 
time, with meticulous colouring in. There were ways in which she used detailed planning and 
control to make her drawing more efficient (I will do a long time to draw all the sun… and then I 
used this one to do a little time) and she drew the bees in a ‘factory line’ approach of doing all 
the black stripes, then all the yellow stripes, then all the legs and wings. There was no evidence 
of her being distracted or sent off task at any stage and the impression of the final picture is that 
it was more-or-less exactly the picture she had in mind at the start. 
 
Dave. Using distractions as ideas, but uniting the whole with logic and sense 
Dave is something of an enigma. On the one hand he is seemingly very open to new stimuli and 
even distractible (I looked out of the window and then I heard a plane and that’s why I drawed 
the plane); on the other he is quite rigid, focused and very obedient to the rules of reality (Do 
pigs live in sandy places? No!) 
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For a child of his age (6yo) he had prolonged focus on executing his drawing, taking nearly an 
hour, with no apparent boredom or fatigue ([Was there ever a bit where you felt a bit bored?] 
No)(piece by piece, box by box by box). He was very concerned with things making sense (I 
knew that I wasn’t going to use that one because that doesn’t really make any sense at all) which 
points towards straightforward, realistic representations, but he was simultaneously concerned 
with his creation being interesting (I wanted my picture not to be like really boring like a boring 
picture of a house that would be quite boring). This line sometimes proves a delicate one to tread 
(I would choose a boat because where could you fit a zigzag line into a picture?). 
He showed some really nice examples of convergent creative thinking, bringing together 
different ideas into one new and valuable solution (I started to have an idea that it would be 
really hot that’s why I was drawing the sweat on the camel) and used deliberate logic to solve 
problems (a house could be like on the edge of the desert because houses are sometimes like 
there’s a tiny bit of desert so they’re on like the very edge and then there’s a town).  
Divergent thinking came less naturally to him (I can’t see how I could make anything, except 
pretend things out of that one), with no examples of coming up with multiple ideas from one 
stimulus and plenty of times where no ideas were forthcoming at all (And that one that was a 
hard one too). There was one moment, when asked to try to make a shape into something where, 
through physical manipulation, he had an insight moment of realizing that turning the shape 
upside down brought with it new possibilities (That’s only pretend things I can make out of that 
one…unless I moved that piece around and I put it there that could be a leg and if I put four more 
it would be like the legs of an animal and that would make sense). But this strategic manipulation 
of input wasn’t something he did naturally preferring ideas that came without effort (I chose that 
one because it looks exactly like a sun) 
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His creative preferences are grounded rather than flights of fancy (There’s no such thing as a 
giant bird unless you’ve drawn it) (That’s when it makes lots of ideas come when it makes 
sense). But within this constraint, he is open to stimuli which for others might be simple 
distractions and new ideas can fly in (Nearly every time you look outside there’s birds in the sky 
so I think I’ll draw a few birds). 
 
Harriet. With self-awareness, openness and tricks, creativity can be taken in hand 
Harriet is almost a self-help book on creativity. She combines openness (I like strange things) 
with confidence (usually I always just think of something) and a wise-beyond-her-years 
understanding of the accidental magic that can make something creative (if it ends up as 
something nice then I just stick it up on my wall and tell everyone I did it on purpose). 
There are two distinct routes to creativity for her; one emanates from her openness to the new, 
the strange, the weird and her willingness to let go and be led by apparently random events 
unfolding (first it was trying to be a door…then it looked more like a window…then I realized I 
wanted to keep it like that because it looked weird). In this mode, she is quite willing to be led by 
her actions more than her thoughts (my brain kinda hadn’t caught up with me). The second route 
is almost the exact antithesis. It is a deliberate set of strategies designed to maximize predefined 
creative output. The clearest example was her strategy for making her picture have a surprising 
and unexpected colour scheme (I wanted it to be strange colours…so sometimes I was just taking 
the nearest pen or a random pen to make it look like an unusual colour). It wouldn’t be too much 
of a leap to say that each of these seems to illustrate one of each of the dual path prototypes. 
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Her ideation method is another exemplar of balancing the benefits of both focused and defocused 
thought. It is as if she makes a list of everything which might help come up with idea (all the 
books I’ve read which are a billion…different pictures that I’ve seen… the colours that were 
there…pictures that I’ve done before) and throws them all together like a creative primeval soup 
ready to recombine. She then has little tricks she uses to help keep the defocused thing just 
focused enough (holding a pencil makes my mind not wander off…it makes me think about 
drawing)  
The final weapon in her armoury is a great level of patience and attention to elaboration  (If I 
think about only the individual bits then I do more detail) as well as a metacognitive awareness 
of how to balance well enough to stay on track (I didn’t want to smudge it so I kind of went 
slow…but also hurry up because it was getting very boring). I have described her as ‘master of 
her universe’. 
 
Betty. A detailed memory and deliberate switching between concentration and 
relaxation 
Betty’s creation was heavily based on a depiction from memory; the changes from the original 
(the Moana movie) were subtle (I wanted to change it a little bit). As a consequence, her account 
contained more explicit mention of memory (I might use the same ideas from the movie). Is it 
just chance that led her to this kind of picture? Lack of creative confidence? Or a different 
measure of creativity – she mentions a few times that she wants it ‘similar but different’ so 
maybe her idea of creating is to do with her own small tweaks to something else.  
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Another thing that stands out in her account is the switching between concentrating and 
deliberately switching off, relaxing, to enable thoughts to come (I realise I'm concentrating too 
hard and then that's normally when my mind goes blank... and then after I sit back and then I 
relax and then after it comes back to me). This could be as much to do with evoking memories as 
opening up to new ideas. We all know the feeling of failing to remember something we are 
trying hard to remember and then remembering it as soon as we cease trying. Perhaps she is 
speaking less of defocused ideation and more of defocused remembering: what, if anything, is 
the difference? 
Her spontaneous ideation in the face of new stimuli (a hawk just popped into my head) showed 
evidence of thinking which was quite unusually creative and broad ranging. She saw things in 
the shapes which other children did not (witch’s hat as broken cot, birthday cake as drawing pin 
or playground roundabout), and rarely went for the most obvious choice. Her demeanour was in 
contrast to this freewheeling ideation; she was controlled, still, undistracted (despite plenty of 
noise and commotion) and calm. She said the only thing which would make it hard to have ideas 
would be multi-tasking. 
There was a good deal of self-talk, mentions of liking the idea of doing something, ‘telling 
herself’ things, knowing her own limitations, a high degree of self-awareness, a level of humility 
and modesty. She dwelled upon the social aspect of creativity, both in terms of input (Sometimes 
I get ideas from other people) but also in output, other people ultimately often being the judge of 
the value of an idea (when other people think it’s bad…then I think it’s a bad idea). 
Because she is concerned with specific memories, specific representations, does that mean she is 
less open to surprising creative possibilities (normally all the ideas are in my head and I just 
remember it)? Her way of being creative seems to be to find something in memory, in a high 
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level of detail, as ‘true’ to the original as possible and then to deliberately decide on the extent to 
which she wants to change it from that original form to make it her own. A high level of detailed 
elaboration (it was kind of darkish light…loads of dark colours). In short, a very controlled 
process – control in the search, control in the change. 
 
Kitty. Strong spontaneous associational abilities…until the obstructor steps in 
Kitty is a counterpart to Harriet. They both show high levels of control and strict evaluation of 
their own work, but are differentiated by their degree of openness to new experience. Kitty does 
not like things which are weird or strange and is somewhat anxious about things which are 
unpredicted (I got off the line…it wasn’t relaxing because i might have got it on my school top). 
Whilst in spontaneous ideation, she can provide rich, surprising, far associations (this could be a 
bank and it’s all calm and then here was horses riding everywhere and robbers coming) and 
evocative poetic story-telling (I thought this could be  a candle in the river like some people 
celebrate lights in the river and I thought that can be like a bridge and all trees coming over), 
when it comes to evaluation, the rules become more didactic (I didn’t want it like that because it 
would just be weird), things need to follow logic rather than imagination (it would make a little 
bit more sense) and she gets cross when things go wrong (I felt just mad that I did that). 
There is a clear sense of the battle between these two sides and a slightly melancholy impression 
that for her creativity is an impossible dream (it doesn’t really look like a creative picture…I 
think I’ve just done a normal picture). At one point she did allow herself to loosen the constraints 
a little (splashes can go anywhere) and this was the one point in her picture where something 
seemed to arise from the gut – or from the hand (I love drawing this… I think my hand was 
going first) and resulted in a really good piece of detail. For the most part though, she prefers to 
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stick to what she knows (it would be my first time drawing that and it might go horribly wrong), 
only try new things once they have been practiced and perfected (I need a little bit more practice 
to do it that way) and taking things nice and slow (I was making sure it was steady). Even small 
deviations from the plan are generally not acceptable (I was feeling mad because it’s just a 
different colour and I like everything the same colour).  
After the event, perhaps when the high level of control is turned down a bit, she can again see 
more creative possibilities (I was gonna do like a treasure chest and like sea horses and under sea 
creatures…and then I forgot; I could have changed the sea the colours of the sea and the 
mountains…but I didn’t). Her understanding of what creativity comprises is comprehensive, like 
an idea recipe (I think it just pops up when you look at stuff, you see stuff and you just like 
combine it together and think how you’re making it better I think the brain puts all that together 
and makes an idea). In practice, it seems that the effortful ‘putting it all together’ overrides the 
popping up; in her description of where things happen in her brain, creativity and concentration 
both happen at the front (they link at the front and they just park up in my head) with sometimes 
negative consequences (that’s where it hurts if I concentrate too much). 
 
Roxy. Careful modulation of focus, an abundance of ideas and a flexible approach 
to evaluation 
Roxy’s interview started off less than ideal as it transpired, too late, that she was wary of the 
cameras (Not really self-conscious but… just a bit… am I doing something wrong?). 
Consequently, she was keen to get her picture over with and completed it in just a few minutes. 
The interview focused more on the spark stimuli and I used some think aloud fragments to try to 
get to the heart of her creative process. This reaped rewards. 
Appendix 
 510 
She had great awareness of her own creative process and provided potent validation of well 
documented creative processes. One was a most pleasing depiction of Wallas’ four stages of 
creativity (I think of loads [preparation] and then… I step back [incubation] and there’s still like 
this one glowering in my mind [illumination] and I just think yeah that one [insight]). Another 
was her realization and eloquent description of her own experience of functional fixity (Once 
I’ve kind of got one image in my mind… I kind of find it a bit harder to find a different one) as 
well as some textbook examples of how to overcome it (I just try and like… maybe swap parts of 
it or look at it from a different angle, or step back and see if I can see something else). Further 
sophistication in the creative metacognition vein came from an analogy between the angularity 
vs fluidity of the spark shapes and the fluidity and ease of prompting ideas (Cos it doesn’t have 
as many like sharp points, it’s easier to think of other ones [ideas]). 
The simple addition of time improved not just the fluency but the originality of her ideas (when I 
first saw it I didn’t really see it… yeah I can see it as, what’s it called, those Christmas door 
wreaths or something? That you put on your door. Or also like a clown’s thing that they put on 
their neck and then they have all those spikes coming out). But generally she was not someone 
short of ideas; if anything she was burdened by an excess of idea generation; particularly in the 
absence of constraint (my mind would have been a frenzy). 
She talked about how increased constraint negatively affected evaluation but not generation (it 
doesn’t make it harder to come up with them, it makes it harder to find the one that will work) 
suggesting the former is controlled while the latter is not. Further evidence of this came from her 
description of how enforced focus can disrupt spontaneous ideation (when you’re made to look 
at a particular one, it’s like harder). She also had a flexible, creative approach to evaluation, 
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seeing it as an opening up rather than a closing down ([I chose it] because I thought you could 
relate more things to it). 
Her creative process in a nutshell is thus: (Immediately like loads of ideas come to my mind, so 
then I try and like ‘Caaalm down’ and just find one that really captures me). 
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Executive functions and creativity 
Head teacher information sheet 
 
Researcher: Cathy Rogers cathyjanerogers01@gmail.com 
Supervisor: Prof Michael Thomas ubjtc22@mail.bbk.ac.uk  
Ethics number: Dept. of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, Ref. 181989 
 
Dear Head teacher 
 
We would like to invite pupils in your school to take part in a research project. This 
information sheet will explain the purpose of the study and tell you more about what 
would be involved on a practical level, so that you can decide whether or not to involve 
your school. The project has received ethical approval from both the Department of 
Psychological Sciences and the College Research Ethics Committees of Birkbeck, 
University of London. If you would like any further information, please do not hesitate to 
contact the researcher Cathy Rogers. 
 
What is the study about? 
The study is investigating the effect of training children’s executive functions on their 
creativity. Executive functions are cognitive processes which govern our ability to stay 
on task, avoid being distracted and plan ahead. Better executive functions are 
associated with a range of benefits for children, both in the short term (eg better exam 
results) and in the longer term (eg better job prospects, better health, higher income).  
 
This training, as well as hopefully bringing about improvements in children’s executive 
functions themselves, might carry transferred effects to other aspects of learning – and 
in this study we are investigating the potential transferred effects to children’s creativity. 
In particular, we are interested in how children’s ability to inhibit or ‘switch off’ certain 
internal or external distractions might help or hinder their creative efforts. 
 
The creative process has not been studied in great detail in primary school age children 
so we hope that this research will provide important new information about children’s 
creative thinking and how it relates to their learning more generally. Once our research 
project is complete, we will communicate our results to educators and parents as well 
as to the wider public. 
 
What are the practicalities? 
The training would take place over a 6week period during the autumn term 2019 (ie 
between September and December) and within the normal school day (ie between 9am 
and 3pm). Teachers would be trained to use a simple set of materials (cards, board 
games and whole class games) which have been specially developed to train children’s 
executive functions and which have proven effective in previous studies. The training 
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would involve half hour sessions, carried out two or three times a week over the 6 week 
period (ie 12-18 sessions in total). All the training would be carried out by the children’s 
normal teacher(s) at a time (eg morning, afternoon) which best suits the class and all 
children in the class can take part in the training. We are looking to recruit children in 
years 4 and 5. 
 
This trial is a randomised controlled trial. This means that participating classes would be 
randomly assigned to the training intervention or to an active control condition; in the 
control condition, children would also play card and board games but these would be 
focused on numeracy (eg snakes and ladders) or literacy (eg Scrabble) rather than 
executive functions.  
 
In addition to the training, children would be tested before and after the training on a 
range of short tests of executive function and creativity. This is in order to measure 
whether – and the extent to which - the training has brought about changes in these 
measures. The testing would be done within the normal school day with groups of 6-8 
children at a time and would take approximately 30 minutes per group. Since some 
tests are on computer, this testing would require use of the school’s IT facilities. These 
tests would be done on 3 occasions: in the 2 weeks prior to the training programme, in 
the 2 weeks immediately after the training programme and finally 6 weeks after that. 
 
The testing would be carried out by trained researcher Cathy Rogers, a PhD student at 
Birkbeck, University of London. All the tests have been specially developed for children, 
and involve a mix of simple pen and paper tests and short computer tests. Children 
typically find the tests fun and enjoyable to do. They are encouraged to have fun, be 
playful in their answers and use their imaginations. They do not receive individual 
feedback on how they have performed. 
 
The children will also complete a short questionnaire which asks them about how often 
they engage in creative activities (drawing, making up stories etc) at home. Finally, we 
would also ask you for participating children’s average grades in English and 
Mathematics, so that we can look at their creativity in the context of their overall 
learning. 
 
What will happen to the data? 
The data will be completely anonymised. Each child will be assigned a code, and only 
this code will be used in the computer for analyses. The correspondence between the 
code and the name of the child will not be given to anyone outside of the research team. 
Results will be used as part of Cathy Rogers’ doctoral thesis. In the thesis or any 
potential publication or conference report, group averages will be reported rather than 
individual scores and schools will not be named. 
 
How do we take part?  
If you agree for your school to take part in our study, we will prepare information packs 





come and see you to explain the study in detail, show you the training materials and 
make a detailed schedule. 
 
Does the school get anything in return? 
There are various benefits to your school in taking part in this research. Firstly, in 
intervention groups, the research would provide a short, free training designed to 
improve executive functions. For those assigned to control groups, we would be happy, 
once the study is complete, to share the materials used in the intervention so that 
teachers could use them if they wished. We would also be happy to come to your 
school and run a workshop or assembly to talk to children about their brains and how 
they work. We will also be pleased to present the results of our study to you and 
interested staff and parents, once the data has been analysed. More broadly, your 
school would be contributing to an important research area with a world centre of 
excellence in psychological research.  
 
We very much hope that this research will be something you would like to be involved 






Centre for Educational Neuroscience 
Birkbeck, University of London 
 
 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher, Cathy Rogers 
cathyjanerogers01@gmail.com Tel 07969 123201. You can also talk directly to the supervisor of 







What makes children creative? 
Parent/carer information sheet 
 
Researcher: Cathy Rogers croger05@mail.bbk.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Prof Michael Thomas ubjtc22@mail.bbk.ac.uk  
Ethics number: Dept. of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck. Ref. 181989 
 
Dear Parents / Carers 
 
We would like to invite your child to take part in a research project. This information 
sheet will tell you the purpose of the study and give you details about what is involved, 
so that you can voluntarily choose whether or not to let your child take part. Declining to 
participate will not disadvantage you or your child in any way. If you would like any 
further information, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher Cathy Rogers 
croger05@mail.bbk.ac.uk  
 
What is the study about? 
The study is investigating the process of creativity in children. We are trying to find out 
more about what encourages or discourages children’s creativity. In particular, we are 
interested in how children’s ability to concentrate, focus and ‘switch off’ distractions 
might help or hinder their creative efforts.  
 
The creative process has not been studied in great detail in primary school age children 
so we hope that this research will provide important new information about children’s 
creative thinking, with potential implications for early years’ educators, parents and the 
wider public.  
 
Why has my child been chosen? 
Your child’s school has agreed to take part in this project. This information sheet has 
therefore been sent to all children in years 4 and 5. If you give your consent, we will also 
explain the purpose of the study to your child and double check that s/he is happy and 
willing to participate before we start our research. 
 
What would my child have to do? 
There are two parts to the study. The training part will help children develop their skills 
of paying attention, concentrating and planning ahead. It will take place as part of your 
child’s normal lessons, and be carried out by their usual teacher. Your child, along with 
the whole class or in small groups, will play a variety of specially-developed card and 
board games. They will do this a few times a week for 6-8 weeks for about half an hour 




The second part, the test part, will also take part in the normal school day and this time 
will be carried out by trained researcher Cathy Rogers, a PhD student at Birkbeck, 
University of London. Your child will complete various pen and paper tests, some where 
they have to give short written answers and some where they do drawings. The tests 
are presented as games and the children are encouraged to have fun and be playful in 
their thinking. It will be emphasised to the children that there are no wrong answers. 
Your child will also be asked to play some simple games on a computer – for example 
identifying a particular animal or shape and pressing a key in response. At the 
beginning of each session, each task will be fully explained to your child and they will be 
able to ask any questions they have. They will be told that they can stop participating in 
the study at any time, without having to give a reason. Cathy will be present with them 
for the whole testing session.  
 
There will be three testing sessions, one before and two after the training part of the 
study. Each session will last for approximately 30 minutes. 
 
We will also ask your child’s teacher for your child’s average grades in English and 
Maths, so that we can look at their creativity in the context of their overall learning. 
 
What will happen to the data from my child? 
We are interested in finding out how children perform on average rather than looking at 
the results of any individual child. The data will be completely anonymised. Each child 
will be assigned a code, and only this code will be used in the computer for analyses. 
The correspondence between the code and the name of your child will not be given to 
anyone outside of the research team. Results will be used as part of Cathy Rogers’ 
doctoral thesis. 
 
Your child’s involvement in the study will remain confidential except in the highly unlikely 
event that the researcher has a serious concern regarding a child protection issue. All 
data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018. The 
project has received ethical approval from both the Dept of Psychological Sciences and 
the College Research Ethics Committees of Birkbeck, University of London. 
 
How do I give my consent for my child to take part?  
If you agree that your child can take part in our study, please sign the attached consent 
form. Please return this form to your child’s teacher, who will pass it on to the 
researcher. Even after signing the consent form, you are still free to withdraw your child 
from the study at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
We are extremely grateful for the time you and your child have given us. 
 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher: 
Cathy Rogers croger05@mail.bbk.ac.uk Tel 07969 123201 
 






What helps children to be creative? 
Information sheet for children 
 
What is creativity and why should we care about it? 
‘Creativity’ means coming up with good new ideas. Without creativity, humans might still 
be living in caves and eating horrible leaves! Think of all the things that have been 
invented since then…. 
 
What does that have to do with me? 
We would like to understand more about what helps children to be creative. To do this, a 
researcher called Cathy Rogers will visit your school to work with you and your teachers. 
You will be allowed to leave your classroom to play some games on a computer, do some 
drawings and also try to come up with some new ideas – Cathy will explain each game as 
you do it. You will be able to ask Cathy any questions you have about anything you’re 
doing and we hope you will really enjoy the games. 
 
If you are happy to take part, you can just tell Cathy. If you change your mind and decide 
you don’t want to do it, that’s fine too. The information we collect about you will not be 













‘Nelly and Noah in the Rainforest’ training intervention 
Instructions for Teachers   
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1. Structure and support principles 
There are 5 small group games and 5 individual worksheets for children to complete by 
themselves. The planned timetable means a maximum of two small group games and 
one type of individual exercise need be learned each week. All the activities are framed 
within the general setting of a rainforest and the adventures of the two explorers, Nelly 
and Noah. 
There are some key principles important to bear in mind for successful training: 
1. Give clear introductions to the games and sufficient practice time.  
When introducing a new game, all cards which will be used at that level should 
be shown and explained. Children should ‘mirror back’ names of animals, plants etc to 
make sure all children are familiar with all pictured items. 
The words in the introduction to each game can be read out as they are to give 
the context for the game. Other italicized words are also meant to be read out loud.  
All children should start at the simplest level of the game 
It is important that less able children have sufficient practice time at lower levels 
before moving up. 
At first the games should be carried out at a slow and controlled pace. Games 
shouldn’t be made into a race until everyone playing has mastered the rules. 
 
2. Ensure a steadily increasing level of difficulty.  
All activities have multiple difficulty levels, shown by magnifying glass icons (1 is 
the easiest, 3 is the hardest).  
A switch to the next level should only be made once children have mastered the 
previous one. 
Executive functions come into play through activities being somewhat demanding 
so it is important to encourage children to continue playing even if they have some 
difficulty – and to carry on until they can manage to play the games. 
If a higher difficulty level is too challenging for one or more children in a group, 
teachers should ideally go back and repeat the last, less challenging game level. 
It is important that all children are given sufficient practice to allow mastery of at 
least two levels of difficulty per game. 
 
3. Regularly change roles.  
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As well as improving their executive functions through playing, children benefit 
from supervising.  
In the small group games, children should take over and lead the games, 
identifying and correcting mistakes. For individual activities, solution sheets are given 
for children to correct themselves. 
Small groups should initially be comprised of children with reasonably similar 
levels of competence. Children should not be too over- or under- challenged. 
The small groups should be changed frequently - in every session they should be 
composed differently 
Allow children to self-manage, resolve conflict, work out their own strategies, 
rather than intervening to help (as much as possible) 
 
The individual worksheets can be used at your discretion (ie in addition to using them as 
scheduled) if children aren’t getting enough practice in group games, groups are too big, 
for children who come into class late and so on. 
 
Table 1 shows the recommended six-week-programme.  
 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 








Identifying animals (ind) 
 










Looking for food (ind) 
 








Day or night 
 
Labyrinth in the rainforest (ind) 
 






Day or night 
Collecting insects 
 
Drawing lessons (ind) 
 
Week 5 Collecting insects 
 








Changes in the rainforest (ind) 
 










Hardest levels of any 







The general structure of lessons, assuming a class size of 24-30 children, should be as 
follows: 
1. The class should be divided in half, the class teacher taking one half and the 
teaching assistant (or other helper) the other. One half will play game A for the 
first half of the lesson, the other half will play game B. After 15 minutes, they 
swap over. So in week 1, session 1, teacher would start with Cheeky monkey 
and TA would start with Collecting insects. After 15 minutes they would swap 
games. 
2. Children should be organized into groups of 4 (max 5), seated around small 
tables so that they can all see each other. This should make 3 groups per half 
class. 
3. It is important that the groups should be mixed up and changed around each 
lesson, so that children experience the games with different players. Children 
who are not placed within groups for any reason can complete individual 
worksheets  
4. Once the game has been explained to the children, one child in each group 
should be assigned the ‘manager’ of that game. That child will be responsible for 
running the game in that group, making sure the game is being played correctly. 
Children should take it in turns to play this manager role. 
5. The teacher/TA should move around the class, watching each of the groups, to 
make sure that games and particularly the right levels of the games, are being 
played.  
6. It is important that children don’t race ahead too quickly, but instead play at a 
level until everyone is competent at playing the game and can move up to the 
next one. 
7. Clearly, the first session in a week when children are learning new games, will be 
more taken up with explaining. By session 2, it should be possible for children to 
immediately start playing the game as soon as the lesson begins. 
8. At the end of the lesson, it is worth taking a moment to sort all the cards and 






2. Small-Group Games 
2.1 Cheeky Monkey 
Material 
▪ 16 playing cards with green background 
▪ 16 playing cards with red background 
▪ 5 control cards (tree house cards with all items pictured) 
Introduction 
Nelly and Noah live in a lovely jungle tree house. A monkey family lives in the same 
tree. The smallest monkey is very cheeky. When Nelly and Noah leave in the morning, 
the monkey climbs into their tree house and rifles through their things. When Nelly and 
Noah return home in the evening, there is always something missing. 
Help Nelly and Noah figure out what the monkey has taken 
Game structure 
Each child is given a control card (one of the large cards) which shows eight objects lit 
up by a spotlight. Here you can see Nelly and Noah’s tree house. Eight objects are lit 
up. Point to each object (torch, socks, shoe, camera, flask, magnifying glass, lantern, 
book) to ensure everyone playing is familiar with the objects. The cheeky monkey 
always steals one of these objects. Show a green playing card and explain: Here you 
can see the objects again. But there is one object missing – that’s the one the monkey 
has taken away. Can you figure out which object is missing? 
Variant I (familiarization) 
Green cards only. Not a race. Turn over a green card and instruct children to work out 
which item the monkey has stolen. Children should indicate by a hand signal when they 
have the answer - but no one should say it out loud until everyone has got it. 
Variant II  
Green cards only. Cards are put in a pile so that everyone can reach. One card at a 
time is turned over and it is a race to find the missing object. The first to spot it wins that 
card. The child with the most cards wins the game. 
Variant III  
Red cards only. Here, additional objects complicate the search for the missing object. 
But the monkey still only steals items which are lit up. Rules as for variant II 
Variant IV  
Red and green cards can be mixed together. 
Variant V 
Can be played with only green or only red or a mix. But here the control cards are taken 
away so children need to remember the lit up objects by heart. 
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2.2 Collecting insects 
Material 
▪ 55 insect cards: fly, wasp, mosquito, ant, beetle 
▪ 1 jam card 
▪ 5 spider cards (3 red spiders, 2 black spiders) 
▪ 5 snake cards (3 active snakes, 2 snakes sleeping) 
▪ 2 rule cards (1 Animal, 1 Number) 
Introduction  
Nelly and Noah want to inspect every type of insect in the rainforest. They attract 
insects with the smell of ripe fruit, then when enough insects have settled in one place, 
they trap them in a jam-jar.  
Help Nelly and Noah collect all the insects 
Game rules  
All cards are shuffled and dealt out. Each child puts their cards face down on the table 
(the draw pile). The jam jar card is placed in the middle so everyone can reach it. When 
a signal is given (e.g. ‘Ready steady GO’) every child turns over their top card and puts 
it face up in a new pile in front of them (the discard pile). The top cards of the discard 
piles need to be easily visible to everyone playing. 
When two cards match according to the relevant rule (ie ‘Animal’, ‘Number’ or ‘Add up 
to 8’), it is a race for the players to spot the match and tap the jam jar card as quickly as 
possible. Whoever comes first, takes all the discard pile cards (including their own) and 
puts them at the bottom of their draw pile. If someone taps the jam jar by mistake, the 
discard pile of that player is distributed evenly to the other players. The game is won by 
whoever wins all the cards – or who has the most cards when the game stops. 
Variant I: Animal or number?  
Snake and spider cards are left out. Children should be familiarised with the different 
insect cards by pointing to and naming each of the different insects. Then the rules 
Animal and Number should be introduced: We will first play the animal game. You need 
to tap the jam jar card as soon as you spot a match of two insects of the same type; it 
doesn’t matter how many are on each card. Once children understand the Animal rule, 
rule type Number should be introduced: Now we’ll play the Number game. You need to 
tap the jam jar card as soon as you spot a match of the number of insects; it doesn’t 
matter what type they are. 
To begin with, it is advisable to let children play according to just one rule. When they 
have understood the game, the two rules can be combined. So the game might start off 
with the Animal matching rule then, during the course of the game, the support person 




Spider and snake cards are added. Spider cards (red and black) should be introduced: 
Watch out for the red spider, it’s poisonous! When someone turns over a red spider, call 
out “Spider!” as fast as you can. Whoever calls out first, will get one card from each of 
the other players’ draw piles. But be careful because the black spider is not poisonous. 
If someone turns it over, you should just carry on playing. If “Spider!” is called out by 
mistake, whoever calls it must hand over a card from their draw pile to the other players. 
The snake cards (active and sleeping) should also be introduced: Snakes can be 
dangerous too. When someone turns over a snake card, you need to clap your hands to 
scare the snake away. Whoever claps first, will get one card each from the other 
players’ draw piles. But be careful: if the snake is curled up, it is asleep and is not 
dangerous. If someone turns it over, just continue playing. If someone claps their hands 
by mistake, they must hand over a card from their draw pile to the other players. 
When the children have understood and used all the rules, they (as well as the support 
person) can swap the rule cards over themselves – ie to change ‘Animal’ to ‘Number’ or 
vice versa.  
Variant III: EXACTLY 8 
The rule cards Animal and Number should be set aside. At first, snake and spider cards 
should also be omitted but then introduced once early stages are mastered. 
This game should be introduced: With rule type “Exactly 8” you need to tap the jam jar 
as soon as you count exactly eight insects of the same type. Be careful because there 
are different possible combinations. Give examples of some possible combinations 
using the cards eg, 1+1+2+2+2, 1+1+1+2+3 etc  
If anyone makes a mistake, they must hand out their discard pile cards evenly to the 
other players. As soon as the children are familiar with the game, spider and snake 
cards can be added in. If a child has turned over all their cards but still has cards in their 
discard pile, they can continue playing to look for a match of 8. If they are not the first to 
spot one, then they will be out of the game. 
Variant IV 
To make any variant even harder, the rule card (ie ‘Animal’ or ‘Number’) can be covered 





2.3 Leafcutter ants 
Material 
▪ 18 regular playing cards (circle, triangle, square in green, yellow and red) 
▪ 5 playing cards of “unusual colour” (blue, rose, purple) 
▪ 5 playing cards of “unusual shape” (oval, diamond, rectangle) 
▪ 6 cards “butterfly” (leaf pieces plus butterfly in the corner) 
▪ 1 leafcutter ant card (stop card) 
▪ 1 target card (3 columns headed with green square, red triangle, yellow circle) 
▪ 8 control cards (A1 through to D2) 
Introduction  
Leafcutter ants have very sharp jaws. They bite leaves into different shaped pieces 
before gobbling them up. Nelly and Noah find this fascinating and observe the little ants, 
making notes of the most common colours and shapes of the leaves. When Nelly and 
Noah find leaf pieces, they sort them according to their colour and shape. 
Help Nelly and Noah sort out the leaf pieces 
Game structure  
All the different cards should be shown, and all the colours and shapes named. 
Particular attention should be drawn to the unusual colours and shapes as these are 
quite hard to spot. One of the children manages the game and holds the control cards 
(A1 to D2) as well as the leafcutter ant card. The target card lies on the table facing the 
players. The players, taking turns, have to accurately sort the cards according to the 
relevant rule (colour or shape), placing them onto the target card as quickly as possible. 
The manager checks the cards have been correctly assigned (using the control cards to 
check). If a card is put down incorrectly, the manager puts down the stop card (the 
leafcutter ant) to signal the player to correct it.  
For each level of difficulty there is one colour control card and one shape control card. 
Colour always comes first. Ie A1, B1, C1 and D1 are ‘sort by colour’ and A2, B2, C2, D2 
are ‘sort by shape’. After each round, the cards should be shuffled and the change in 
sort rule explained. The manager role should also be swapped each time a level is 
completed so that all children get a turn playing and managing.  
Variant I (Control cards A1 and A2) 
Cards of “unusual colour” (blue, rose, purple), “unusual shape” (oval, diamond, 
rectangle) and “butterfly” cards are set aside. All the other cards are shuffled and given 
to the first player who must sort them either by colour or shape, depending on the 
control card rule. A1 signals ‘sort by colour’. A2 is ‘sort by shape’. 
Variant II (Control cards B1 and B2) 
“Butterfly” cards are set aside. Cards of “unusual colour” and “unusual shape” are 
introduced: Nelly and Noah sometimes find rare leaf pieces. They haven’t noted them in 
their explorer’s book, so they need to be put aside when the cards are sorted. Some 
leaf pieces have unusual colours, so when we’re sorting by colour, we put them aside. 
Appendix 
 527 
But when we’re sorting by shape, they should be sorted along with the normal cards. 
There are other leaf pieces with unusual shapes, so when sorting by shape, we need to 
put them aside. But when we’re sorting by colour, they should be sorted along with the 
normal cards. B1 signals ‘sort by colour’. B2 is ‘sort by shape’. 
Variant III (Control cards C1 and C2)  
Cards of “unusual colour” and “unusual shape” are set aside. “Butterfly” cards are 
introduced: You need to be very careful with cards showing a butterfly, because Nelly 
and Noah made up a game with them – when there’s a butterfly, the sorting rule swaps 
over. So when you are sorting cards by colour, you need to sort cards showing a 
butterfly by shape instead. And when you’re sorting by shape, you need to sort cards 
with a butterfly by colour. All the other cards, without a butterfly, are sorted by the 
original sorting rule. C1 signals ‘sort by colour’. C2 is ‘sort by shape’. 
Variant IV (Control cards D1 und D2)  
The complete set of cards is now used. Depending on the sorting rule (colour or shape), 
unusual colours or unusual shapes need to be put aside when sorting. For “butterfly” 





2.4 Medicine woman 
Material 
▪ 12 instruction cards with three rows on each (1 row=1 round; cards A1 through to F2) 
▪ 7 animal cards (monkey, sloth, tree squirrel, snake, lizard, parrot, toucan) 
▪ 1 target card (Nelly and Noah carrying the box back to the forest) 
▪ 1 card «medicine woman» 
Introduction  
Nelly and Noah have an important mission. With the help of the medicine woman, they 
need to check if the rainforest animals are healthy by examining each one. When the 
examination is done, Nelly and Noah bring the animals back to the forest in a big 
wooden crate - except for the birds, who can fly back by themselves. Sometimes, the 
medicine woman notices an injury; in that case the animal needs to stay with the 
medicine woman to be looked after. 
Help Nelly and Noah bring the right animals back to the forest 
Game structure  
Before playing, point to the seven animal cards (monkey, sloth, tree squirrel, snake, 
lizard, parrot and toucan) and jointly name them with the children. One child manages 
the game while another plays. Manager and player roles should be played by all 
children in the group. The card showing Nelly and Noah carrying the box and the 
medicine woman card are put on the table facing the players.  
The child playing first is given all seven animal cards. The child managing the game 
holds the instruction cards (A1 first, all the way to F2). Each card shows three rounds of 
the game (one row=one game). On the left of the card are the animals to be read out by 
the manager and the right side acts as a check for which animals should be brought 
back in the box. To start the game, the game manager says out loud the animals which 
are either being sent back to the forest or which are ill. On a signal (‘Go’) the child 
playing can then start carrying out orders, namely, putting the cards of those animals 
which are being sent back to the forest on top of the target card. The game manager 
watches to make sure the correct cards are placed on the target card. 
Each child should have a turn working through the cards of each level (eg level A) 
before passing on to the next child. The manager should also swap roles so that they 
get a turn playing.  
Variant I (Instruction cards A1 and A2) 
Nelly and Noah bring two animals back to the forest in each round. Point to the left hand 
side of the instruction card and explain: This tree stands for the forest so animals shown 
on this card can be taken back to the forest. Point to the right hand side of the 
instruction card and explain: Here you can see the animals that Nelly and Noah have to 
bring back to the forest. The game manager names the animals that are allowed back 
and says ‘go’. The child playing places the relevant animals on the target card. 
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Variant II (Instruction cards B1 and B2) 
Now Nelly and Noah always bring three animals back to the forest. The game manager 
names the animals that are allowed back and says ‘go’. Then, the child playing places 
all the named animals on the target card. The game manager checks each time. 
Variant III (Instruction cards C1 and C2)  
Point to the left hand side of the instruction card and explain: The tree shows which 
animals are allowed back to the forest – but the parrot and the toucan can fly back by 
themselves. They don’t have to be brought back by Nelly and Noah in the box. So the 
birds never get placed on the card with Nelly and Noah’s box. 
The person managing the game names the animals that are allowed back to the forest 
and says ‘go’. The child playing places all the named animals on the target card, except 
for the parrot and the toucan. Those cards should instead be placed directly in front of 
the player. The game manager checks the cards have all been correctly placed. 
Variant IV (Instruction cards D1 and D2)  
Point to the left hand side of the instruction card and explain: While examining all seven 
animals, the medicine woman realises that two animals are injured. The First Aid kit 
shows which ones are injured and have to stay with the medicine woman. Nelly and 
Noah can only bring back the other animals. The parrot and the toucan can still fly back, 
so they don’t need to go in the box. 
The game manager names the animals that are injured and says ‘go’. The child playing 
places all the animals (except for the parrot and the toucan) that were not named on the 
target card.  
Variant V (Instruction cards E1 and E2) 
Point to the left hand side of the instruction card and explain: Now three of the animals 
are injured. They need to be taken care of so only the remaining ones can be brought 
back to the forest. The parrot and the toucan still fly back by themselves.  
The game manager names the animals that are injured and says ‘go’. The child playing 
places all the animals that were not named on the target card except for the parrot and 
the toucan.  
Variant VI (Instruction cards F1 and F2) 
The different types of tasks (ie back to forest and medicine woman treated) are now 
mixed. The symbol for each round tells the game manager which rule to announce. 
If the tree is shown, the game manager will say: The following animals are allowed back 
to the forest. The child playing places all the animals named on the target card (except 
for the parrot and the toucan). 
If the First Aid Kit is shown, the game manager will say: The following animals are 
injured. The child places all the animal cards that have not been named on the target 
card (except for the parrot and the toucan). 
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2.5 Day or night 
Material 
▪ 1 overview card with nocturnal animals (otter, jaguar, snake, monkey), plants and fruit 
(flower, tree, orange, melon) 
▪ 24 playing cards with blue borders 
▪ 24 playing cards with yellow borders 
▪ 4 change-of-weather cards (sun/storm: signal rule change) 
Introduction  
There is plenty to explore in the rainforest, both day and night. During the day, Nelly and 
Noah get to inspect all the plants, flowers and fruits. But it’s also very exciting to spend 
time in the rainforest at night when many of the forest animals are out and about. To 
make sure they see everything, Nelly and Noah sometimes sleep during the day and go 
out at night time.  
Can you figure out if it’s day or night so Nelly and Noah know what to search for? 
Game structure  
All playing cards show one plant and one animal. For cards with blue (night) borders, 
players need to name the animal shown. For cards with yellow (day) borders, they need 
to name the plant or fruit. Before starting the game, read aloud the names of all animals 
and plants on the overview card, to ensure all children are familiar with them. Blue and 
yellow borders should also be shown and explained. The change-of-weather cards 
(sun/storm) indicate a change of rule (storm clouds make the day dark, while lightening 
brightens up the night) i.e. the border colour matching rule swaps over. Now yellow 
borders mean naming the animal, and blue borders, naming the plant. These cards are 
only in variant three. 
Variant I   
Change of weather cards are left out. One child at a time takes a card from the stack (all 
the cards) and names the animal or fruit according to the border rule. If they are right, 
they keep the card. If they are wrong, the card goes to the bottom of the pile. The game 
is won by whoever has the most cards at the end. 
Variant II  
Change of weather cards are left out. All the cards are dealt out. The first child turns 
over a card so everyone can see; that child acts as a referee and can’t answer this go 
(though they must work out the right answer in their head). The other children try to 
name the plant / animal as quickly as possible. The referee hands the card to whoever 
gives the right answer fastest. If no one gets it right, the referee keeps the card. If there 
is a tie, the card goes in the middle and will be won by whoever wins the next round. 
Whoever has the most cards at the end is the winner. 
Variant III 
Can be played with both variants one and two (ie individual players or as a race). The 
change-of-weather cards are introduced: The weather can change quickly in the 
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rainforest. When a storm comes up, yellow lightening brightens the sky. In these 
conditions, the yellow borders indicate night and you need to name the nocturnal 
animals. The day, on the other hand, gets dark, so now blue borders stand for day and 
you have to name plants. The change of rule lasts until the weather turns nice again, 




3. Individual games 
3.1 Identifying animals (dotty dot-to-dot) 
 
Material 
▪ 10 exercise sheets 
▪ 10 solution sheets 
 
Can you figure out what kind of animal is hiding behind the bushes? 
Game structure  
Matching symbols need to be connected in order to reveal an animal. It’s trickier than a 
normal dot-to-dot because there are no numbers, just symbols which have to be joined 
together. The start symbol is always marked with an arrow. Its matching symbol then 
needs to be found – eg if the start symbol is a black dot, children need to look for 
another black dot and join the two black dots with a line. Each symbol also has a 
partner next to it - this shows the next symbol to look for and connect. Eg If the black 
dot’s partner is a black triangle, children need to find another black triangle and connect 
them - and so on. When the puzzle is completed, an animal is revealed. The name of 
the animal should be written at the bottom of the sheet. 
 
Exercise sheets have three different levels of difficulty: 
√ The symbols are clearly distinguishable. There are few distracting symbols.  
√√ Different symbols either closely resemble each other, or there are many additional, 
distracting symbols.  





3.2 Looking for food 
 
Material 
▪ 15 exercise sheets 
▪ 15 solution sheets 
 
Introduction  
Nelly and Noah have been researching what rainforest animals eat. As they study the 
animals, they realise that the biggest animals always eat the biggest food, while the 
smaller animals go for the smaller food. 
Can you match each animal to the right food?  
Game structure  
Each animal needs to be connected with the food that fits its size. Children must draw a 
line to connect the animal-food pairs, starting with the smallest and ending up at the 
biggest. So the smallest animal connects with the smallest type of food, then the line 
goes on to the second smallest animal and the second smallest food type and so on, 
right up to the biggest. 
 
Exercise sheets have three different levels of difficulty: 
√ Pictures show five of the same kind of animal in different sizes, as well as five foods in 
different sizes.  
√√ To make it harder to establish the animals’ size, some are partially hidden behind 
bushes or rocks.  
√√√ Again, some animals are partially hidden. Additionally, animals or plants of different 
kinds are also included as distractions. These distractions should not be included in the 




3.3 Rainforest mazes 
 
Material 
▪ 10 exercise sheets 
▪ 10 solution sheets 
 
Introduction  
The rainforest is home to the jaguar, a very fast wild cat which can be very dangerous if 
it’s disturbed while sleeping or out hunting. It’s a beautiful animal and Nelly and Noah 
would love to see it in real life. But there are loads of different pathways in the forest so 
it’s easy to get lost. Before heading out, Nelly and Noah plan their route on a map. 
Draw in the path that Nelly and Noah should follow to reach the jaguar 
Game structure  
Children must find their way from the starting point (marked with a tree house) to the 
finish (marked with the jaguar). There is only one correct solution. If possible, the lines 
should be drawn without mistakes and detours, which will mean a bit of planning. The 
pen shouldn’t be lifted off the paper while marking the route. The level of difficulty is 





3.4 Drawing lessons 
 
Material 
▪ 5 exercise sheets of picture-pairs 
▪ 5 exercise sheets of something is missing 
▪ 10 solution sheets 
 
Introduction  
Nelly and Noah are not the only children in the rainforest. There are several villages 
which are home to aboriginal families. The aboriginal children know everything about 
the rainforest and they’re teaching Nelly and Noah how to draw everything accurately by 
letting Nelly and Noah copy their drawings. When Nelly and Noah finish a drawing, they 
give it to one of the children to check. The drawings are pretty good, but there is always 
something missing. Together with Nelly and Noah, the children complete the missing 
parts. 
Now it’s up to you to help correct and complete Nelly and Noah’s drawings 
Game structure  
This game includes two different types of exercise sheets, five for every level of 
difficulty.  
Picture pairs: Four picture pairs are shown. The one on the left is the original and 
serves as a reference. The one on the right has between 1 and 3 elements missing. The 
pictures must be compared, then completed with the missing elements to make them 
identical.  
Something is missing: The reference picture is shown above the line at the top of the 
page. The pictures below the line are each missing one element. Children need to 




3.5 Changes in the rainforest (spot the difference) 
 
Material 
▪ 10 exercise sheets 
▪ 10 solution sheets 
 
Introduction  
The rainforest is constantly changing. New trees and plants grow up and others are 
knocked down by storms; animals that are awake and active in the day disappear at 
night to sleep. Nelly and Noah want to keep track of the changes. They take photos of 
specific places and then take a second set of photos when they pass the same place 
again. Whenever they have two shots of the same place, they stick them in their book, 
right underneath each other and mark everything that has changed. Sometimes the 
changes are obvious and easy to notice. But often, they have to look very closely to 
make them out. 
Help Nelly and Noah mark the changes to the pictures 
Game structure  
For this game, two very similar pictures have to be compared. In each one, seven to ten 
elements do not match exactly and need to be marked on the bottom picture. Children 
who finish quickly can be given a further challenge to reproduce the picture by 
themselves.  
 
Exercise sheets come in three different levels of difficulty: 
√ Drawings are clear and not very detailed. The seven differences are fairly big and 
obvious.  
√√ Drawings have more detail. The seven differences are smaller and less obvious.  
√√√ Drawings are full of detail. The ten differences are small and not very obvious. 
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Traditional games training intervention 





1. Structure and support principles 
There are 5 small group games and 5 individual worksheets for children to complete by 
themselves. The planned timetable means a maximum of two small group games and 
one type of individual exercise need be learned each week. Many of the games are 
likely already to be familiar to the children 
There are some key principles important to bear in mind for successful training: 
1. Give clear introductions to the games and sufficient practice time.  
When introducing a new game, all materials should be shown and explained.  
It is important that less able children have sufficient practice time at lower levels 
before moving up. 
At first the games should be carried out at a slow and controlled pace. Games 
shouldn’t be made into a race until everyone playing has mastered the rules. 
 
2. Ensure a steadily increasing level of difficulty.  
All activities have a range of difficulty levels; children should always start at the 
simplest. 
A switch to the next level should only be made once children have mastered the 
previous one. 
If a higher difficulty level is too challenging for one or more children in a group, 
teachers should ideally go back and repeat the last, less challenging game level. 
It is important that all children are given sufficient practice to allow mastery of at 
least two levels of difficulty per game. 
 
3. Regularly change roles.  
Once children have learned the games they should, in their small groups, be able 
to take over and lead the games themselves, identifying and correcting mistakes and 
resolving disagreements.  
For individual activities, solution sheets are given for children to correct 
themselves. 
Small groups should initially be comprised of children with reasonably similar 
levels of competence. Children should not be too over- or under- challenged. 
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The small groups should be changed frequently - in every session they should be 
composed differently 
Allow children to self-manage, resolve conflict, work out their own strategies, 
rather than intervening to help (as much as possible) 
 
The individual worksheets can be used at your discretion (ie in addition to using them as 
scheduled) if children aren’t getting enough practice in group games, groups are too big, 
for children who come into class late and so on. 
 
Table 1: Training Schedule for 6-Week-Intervention 
 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
Week 1 Snakes and ladders 
 
Uno 
Snakes and ladders 
 
Uno 













Individual: word search 





















Week 5 Uno 
 
Rummikub  















Snakes and ladders 
 






The general structure of lessons, assuming a class size of 24-30 children, should be as 
follows: 
1. The class should be divided in half, the class teacher taking one half and the 
teaching assistant (or other helper) the other. One half will play game A for the 
first half of the lesson, the other half will play game B. After 15 minutes, they 
swap over. So in week 1, session 1, teacher would start with Snakes and ladders 
and TA would start with Uno. After 15 minutes they would swap games. 
2. Children should be organized into groups of 4 or 5, seated around small tables 
so that they can all see each other. This should make 3 groups per half class. 
3. It is important that the groups should be mixed up and changed around each 
lesson, so that children experience the games with different players. Children 
who are not placed within groups for any reason can complete individual 
worksheets  
4. The teacher/TA should move around the class, watching each of the groups, to 
make sure that games and particularly the right levels of the games, are being 
played.  
5. Clearly, the first session in a week when children are learning new games, will be 
more taken up with explaining. By session 2, it should be possible for children to 
immediately start playing the game as soon as the lesson begins. 
6. At the end of the lesson, it is worth taking a moment to sort all the cards and 




2. Small group games 








Snakes and ladders is one of the best known board games. Players travel up ladders 
and down snakes to help them move from 1 up to 100. 
Can you land on the final square before anyone else?  
Game structure 
Players roll the dice to see who goes first: highest scorer starts. Play then moves to the 
child on their left and so on. 
To take a turn, roll the dice and move your piece forward by that number of spaces on 
the board. If you land exactly on a square at the bottom of a ladder, you go up the 
ladder. If you land exactly on a square with the head of a snake, you go down the 
snake. If you roll a six, you get an extra turn. Move your piece forward six squares then 
roll again. You must land exactly on the last square to win. If you roll too many, you 
‘bounce back’ off the last square and move backwards. You can only win by rolling the 
exact number needed to land on the last square. 
Variant I  
Patience is a virtue. When you get towards the end of the board, instead of ‘bouncing 
back’ if you don’t get the right score, you must wait until you roll exactly the right 
number. 
Variant II  
Topsy turvy world. Start at the end of the board and count backwards. Snakes are now 
good and ladders are bad! 
Variant III  
Each player rolls twice. They must use one roll to move their own piece. With the other 






Cards numbered 1-9 in yellow, blue, red and green 
Change direction cards (arrows) 
Miss a turn cards (no entry sign) 
Pick up +2 cards (coloured with +2 in the corner) 
Pick up +4 cards (black with +4 in the corner) 
Change colour cards (black with all four colours in the middle) 
 
Introduction  
A classic card game often seen played on European beaches in the summer. 
Can you be the first to get rid of all your cards? And don’t forget to say ‘Uno’! 
Game structure  
Each player is dealt 7 Uno cards. The rest of the cards are put in a pile (the draw pile) 
except the top card which is turned face up. This second pile becomes the discard pile. 
The first player (the one to the left of the dealer) has to put one of their cards on the 
face up pile; the card must match by colour or number (or both). If they do not have a 
card that matches, they must pick up a card from the draw pile. Wild cards (the cards 
with features other than numbers) can be played at any time instead of a number card, 
provided they match colour. +4 cards and change colour cards do not need to match. 
As you approach the end of the game and you’re down to one card, you must, during 
your go call out ‘Uno’ (meaning ‘one’). If you fail to do this, you will receive 2 cards from 
the draw pile as penalty. If you manage to play your last card, you will be the winner. 
Variant I  
Play with only number cards, change of direction and miss a turn cards  
Variant II 
Add +4, +2 and change colour cards too – ie now full set of cards in play  
Variant III 
Scoring! Now you need to keep score. They player who goes out scores the sum of all 
the cards the other players have left in their hand. Add up all the number cards left in 
the hands of all your opponents and write down the total. The first to get to 100 is the 











The object of the game is to carefully study a card for a fixed amount of time, then 
answer a question about it correctly. The question asked depends on the roll of a dice. If 
the question is answered correctly, the player keeps the card. The player with the most 
cards at the end of the game is the winner. 
Can you win the most cards by being the memory champion?  
Game structure  
All children act as both player and questioner. Each child takes a card from the box. On 
a given queue (Go!) the timer is turned over and the children study their own card for 
the fixed length of time. (If the timer is too quick, feel free to turn it over again). When 
the time is up, each child passes their card to the player on their left. The first child rolls 
the dice and their questioner (ie the child holding their card) reads out the question 
matching that number. If they get it right, they keep the card and play passes to the next 
child. If they get it wrong, the card is returned to the back of the box of cards. 
Variant I 
Answer one question correctly to win the card 
Variant II   
Each child must answer two questions on each card correctly to win the card 
Variant III 
Double up. Children take two cards at a time to study and have to correctly answer one 








4 tile holders 
100 letter tiles in a bag 
A dictionary 
Paper and pencil to keep score 
Introduction  
One of the classic word games, the challenge is to build up a crossword, with each 
player adding a single word to what has gone before. The letters a player puts down 
must make at least one new word and must not create any non-words. Tricky letters 
score higher and if you plan carefully, you can get your words down on double or triple 
boxes on the board to boost your score. 
Can you score the most points by thinking up lots of great words?  
Game rules  
To see who goes first, each player takes a letter; whoever has the letter closest to A in 
the alphabet goes first. All players then pick out 7 letter tiles from the bag (no peeking!) 
and lay them out on their tile holder so that other players can’t see. The player who won 
the draw goes first and must put down a word of at least two letters so that it crosses 
the star in the centre of the board. It can go horizontally or vertically but not diagonally. 
The star counts as a double word score so the score for that player is the sum on the 
letter tiles, doubled. Once the player has put a word down, their score should be written 
down, and then they pick up the same number of new letter tiles from the bag as letters 
they put down. The play then passes to the player on the left. Their word must connect 
with at least one letter on the word already on the board. If anyone doubts whether a 
word is real, check in the dictionary. If it comes to your go and you are really stuck, you 
can swap tiles you don’t want instead of having a turn putting down a word. 
Variant I  
The regular game as above. 
Variant II 
A speed element is introduced. Each child is only given one minute for their go.  
Variant III 
All words must fit a given theme eg animals and plants, things in the home, history etc. 






Number tiles in red, orange, yellow and black and numbered 1-13 
4 tile holders  
2 ‘joker’ tiles – these can act as any tile you want 
 
Introduction  
Based on the card game ‘rummy’, the aim is to get rid of all your tiles before the other 
players do. First you have to collect sets (see below) and put them out, then you have to 
watch the developing play to see new opportunities to put down your tiles on other 
players’ sets. 
Can you get all your number tiles out before anyone else?  
Game structure  
Turn the tiles so they are all face down and shuffle them around. Choose a number tile 
to see who will go first – highest number starts. Each player then selects 14 tiles and 
puts them on their tile rack so that no-one else can see. You need to find ‘groups’ which 
are collections of at least three. There are two types of groups: ‘sets’ of the same 
number in different colours (eg red 4, orange 4, black 4) or ‘runs’ which are collections 
of at least three consecutive numbers in the same colour (eg black 5, black 6, black 7).  
When it is your turn, you can either put down tiles or if you can’t put down tiles, you pick 
up a tile. You can either put down a set, a run, or both; once you have put down at least 
group, you can also add tiles to other people’s sets (eg if someone has a run of black 5, 
6, 7, you can add black 8 or black 4 to their run). You can also break up groups that 
have been put down and re-use the tiles in them, as long as you can complete your 
moves straight away with no tiles left over. Eg You can split a run of red 10, 11, 12, 13 
to take the 10 to go with a black 10 and a blue ten you have in your hand. You can 
never leave or make a set with less than 3 tiles in it. A joker can act as any tile (eg if you 
have a blue 8 and a red 8, you could use the joker to make the third 8). When you have 
played your last tile, say ‘Rummikub’ and you have won the game. 
Variant I  
Play the version as above, except loosen the rules so that runs can be any colour rather 
than all the same colour (eg black 5, red 6, orange 7 is allowed).  
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Variant II  
Runs must now be all the same colour. 
Variant III  
Introduce scoring. Once someone is out, their score is calculated by adding together the 
numbers on the tiles everyone else still holds in their hand. Each player must add their 











10 x dot-to-dot puzzles 
10 x solutions 
 
Instructions 
Starting with the dot numbered ‘1’, the aim is to join all the dots in the right order (1, 2, 3 
etc) to form a picture.  
 
Levels 
Sheets are grouped into three different levels of difficulty: 
Beginner (3 sheets) 
Intermediate (4 sheets) 








10 x wordsearch puzzles 
10 x solutions 
 
Instructions 
Beneath each puzzle is a list of words to find in the grid above. The words can be in any 
direction, horizontal, vertical or diagonal and might go forwards or backwards. When 
you find a word, mark it off on the grid and tick it off on the list beneath to show you 
have found it. 
 
Levels 
Sheets are grouped into three different levels of difficulty: 
Beginner (3 sheets) 
Intermediate (4 sheets) 








10 x crossword puzzles 
10 x solutions 
 
Instructions 
The rules of crosswords are very simple. Just find the answer to the word given by each 
numbered clue (across or down) and fill it in the grid. One blank square is for one letter. 
Someimtes you might be able to think of more than one answer for a clue; in that case 
leave it, find some other answers and come back once some of the letters are filled in. 
Each clue has a number in brackets after it like this (3); this tells you how many letters 
are in the word. Sometimes a clue has two different parts, in which case the parts will 
be separated by a semi colon (one of these ;). If you want to really test yourself, you can 
also time how long it takes you to complete a puzzle. 
 
Levels 
Sheets are grouped into three different levels of difficulty: 
Beginner (3 sheets) 









10 x mazes 
10 x solutions 
 
Instructions 
The mazes are made up of branching passages through which you must find a route, 
starting at ‘In’ and ending at ‘Out’. Whatever the shape of the pathways, the walls are 
fixed and you cannot jump over them. If you reach a dead end, you have to either turn 
around and go back or return to the start and try again.  
 
Levels 
Sheets are grouped into four different levels of difficulty: 
Beginner (2 sheets) 
Intermediate (3 sheets) 
Advanced (3 sheets) 









10 x worksheets 
10 x solutions 
 
Instructions 
All sudoku have a square grid of large squares, with smaller squares inside. The basic 
rule of the game is every column and row must have all of the numbers from 1 to 9. 
That means that within a row or column, a number cannot repeat. In addition, every 
number from 1 to 9 must also appear in each of the large squares, only once each. So, 
if a large square already has the number “2” in it, you know it can’t include another 
number “2” anywhere in the square. 
All sudoku start with some numbers already filled in; the easier the puzzle, the more 
squares already filled in.  
The aim of the game is to fill in the whole grid with the right numbers. It’s best to use a 
pencil so you can rub out any mistakes! 
 
Levels 
Sheets are grouped into four different levels of difficulty: 
Beginner (3 sheets) 
Intermediate (4 sheets) 
Advanced (3 sheets) 
 
